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   past	   few	  years.	  A	  simple	  paragraph	  really	  cannot	  do	  justice	  to	  her	  generosity.	  To	  my	  son	  Nael,	  who	  has	  brought	  a	  whole	  different	  meaning	  to	  my	   life	  and	  has	  given	  me	  joy	  beyond	   imagination,	   I	  can	  only	  say	   thank	  you	   for	  coming	   into	  our	  world.	   I	  hope	   this	   thesis	   can	   justify	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	   moments,	   occasions	   and	  celebrations	  I	  have	  missed	  in	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  	  Finally,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  my	  father,	  Farhat	  Saeed,	  and	  my	  late	   mother,	   Tayyaba	   Khanum,	   who	   laboured	   during	   my	   childhood	   and	  provided	  me	  the	  opportunities	  to	  pursue	  knowledge	  and	  learn	  from	  some	  of	  the	  best	   minds	   and	   educational	   institutions	   in	   the	   world.	   They	   taught	   and	  encouraged	  me	  to	  read,	  write,	  think,	  reflect,	  challenge	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  to	  use	   these	   skills	   with	   courage	   to	   strive	   against	   injustices.	   In	   the	   week	   of	   the	  submission	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  has	  been	  exactly	  eight	  years,	  since	  my	  mother	  left	  us	  quite	  unexpectedly.	  In	  some	  ways	  it	  seems	  I	  have	  come	  a	  long	  way	  since	  then,	  but	   in	   many	   others	   I	   have	   not	   yet	   been	   able	   to.	   I	   dedicate	   this	   thesis	   to	   my	  parents	   in	   the	  hope	   that	   I	   can	   someday	  develop	   the	   same	  courage	  as	   them	   to	  help	  those	  who	  are	  never	  given	  the	  opportunities	  that	  we	  take	  for	  granted.	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Abstract	  The	   study	   develops	   two	   significant	   arguments	   in	   relation	   to	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   situation	   and	   analysis.	   First,	   it	   outlines	   and	   discusses	   the	   various	  prominent	   facets	   of	   the	   country’s	   legal	   architecture	   to	   formulate	   and	  present,	  what	   the	   thesis	   terms	   as,	   Pakistan’s	   Socio-­‐Legal	   Tapestry.	   It	   considers	   the	  historical	   and	   conceptual	   trajectories	   of	   some	   of	   the	   multiple	   legal	   and	  normative	  structures	  that	  prevail	  in	  the	  country,	  their	  interplay	  and	  encounters,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  limitations	  and	  problems.	  It	  puts	  this	  socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  at	  the	   heart	   of	   the	   examination,	   and	   by	  making	   the	   different	   constituents	   of	   the	  legal	   terrain	   explicit	   –	   components	   that	   include	   common	   law,	   Islamic	   law,	  colonial	   law,	   traditional	   law,	   legal	   ‘exteriority’	   of	   tribal	   regions,	   and	   issues	   of	  ‘lawlessness’–	   it	   makes	   the	   case	   for	   a	   holistic	   understanding	   of	   law	   as	   the	  necessary	  prerequisite	  to	  understanding	  the	  difficulties	  that	  that	  the	  country’s	  law,	  state	  and	  the	  wider	  society	  are	  faced	  with.	  	  	  The	   second	   significant	   argument	  of	   the	   study	  emerges	   from	   this	   expansion	  of	  the	   subject	   matter	   of	   (socio)legal	   analysis.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   a	   shift	   in	   the	  understanding	  of	  what	  constitutes	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  logically	  leads	  towards	  a	  (re)consideration	  of	  the	  lenses	  and	  narratives	  generally	  employed	  to	  examine	   it.	   The	   identification,	   examination	   and	   problematisation	   of	   these	  narratives	  –	  which	  include	  the	  dominant	  state-­‐oriented	  legal	  narrative	  and	  the	  legal	  positivistic	  approach,	  the	  Islamic	  law	  narrative,	   legal	  pluralistic	  approach	  and	   the	   ascendant	   discourse	   on	   human	   rights	   –	   formulate	   the	   second	  substantive	  part	  of	  the	  study.	  It	   is	  argued	  that	  these	  Narratives	  of	   law	  differ	  in	  terms	   of	   how	   they	   perceive	   the	   context,	   identify	   their	   priorities,	   frame	   the	  problems	  and	  then	  propose	  solutions	  for	  their	  rectification.	  However,	  caught	  in	  a	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  their	  definitional	  consistencies,	  these	  narratives	  are	  only	  able	   to	   adopt	   a	   partial	   view	   of	   the	   picture	   and,	   owing	   to	   that,	   they	   generate	  contradictions	  that	  ultimately	  weaken	  their	  approach	  and	  proposed	  solutions.	  	  	  The	   purpose	   behind	   these	   two	   arguments	   is	   both	   to	   make	   a	   case	   for	   new	  avenues	  of	  context-­‐specific	  legal	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  create	  possibilities	  for	  it	  in	   the	  case	  of	  Pakistan.	  The	  problems	   that	   the	  country	   faces	  and	   the	  suffering	  that	   its	  people	  experience	  create	  an	  urgent	  need	   to	  recognise	   the	  deficiencies,	  both	   in	   our	   conceptualisation	   of	   law	   in	   this	   particular	   context,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  narratives,	  perspectives,	  theories	  and	  ideologies	  that	  we	  employ	  to	  approach	  it.	  This	   necessitates	   the	   search	   for	   alternative	   narratives	   for	   comprehending	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   situation,	   to	   offer	  more	   nuanced	   approaches	   that	  might	  enable	  us	  to	  frame	  issues	  differently.	  This,	  I	  argue,	  is	  the	  most	  pressing	  task	  for	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  analyses	  of	   legal,	  social	  and	  political	  spheres	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	   the	   necessary	   first	   step	   if	   our	   goal	   is	   the	   (re)formation	   of	   the	   legal	   and	  normative	  orders	   to	  make	   them	  more	   accountable	   to	   the	  people.	  By	   adopting	  the	   framework	   of	   colonialism	   and	   Coloniality	   to	   offer	   a	   different	   lens	   to	  understand	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   peculiarities,	   the	   study	   presents	   one	   such	  attempt	   in	   this	   vein,	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   initiating	   discussion	   and	   inviting	  critique.	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  of	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  of	  local	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  Balochistan	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  of	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  by	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  in	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Madrassah	   	   Religious	  seminary	  
Mujahideen	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  term	  generally	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  in	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  to	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   Judge,	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I. Introduction	  
In	  such	   Jirgas	   the	  girl	   is	  condemned	  unheard	  which	   is	  violative	  (sic.)	  of	  human	  and	  religious	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land….	  The	   decision	   of	   the	   Honourable	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Pakistan	   is	   to	   be	  protected,	  preserved	  and	  implemented	  by	  all	  concerned	  because	  a	  duty	  is	  cast	  upon	  the	  police	  to	  act	  swiftly	  and	  to	  preserve	  the	  basic	   fabric	  of	  the	   society,	   Injunction	   of	   Islam,	   law	   of	   the	   land	   and	   decision	   of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan.	  Thus,	   the	  decision	  of	   Jirga	  declaring	  a	  valid	  piece	  of	  law	  as	  unlawful	  amounts	  to	  legislation	  and	  usurping	  the	  powers	  of	  Parliament....	  The	   functions,	  which	   are	   exclusively	   to	   be	   performed	   by	   the	   Courts	   of	  law,	  are	  being	  performed	  by	   the	   Jirgas	   thereby	  usurping	   the	  powers	  of	  the	   Courts.	   As	   such	   the	   Jirgas	   are	   parallel	   Judicial	   System	   which	   by	  themselves	   are	   unlawful	   and	   illegal,	   therefore	   any	   law	   do	   not	   protect	  them	  (sic.).	  Furthermore	  no	  appeal	  is	  filed	  against	  the	  decisions	  of	  Jirgas	  are	  final	  which	  is	  also	  against	  the	  principle	  of	  natural	  justice.	  The	   Constitution	   is	   based	   on	   trichotomy	   of	   powers	   i.e.	   Legislature,	  Judiciary	   and	   Executive.	   Their	   powers	   and	   duties	   are	   enshrined	   in	   the	  Constitution.	   All	   these	   authorities	   of	   the	   State	   are	   functioning	   in	  accordance	   with	   provisions	   of	   the	   Constitution.	   In	   the	   Jirgas	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   the	   powers	   of	   Legislature,	   judiciary	   and	   Executive	  Authorities	  are	  being	  exercised.	  All	   the	   learned	  counsel	   are	  unanimous	  that	  Jirgas	  are	  against	  the	  trichotomy	  powers	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  It	  thus,	  appears	  that	  the	  Jirgas	  are	  undermining	  or	  attempting	  to	  undermine	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Constitution.1	  	  The	   2004	   judicial	   order	   of	   the	   provincial	   High	   Court	   of	   Sindh,	   Pakistan,	   from	  which	  the	  above	  excerpts	  are	  taken,	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  ‘landmark	  judgement’2	  on	   the	   issue	   of	   informal	   justice	   systems	   in	   the	   country.	   Passed	   within	   the	  backdrop	  of	  reported	  harassment	  of	  the	  petitioner	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  at	   the	   hand	   of	   the	   local	   tribunal	   (or	   Jirga),	   this	   judgement	   is	   championed	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Mst.	  Shazia	  v.	  Station	  House	  Officer	  and	  others	  (2004	  PCrLJ	  1523).	  	  2	  Ardeshir	  Cowasjee,	  'A	  first	  step'	  Dawn	  (Karachi,	  Pakistan	  02	  May	  2004)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1072875/a-­‐first-­‐step>	  last	  accessed	  7	  September	  2013.	  
2	  	  
human	  rights	  advocates	  for	  its	  declaration	  of	  illegality	  against	  all	  forms	  of	  local	  justice	  mechanisms	  not	   sanctioned	  by	   the	   law	  of	   the	   state.3	  But	   it	  would	  be	  a	  great	  oversight	  if	  our	  reading	  of	  the	  text	  remains	  limited	  to	  this.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  conflict	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  judgement	  is	  the	  historical	  struggle	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  systems	  of	  law	  and	  justice	  in	  Pakistan,	  both	  claiming	  to	  be	   the	   true	   guardians	   and	   representatives	   of	   the	   people.	   The	   expanding	  discourse	   on	   human	   rights	   as	  well	   as	   the	   realisation	   that	   the	   informal	   justice	  systems	   are	   often	   found	   wanting	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   safeguard	   the	   rights	   of	  women,	   minorities	   and	   the	   members	   of	   marginalised	   communities,4	   form	  another	   shade	   of	   this	   picture.	   The	   judgement	   in	   question	   also	   depicts	   the	  capacity	   of	   the	   dominant	   legal	   system	   to	   pass	   verdicts	   of	   legality	   or	   illegality	  against	   alternative	   normative	   forums	   that	   do	   not	   originate	   from	   it	   or	   are	   not	  subsumed	   by	   it.	   Moreover,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   Constitutional	   Principles	   and	  Islamic	  Injunctions,	  which	  are	  claimed	  to	  represent	  the	  real	  ethos	  of	  the	  society,	  add	   to	   the	   complexity	   of	   this	   picture.	   This	   judgement,	   then,	   is	   not	   merely	   a	  denunciation	   of	   the	   practises	   and	   legality	   of	   informal	   legal	   and	   normative	  structures	  that	  pervade	  the	  society.	  Rather,	   it	  provides	  a	  portrait	  of	  Pakistan’s	  overall	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture,	   encapsulating	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   its	  constituents,	  along	  with	   their	  contestations,	  mutual	  encounters,	   interplay,	  and	  competing	  narratives.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Maliha	  Zia	  and	  Riffat	  Butt,	  'Pakistan	  NGO	  Alternative	  Report	  on	  CEDAW	  2012'	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2012)	  43.	  4	  This	  conflict	  between	  the	  traditional	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  human	  rights	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  5.	  
3	  	  
Indeed,	   not	   just	   the	   domain,	   but	   even	   the	   label	   of	   Law	   is	   a	   ‘terrain	   of	  contestation’5	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Pakistan,	   and	   the	   complexity	   of	   this	   terrain	   is	  evident	   even	  within	   the	   Constitutional	   framework	   of	   the	   country.	   The	   formal	  legal	   and	   constitutional	   system	  of	   the	   country	  owes	  much	   to	   its	   colonial	  past,	  and	  this	  colonial	   legacy	  is	  still	  reflected	  in	  the	  civil	  and	  penal	  codes	  in	  force	  in	  the	   country.6	   The	   fact	   that	   Pakistan	   is	   officially	   proclaimed	   to	   be	   an	   Islamic	  Republic	   means	   that	   the	   injunctions	   and	   principles	   of	   Islamic	   Law	   form	   an	  undercurrent	   that	   flows	   through	   the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   instruments	   –	   a	  fact	  that	  constitutes	  a	  source	  of	  friction	  between	  notions	  of	  secular	  common	  law	  and	  religious	  law.	  	  	  The	  informal	  normative	  and	  justice	  systems	  also	  form	  a	  significant	  facet	  of	  the	  legal	  architecture,	  as	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  populace	  continues	  to	  rely	  on	  them	  and	  as,	  despite	  the	  declarations	  of	  illegality	  and	  struggle	  with	  the	  dominant	  law,	  they	  are	  sanctioned	  by	   the	  State7	   in	  some	  parts	  of	   the	  country.8	  Then	   there	   is	  the	  matter	  of	  a	  legal	  exteriority	  created	  through	  the	  Constitution	  –	  geographical	  regions	  to	  which	  the	  executive	  authority	  of	  the	  State	  extends,	  but	  which	  have	  no	  recourse	   to	  mainstream	   judicial	   institutions	   and	   guarantees.9	   Added	   to	   all	   of	  this	  is	  the	  rising	  internal	  and	  external	  violence	  in	  its	  various	  guises,	  commonly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal,	  'Limits	  of	  Law	  in	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  globalization:	  The	  Indian	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Narmada	  Valley	  Struggle'	  in	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  and	  Cesar	  Rodriguez-­‐Garavito	  (eds),	  Law	  and	  Globalization	  from	  Below	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  2005)	  183.	  6	  A	  description	  of	  the	  continuation	  of	  colonial	  law	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  and	  revisited	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  7	  In	  this	  document,	  State	  (capitalised)	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  while	  state	  (non-­‐capitalised)	  is	  employed	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  entity	  in	  general.	  8	  Official	  Jirgas	  form	  part	  of	  the	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations	  1901,	  which	  govern	  Pakistan’s	  tribal	  regions.	  This	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  the	  section	  on	  Tribal	  Areas	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  9	  The	  issue	  of	  these	  Tribal	  Areas	  will	  also	  be	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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labelled	   as	   increasing	   lawlessness	   (or	   absence	   of	   law),	   which	   not	   only	   defies	  legal	   and	   normative	   orderings	   but	   also	   emerges	   from	   their	   mutual	   conflict.	  Furthermore,	   each	   of	   these	   segments	   of	   the	   legal	   terrain,	   far	   from	   being	  monolithic,	  has	  multiplicities	  inherent	  within	  it.	  The	  notion	  of	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  intricate	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan,	  then,	  is	  far	  more	  elusive	  than	  is	  generally	  and	  readily	  assumed	  in	  legal	  and	  political	  discourses.	  	  It	   is	   contended	   in	   this	   study	   that	   the	   principal	   reason	   why	   this	   complexity	  remains	   concealed	   in	   mainstream	   accounts	   is	   that	   the	   analyses	   and	  examinations	   of	   the	   legal	   architecture	   of	   Pakistan	   remain	   trapped	   within	  specific	  perspectives	  and	  approaches	  to	   law,	  each	  of	  which	  reads	  the	  situation	  through	   its	   own	   definitions	   and	   categories.	   These	  Narratives	   of	   Law	   differ	   in	  terms	   of	   how	   they	   perceive	   the	   context,	   identify	   their	   priorities,	   frame	   the	  problems	  and	  then	  propose	  solutions	  for	  their	  rectification.	  However,	  caught	  in	  a	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  definitional	  consistencies,	  these	  narratives	  are	  only	  able	  to	  adopt	  and	  offer	  a	  partial	  view	  of	  the	  picture	  and	  owing	  to	  that,	  they	  generate	   contradictions	   that	   ultimately	   weaken	   their	   foundational	   approach	  and	  proposed	  solutions.	  The	  identification,	  examination	  and	  problematisation10	  of	   these	   narratives	   of	   law,	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   broadened	   horizon	   of	   socio-­‐legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  ‘Problematisation’	  presents	  the	  more	  discussed	  version	  of	  this	  idea.	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  ‘phenomena	  that	  are	  taken	  for	  granted,	  largely,	  because	  they	  are	  too	  obvious’	  and,	  in	  this	  manner,	  to	  ‘objectify	  what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  objective.’	  Roger	  Deacon,	  'Theory	  as	  Practice:	  Foucault's	  Concept	  of	  Problematization'	  (2000)	  118	  Telos	  127,	  127.	  However,	  as	  I	  am	  using	  this	  term	  in	  the	  discussion	  divested	  from	  the	  larger	  Foucauldian	  approaches	  of	  Genealogy	  or	  Archaeology,	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  thesis	  is	  closer	  to	  Paulo	  Freire’s	  formulation	  of	  Problematisation	  as	  a	  ‘pedagogical	  practice	  that	  disrupts	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  “truths”.’	  Carol	  Bacchi,	  'Why	  Study	  Problematizations?	  Making	  Politics	  Visible'	  (2012)	  2	  (1)	  Open	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  1,	  1.	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architecture	   of	   Pakistan,	   provide	   the	   context	   and	   the	   crux	   of	   the	   current	  investigation.	  	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	   in	  the	  course	  of	   this	  discussion	  that	  we	  can	   identify	   four	  key	  narratives	  of	  law	  employed	  within	  Pakistan	  to	  understand	  its	  socio-­‐legal	  setup.	  The	  present	  study	  will	  also	  highlight	  that	  the	  perspectives	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  narratives	   of	   State	   Law,	   Islamic	   Law,	   Legal	   Pluralism	   and	   Human	   Rights,	  exclude	  from	  their	  accounts	  those	  significant	  facets	  of	  the	  context	  that	  challenge	  their	   fundamental	   hypotheses.11	   The	   contradictions	   present	   within	   these	  narratives	  can	  be	  uncovered	  through	  two	  steps:	  First,	  through	  the	  consideration	  of	   the	   wider	   social	   context	   in	   which	   law	   operates;	   and	   second,	   through	   the	  identification	   and	   examination	   of	   the	   implicit	   and	   explicit	   (legal-­‐theoretical)	  assumptions	   of	   these	   narratives.	   A	   focus	   on	   the	   wider	   context	   enables	   the	  subsequent	  analysis	  to	  shed	  some	  of	  the	  constraints	  that	  limit	  any	  examination	  conducted	   from	   within	   a	   particular	   perspective	   on	   law.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  bridging	   the	  gap	  between	   these	  approaches	  and	   their	   theoretical	   foundations,	  which	  often	  remain	  hidden,	  permits	  not	  only	  an	  abstraction,	  but	  also	  prevents	  the	  discussion	   from	  being	  overwhelmed	  by	   the	   complexity	  of	   the	   situation.	   In	  this	   regard,	   the	   thesis	  makes	   the	  case	   for	   the	  need	   for	  a	  different	  narrative	  of	  law	  in	  this	  context,	  and	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  context-­‐specific	  approaches	  to	  law.	  By	  adopting	  the	  framework	  of	  Coloniality	  to	  offer	  a	  different	  lens	  to	  understand	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  A	  discussion	  on	  these	  narratives	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  Chapters	  3-­‐6.	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Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	  peculiarities,12	   it	  presents	  one	  attempt	   in	   this	  vein,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  initiating	  discussion	  and	  inviting	  critique.	  	  	  
A. The	  need	  to	  examine	  Pakistan’s	  Legal	  Tapestry	  
The	  basic	  assertions	  made	  in	  this	  study	  and	  the	  questions	  raised	  in	  this	  enquiry	  are	   ‘strong’	   statements.13	   They	   are	   strong	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	  controversial,	   although	   they	   may	   be	   considered	   as	   such	   by	   those	   who	   are	  engaged	   in	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   legal	   systems	   and	   the	   practise	   of	   law	   in	  Pakistan.	   The	   controversial	   aspect	   of	   these	   assertions	   springs	   from	   the	   same	  fount	  from	  which	  their	  significance	  emanates.	   I	  call	   them	  strong	  statements	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  Santos’s	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  strong	  questions	  are	  ‘paradigmatic	   in	   nature’	   that	   question	   ‘the	   societal	   and	   epistemological	  paradigm	  that	  has	  shaped	  the	  current	  horizon	  of	  possibilities	  within	  which	  we	  make	  our	  options’.14	  The	  questions	  and	  arguments	  discussed	  in	  the	  present	  text,	  therefore,	  are	  strong	  statements	  because	  they	  attempt	  not	  only	  a	  critique	  of	  one	  particular	   paradigm,	   but	   of	   multiple	   paradigms,	   and	   bring	   into	   question	   our	  resultant	  horizon	  of	  analytical	  and	  material	  possibilities	  in	  a	  holistic	  form,	  while	  offering	   a	   reading	   of	   the	   context	   which	   is	   not	   generally	   studied	   through	   this	  angle.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  term	  Coloniality	  is	  coined	  by	  Latin	  American	  sociologist,	  Anibal	  Quijano,	  and	  has	  been	  elaborated	  by	  various	  scholars,	  which	  include	  Walter	  Mignolo,	  Arturo	  Escobar,	  Ramón	  Grosfoguel	  and	  Jayan	  Nayar.	  A	  discussion	  on	  colonialism	  and	  Coloniality	  is	  conducted	  in	  Chapter	  7	  of	  this	  study.	  For	  foundational	  texts	  about	  this	  idea,	  see	  Anibal	  Quijano,	  'Coloniality	  of	  Power,	  Eurocentrism,	  and	  Latin	  America'	  (2000)	  1	  (3)	  Nepentla:	  Views	  from	  South	  533;	  Anibal	  Quijano,	  'Coloniality	  and	  Modernity/Rationality'	  (2007)	  21	  (2-­‐3)	  Cultural	  Studies	  168.	  13	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos,	  'If	  God	  were	  a	  Human	  Rights	  Activist:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Political	  Theologies'	  Law,	  Social	  Justice	  &	  Global	  Development	  Journal	  (LGD)	  <http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2009_1/santos>	  last	  accessed	  5	  September	  2013,	  3.	  14	  Ibid.	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  The	  primary	  claim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  that	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  employed	  to	  understand	   law	   in	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	   Pakistan,	   both	   that	   fall	   into	   the	  mainstream	   camp	   and	   those	   that	   assume	   positions	   of	   alterity	   or	   critique,	   are	  largely	   unable	   to	   capture	   the	   legal	   realities	   prevalent	   in	   the	   country.	   An	  unquestioning	  adherence	   to	   these	  narratives	  and	  an	   insufficient	  apprehension	  of	   the	   legal,	   contextual,	   societal	   and	   theoretical	   frames	   they	   are	   built	   upon,	  generates	  contradictions	  that	  undermine	  the	  solutions	  proposed	  through	  these	  narratives,	  while	   also	   challenging	   the	  viability	  of	   the	  narratives	  on	   the	  whole.	  Pakistan’s	   legal	   architecture	   is	   a	   medley	   of	   post-­‐colonial	   and	   colonial	  approaches	  to	  law,	  of	  religious	  and	  secular	  perspectives,	  of	  an	  array	  of	  popular	  justice	   mechanisms	   locked	   in	   a	   struggle	   with	   both	   state	   law	   as	   well	   as	   the	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  In	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  dominant	  understanding	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan	   that	   emerges	   from	   the	   idea	  of	  Positive	  Law	  –	   i.e.,	   law	  posited	  by	   the	  state	  that	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  author	  law	  –	  albeit	  with	  its	  multiple	   theoretical	   facets,	   cannot	   account	   for	   the	   multiplicities	   and	  problematics	  of	  law	  as	  present	  and	  practised	  in	  Pakistan.	  While	  this	  approach	  is	  prevalent	  both	  within	  the	  legal	  fraternity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  society,	  the	  thesis	  argues	   that	   our	   conception	   of	   this	   entire	   discourse	   requires	   reconsideration.	  This	   is	   in	   light	   of	   the	   assertion	   that	   state-­‐law,	   though	   it	   occupies	   a	   dominant	  position	   within	   the	   legal	   landscape,	   does	   not	   encompass	   the	   entire	   legal	  tapestry	   of	   Pakistan.	  Moreover,	   some	   aspects	   of	   this	   set-­‐up,	   such	   as	   the	   laws	  governing	   the	   tribal	   regions	   of	   the	   country,	   do	   carry	   state	   authority	   but	   fall	  outside	   the	   purview	   of	   the	   courts	   and	   the	   legal	   system	   and	   straddle	  multiple	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narrative	   and	   theoretical	   paradigms	   simultaneously.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   the	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  coexists	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  Rule	  of	  Law;	  the	  presence	  of	  state	  law	   coincides	   with	   the	   absence	   of	   legal	   rights	   and	   constitutional	   guarantees.	  This	  will	  be	  elaborated	  and	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  even	  the	  narratives	  that	  attempt	  to	  offer	  alternatives	  to	  this	  legal	  positivistic	  position,	   as	  well	   as	   their	  underlying	   theoretical	  propositions,	  are	   found	   wanting.	   Though	   these	   approaches	   provide	   us	   with	   insightful	  explanations	  of	  some	  facets	   in	  isolation,	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  adequate	  responses	  to	  their	  internal	  incongruities.	  For	  instance,	  while	  the	  perspective	  of	  Islamic	  law	  (as	  practised	  and	  advocated	  in	  the	  country)	  critiques	  the	  alien	  and	  foreign	   roots	   of	   the	   common	   law	   tradition,	   it	   fails	   to	   recognise	   its	   own	  foreignness	  or	   its	   roots	   in	  precisely	   the	   same	   colonial	   history	   from	  which	   the	  mainstream	   legal	   system	   sprang.15	   Similarly,	   while	   the	   legal-­‐pluralistic	  approach	   highlights	   the	   oppressive	   nature	   of	   state	   law	   and	   the	   emancipatory	  potential	   of	   traditional	   and	   folk	   laws,	   it	   does	   not	   challenge	   the	   equally	  problematic	  and	  oppressive	  nature	  of	  customary	  tribunals	   to	   the	  same	  extent.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	   the	  human	  rights	  approach	   to	   law	  raises	  concerns	  about	   the	  patriarchal	   nature	   of	   informal	   tribunals,	   but	   then	   further	   limits	   the	   options	  available	  to	  marginalised	  sections,	  and	  pins	  its	  hopes	  on	  the	  state	  which	  is	  itself	  riddled	   with	   problems	   of	   patriarchy	   and	   clientelism.	   It	   is	   because	   of	   such	  quandaries	   that	   I	  make	   the	   case	   for	   a	  more	  nuanced	  narrative	   and	   a	   context-­‐specific	  approach	  to	  law	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Revisited	  in	  Chapter	  8	  on	  page	  251.	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  Before	  venturing	   into	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  on	   these	  narratives,	  however,	   it	   is	  important	  to	  highlight	  the	  rationale	  and	  the	  need	  behind	  a	  study	  of	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	   of	   Pakistan.	   The	   reasons	   why	   Pakistan	   is	   a	   suitable	   subject	   for	   the	  purpose	   of	   this	   examination	   are	   manifold.	   First,	   the	   social	   and	   geo-­‐political	  situation	  of	  the	  country	  renders	  that	  its	  domestic	  issues	  not	  only	  affect	  the	  180	  million	   inhabitants	   of	   this	   sixth	  most	  populous	   country	  of	   the	  world,	   but	   that	  they	   have	   repercussions	   for	   the	   wider	   world	   as	   well.	   Without	   going	   into	   a	  discussion	  on	  the	  geo-­‐strategic	  position	  of	  Pakistan,	  on	  which	  numerous	  books	  and	   articles	   have	   been	   written	   in	   this	   era	   of	   increased	   preoccupation	   with	  securitisation,16	  two	  factors	  can	  be	  mentioned	  that	  highlight	  the	  country’s	  wider	  significance.	  One	  is	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  one	  of	  the	  eight	  states	  in	  the	  world	  that	  are	  armed	   with	   nuclear	   weapons,	   and	   any	   instability	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   is	  considered	   a	   cause	   for	   International	   concern.17	   Two,	   the	   rise	   of	   Islamic	  militancy	   and	   consequent	   violence	   in	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   and	   its	   alleged	  linkages	   to	   the	   territory	   of	   Pakistan,	   highlight	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	   country’s	  internal	  matters	  to	  events	  around	  the	  world.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For	  example,	  see	  Ayesha	  Siddiqa	  Agha,	  Military	  Inc.:	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Karachi,	  Pakistan	  2007);	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones,	  Pakistan:	  Eye	  of	  the	  Storm	  (4th	  edn	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  New	  Haven	  2011).	  17	  There	  are	  five	  states	  which	  are	  termed	  as	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  States	  (NWS)	  under	  the	  Nuclear	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty.	  These	  are,	  United	  States,	  Russia	  (formerly	  Soviet	  Union),	  United	  Kingdom,	  France	  and	  China.	  There	  are	  three	  states,	  which	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  but	  which	  have	  conducted	  nuclear	  weapons	  tests	  –	  India,	  Pakistan	  and	  North	  Korea.	  Further	  information	  available	  from	  the	  Agency	  for	  the	  Prohibition	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  (OPANAL),	  'Nuclear	  Weapon	  States'	  <http://www.opanal.org/Desarme/Potencias/npowers.htm>	  last	  accessed	  11	  February	  2013.	  Israel	  is	  also	  widely	  considered	  to	  have	  nuclear	  weapons	  capability,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  official	  policy	  of	  Israel	  to	  neither	  confirm	  nor	  deny	  this.	  See,	  Luke	  Harding,	  'Call	  for	  Olmert	  to	  resign	  after	  nuclear	  gaffe'	  The	  Guardian	  (London	  12	  December)	  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/12/germany.israel>	  last	  accessed	  11	  February	  2013.	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  The	   second	   reason	   for	   selecting	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   of	   Pakistan	   as	   a	  subject	  matter	  is	  related	  to	  the	  place	  of	  legal	  discourse	  in	  the	  country.	  Law	  and	  legal	   analysis	  have	  emerged	  as	   leading	  paradigms	   in	   the	   country	  especially	   in	  the	   past	   7	   years,	   with	   the	   so-­‐termed	   Lawyers’	   Movement	   of	   2007.18	   Legal	  institutions,	   judiciary	   and	   lawyers	   have	   gained	   prominence	   as	   ‘guardian[s]	   of	  law’19	  and	   justice,	  and	  those	  who	  were	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	   the	  movement	  have	  attained	   a	   celebrity	   status.	   Yet	   despite	   the	   increased	   importance	   of	   law	   and	  lawyers,	   the	  analysis	  of	   law	  and	   legal	  systems	  remains	  deficient	   in	  accounting	  for	   diverse	   aspects	   of	   the	   legal	   situation	   of	   the	   country.	   The	   primary	   reason	  behind	  this	  is	  that	  the	  analysis	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  technical	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  constitution	   and	   legal	   statutes,	   which	   fails	   to	   explain	   or	   include	   the	   legal	  pluralities	  in	  Pakistan.	  20	  Legal	  analysts	  and	  experts,	  having	  been	  trained	  within	  common	  law	  and	  positivist	  traditions,	  tend	  to	  ignore	  other	  realities	  pertaining	  to	  law’s	  operation	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  the	  complexities	  and	  materialities	  of	  life	  within	  the	  neat	  demarcations	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  law.	  Because	  of	  this,	  discussions	  on	  legal	   structures	   that	   fall	   outside	   state-­‐oriented	   conceptions	  of	   law	   fall	   prey	   to	  debates	  on	  domains	  of	  power,	  realpolitik,	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  divides	  within	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  A	  civil	  society	  movement	  for	  the	  restoration	  and	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  spearheaded	  by	  lawyers,	  which	  continued	  until	  2009.	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  timeline	  and	  movement	  strategy,	  see	  Zahid	  Shahab	  Ahmed	  and	  Maria	  J.	  Stephan,	  'Fighting	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  Civil	  Resistance	  and	  the	  Lawyers'	  Movement	  in	  Pakistan'	  (2010)	  17	  (3)	  Democratization	  492.	  19	  Kersi	  B.	  Shroff	  and	  Krishan	  S.	  Nehra,	  'Suspension	  and	  Reinstatement	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Pakistan:	  From	  Judicial	  Crisis	  to	  Restoring	  Judicial	  Independence?'	  The	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  
August	  2007	  <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/pakistan-­‐justice.php>	  last	  accessed	  15	  July	  2013.	  20	  For	  instance,	  see	  Paula	  Newberg,	  Judging	  the	  State	  :	  Courts	  and	  Constitutional	  Politics	  in	  
Pakistan	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  1995);	  Shamil	  Shams,	  'Transparency	  International:	  Rule	  of	  law	  can	  end	  corruption	  in	  Pakistan'	  Deutsche	  Welle,	  6	  December	  2012	  <http://www.dw.de/rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐can-­‐end-­‐corruption-­‐in-­‐pakistan/a-­‐16431781>	  last	  accessed	  17	  July	  2013;	  NNI,	  'Rule	  of	  law	  vital	  to	  civilize	  society:	  CJP'	  The	  Nation,	  9	  February	  2013	  (Pakistan	  15	  July	  2013)	  <http://www.nation.com.pk/lahore/09-­‐Feb-­‐2013/rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐vital-­‐to-­‐civilize-­‐society-­‐cjp>	  last	  accessed	  07	  August	  2013.	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country.	  For	  instance,	  the	  informal	  legal	  tribunals	  are	  condemned	  as	  ‘Kangaroo	  Courts’	  without	   ‘due	  process’	  and	  Rule	  of	  Law;21	  the	  demands	  by	  some	  groups	  for	   imposition	  of	   Islamic	  Law	   in	   the	  country	  are	  understood,	  not	  as	  a	  clash	  of	  different	   normative	   orderings,	   but	   as	   issues	   of	   governance	   and	   political	  militancy;22	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  functioning	  of	  law	  and	  courts	  are	  commonly	  discussed	   in	   terms	  of	   inefficiencies,23	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  divides	  hampering	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law.24	  	  Third,	   in	   the	   same	  vein,	  while	   symptomatic	   of	   post-­‐colonial	   societies	   in	  many	  aspects,	   Pakistan’s	   constitutional	   and	   legal	   arrangements	   nevertheless	   offer	   a	  distinct	  case	  where	  major	  limitations	  of	  mainstream	  legal	  analyses	  are	  evident.	  The	  common	  factors	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  other	  post-­‐colonial	  societies	  such	  as	  India	   and	   Bangladesh,	   which	   also	   share	   a	   common	   pre-­‐independence	   history	  with	  Pakistan,	  are	  the	  struggle	  between	  state	  law	  and	  notions	  of	  indigenous	  and	  traditional	   legalities.25	   	   State	   law	   in	   these	   instances	   is	   an	   amalgamation	   of	  western	   concepts	   of	   social	   contract,	   constitutionalism	   and	   common	   law,	  predominantly	  originating	  in	  the	  colonial	  past	  of	  these	  countries.	  This	  state	  law	  sits	  in	  an	  uneasy	  relationship	  with	  legal	  and	  normative	  orders	  indigenous	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Editorial,	  'The	  farce	  of	  tribal	  jirgas'	  The	  Express	  Tribune,	  28	  May	  2012	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/385442/the-­‐farce-­‐of-­‐tribal-­‐jirgas/>	  last	  accessed	  16	  July	  2013.	  22	  For	  instance,	  see	  Christine	  C.	  Fair,	  Neil	  Malhotra	  and	  Jacob	  N.	  Shapiro,	  'Islam,	  Militancy,	  and	  Politics	  in	  Pakistan:	  Insights	  From	  a	  National	  Sample'	  (2010)	  22	  (4)	  Terrorism	  and	  Political	  
Violence	  495.	  23	  Dawn,	  'Court	  cases	  backlog,	  suffers	  common	  Pakistanis'	  Dawn	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  21	  July	  2010)	  <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/144137>	  last	  accessed	  15	  November	  2013.	  24	  See,	  for	  instance,	  USAID	  and	  Management	  Systems	  International,	  'Pakistan	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Assessment	  -­‐	  Final	  Report'	  (Pakistan	  2008).	  25	  For	  an	  account	  of	  legal	  pluralistic	  issues	  faced	  by	  India	  in	  the	  post-­‐partition	  period,	  see	  Shalini	  Randeria,	  'Entangled	  Histories:	  Civil	  Society,	  Caste	  Solidarities	  and	  Legal	  Pluralism	  in	  Post-­‐colonial	  India'	  in	  John	  Keane	  (ed)	  Civil	  Society:	  Berlin	  Perspectives	  (Berghahn	  Books,	  New	  York	  2006);	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  (2005)	  (n	  5).	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region.	  But	   the	  multiplicity	   integral	   to	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   structure	  of	   the	   country	  includes	   other	   factors	   that	   distinguish	   Pakistan	   from	   other	   post-­‐colonial	  countries.	   In	   addition	   to	   colonial,	  western	  and	   traditional	   influences,	   the	   legal	  system	  of	  Pakistan	  is	  also	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  struggle	  between	  notions	  of	  Islamic	  law	  and	  a	  secular	  understanding	  of	  law.	  The	  country’s	  constitution	  also	  outlines	  a	   legal	   exteriority	   within	   its	   territory	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   laws	   applicable	   to	   the	  tribal	  areas.	  And	  this	  arrangement,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  presence	   of	   areas	   of	   lawlessness,	   where	   the	   writ	   of	   the	   state	   is	   increasingly	  challenged.	  The	  endeavour	  of	  this	  work	  will	  be	  to	  flesh	  out	  these	  pluralities	  and	  complexities	   existent	   in	   the	   country’s	   socio-­‐legal	   arrangement	   and	   then	  interrogate	   some	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   narratives	   and	   legal	   theoretical	  frameworks	  from	  this	  perspective.	  	  Fourth,	   and	   finally,	   I	   have	   chosen	   Pakistan	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   this	   examination	  because	   of	  methodological	   reasons	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   country’s	   legal	  issues	  to	  me	  personally.	  Being	  engaged	  with	  the	  judicial	  and	  legal	  systems	  of	  the	  country	   in	   the	   past	   highlighted	   for	   me	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   the	   legal	   and	  political	   institutions,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   impact	   on	   the	   population	   that	   relies	   on	  them	   for	   dispute	   resolution	   and	   dispensation	   of	   justice.	   My	   interrogation	   of	  both	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  legal	  frameworks	  emerges	  from	  a	  concern	  to	  try	  and	  comprehend	  the	  issues	  of	  law	  and	  state	  more	  effectively,	  as	  a	  critical	  understanding	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  better	  resolution	  of	  the	  problems.	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  pressing	  task	  for	  academics	  and	  scholars	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  is	  to	   conceive	  of	  more	  nuanced	  ways	   through	  which	   the	  systems	  could	  be	  made	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accountable	   to	   the	   people,	   and	   could	   be	   made	   more	   geared	   towards	   their	  suffering.	   Granted	   that	   this	   would	   be	   a	   lifelong	   project,	   this	   thesis	   is	  nevertheless	  my	  first	  major	  step	  in	  that	  direction.	  	  	  The	  assertion	  I	  am	  making	  here	  is	  that	  law	  and	  legal	  institutions,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  have	  become	  inherently	  linked	  with	  justice,	  need	  to	  be	  questioned	  and	  analysed	   to	   create	   opportunities	   for	   the	   betterment	   of	   the	   people	   these	  institutions	  govern.	  However,	   these	  questions,	   so	   long	  as	   they	  stay	  within	  any	  particular	   paradigm	   or	   ideology,	   will	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   get	   to	   the	   roots	   of	  complexities.	   An	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   any	   one	   paradigm	   –	   be	   it	   positive	   law	   or	  indigenous	   law,	   human	   rights	   or	   critical	   legal	   theory,	   religious	   law	   or	   secular	  law	  –	  acts	  as	  a	  blinker	  which	  compels	  us	  to	  treat	  everything	  that	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  criteria	  of	  that	  particular	  discourse	  as	  an	  exception	  or	  anomaly.	  The	  chief	  goal	  of	   the	   researchers	   then,	   as	   some	   scholars	   argue,26	   should	   be	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  material	  and	  conceptual	  realities	  of	  the	  society	  in	  consideration	  and	  then	  move	  towards	   their	   theoretical	   explanations	   if	   possible.	   This	   serves	   as	   the	   main	  rationale	  behind	  this	  study	  and	  the	  aim	  here	   is	   to	  aid	   the	   filling	  of	  a	  void	   that	  has	   emerged	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   emphasis	   on	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   examination	   of	   the	  country.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Brian	  Z.	  Tamanaha,	  'A	  Non-­‐essentialist	  version	  of	  Legal	  Pluralism'	  (2000)	  27	  (2)	  Journal	  of	  
Law	  and	  Society	  296;	  also,	  H.	  L.	  A.	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  Delhi	  2005)	  242.	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B. Outline	  and	  Structure	  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   thesis	   follows	   the	   theoretical	   journey	   my	   research	   has	  taken	   in	   order	   to	   trace	   the	   perimeter	   of	   the	   research	   question,	   as	   well	   as	   to	  comprehend	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  subject	  matter.	  It	  offers	  a	  dialogue	  between	  the	   legal	   context	   under	   consideration	   and	   the	   narratives	   employed	   to	  understand	  it,	  and	  this	  dialogue	  frames	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  text.	  The	  next	  section	  of	  the	   thesis	   discusses	   the	  methodology	   and	  methods	   employed	   to	   conduct	   this	  research.	   It	   begins	   by	   offering	   a	   background	   to	   the	   questions	   from	  which	   the	  research	  started,	  and	   links	   it	   to	   the	  overarching	  research	  question	   that	  drives	  the	   current	   study.	   The	   section	   provides	   information	   on	   Engaged	   Theory,27	  which	  serves	  as	  the	  main	  methodology	  for	  the	  present	  examination.	  	  Chapter	   1	   provides	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	   overall	   project.	   It	   identifies	   and	  briefly	  discusses	  the	  four	  prominent	  narratives	  arguably	  employed	  to	  approach	  law	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Pakistan,	   highlighting	   some	   of	   the	   contradictions	   and	  challenges	   that	   emerge	   when	   these	   perspectives	   are	   analysed	   in	   relation	   to	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain.	   The	   first	   chapter	   also	   introduces	   the	   main	  assertions	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  introduces	  the	  idea	  that	  an	  alternative	  narrative	  of	  law,	   such	   as	   the	   one	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   Coloniality,	   might	   enable	   us	   to	  understand	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  context	  more	  holistically.	  	  Chapter	   2	   constitutes	   the	  most	   descriptive	   part	   of	   the	   study,	   and	  presents	   an	  overview	  of	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  turmoil	  that	  has	  gripped	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See	  Methodology	  on	  page	  25.	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post-­‐independence	  era.	  The	  purpose	  behind	  this	  section	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  reader	  an	   insight	   into	  the	   legal	  uncertainty	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  state,	  which	   frames	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  of	  the	  country.	  	  Chapter	  3	   lays	  out	   the	  overall	   context	  of	   the	  current	  examination	  by	  outlining	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  complex	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  of	  Pakistan.	  The	  chapter	  discusses	  the	   country’s	   constitutional	   arrangement	   and	   common	   law	   heritage,	   their	  engagement	  with	   notions	   of	   Islamic	   law,	   the	   presence	   of	   traditional	   tribunals	  and	   informal	   courts,	  problems	  of	   colonial	   laws	  and	  rules	  governing	   the	  Tribal	  regions,	   and	   the	   difficulties	   associated	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   internal	   and	   external	  violence.	  The	  historical	  trajectories	  of	  these	  domains	  and	  their	  mutual	  interplay	  will	  be	  discussed	  to	  provide	  a	  footing	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  begin	  to	  understand	  what	  may	  be	  characterised	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  legal	  and	  socio-­‐legal	  spheres.	  	  Chapter	  4	  addresses	  and	  challenges	  the	  mainstream	  understanding	  of	  law	  as	  it	  exists	  within	  Pakistan,	  both	  within	   the	   legal	   fraternity	  as	  well	   as	   in	   the	  wider	  discourse.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  and	   linked	  to	  the	   legal	  positivistic	  approach,	  which	  dominates	  the	   legal	  and	  political	  discourse	   in	   the	  country.	  Through	  a	  brief	  discussion	  on	   the	  narrative	  on	   law	   based	   on	   this	   perspective,	   the	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	   exclusivity	   of	  positivism	   fails	   to	   provide	   us	   any	   insight	   into	   the	   plurality	   of	   normative	  orderings	  that	  exist	  in	  Pakistan.	  It	  will	  also	  be	  asserted	  that	  our	  insistence	  on	  a	  Hobbesian	  approach	  to	  state	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  all	  evils	  is	  based	  on	  our	  inability	  to	  problematise	  the	  historical	  nature	  of	  the	  State	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  
16	  	  
Chapters	   5	   and	   6	   present	   and	   discuss	   the	   most	   prominent	   critiques	   of	   the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  as	  they	  exist	  in	  the	  country.	  These	  critiques	  focus	  on	  the	   alienation	   and	   foreignness	   of	   the	   mainstream	   legal	   institutions	   and	  instruments,	  and	  challenge	  their	  link	  to	  the	  colonial	   legacy	  of	  the	  region.	  I	  will	  argue	   that	   these	  challenges	   lead	   to	   two	  alternative	  approaches	   to	   law:	   Islamic	  Law	   and	   Legal	   Pluralism.	   Chapters	   5	   and	   6	   will	   be	   devoted	   to	   these	   two	  narratives	  of	   law	  respectively.	  The	  former	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  ascendancy	  of	   the	   Islamic	   narrative,	   its	   nuances	   and	   the	   challenges	   it	   presents.	   The	   core	  debates	   and	   problems	   associated	   with	   legal	   pluralism	   will	   be	   covered	   in	  Chapter	  6.	  This	  chapter	  will	  argue	   that	  while	  pluralism	  allows	  us	   to	  recognise	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  legal	  and	  normative	  orderings	  in	  the	  country,	  it	  does	  not	  give	  enough	  weight	   to	   the	   repressive	   or	   problematic	   notions	   of	   the	   traditional	   or	  informal	  justice	  systems.	  	  Linked	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  legal	  pluralism,	  Chapter	  7	  discusses	  the	  human	  rights	  approach	  to	  law,	  which	  is	  gaining	  ever	  more	  ascendancy	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  is	  the	  main	   viewpoint	   employed	   to	   challenge	   the	   traditional	   and	   informal	   justice	  systems	   of	   the	   country.	   The	   chapter	   argues	   that	   while	   human	   rights	  campaigners	   correctly	   challenge	   the	   patriarchy,	   clientelism	   and	   misogyny	  present	  in	  the	  informal	  systems,	  the	  narrative	  on	  the	  whole	  fails	  to	  highlight	  the	  same	   problems	   that	  mar	   the	   state	  mechanisms	   of	   the	   country.	   Human	   rights	  approach	  to	  law	  makes	  demands	  for	  a	  stronger	  state	  and	  a	  stronger	  writ	  of	  the	  government,	   but	   through	   this	   it	   often	   replicates	   the	   problems	   it	   set	   out	   to	  challenge.	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  Chapter	   8	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   return	   to	   the	   overall	   context	   of	   law	   and	   will	  present	   an	   alternative	   narrative	   to	   understand	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	  Pakistan.	  Building	  on	  the	  framework	  of	  Coloniality	  and	  the	  historical	   legacy	  of	  colonialism,	   it	   presents	   a	   more	   nuanced	   approach	   to	   understanding	   the	  particularities	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   Pakistan.	   Moreover,	   borrowing	  conceptual	   building	   blocks	   from	   the	   previous	   discussion	   on	   context	   and	  narratives,	   it	  will	  offer	  a	  different	  approach	  through	  which	  law	  and	  socio-­‐legal	  framework	   of	   Pakistan	   may	   be	   considered.	   Though	   this	   theorisation	   would	  certainly	   have	   room	   for	   critique	   and	   improvement,	   it	  would	   allow	   us	   to	   both	  comprehend	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan	   more	   holistically,	   as	   well	   as	  create	   room	   for	   its	   elaboration	  and	  expansion.	  The	   last	   section	  of	   the	   chapter	  will	   also	   present	   a	   rereading	   of	   the	   contextual	   phenomena	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  alternative	   narrative	   constructed	   in	   the	   previous	   sections.	   This	   will	   then	   be	  followed	  by	  a	  concluding	  chapter	  to	  the	  dissertation.	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II. Background	  and	  Methodology	  
A. Background	  to	  the	  Study	  
This	   study,	  not	  unlike	  other	   research	  projects	  of	   this	   length	  and	  duration,	  has	  been	   a	   journey	   through	   several	   different	   questions,	   theoretical	   paradigms,	  questions	  and	  methodologies.	  It	  initially	  began	  with	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  People’s	  Law	  as	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  law,28	  aimed	  at	  emphasising	  and	  addressing	   the	   problems	   created	   or	   sustained	   by	   the	   dominant	   legality	   and	  mainstream	   legal	   frameworks.	  The	  original	   approach,	  which	  was	   later	   greatly	  modified,	   was	   geared	   towards	   focussing	   on	   a	   particular	   social	   movement	   in	  Pakistan	   –	   the	   Anjuman	   Mazarain	   Punjab	   (AMP)	   which	   had	   claimed	   to	   have	  adopted	  the	  People’s	  Law	  perspective	  to	  further	  its	  struggle.29	  	  
i) Examining	  People’s	  Law	  and	  Proto-­‐Legality	  The	   initial	   idea	   behind	   the	   study	  was	   to	   observe	  AMP’s	   engagement	  with	   the	  formal	   legal	   systems,	   and	   examine	   how	   its	   claims	   of	   alternative	   legality	  were	  conceptualised	   and	   put	   into	   practise.	   If	   these	   claims	   could	   be	   translated	   into	  concrete	  measures	  and	  strategies	  by	  the	  movement,	  these	  would	  offer	  valuable	  insights	  into	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  engagement	  between	  social	  movements	  and	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  this	  idea,	  see	  Jayan	  Nayar,	  'Peoples'	  Law:	  Decolonising	  Legal	  Imagination'	  Law,	  Social	  Justice	  &	  Global	  Development	  <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007_1/nayar/>	  last	  accessed	  10	  June	  2010.	  29	  In	  2005,	  after	  a	  rift	  between	  the	  adherents	  of	  the	  movement,	  one	  faction	  of	  the	  AMP	  attempted	  to	  organise	  People’s	  Tribunals	  to	  judge	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state,	  military	  and	  the	  law	  in	  their	  oppression,	  and	  claimed	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  dominant	  legality.	  Asserting	  that	  what	  matters	  is	  their	  own	  memory,	  history	  and	  their	  toil	  for	  a	  century,	  this	  approach	  argued	  for	  a	  distinct	  position	  from	  the	  one	  adopted	  by	  the	  rights-­‐based	  approach.	  See,	  ibid.;	  see	  also,	  Asad	  Farooq,	  'Mazarain	  People's	  Tribunal	  Declaration'	  (Pakistan	  2005,	  available	  from	  the	  author).	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law,	  the	  encounter	  between	  alternative	  forms	  of	  law	  and	  dominant	  legality,	  and,	  at	  best,	  insights	  into	  proto-­‐legal	  forms30	  operating	  in	  this	  region.	  	  The	  AMP	  (literally,	  the	  Association	  of	  Peasants	  of	  the	  Punjab)31	  represents	  the	  struggle	  of	   local	  peasants	   for	  rights	   to	   land	  that	   they	  and	  their	  ancestors	  have	  tilled	   for	  more	   than	   a	   century	   in	   the	   canal	   irrigation	   colonies	   of	   Punjab.	   The	  establishment	   of	   these	   colonies,	   which	   has	   been	   called	   both	   an	   ‘agricultural	  colonisation’32	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ‘[British-­‐Indian]	   colonial	   state’s	   greatest	  achievement’,33	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries,	  primarily	  to	  sustain	  and	  cater	  for	  the	  resource	  requirements	  of	  an	  expanding	  British-­‐Indian	  Army.34	  With	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  colonies	  came	   the	  need	   for	  agricultural	  labour	  which	   led	   to	   a	   significant	   relocation	   of	   people	   (mainly	   on	   a	   voluntary	  basis)	   to	   the	   newly	   established	   canal	   colonies,	   in	   what	   Kaur	   terms	   the	   ‘first	  mass	  migration’	  of	  the	  people	  of	  eastern	  sub-­‐continent.35	  	  The	  British-­‐Indian	   government	   followed	  a	   tiered	  policy	  of	   land	   allocation,	   the	  primary	   focus	   of	   which	   was	   to	   grant	   land	   to	   serving	   or	   retired	   military	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  My	  gratitude	  to	  Professor	  Alan	  Norrie	  and	  Professor	  Abdul	  Paliwala	  for	  giving	  me	  this	  insight	  during	  the	  PhD	  upgrade	  review	  discussion.	  31	  For	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  the	  AMP’s	  struggle,	  see	  Asha	  Amirali,	  'Dispossession,	  Democracy,	  Solidarity	  and	  Community	  in	  Ireland	  and	  Pakistan'	  Indymedia	  Ireland	  <http://www.indymedia.ie/article/61697>	  last	  accessed	  24	  October	  2010;	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  'Soiled	  Hands:	  The	  Pakistan	  Army’s	  Repression	  of	  the	  Punjab	  Farmers’	  Movement'	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2004);	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar,	  'Are	  We	  Not	  a	  Working-­‐Class	  Movement?'	  (2005)	  19	  (2)	  Socialism	  and	  Democracy	  133.	  32	  Imran	  Ali,	  The	  Punjab	  under	  Imperialism,	  1885-­‐1947	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  Delhi	  1988)	  3.	  33	  Ian	  Talbot,	  'The	  Punjab	  under	  Colonialism:	  Order	  and	  Transformation	  in	  British	  India'	  (2007)	  14	  (1)	  Journal	  of	  Punjab	  Studies	  3,	  7.	  34	  Gopal	  Krishan,	  'Demography	  of	  the	  Punjab	  (1849-­‐1947)'	  (2004)	  11	  (1)	  Journal	  of	  Punjab	  
Studies	  77,	  80.	  35	  Ravinder	  Kaur,	  'The	  Second	  Migration:	  Displacement	  and	  Refugees	  from	  Rawalpindi	  during	  Partition'	  (2007)	  14	  (1)	  Journal	  of	  Punjab	  Studies	  89,	  89.	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personnel,	   army	   officers,	   military	   farms	   and	   other	   military	   institutions,	   and	  relocated	  ‘agricultural	  castes’	  –	  those	  groups	  in	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent	  whose	  livelihood	  had	  become	  associated	  with	  agricultural	  labour.36	  The	  grantees	  were	  not	  given	  absolute	  ownership	  of	   land,	  and	   land	  was	  awarded	  under	   'Rights	   to	  Occupancy',	   through	   the	   Colonisation	  Act	   of	   1893	   and	   its	   further	   amendment	  through	  the	  Colonisation	  Bill	  1906.37	  This	  ensured	  that	  the	  ultimate	  possession	  of	  land	  remained	  with	  the	  Crown,	  and	  the	  peasants	  held	  non-­‐alienable	  rights	  to	  possession,	  with	  the	  benefit	  that	  they	  had	  a	  right	  not	  to	  be	  evicted	  from	  the	  land	  they	  tilled	  unless	  expressly	  authorised	  by	  the	  colonial	  government.38	  	  	  The	  colonial	  state	  promised	  to	  give	  the	  ownership	  of	  land	  to	  the	  peasants	  once	  it	   was	   made	   cultivable,	   although	   this	   promise	   was	   never	   fulfilled	   once	   the	  benefits	   of	   the	   land	  were	   fully	   realised	   and	   the	   state	   recognised	   its	  monetary	  potential.39	  A	  further	  condition	  was	  imposed	  upon	  the	  peasants	  through	  a	  crop-­‐sharing	   system.	   The	   statutes	   of	   the	   time	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   these	   lands	  were	  granted	   in	   return	   for	   a	   ‘rent’,	   which	  was	   not	   paid	   in	   cash	   but	   was	   a	   rent	   on	  produce	  –	  a	  share	  in	  the	  crop	  or	  the	  harvest.40	  The	  process	  of	  establishment	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Ibid.	  101.	  The	  larger	  tracts	  of	  land	  were	  granted	  to	  landlords	  and	  military	  (which	  employed	  peasants	  to	  work	  the	  land),	  while	  peasants	  and	  janglis	  were	  awarded	  smaller	  holdings.	  Jangli	  was	  a	  category	  used	  for	  the	  native	  pastoral	  inhabitants	  by	  the	  colonial	  state,	  and	  it	  is	  still	  used	  as	  a	  derogatory	  term	  in	  the	  local	  language	  to	  portray	  ‘uncivilised’.	  Gopal	  Krishan	  (2004)	  (n	  34)	  81.	  The	  colonial	  government	  considered	  it	  a	  ‘civilising	  mission’	  to	  raise	  the	  position	  of	  the	  pastoral	  inhabitants	  from	  ‘wretched	  cattle	  graziers,	  struggling	  for	  existence,	  to	  that	  of	  prosperous	  peasant	  proprietors’,	  as	  noted	  by	  a	  British	  Indian	  Civil	  Servant	  of	  the	  time.	  Anjali	  Gera	  Roy,	  'Land	  of	  Five	  Rivers,	  Canal	  Colonies	  and	  Oceanic	  Flows	  to	  Southeast	  Asia'	  (Third	  Critical	  Studies	  Conference,	  Kolkata,	  India,	  2009)	  4.	  37	  Rajit	  Mazumder,	  Indian	  Army	  and	  the	  making	  of	  Punjab	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  Delhi	  2003)	  204.	  38	  See,	  The	  Government	  of	  the	  Punjab	  (1900),	  'The	  Punjab	  Alienation	  of	  Land	  Act',	  Act	  XIII	  of	  1900	  <http://www.pap.gov.pk/uploads/acts/18.html>	  39	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (2004)	  (n	  31)	  9.	  40	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar	  (2005)	  (n	  31)	  137.	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canal	  irrigation	  colonies	  and	  increase	  in	  cultivated	  tracts	  of	  land	  continued	  until	  the	   1940s.41	   With	   the	   independence	   of	   Pakistan	   in	   1947,	   the	   use	   of	   land	  transferred	   from	   the	  British	   Indian	  Army	   to	   the	  Pakistan	  Army,	  Military	   Seed	  Corporation,	   and	   other	   organisations.	   The	   de	   facto	   conditions	   regarding	   the	  peasants’	  right	  to	  land	  and	  occupancy,	  however,	  remained	  unchanged.	  	  	  AMP’s	  struggle	  began	  in	  the	  year	  2000,	  when	  the	  peasants	  were	  forced	  to	  shift	  to	   cash-­‐contract	   tenure	   rather	   than	   a	   crop-­‐sharing	   system	   by	   the	   Pakistan	  Army,	   which	   inherited	   the	   use	   of	   this	   land	   by	   the	   British	   Indian	   Army.42	  Struggling	   against	   and	   denouncing	   the	   laws	   imposed	   on	   them	   by	   the	   state,	  military	  and	  western	  capitalist	  agriculture,	   the	  adherents	  demanded	  that	  their	  titles	  to	  land	  be	  recognised	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  century-­‐old	  claim,	  toil,	  indigenous	  laws,	   local	   practises	   and	   history.	   Essentially	   a	   struggle	   for	   land	   rights,	   the	  movement	   also	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   popular	   law	   movement	   through	   its	  communiques.43	  Having	  attempted	  to	  organise	  People’s	  Tribunals	  on	  the	  issue,	  the	  proponents	  declared	  to	  have	  the	  right	  to	  author	  their	  own	  law,	  which	  would	  accept	  their	  claim	  to	  land	  and	  a	  century-­‐old	  livelihood.	  The	  claim	  by	  one	  section	  of	   the	  peasants	   –	   that	  what	  matters	   is	   not	  what	   the	   state’s	   notion	   of	   law	   and	  reading	  of	  history	  is,	  but	  the	  people’s	  own	  memory	  of	  their	  history,	  reality,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Ravinder	  Kaur	  (2007)	  (n	  35)	  98.	  42	  Aoun	  Sahi,	  'Pakistan:	  The	  Tenants’	  Struggle	  on	  Okara	  Military	  Farms	  -­‐	  Analysis	  and	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  leader	  of	  Anjuman	  Mazarain	  Punjab'	  South	  Asia	  Citizens	  Web	  <http://www.sacw.net/article847.html>	  last	  accessed	  15	  August	  2010.	  43	  Asad	  Farooq	  	  (n	  29).	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entitlements	   –	   represented	   an	   intriguing	   case	   in	   terms	   of	   understanding	   the	  relation	  between	  dominant	  law	  and	  social	  movements.44	  	  
ii) From	  Proto-­‐Legality	  to	  the	  wider	  Socio-­‐Legal	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  To	   examine	   AMP’s	   claim	   of	   People’s	   Law	   and	   its	   dynamics	   in	   relation	   to	  dominant	   legality,	   I	   conducted	   two	   field	   trips	   to	   Pakistan	   in	   2010	   and	   2011,	  during	   which	   I	   interviewed	   some	   members	   of	   the	   movement	   as	   well	   as	  intellectuals	   and	   academics	  who	  were	   proponents	   of	   the	   struggle.45	   The	   four	  major	   findings	   that	   emerged	   during	   empirical	   research	   and	   from	   these	  interviews	  proved	  to	  alter	  the	  course	  of	  the	  current	  study.	  First,	  it	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  that,	  while	   ideas	  of	  People’s	  Law	  had	  emerged	  from	  interactions	  between	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  academics	  working	  in	  this	  field,	  these	  were	   not	   successfully	   translated	   into	   any	   concrete	   or	   sustainable	   strategy	   for	  the	   struggle.46	   On	   the	   ground,	   the	   struggle	   remained	   aimed	   at	   acquiring	   land	  rights	   rather	   than	   formulating	   or	   implementing	   any	   form	   of	   alternative	  legality.47	   Second,	   even	   though	   the	   people’s	   tribunals	   could	   not	   be	   translated	  into	   an	   effective	  measure	   for	   the	   struggle,	   the	   disengagement	   of	   the	   peasants	  from	   legal	   institutions	  and	   frameworks	  of	   the	  State	  because	  of	  violent	  conflict	  had	  strengthened	   their	  village	   tribunals	   (panchayats)	  and	   traditional	  methods	  of	   dispute	   settlement.	   Third,	   it	   emerged	   that	   from	   2007	   onwards,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.	  45	  The	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  Dr.	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar	  (Quaid-­‐e-­‐Azam	  University,	  Pakistan),	  Dr.	  Aasha	  Amirali	  (University	  of	  Oxford),	  Dr.	  Taimur	  Rahman	  (Lahore	  University	  of	  Management	  Sciences,	  Pakistan),	  Dr.	  Asad	  Farooq	  (Lahore	  University	  of	  Management	  Sciences),	  and	  two	  leaders	  from	  the	  AMP.	  46	  Interview	  with	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar	  and	  Aasha	  Amirali	  (December	  2011)	  and	  Asad	  Farooq	  (December	  2011).	  47	  Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Taimur	  Rahman	  (December	  2011).	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movement,	   army	   and	   the	   government	   institutions	   had	   reached	   a	   stalemate.48	  The	   incumbent	  provincial	   government	  had	   renewed	   its	   assurance	   to	   the	   local	  peasants,	   that	   their	   rights	   to	   land	   would	   be	   recognised.49	  With	   less	   pressure	  from	  the	  state	  and	   the	  army	   to	   force	   the	  peasants	  off	   the	   land,	   the	  movement	  had	   also	   lost	   some	   of	   its	  mobilisation	  momentum.	   This	   easing	   of	   the	   conflict,	  and	   the	  assurance	  of	   the	  government,	  could	  be	  explained	  as	  a	  corollary	  of	   the	  weakening	   of	   the	   then	   army-­‐led	   central	   government	   around	   the	   same	   time,50	  which	  any	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  People’s	  law	  or	  the	  local	  social	  movement	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  wider	  context.	  	  	  The	   fourth	   and	   most	   important	   outcome	   of	   the	   initial	   research	   was	   that	   it	  challenged	  my	  understanding	  of	   law	   in	   the	   context	  of	  Pakistan,	  which	  had	   till	  then	   been	   based	   on	   the	   mainstream	   discourse	   on	   law	   as	   it	   prevails	   in	   the	  country.	  The	  encounter	  between	  the	  movement	  and	  army,	  the	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  state	   law	   to	   resolve	   the	   mentioned	   conflict,	   the	   strengthening	   of	   village	  tribunals	  in	  the	  region	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  struggle,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ideas	   of	   People’s	   Law,	   highlighted	   the	   limitation	   and	   the	   contestation	   of	   the	  label	  of	   law	   in	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	   terrain.	   It	  also	  emphasised	   the	  notions	  of	  law	   that	   are	   taken	   for	   granted	  and	   their	   assumptions	   that	   go	  unchallenged	   in	  the	  mainstream	  political	  and	  legal	  discourse	  in	  Pakistan.	  The	  discussions	  on	  law	  and	  the	  state	  permeate	  the	  media	  and	  common	  discussions,	  especially	  because	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Interview	  with	  leaders	  of	  the	  AMP,	  Okara	  (December	  2011).	  49	  Amir	  Parvez,	  'Anjuman	  Mazarain	  Punjab	  acquired	  ownership	  rights'	  (Communist	  Workers	  and	  Peasants	  Party,	  Pakistan	  2010)	  <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/cmkp_pk/message/17294>	  last	  accessed	  30	  January	  2011	  50	  This	  period	  coincided	  with	  the	  increasing	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  the	  regime	  of	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Lawyers’	  Movement	  for	  the	  restoration	  and	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  These	  events	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  Chapter	  2	  on	  page	  82.	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of	  the	  unstable	  political	  situation,	  the	  presence	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  violence,	  and	   the	   post-­‐Lawyers’	   Movement	   environment	   which	   has	   strengthened	   the	  legal	  narrative	  in	  the	  country.51	  Despite	  the	  ubiquitous	  presence	  of	  debates	  on	  law	  and	  the	  state,	  the	  complexity	  of	  these	  terminologies	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  context	  is	  absent	  in	  the	  dominant	  accounts	  of	  the	  legal	  sphere.	  The	  studies	  focussing	  on	  the	  complexity	  of	  legal	  architecture	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  scarce,	  and	  those	  focussing	  on	  theoretical	  examinations	  are	  even	  less.	  It	  was	  a	  troubling	  realisation	  that	  the	  diverse	   legal	   and	  normative	   structures,	   that	   are	  part	  of	   the	   legal	   realities	  of	   a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  country’s	  populace,	  are	  mainly	  discussed	  through	  a	  political	  lens	   and	   are	   largely	   excluded	   from	   the	   legal	   discourse.	   There	   is	   a	   dearth	   of	  comprehensive	   examinations	   that	   would	   outline,	   let	   alone	   theorise,	   all	   the	  different	   aspects	   of	   this	   intricate	   legal	   and	   normative	   architecture	   of	   the	  country.	   The	   study	   that	   began	   as	   a	   legal	   ethnographic	   project	   then	   became	   a	  significantly	  different	  and	  broader	  exercise.	  	  	  Although	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research	  project	  has	  widened	  through	  the	  course,	  its	  socio-­‐legal	   nature	   has	   remained.	   This	   thesis	   presents	   a	   study	   of	   the	   complex	  legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  in	  its	  societal	  context.	  With	  the	  diverse	  aspects	  of	  the	  normative	  architecture	  of	  Pakistan	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  enquiry,	  the	  primary	  aim	  was	  to	  enquire	  whether	   this	  structure,	  with	  all	   its	  anomalies	  and	   facets,	  could	  be	  satisfactorily	  explained	  by	  the	  narratives	  and	  theoretical	  conceptions	  of	  law	  that	   are	   used	   by	   political	   commentators,	   legal	   academics	   and	   practitioners	  focussing	  on	  Pakistan’s	  law.	  This	  journey	  took	  me	  first	  on	  a	  path	  of	  discovering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  These	  themes	  will	  be	  revisited	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  discussion.	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the	  multiple	  legal	  orders,	  normative	  structures,	  parallel	  systems,	  tendencies	  and	  trajectories	   of	   law	   that	   constitute	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain.52	   Subsequently,	   the	  research	   identified	   and	   problematised	   the	   narratives	   and	   theoretical	  propositions	  based	  on	   the	   conceptions	  of	   legal	  positivism,	   legal	  pluralism	  and	  informal	   justice,	   Islamic	   law	   and	   human	   rights	   approaches	   to	   law.53	   These	  lenses	  were	  explored	  solely	  because	  they	  are	  employed	  by	  legal	  academics	  and	  practitioners	   to	   explain	  one	  or	  more	  of	   the	   facets	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   tapestry.	  The	  research,	  in	  this	  regard,	  is	  a	  dialogue	  between	  narratives	  and	  context,	  and	  between	  theory	  and	  practise,	  the	  aim	  of	  which	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  or	  propagate	  a	  singular	  perspective;	  rather	  the	  rationale	  is	  to	  discover	  how	  the	  situation	  could	  be	  understood	  better	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  these	  systems.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  represents	  the	  course	  of	  this	  journey.	  	  	  
B. Methodology	  
This	  research	  adopts	  the	  methodology	  of	  Engaged	  Theory,	  which	  is	  a	  relatively	  recent	   approach	   to	   social-­‐theoretical	   study.	   Although	   the	   analytical	  methodology	  adopted	   in	   the	  current	   study	  bears	  some	  similarity	   to	  Grounded	  Theory	  and	  Discourse	  Analysis,	  there	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  Engaged	  Theory	  has	  been	  preferred	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  enquiry.	  	  	  Discourse	  Analysis	  is	  primarily	  linked	  to	  the	  reading	  of	  statements,	  acts	  and	  the	  wider	  discourse	  to	  try	  and	  uncover	  what	  is	  hidden,	  or	  left	  aside	  to	  maintain	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  A	  discussion	  on	  these	  facets	  constitutes	  the	  subject	  matter	  for	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  96.	  53	  These	  perspectives	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  Chapters	  4-­‐7,	  starting	  from	  page	  144.	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consistency	   and	   unity	   of	   discourses.54	   The	   approach	   of	   the	   present	   study	   to	  identify,	  question	  and	  critique	   the	  narratives	  employed	   to	  comprehend	   law	   in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan,	   shares	   this	  perspective	   to	   some	  extent.	  However,	   it	   is	  the	   emphasis	   on	   linguistics	   and	   semiotics	   in	   Discourse	   Analysis	   that	  differentiates	  it	  from	  the	  methodology	  adopted	  in	  this	  study.55	  While	  the	  thesis	  employs	   statements	   from	   the	   judiciary,	   activists,	   government	   officials	   and	  researchers	   to	   construct	   and	   analyse	   the	   identified	   narratives	   of	   law,	   it	  recognises	   that	   their	   implications	   and	   assertions	   are	   not	   always	   hidden	   that	  could	   only	   be	   brought	   to	   the	   fore	   through	   a	   linguistic	   analysis.	   The	  meanings	  that	   the	   statements	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   carry	   are	   quite	   evident	   in	  most	   cases,	  although	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   schematise	   them	   and	   to	   frame	   them	   within	   the	  larger	  narrative	   to	  understand	   their	   implications.	   In	   this	   sense,	  narrative	   as	   a	  category	   is	   related	   to	  discourse	   as	   an	   organisational	   schema,	   and	   these	   terms	  have	  been	  used	  interchangeably	  throughout	  the	  discussion.	  But	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	   thesis	   is	   to	   identify	   and	   categorise	   these	   schema,	   rather	   than	   trace	   any	  obscure	  meaning	  behind	  them.56	  	  The	  approach	  of	  the	  thesis	  also	  overlaps	  with	  some	  facets	  of	  Grounded	  Theory,	  while	  differing	   in	   some	  key	   respects.	  Grounded	  Theory	   is	   acknowledged	   as	   ‘a	  major	  –	  or	  perhaps	  the	  major	  –	  contributor	  to	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  See,	  the	  Unity	  of	  Discourses	  and	  Discursive	  Formations	  in	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Archaeology	  of	  
Knowledge	  (Routledge,	  London	  2002)	  23-­‐43.	  55	  This	  linguistic	  turn	  is	  a	  critique	  levelled	  against	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  as	  well.	  See,	  Sean	  Phelan	  and	  Lincoln	  Dahlberg,	  'Discourse	  Theory	  and	  Critial	  Media	  Politics:	  An	  Introduction'	  in	  Lincoln	  Dahlberg	  and	  Sean	  Phelan	  (eds),	  Discourse	  Theory	  and	  Critial	  Media	  Politics	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  New	  York	  2011)	  9.	  56	  For	  an	  overview	  on	  Discourse	  Analysis,	  see	  Norman	  Fairclough,	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis:	  
The	  critical	  study	  of	  language	  (2nd	  edn.,	  Longman,	  Harlow	  2010).	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of	   qualitative	  methods	   in	   applied	   social	   research’.57	   Strauss	   and	   Corbin	   argue	  that	  Grounded	  Theory	  is	  the	  most	  influential	  method	  of	  ‘carrying	  out	  qualitative	  research	   when	   generating	   theory	   is	   the	   researchers’	   principal	   aim’.58	   It	   is	  conceived	  of	  as	   ‘a	   set	  of	   flexible	  analytic	  guidelines	   that	  enable	  researchers	   to	  focus	  their	  data	  collection	  and	  to	  build	  inductive	  middle-­‐range	  theories	  through	  successive	   levels	   of	   data	   analysis	   and	   conceptual	   development’.59	   Despite	   the	  fact	   that	   the	  principal	   aim	  of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	  argue	   for	  and	  generate	  a	   theory,	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  why	  Grounded	  Theory	  has	  not	  been	  employed	  here.	  First,	  the	   subject	   matter	   of	   my	   research	   covers	   a	   number	   of	   diverse	   facets	   of	  Pakistan’s	   legal	   and	   normative	   structure.	   Because	   of	   this,	   it	   would	   not	   be	  possible	   to	   discern	   and	   encompass	   all	   these	   multiple	   structures	   through	  fieldwork	  and	  qualitative	  data	   in	   a	   short	  period	  of	   time.	   Second,	   the	   critics	  of	  Grounded	  Theory	  argue	  that	  the	  theory	  reached	  through	  this	  method	  is	  mainly	  an	  interpretation	  of	  qualitative	  information,	  and	  does	  not	  deliver	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  ‘theory	   as	   discovery’	   and	   ‘theory	   as	   part	   of	   an	   explanatory	   exercise’.60	   As	   the	  main	   purpose	   of	   the	   research	   is	   to	   conduct	   a	   dialogue	   between	   socio-­‐legal	  context	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   the	   legal	   theories	   that	   attempt	   to	   explain	   it,	   a	  methodology	  was	   required	   that	  would	  allow	  us	   to	  move	   towards	   theorisation	  rather	  than	  interpretation	  of	  data.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Gary	  Thomas	  and	  David	  James,	  'Re-­‐inventing	  grounded	  theory:	  some	  questions	  about	  theory,	  ground	  and	  discovery'	  (2006)	  32	  (6)	  British	  Educational	  Research	  Journal	  767,	  768.	  58	  Quoted	  in	  ibid.	  59	  Kathy	  Charmaz,	  'Grounded	  Theory	  	  in	  the	  21st	  Century:	  Applications	  for	  Advancing	  Social	  Justice	  Studies'	  in	  Norman	  K	  Denzin	  and	  Yvonna	  S.	  Lincoln	  (eds),	  The	  Sage	  Handbook	  of	  
Qualitative	  Research	  (3rd	  Edition	  edn,	  Sage	  Publications,	  California	  2005)	  507.	  60	  Gary	  Thomas	  and	  David	  James	  (2006)	  (n	  57)	  773.	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But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  theory	  is	  not	  taken	  here	  as	  an	  unproblematic	  exercise.	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   theory	   as	   an	   abstraction	   does	   not	   possess	   an	  inherent	  value;	  rather	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  certain	  aims,	  and	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  phenomena	  at	  hand	  and	  understand	  it	  in	  the	  larger	  context.	  	  Clifford	  borrows	  from	  Foucault	  to	  build	  on	  this	  idea	  of	  theory	  as	  an	  instrument	  and	  makes	  his	  case	  for	  Engaged	  Theory.	  In	  Power/Knowledge,	  Foucault	  argues:	  
The	  notion	  of	  theory	  as	  a	  toolkit	  means:	  (i)	  The	  theory	  to	  be	  constructed	  is	   not	   a	   system	   but	   an	   instrument,	   a	   logic	   of	   the	   specificity	   of	   power	  relations	  and	  the	  struggles	  around	  them;	  (ii)	  That	  this	  investigation	  can	  only	   be	   carried	   out	   step	   by	   step	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   reflection	   (which	  will	  necessarily	  be	  historical	  in	  some	  of	  its	  aspects)	  on	  given	  situations.61	  	  Clifford	  calls	  these	  two	  facets	  –	  the	  instrumentality	  of	  theory,	  and	  the	  reflection	  and	  dialogue	  between	  context	  and	  theory	  –	  a	  ‘Toolkit	  of	  engaged	  theory’.62.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  methodology	  that	  has	  steered	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  approach	  to	  legal	  theory	  adopted	  here	  is	  a	  reflexive	  dialogue	  with	  practise	  or	  the	  context	  of	  socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   of	   Pakistan,	   the	   aim	   of	   which	   has	   been	   to	   enrich	   our	  understanding	   of	   both	   of	   them,	   and	   draw	   out	   themes	   to	   improve	   on	   their	  mutual	   shortcomings.	   As	  Deleuze	   argues,	   ‘Practise	   is	   a	   set	   of	   relays	   from	  one	  theoretical	  point	  to	  another,	  and	  theory	  is	  a	  relay	  from	  one	  practise	  to	  another.	  No	  theory	  can	  develop	  without	  eventually	  encountering	  a	  wall,	  and	  practise	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Michel	  Foucault,	  'On	  Popular	  Justice:	  A	  Discussion	  with	  Maoists'	  in	  Colin	  Gordon	  (ed)	  
Power/knowledge:	  Selected	  Interviews	  and	  Other	  Writings,	  1972-­‐1977	  (Harvester	  Press,	  Brighton	  1980)	  145.	  62	  James	  Clifford,	  'On	  Ethnographic	  Authority'	  in	  Yvonna	  S.	  Lincoln	  and	  Norman	  K.	  Denzin	  (eds),	  
Turning	  Points	  in	  Qualitative	  Research:	  Tying	  Knots	  in	  the	  Handkerchief	  (AltaMira	  Press,	  Walnut	  Creek,	  California	  2003)	  123.	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necessary	   for	   piercing	   this	   wall.’63	   Theorisation,	   in	   this	   sense,	   becomes	   a	  political	  and	  practical	  exercise	  that	  questions	  both	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  and	  the	  horizon	  of	  possibilities	  presented	  by	   the	  abstract	  expositions.	  Theory,	   then,	   is	   not	   just	   an	   illustration	   of	   context,	   or	   it	   ‘does	   not	   express,	  translate,	  or	  serve	  to	  apply	  practise;	  it	  is	  practise.’64	  	  	  More	   significantly,	   as	   discussed	   above,	   the	   primary	   objective	   behind	   the	  research	   is	   to	   understand	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   in	   order	   to	   find	  ways	  through	  which	  the	  situation	  could	  be	  improved	  for	  the	  common	  citizen	  of	  the	   country.	   The	   instrumentality	   of	   theory	   granted,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   be	  conscious	  of	  the	  consequences	  and	  repercussions	  of	  the	  proposed	  perspectives.	  This	   is	   the	   main	   reason	   why	   the	   methodology	   of	   Engaged	   Theory	   has	   been	  employed	  here.	  The	  key	  aspect	  behind	  Engaged	  Theory	  is	  that	  it	  is	  ‘intended	  to	  support	  social	  change	  directly	  or	  indirectly’.65	  Like	  Grounded	  Theory,	  Engaged	  Theory	  also	  adopts	  the	  approach	  that	  ‘theory	  evolves	  dialogically’,66	  though	  this	  dialogue	   is	   not	   between	   data	   and	   analysis,	   but	   rather	   between	   practise	   and	  theory.	   A	   key	   difference	   lies	   in	   the	   idea	   that	   Engaged	   Theory	   does	   not	   see	  theorisation	  as	  value	  neutral,	  but	  as	  a	  political	  exercise.	  Carol	  Adams	  labels	  her	  research	  on	  sexuality	  as	  an	  ‘engaged	  theory	  that	  arises	  from	  anger;	  theory	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Michel	  Foucault	  and	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  'Intellectuals	  and	  power:	  A	  conversation	  between	  Michel	  Foucault	  and	  Gilles	  Deleuze'	  libcomorg,	  9	  September	  2006	  <http://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-­‐power-­‐a-­‐conversation-­‐between-­‐michel-­‐foucault-­‐and-­‐gilles-­‐deleuze>	  last	  accessed	  12	  February	  2012.	  64	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Donald	  Fernand	  Bouchard	  and	  Sherry	  Simon,	  Language,	  counter-­‐memory,	  
practice	  :	  selected	  essays	  and	  interviews	  (Blackwell,	  Oxford	  1977)	  207.	  65	  Ann	  Garry,	  'Intersections,	  Social	  Change	  and	  “Engaged	  Theories":	  Implications	  of	  North	  American	  Feminism'	  (2008)	  8	  Pacific	  and	  American	  Studies	  99,	  99.	  66	  Jacques	  M.	  Chevalier	  and	  Daniel	  J.	  Buckles,	  Participatory	  Action	  Research:	  Theory	  and	  Methods	  
for	  Engaged	  Inquiry	  (Routledge,	  Oxford	  2013)	  39.	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envisions	  what	   is	  possible.	  Engaged	  Theory	  makes	  change	  possible’.67	  And	  this	  kind	   of	   theorisation	   makes	   change	   possible	   by	   exposing	   problems,	   offering	  solutions,68	  and	  conducting	  reflexive	  research	  that	  ‘reflects	  on	  itself’	  in	  line	  with	  the	  researchers’	   ‘commitments	  to	  changing	  social	  history’.69	  More	  importantly,	  Engaged	   Theory	   highlights	   the	   importance	   to	   ‘understand	   that	   everything	   is	  connected.’70	   It	   is	   this	  commitment	   to	  change	  and	  the	   tendency	  to	  understand	  the	  connection	  between	  complex	  and	  seemingly	  unconnected	  phenomena	  that	  characterises	  the	  thesis	  under	  consideration.	  	  
C. Research	  Method	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  methods	  for	  research,	  I	  have	  relied	  on	  three	  categories	  of	  texts	  and	   literature.	   First,	   the	   literature	   related	   to	   law	   has	   been	   studied	   to	   better	  understand	   the	   multiple	   facets	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan.	   This	  includes	  the	  Constitution(s)	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  its	  related	  documents,	   legislations	  relevant	   to	   the	   discussion,	   and	   some	   related	   case	   reports	   and	   commentaries.	  Second,	  the	  legal-­‐theoretical	  literature,	  that	  encompasses	  a	  number	  of	  different	  paradigms	  and	  positions,	  has	  been	  engaged	  with	  to	  facilitate	  the	  dialogue	  with	  the	   context	   of	   the	   project.	   Third,	   I	   have	   extensively	   relied	   on	   secondary	  literature	   (mainly	   newspaper	   columns,	   articles,	   speeches,	   news	   stories	   and	  academic	   articles)	   to	   build	   a	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	  frameworks,	   the	   narratives	   employed	   to	   understand	   them,	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Carol	  J.	  Adams,	  The	  Sexual	  Politics	  of	  Meat:	  A	  Feminist-­‐Vegetarian	  Critical	  Theory	  (The	  Continuum	  International	  Publishing,	  London	  2010)	  2.	  68	  Ibid.	  69	  Jacques	  M.	  Chevalier	  and	  Daniel	  J.	  Buckles	  (2013)	  (n	  66)	  39.	  70	  Carol	  J.	  Adams	  (2010)	  (n	  67)	  2.	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contradictions	  that	  they	  raise.	  Because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  many	  significant	  academic	  studies	   on	   different	   aspects	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   narratives,	   the	   newspaper	  articles	  and	  reports	  are	  the	  main	  resources	  that	  highlight	   issues	  linked	  to	  law,	  religious	  notions,	  human	  rights,	  traditional	  courts,	  and	  their	  interplay.	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Chapter	  1: Overview	  of	  the	  Study	  
1.1. Chapter	  Synopsis	  
Building	   on	   the	   points	   raised	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   the	   current	   study,	   this	  chapter	   presents	   and	   discusses	   the	   main	   research	   question	   that	   guides	   the	  enquiry.	  It	  considers	  the	  key	  corollaries	  of	  the	  research	  question,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  implications	  of	  some	  of	  the	  conceptual	  categories	  that	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  this	  discussion.	  	  It	  also	  outlines	  the	  main	  assertions	  and	  arguments	  of	  the	  thesis	  in	  relation	  to	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain,	  and	  introduces	  the	  four	  dominant	   narratives	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   employed	   both	   within	   and	   outside	  Pakistan	  to	  understand	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  chapter	  highlights	  the	   challenges,	   paradoxes	   and	   limitations	   that	   appear	  within	   the	   assumptions	  and	   application	   of	   these	   narratives,	  when	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan.	   The	   last	   section	   of	   the	   chapter	   maps	   out	   the	  alternative	  proposition	  offered	  by	  this	  thesis	  that	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  a	  different	  framing	  of	  issues	  presented	  by	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  situation	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  more	  nuanced	  narrative	  on	  law	  within	  this	  context.	  	  	  	  	  
1.2. Law	  in	  Pakistan:	  Binaries	  of	  Opposition	  
The	  relationship	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  Law	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  one	  to	  characterise.	  In	   the	  past	  decade,	  Pakistan	  has	  seen	  a	  spirited	  movement	   for	   the	  restoration	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and	   independence	  of	   the	   judiciary,	  spearheaded	  by	   lawyers,71	  which	   finds	   few	  comparisons	   outside	   the	   country.	   Since	   the	   movement,	   the	   country’s	   courts	  have	  become	  one	  of	  the	  prime	  examples	  of	  judicial	  activism	  in	  the	  world.72	  The	  past	  decade	  has	  also	  seen	   the	  end	  of	  a	  military-­‐rule	  and	   the	   first	   transition	  of	  power	  in	  the	  country’s	  history	  from	  one	  civilian	  government	  to	  another.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  Pakistan	  has	  seen	  a	  rise	  in	  militancy,73	  insurgencies,74	  and	  internal	  and	  external	  violence	  –	  phenomena	  which	  in	  common	  parlance	  as	  well	  as	   academic	   discourses	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   problems	   associated	   with	  
Lawlessness,75	  absence	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,76	  erosion	  of	  Sovereignty,77	  attacks	  on	  
Human	  Rights,78	  and	  weakening	  of	  the	  Writ	  of	  the	  State.79	  The	  strengthening	  and	  activism	   of	   the	   legal	   sphere	   is	   in	   this	   sense	   coupled	   with	   its	   increasing	  weakening.	  The	  country	  with	  one	  of	   the	  most	  active	   judiciaries	   is	  also	   termed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  For	  a	  background	  on	  the	  events	  preceding	  the	  Lawyers’	  Movement,	  see	  Shoaib	  A.	  Ghias,	  'Miscarriage	  of	  Chief	  Justice:	  Judicial	  Power	  and	  the	  Legal	  Complex	  in	  Pakistan	  under	  Musharraf'	  (2010)	  35	  (4)	  Law	  &	  Social	  Inquiy	  985.	  For	  a	  timeline	  of	  events	  and	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  Movement’s	  strategy,	  see	  Zahid	  Shahab	  Ahmed	  and	  Maria	  J.	  Stephan	  (2010)	  (n	  18).	  72	  Charles	  H.	  Kennedy,	  'The	  Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Pakistan'	  in	  Björn	  Dressel	  (ed)	  The	  
Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Asia	  (Routledge,	  Oxford	  2012)	  158.	  	  73	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Islamist	  militancy	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16).	  74	  The	  nationalist	  struggle	  and	  insurgency	  in	  Balochistan	  has	  been	  continuing	  since	  the	  1970s,	  and	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  the	  political	  parties	  and	  the	  armed	  forces	  often	  wrongly	  band	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  Islamic	  militancy.	  Although	  this	  issue	  will	  not	  be	  covered	  in	  this	  thesis,	  for	  an	  account	  of	  Baloch	  nationalist	  struggle,	  see	  Adeel	  Khan,	  'Baloch	  Ethnic	  Nationalism	  in	  Pakistan:	  From	  Guerrilla	  War	  to	  Nowhere?'	  (2003)	  4	  (2)	  Asian	  Ethnicity	  281;	  and	  Adeel	  Khan,	  Politics	  of	  
Identity:	  Ethnic	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  State	  in	  Pakistan	  (Sage	  Publications,	  New	  Delhi	  2005)	  109-­‐126.	  75	  See,	  for	  instance	  Azhar	  Hassan	  Nadeem,	  Pakistan:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Lawlessness	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Karachi,	  Pakistan	  2002).	  	  76	  International	  Bar	  Association,	  'The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Legal	  System	  of	  Pakistan'	  (London	  1998).	  77	  Hassan-­‐Askari	  Rizvi,	  'Who	  is	  sovereign	  in	  Pakistan?'	  (Pakistan	  Today	  2012)	  <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/08/01/comment/columns/who-­‐is-­‐sovereign-­‐in-­‐pakistan/>	  last	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  78	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan,	  'State	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  2012'	  (HRCP,	  Lahore,	  Pakistan	  2013),	  4-­‐9.	  79	  Khaled	  Ahmed,	  'Pakistan	  and	  Nature	  of	  the	  State:	  Revisionism,	  Jihad	  and	  Governance'	  
Criterion	  Quarterly	  <http://www.criterion-­‐quarterly.com/pakistan-­‐and-­‐nature-­‐of-­‐the-­‐state-­‐revisionism-­‐jihad-­‐and-­‐governance/>	  last	  accessed	  18	  September	  2013.	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‘the	  most	  dangerous	  nation	   in	   the	  world’;80	   the	  country	  with	  an	   ‘ubiquitous’81	  and	  powerful	  state	   is	  also	  branded	  as	  a	   ‘lawless	  frontier’;82	  the	  country	  armed	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  amassed	  with	  the	  seventh	  largest	  army	  in	  the	  world,	  is	  also	  considered	  a	  ‘fragile’83	  and	  a	  ‘failed	  state’.84	  These	  binaries	  of	  opposition,	  at	   the	   least,	   make	   an	   intriguing	   case	   that	   necessitates	   further	   enquiry	   and	  compels	   us	   towards	   in-­‐depth	   examinations,	   both	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   these	  analyses	  as	  well	  as	  the	  phenomena	  they	  are	  concerned	  with.	  	  	  The	  present	  study	  offers	  such	  an	  examination,	  though	  it	  differs	  from	  the	  general	  discussions	  on	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  in	  some	  crucial	  aspects.	  It	  does	  not	  analyse	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   country	   in	   terms	   of	   power	   politics,	   international	  relations,	  foreign	  policy	  or	  security,	  which	  guide	  a	  great	  number	  of	  discussions	  on	  the	  topics	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state,	  both	  within	  and	  on	  Pakistan.	  It	  is	  an	  attempt	  towards	  uncovering	  (or	  discovering)	  the	  notion	  of	  law	  within	  the	  socio-­‐political	  terrain	   of	   the	   country	   through	   a	   discussion	   on	   sociological	   and	   critical	  perspectives	  on	   law.	  However,	   the	   thesis	  also	  moves	  away	   from	  the	  dominant	  narratives	   and	   theoretical	   approaches	   employed	   to	   understand	   law,	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Ron	  Moreau	  and	  Michael	  Hirsch,	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Nation	  in	  the	  World	  Isn't	  Iraq.	  It's	  
Pakistan.	  (Newsweek,	  New	  York	  2007).	  81	  Doug	  Bandow,	  'The	  Islamic	  Republic	  Of	  Pakistan:	  The	  World's	  Most	  Dangerous	  Nation	  Holds	  An	  Election'	  Forbes	  20	  May	  2013	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  last	  accessed	  12	  August	  2013.	  82	  Robert	  D.	  Kaplan,	  'The	  Lawless	  Frontier'	  The	  Atlantic	  <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/09/the-­‐lawless-­‐frontier/305296/>	  last	  accessed	  5	  November	  2013.	  83	  According	  to	  a	  recent	  report	  on	  ‘Fragility	  Indicators’,	  Pakistan	  is	  one	  of	  the	  top	  five	  ‘authority-­‐challenged	  fragile	  states’.	  See,	  David	  Carment	  and	  Yiagadeesan	  Samy,	  'Assessing	  State	  Fragility:	  A	  Country	  Indicators	  for	  Foreign	  Policy	  Report'	  (Country	  Indicators	  for	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Ottawa	  2012)	  7.	  84	  The	  Failed	  State	  Index	  2013	  ranks	  Pakistan	  as	  the	  13th	  most	  failed	  state	  in	  the	  world,	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  The	  Fund	  for	  Peace,	  'The	  Failed	  States	  Index	  2013'	  (The	  Fund	  for	  Peace	  2013)	  <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-­‐2013-­‐sortable>	  last	  accessed	  5	  November	  2013.	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institutions,	  functioning	  and	  failings	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  What	  follows	  is	  not	  a	  corpus	  of	  cases	  and	   judicial	  decisions,	  nor	  a	   list	  of	   laws	  and	   legislations,	  and	  neither	  is	  it	  solely	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	   mechanisms;	   rather,	   the	   study	   conducts	   a	   socio-­‐legal	   and	   theoretical	  exposition	   of	   the	   legal	   architecture	   of	   the	   country.	   This	   is	   based	   on	   the	  argument	  that	  several	  normative	  (and	  legal)	  structures	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  society	  and	   govern	   the	   realities	   of	   the	   country’s	   populace	   are	   excluded	   from	   a	   pure	  focus	   on	   state-­‐authored	   law	   and	   its	   various	   instruments.85	   The	   legal	  architecture	   of	   the	   country	   is	   an	   admixture	   of	   colonial	   law,	   post-­‐colonial	   law,	  common	   law,	   Islamic	   law,	   as	  well	   as	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   notions	  of	   legality.	  The	  struggle	  between	  these	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  country’s	  legal	  inheritances,	  constructions	   and	   narratives	   cannot	   be	   encompassed	   through	   an	   exclusive	  focus	   on	   legislations	   and	   judicial	   decisions,	   or	   adequately	   understood	   while	  remaining	  within	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  law.	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   the	   current	   study	   does	   not	   employ	   or	   propose	   a	  
grand	   theory	   as	  a	  panacea	   to	  examine	   the	   legal	   and	  normative	  architecture	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  resolve	  its	  contradictions.	  This	  is	  primarily	  because,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  argued	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  text,	  there	  are	  facets	  which	  are	  unique	  to	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  structure	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  which	  are	  difficult	  for	  any	  single	  legal	  theory	  to	  fully	   comprehend	   and	   explain.	   In	   this	   backdrop,	   the	   task	   at	   hand	   is	   not	   to	  construct	  or	   resurrect	   a	   theoretical	  proposition	  based	  only	  on	   its	   explanatory	  power;	  rather,	  the	  purpose	  here	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  prominent	  narratives	  of	  law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  See,	  The	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  96.	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as	  they	  exist	  within	  the	  country.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  theoretical	  foundations	  of	   these	  narratives,	  question	   their	   framing	  of	  problems	  as	  well	  as	  the	  solutions	  that	  emerge	  from	  this.	  The	  main	  aim	  for	  this	  problematisation	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  necessity	  and	  the	  urgency	  to	  move	  towards	  alternative	  narratives	  and	  context-­‐specific	  approaches	  to	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  I	   argue	   that	   there	   are	   four	   main	   narratives	   that	   dominate	   the	   reading	   and	  perception	  of	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  These	  are	  the	  narratives	  of	  ‘law	  as	  State-­‐oriented	   law’	   (including	   common	   law	   and	   English	   constitutional	  traditions),86	   of	   ‘Islamic	   law’	   (which	   emerges	   from	   a	   critique	   of	   colonial	   legal	  legacies,	  and	  creates	  inroads	  for	  what	  it	  claims	  as	  the	  real	  ethos	  of	  Pakistan),87	  of	   ‘Legal	  Pluralism’	   (which	  argues	   for	  a	   recognition	  of	   the	  multiplicity	  of	   legal	  and	  normative	  orderings)88	  and	  the	  narrative	  of	  Human	  Rights	  approach	  to	  law	  (which	  focuses	  on	  ideas	  of	  the	  responsiveness	  and	  responsibility	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state).89	   The	   assertion	   here	   is	   that	   these	   narratives	   read	   the	   concerned	  phenomena	  through	  their	  own	  particular	  lens,	  frame	  the	  problems	  according	  to	  their	  own	   logics	  and	  offer	  solutions	  based	  on	   their	  own	  reasoning,	  but	  during	  this	  process	  they	  exclude	  much	  more	  than	  they	  include.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  their	  analyses	   consistent	   and	   their	  perceived	   resolutions	  viable,	   these	   narratives	  of	  law	   disregard	   crucial	   elements	   that	   emerge	   from	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	  Pakistan.	  The	  task,	   then,	   is	   to	  challenge	  the	   foundational	  assumptions	  of	   these	  narratives;	  to	  see	  whether	  these	  frames	  and	  their	  underlying	  logics	  provide	  us	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Chapter	  4	  on	  page	  144.	  87	  Chapter	  5	  on	  page	  180.	  	  88	  Chapter	  6	  on	  page	  204.	  89	  Chapter	  7	  on	  page	  228.	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with	   an	   adequate	   answer,	   or	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   read	   the	   situation	  differently.	  	  	  
1.3. Main	  Research	  Question	  
In	  this	  backdrop,	   the	  main	  question	  addressed	  by	  this	   inquiry	   is:	  How	  may	  we	  
understand	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  situation	  of	  Pakistan?	  As	  this	  question	  leads	  to	  several	  secondary	   questions	   as	   a	   corollary,	   a	   deconstruction	   of	   the	   main	   research	  question	  is	  required	  before	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  in	  depth.	  There	  are	  three	  main	  components	  of	  the	  question	  in	  consideration:	  Which	  situation	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  we	  trying	   to	  address?	  Which	  phenomena	  are	  encompassed	  within	   the	  category	  of	  
socio-­‐legal?	   And,	   what	   does	   the	   thesis	   mean	   by	   understanding	   these	  phenomena?	  I	  will	  briefly	  consider	  them	  in	  turn.	  	  	  In	  recent	  discussions	  on	  the	  situation	  of	   law,	  society	  and	  the	  State	  in	  Pakistan,	  the	   term	   is	   employed	   to	   address	   anything	   from	   extremism,	   terrorism,	   and	  political	  and	  economic	  instability,90	  to	  inefficiency	  of	  governance	  apparatus	  and	  inadequacy	   of	   Rule	   of	   Law	  mechanisms.91	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  matter	   here	   is	   not	  about	  selecting	  which	  one	  of	  these	  in	  isolation	  is	  the	  most	  significant	  aspect	  of	  the	  said	  situation;	   rather,	   they	   together	   form	  the	  overall	   context	   in	  which	  any	  meaningful	  discussion	  on	  law	  and	  society	  in	  Pakistan	  can	  take	  place.	  The	  legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  See,	  generally,	  Yousuf	  Nazar,	  Balkanisation	  and	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Pakistan	  (National	  News	  Agency,	  Karachi,	  Pakistan	  2011);	  Usman	  Mustafa,	  'Determinants	  and	  Implications	  of	  Major	  Conflicts	  in	  Pakistan'	  (2013)	  4	  (1)	  Millennial	  Asia	  67.	  91	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Robert	  D.	  Lamb	  and	  Sadika	  Hameed,	  'Subnational	  Governance,	  Service	  Deliver,	  and	  Militancy	  in	  Pakistan'	  (Center	  for	  Strategic	  &	  International	  Studies,	  Washington,	  D.	  C.	  2012).	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situation	   of	   Pakistan	   is	   considered	   a	   situation	   only	   because	   it	   provides	   us	   a	  snapshot	  to	  allow	  comprehension	  and	  discussion;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  situation	  based	  on	  any	  temporal	  fixity,	  geographical	  permanence	  or	  a	  definite	  set	  of	  spheres.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  current	  thesis	  or	  any	  single	  treatise	  can	  account	  for	  all	  these	   disparate	   spheres.	   Though	   not	   dealing	   with	   them	   explicitly,	   the	   case	  presented	  here	   is	   that	  some	  of	   these	  occurrences	  (for	   instance,	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  extremist	   religious	   narrative	   in	   the	   country,	   the	   problems	   of	   governance	   and	  rule	   of	   law)	   are	   interlinked	   and	   cannot	   be	   considered	   in	   isolation.	  Moreover,	  these	   problems,	   rather	   than	   being	   self-­‐constituting	   and	   self-­‐contained,	   are	  manifestations	  of	  the	  country’s	  society-­‐state-­‐law	  disconnect.	  These	  problems	  do	  not	   merely	   exist	   because	   of	   the	   inefficiency	   of	   the	   legal	   system;	   rather,	   they	  exist	   because	   of	   the	   crises	   that	   lay	   at	   the	   foundation	   of	   law	   and	   the	   State	   in	  Pakistan.92	  Some	  of	  the	  nuances	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state	  as	  they	  are	  situated	  in	  the	  country	   elude	   the	   narratives	   commonly	   employed	   to	   understand	   them,	   and	  therefore	   the	   issues	   that	   emerge	   from	   them	   appear	   as	   distinct	   phenomena.	  These	  incidences,	  then,	  are	  symptoms	  of	  a	  much	  deeper	  problem	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state	  and,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  they	  form	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  context	  the	  thesis	  is	  attempting	  to	  read.	  	  The	   second	  component	  of	   the	  main	   research	  question	  emerges	   from	   the	  view	  adopted	   here	   that	   an	   exclusive	   emphasis	   on	   the	   category	   of	   law,	   as	   it	   is	  generally	   understood,	   subsumes	   the	   discussion	   to	   focus	   on	   legal	   instruments	  and	  mechanisms.	  This	  is	  why	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  main	  research	  question	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Chapter	  8	  on	  page	  251.	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the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   nature	   of	   the	   project.	   While	   the	   thesis	   does	  employ	   the	   category	   of	   socio-­‐legal,	   it	   is	   with	   some	   caveats	   –	   after	   all,	   the	  research	  does	  not	  present	  a	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  particular	  members	  of	  society	  who	  adhere	   to	   the	   discussed	   normative	   and	   legal	   systems,	   or	   indeed	   present	   a	  survey	   of	   how	   these	   structures	   impact	   the	   lives	   of	   participants.93	   It	   does	   not	  follow	   the	   mainstream	   socio-­‐legal	   method	   of	   starting	   off	   from	   a	   literature	  review,	  conducting	  ‘field-­‐work’	  and	  surveys	  based	  on	  the	  conceptual	  model,	  and	  then	  analysing	  the	  ‘data’	  and	  ‘findings’	  observed	  through	  this	  brief	  linkage	  with	  the	  society.94	   	   Is	   it	   then	  accurate	   to	   term	   this	  a	   socio-­‐legal	   research	  and,	   if	   so,	  what	  is	  the	  rationale	  behind	  it?	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	   is	  not	  only	  correct	  to	  use	  the	  category	  of	  socio-­‐legal,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  essential	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  legal	  terrain	  that	  this	   research	  examines	  provides	  us	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  broad	  societal	   context,	  focussing	   on	   the	   most	   prominent	   (as	   the	   existence	   of	   others	   cannot	   be	  precluded)	  normative	  and	   legal	  orderings	   that	  exist	  within	   this	   context.95	   It	   is	  set	  in	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  these	  systems	  engage	  and	  encounter	  each	  other.	  Law,	   including	   state	   law	  with	   its	   dominant	   role,	   is	   taken	   here	   as	   part	   of	   the	  larger	  societal	  set-­‐up,	  where	  other	  normative	  orderings	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  it	  and	  struggle	  with	  it.	  Examining	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  therefore	  allows	  us	  to	  not	  only	   study	  different	   legal	   structures	  within	   the	   country,	  but	   also	   to	   frame	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  methodological	  difficulties	  for	  socio-­‐legal	  studies	  as	  a	  discipline,	  see	  Reza	  Banakar	  and	  Max	  Travers,	  'Theory	  and	  method	  in	  socio-­‐legal	  research:	  Introduction'	  in	  Reza	  Banakar	  and	  Max	  Travers	  (eds),	  Theory	  and	  method	  in	  socio-­‐legal	  research	  (Hart,	  Oxford	  2005).	  On	  the	  wider	  issue	  of	  socio-­‐legal	  studies	  in	  the	  Third	  World,	  see	  Radha	  D'Souza,	  'Imperial	  Agendas,	  Global	  Solidarities	  and	  Third	  World	  Socio-­‐legal	  Studies:	  Methodological	  Reflections'	  (2012)	  49	  Osgoode	  Hall	  Law	  Journal	  409.	  D’Souza	  argues	  that	  even	  the	  prominent	  categories	  within	  socio-­‐legal	  studies,	  such	  as	  ‘society’	  and	  ‘pluralism’	  etc.,	  need	  to	  be	  reconsidered	  in	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  countries.	  94	  Jayan	  Nayar,	  'The	  Politics	  of	  Hope	  and	  the	  Other-­‐in-­‐the-­‐World:	  Thinking	  Exteriority'	  (2013)	  24	  (1)	  Law	  and	  Critique	  63,	  70.	  95	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  96.	  
40	  	  
them	  and	  find	  their	  place	  in	  the	  larger	  societal	  order.	  In	  this	  manner,	  the	  thesis	  approaches	  ideas	  of	  law	  and	  legality	  as	  the	  dominant	  frame	  of	  analysis,	  situated	  within	  the	  wider	  context.	  	  Finally,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  understanding	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  situation	  
of	  Pakistan	   is	   not	  merely	   to	   list	   or	   describe	  multiple	   facets	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  of	  the	  country,	  albeit	  this	  description	  of	  the	  diverse	  elements	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   is	   the	   first	  and	  necessary	  step.	  Within	  the	  growing,	  but	  still	  not	   sufficiently	   substantial,	   socio-­‐legal	   research	   studies	   conducted	   on	   the	  various	   areas	   of	   law	   in	  Pakistan,	   one	   struggles	   to	   find	   expositions	   that	  would	  bring	   together	   and	   outline	   the	   different	   and	   disparate	   legal	   or	   normative	  orderings	   in	  one	  place.96	   In	   the	  past	   few	  years,	   some	  exceptional	   accounts	  on	  the	   conceptual	   and	   historical	   trajectories	   of	   Islamic	   law,97	   colonial	   law	   and	  constitutional	   law	   of	   Pakistan	   have	   emerged.98	   There	   are	   also	   a	   growing	  number	  of	   publications	   on	  human	   rights	   and	   the	   conflicts	   between	   individual	  rights	  and	  traditional	  customary	  tribunals.99	  However,	  as	  these	  accounts	  mainly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  There	  are	  useful	  insights	  offered	  by	  some	  notable	  socio-­‐legal	  scholars,	  which	  I	  have	  combined	  and	  built	  on.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali,	  'Applying	  Islamic	  Criminal	  Justice	  in	  Plural	  Legal	  Systems:	  Exploring	  Gender-­‐Sensitive	  Judicial	  Responses	  to	  Hudood	  laws	  in	  Pakistan'	  (International	  Judicial	  Conference,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan,	  2006);	  Martin	  Lau,	  'Discussion	  Note	  on	  Informal	  and	  formal	  systems	  of	  rule	  of	  law:	  How	  does	  the	  donor	  community	  approach	  legal	  pluralism?'	  (World	  Bank	  Headline	  Seminar	  Seminar	  III:	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  Fragile	  and	  Conflict-­‐Affected	  Situations,	  London,	  2009);	  Werner	  Menski,	  'Flying	  kites	  in	  Pakistan:	  Turbulences	  in	  theory	  and	  practice'	  (2010)	  1	  (1)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Social	  Research	  41,	  51-­‐52.	  97	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Martin	  Lau,	  The	  Role	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Legal	  System	  of	  Pakistan	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  Leiden	  2006);	  Rubya	  Mehdi,	  The	  Islamization	  of	  the	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  (Nordic	  Institute	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  Monograph	  Series	  No	  60,	  Curzon	  Press,	  Richmond	  1994).	  	  98	  See,	  Osama	  Siddique,	  Pakistan’s	  Experience	  with	  Formal	  Law:	  An	  Alien	  Justice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  2013).	  99	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali,	  'The	  Rights	  of	  Ethnic	  Minorities	  in	  Pakistan:	  A	  Legal	  Analysis'	  (1999)	  6	  (169-­‐195)	  International	  Journal	  on	  Minority	  and	  Group	  Rights	  169;	  Nasira	  Iqbal,	  'Legal	  Pluralism	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  its	  implications	  on	  Women’s	  Rights'	  in	  Jennifer	  Bennett	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maintain	  a	  focus	  on	  selected	  elements	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  or	  any	  one	  of	   the	   relevant	   thematic	   areas	   (such	  as	  pluralism,	   Islamic	   law,	   and	   so	  on),	   for	  new	   researchers	   or	   readers	   of	   socio-­‐legal	   studies	   to	   discover	   what	   may	   be	  included	   within	   the	   labels	   of	   legal	   and	   socio-­‐legal	   in	   the	   Pakistani	   context	  becomes	   an	   incessant	   process	   of	   re-­‐inventing	   the	   wheel.	   Laying	   out	   all	   the	  disparate	  aspects	  of	  the	  country’s	  legal	  tapestry	  into	  one	  place	  is	  therefore	  the	  essential	  first	  step	  towards	  understanding	  the	  legal	  and	  socio-­‐legal	  situation	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  first	  contribution	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Outlining	   the	   multiple	   normative	   and	   legal	   orderings	   of	   Pakistan	   inevitably	  leads	  to	  questions	  on	  their	  links,	  encounters	  and	  conflicts.	  The	  need	  to	  examine	  these	   orderings	   and	   their	   encounters	   exists,	   not	   to	   forecast	   or	   predict	   their	  future	  direction(s),	  but	  because	  we	  do	  not	  even	  have	  adequate	  knowledge	  about	  their	  past.	  The	  entire	  purpose	  behind	  this	  exercise	  is	  that	  if	  a	  holistic	  picture	  of	  the	  phenomena	  could	  begin	  to	  take	  shape,	  it	  might	  allow	  us	  to	  frame	  the	  issues	  through	   a	   different	   lens	   and	   assist	   us	   in	  moving	   towards	   a	   conception	   of	   the	  legal	   and	   normative	   systems	   that	   is	   more	   responsive	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  country’s	  populace.100	  This	  is	  where	  legal	  and	  political	  theoretical	  perspectives	  help	   us.	   By	   highlighting	   what	   arguments	   lay	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   prominent	  narratives	  of	  law,	  the	  theoretical	  propositions	  assist	  us	  in	  reading	  the	  situation,	  deciphering	  the	  institutions	  involved,	  and	  make	  us	  aware	  of	  the	  problems	  and	  pitfalls	  associated	  with	  our	  reading(s).	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (ed)	  Scratching	  the	  Surface:	  Democracy,	  Traditions,	  Gender	  (Heinrich	  Boll	  Foundation,	  Lahore	  2007).	  100	  See,	  section	  The	  need	  to	  examine	  Pakistan’s	  Legal	  Tapestry,	  in	  Introduction	  of	  the	  current	  text	  on	  page	  6.	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thesis,	   however,	   a	  number	  of	  mainstream	   legal-­‐theoretical	   paradigms	  and	   the	  narratives	   they	  generate	  prove	  problematic	  when	  considered	   in	   isolation,	  and	  are	   unable	   to	   adequately	   analyse	   the	   lacunae	   that	   are	   unique	   to	   the	   legal	  architecture	   of	   Pakistan.	   Nevertheless,	   these	   theoretical	   viewpoints	   offer	   us	  valuable	  insights,	  which	  can	  and	  should	  be	  built	  upon.	  	  	  The	   thesis,	   therefore,	  approaches	   the	  subject	  matter	  as	  a	   two-­‐way	  dialogue:	   it	  scrutinises	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   of	   the	   country	   from	   theoretical	  standpoints,	   while	   simultaneously	   questioning,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  Pakistan’s	  legal	  realities,	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  law	  that	  are	  constructed	  on	  such	   propositions.	   The	   theoretical	   propositions	   have	   been	   approached	  primarily	   because	   they	   are,	   or	   have	   been,	   employed	   by	   legal	   academics	   and	  practitioners	   to	   explain	   the	   nature	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   frameworks,	   recognise	  their	  problems	  and	  offer	  solutions.	  The	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  to	  advocate	  the	   development	   of	   context-­‐specific	   theories	   (in	   the	   plural)	   of	   law	   emerging	  from,	  and	  applicable	   to,	   the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	   It	  offers	  one	  attempt	   towards	  this,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  inviting	  discussion,	  critique	  and	  further	  endeavours.	  	  
1.4. Four	  Narratives	  and	  Four	  Assertions	  
In	   light	   of	   the	   discussion	   above,	   there	   are	   four	   primary	   arguments	   that	   are	  offered	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   First,	   it	   brings	   together	   and	   problematises	   the	  history	   and	   conceptual	   trajectories	   of	   multiple	   (and	   more	   prominent)	  normative	   and	   legal	   orderings	   in	   the	   country.	   The	   list	   of	   these	   normative	  orderings	  includes	  notions	  of	  common	  law	  and	  constitutional	  traditions,	  Islamic	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Law,	  traditional	  law,	  the	  law	  of	  the	  tribal	  areas,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  increasing	  spheres	  of	   ‘lawlessness’	   and	   violence.	   The	   argument	   here	   is	   that	   these	   normative	   and	  legal	  orderings	  do	  not	  form	  disparate	  realities,	  but	  should	  be	  read	  as	  part	  of	  a	  whole	  –	  it	  is	  only	  when	  we	  move	  towards	  understanding	  them	  as	  threads	  within	  a	  single	  Tapestry	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  comprehend	  Law	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  context.	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   qualify	   why	   the	   terminology	   of	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   is	  significant	   here.101	   Thus	   far,	   the	   thesis	   has	   employed	   the	   terms	   ‘legal	  architecture’	   or	   ‘framework’	  when	   addressing	   the	   constitutive	   peculiarities	   of	  the	  legal	  set-­‐up	  in	  Pakistan.	  I	  am	  aware,	  however,	  that	  the	  use	  of	  all	  these	  terms	  in	   this	   context	   (set-­‐up,	   architecture,	   framework,	   formation,	   structure)	   is	  inadequate	   for	   two	  reasons.	  One	  reason	   for	   the	   inadequacy	   is	   that	  such	   terms	  appear	  to	  signify	  that	  the	  system	  they	  refer	  to	  has	  a	  pre-­‐defined	  purpose	  and	  a	  
telos	  which	   consciously	  provides	   a	   rationale	   for	   the	   system’s	  particular	   shape	  and	  constitution.	  Moreover,	   these	  conceptual	  categories	   imply	  that	   the	  system	  is	   a	   holistic	   entity	  with	   internal	   consistency,	  with	   its	   constitutive	   elements	   or	  sections	   arranged	   in	   some	   kind	   of	   order,	   or	   co-­‐existing	  with	   some	   kind	   of	   an	  agreement.	  These	  elements	  or	  sections	  may	  overlap,	  but	  they	  nevertheless	  are	  implied	  to	  have	  a	  mutual	  acceptance	  for	  each	  other	  or	  the	  whole	  ‘framework’	  or	  ‘structure’	   breaks	   down.	   As	   the	   following	   chapters	  will	   show,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  read	   the	   legal	   architecture	   or	   framework	  of	   Pakistan	   in	   the	   said	  manner.	   The	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  country	  have	  emerged	  from	  different	   historical	   trajectories,	   different	   conceptual	   and	   normative	   notions,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  With	  thanks	  to	  Dr.	  Jayan	  Nayar	  for	  suggesting	  the	  term	  ‘tapestry’	  to	  approach	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  phenomena	  in	  consideration.	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different	  needs	  and	  realities.	  These	  constitutive	  sections	  are	  also	   in	  a	  struggle	  amongst	  themselves,	  competing	  to	  dominate	  each	  other,	  vying	  to	  impose	  one’s	  own	  normative	  definitions	  over	  the	  other.	  So	  the	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  framework	  or	  architecture	  here	  is	  with	  a	  caveat	  –	  the	  phenomena	  these	  refer	  to	  are	  not	  always	  consistent,	   similar	   or	   symmetrical.	   These	   different	   claims	   to	   law	   exist	   in	   a	  conflict	   with	   each	   other,	   which	   is	   at	   times	   violent,	   each	   judging,	   negating	   or	  trying	  to	  overcome	  the	  other	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  Each	  of	  these	  normative	  orders	  and	   narratives	   pulls	   the	   terrain	   towards	   different	   tangents.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  socio-­‐legal	   setup	   of	   the	   country	   is	   more	   akin	   to	   a	   tapestry,	   with	   interwoven	  threads	  of	  different	  normative	  orderings	  –	  considering	  any	  of	  these	  in	  isolation	  from	   the	  others	   creates	  a	   gap,	   and	  pulling	  one	   (normative)	   thread	  away	   from	  the	  others	  creates	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  entire	  framework	  to	  collapse.	  	  The	   second	   assertion	  made	   in	   this	   thesis	   pertains	   to	   the	   dominant	   narratives	  employed	  to	  understand	  or	  explain,	  both	  law	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  the	   complexity	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture.	  As	  mentioned	   above,	   the	   thesis	  examines	  these	  narratives	  that	  are	  employed,	  in	  common	  discourses	  as	  well	  as	  academic	  or	  legal	  practitioner	  accounts,	  to	  understand	  the	  functioning	  of	  law	  in	  the	   country.	   These	   narratives	   problematise	   the	   situation	   through	   their	   own	  specific	   logics,	   highlight	   the	   deficiencies	   of	   the	   systems	   through	   their	   own	  readings,	  and	  offer	  solutions	  based	  on	  their	  own	  judgements	  on	  the	  issues.	  	  	  In	   this	   regard,	   I	   argue	   that	   there	   are	   four	  main	   narratives	   that	   dominate	   the	  reading	  and	  perception	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  The	  most	  prominent	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narrative	   focusses	   on	   law	   as	   a	   specific	   domain	   of	   the	   state	   institutions	   and	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	  constitution,	  legislations,	  court	  judgements	  and	  state	  proclamations.	   This,	   as	   it	   would	   be	   elaborated,	   is	   based	   on	   the	   tradition	   of	  common	   law	  which	   is	   part	   of	   the	   colonial	   legacy	   of	   the	   region,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  legal	  positivistic	  discourse	  within	  the	  spheres	  of	  legal	  practise	  and	  academia.	  The	  second	  narrative	  approaches	  the	  common	  law	  and	  positivist	  notion	  as	  ‘alien’	  legal	  traditions,	  and	  criticises	  the	  colonial	  legacy	  of	  the	  region.	  With	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   current	   legal	   and	   judicial	   architecture	  was	   imposed	  on	  the	  region	  by	  the	  colonial	  authorities	  to	  further	  their	  own	  aims	  of	  governance,	  this	  narrative	  favours	  the	  normative	  orderings	  allegedly	  more	  rooted	  within	  the	  region’s	   history,	   and	   prefers	   the	   notion	   of	   Islamic	   law	   in	   place	   of	   a	   western-­‐styled	   legal	  system.102	  The	   third	  narrative	   to	  understand	   law	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  in	  part	  emerges	  from	  the	  second	  narrative.	  Based	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  legal	  pluralism,	   it	   critiques	   the	   colonial	   legacy	   that	   underpins	   the	   state	   law	   and	  formal	  legal	  institutions	  and	  then	  argues	  for	  the	  resurrection	  of,	  or	  a	  return	  to,	  the	  local	  and	  indigenous	  mechanisms	  of	  justice.	  This	  perspective	  mainly	  argues	  that	   the	   state	   law,	   indigenous	   laws	   and	   Islamic	   law	   are	   all	   valid	   and	   legal	  normative	   orders	   that	   co-­‐exist	   within	   the	   Pakistani	   context,	   and	   should	   be	  respected	  as	  such.	  The	  fourth	  narrative,	  though	  an	  emergent	  one,	  is	  increasingly	  gaining	   a	   dominant	   position	   among	   civil	   society	   activists,	   Non-­‐Governmental	  Organisations	  and	  even	  among	  the	   legal	   fraternity.	   It	  criticises	   the	  misogynist,	  sectarian	   and	   elitist	   practises	  within	   the	   forums	  of	   state	   law,	   Islamic	   law	   and	  traditional	   tribunals	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   Human	   Rights.	   It	   is	   primarily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Khurshid	  Ahmad,	  'Islam	  and	  Democracy:	  Some	  Conceptual	  and	  Contemporary	  Dimensions'	  (2000)	  90	  (1-­‐2)	  The	  Muslim	  World	  1,	  19.	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geared	   towards	   the	   demands	   for	   state’s	   accountability	   and	   goes	   as	   far	   as	  claiming	   that	  every	  other	   legal/normative	  order	   that	  exists	  outside	   the	  state’s	  authority	  is	  illegal.103	  	  As	  modes	  to	  ‘organise	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  experience	  and	  action’,104	  each	  of	  these	  narratives	  reads	  the	  situation	  of	  Law	  in	   its	  own	  particular	  manner,	  with	  the	  framing	  of	  issues	  and	  problems,	  as	  well	  as	  solutions	  to	  these,	  based	  on	  their	  initial	   perception	   or	   structuring	   of	   the	   situation.	   I	   argue	   that	   while	   these	  narratives	  provide	  us	  with	  useful	  insights	  about	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan,	  their	   foundational	   logics	   compel	   them	   to	   ignore	   those	   facets	   that	   do	   not	  conform	   to	   their	   predefined	   categories.	   In	   order	   to	   maintain	   their	   internal	  consistencies,	   these	   narratives	   exclude	   far	   more	   than	   they	   include	   in	   their	  analyses	   and,	   in	   this	   process,	   the	   viability	   of	   their	   framing	   and	   proposed	  resolutions	   comes	   into	   question.	   The	   myopic	   and	   isolationist	   standpoints	  adopted	   through	   these	   narratives	   ignore	   the	   country’s	   socio-­‐legal	   realities,	  which	  undermines	  their	  own	  assumptions.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  state	  here	  that	  this	   critique	   is	   primarily	   levelled	   against	   the	   narratives	   built	   around	   the	  multiple	   legal-­‐theoretical	   frameworks,	   rather	   than	   against	   the	   frameworks	  themselves.	  Indeed	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible,	  or	  even	  desirable,	  to	  analyse	  these	  diverse	  formulations	  such	  as	  human	  rights,	  pluralism	  or	  Islamic	  law	  in	  a	  single	  study.	   The	   current	   thesis	   therefore	   differentiates	   these	   frameworks	   from	   the	  narratives	   that	   emerge	   from	   them,	   who	   mutilated	   form	   can	   be	   identified	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Chapter	  7	  on	  page	  228.	  104	  David	  Carr,	  Time,	  Narrative,	  and	  History	  (Indiana	  University	  Press,	  Bloomington,	  Indiana	  1991)	  71.	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Pakistan’s	   legal	   and	  political	   discourse.	  These	   issues	  will	   be	   elaborated	   in	   the	  course	   of	   this	   thesis,	   as	   subsequent	   chapters	   will	   consider	   each	   of	   these	  narratives	  in	  depth.	  	  The	  third	  key	  assertion	  of	  the	  thesis	  emerges	  from	  this	  problematisation	  of	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  of	   law,	  which	  prove	  unable	   to	   explain	   the	   lacunae	  of	   the	  complex	   legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan.	   I	   argue	   that	   these	   contradictions	   and	   the	  different	   facets	   of	   this	   legal	   tapestry	   exist	   in	   the	   footprint	   of	   historical	  colonialism	   and	   consequent	   notions	   of	   ‘Coloniality’105	   that	   still	   dominate	   the	  normative	   orderings.	   Therefore,	   a	   preferable	   approach	   to	   understanding	   the	  complexity	  in	  question	  is	  to	  situate	  the	  current	  system	  of	  law	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  continuing	   Coloniality,	   through	  which	   the	   crises	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   system(s)	  can	  be	  approached	  in	  a	  more	  nuanced	  manner.	  	  	  Fourth,	   and	   finally,	   the	   thesis	  makes	   the	   case	   for	   an	   alternative	   lens	   through	  which	  some	  of	  these	  contradictions	  and	  lacunae	  can	  be	  framed	  and	  understood	  better.	  Through	  building	  on	  the	  framework	  of	  Coloniality	  the	  thesis	  argues	  that	  it	   is	   not	   the	   inefficiency	  of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   lack	  of	   nation-­‐building	  measures	  that	  lay	  behind	  the	  problems	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  currently	  embroiled	  in;	  rather	  it	  is	  the	   flawed	   logic	   of	   state	   formation	   and	   nation-­‐building	   that	   have	   resulted	   in	  disastrous	  consequences.	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  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo,	  'Delinking:	  The	  Rhetoric	  of	  modernity,	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  logic	  of	  coloniality	  and	  the	  grammar	  of	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  (2007)	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1.5. The	  Crises	  of	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  
Although	   Chapter	   8	   will	   be	   devoted	   to	   a	   detailed	   discussion	   on	   the	   last	   two	  assertions,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  provide	  a	  sketch	  of	  the	  alternative	  narrative	  on	  law	  here	  before	  moving	  further.	  To	  move	  towards	  a	  more	  nuanced	  narrative	  on	  law	  in	  Pakistan,	  the	  study	  takes	  cue	  from	  the	  discussion	  on	  colonialism	  in	  the	  sub-­‐continent	  and	  highlights	  how,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  mainstream	  legal	   instruments	  and	   institutions,	   even	   the	   notions	   of	   Islamic	   law	   and	   local	   customs	   were	  fossilised	   and	   transformed	   through	   the	   colonial	   encounter.106	   In	   this	   sense,	  colonialism	   provides	   the	   common	   thread	   that	   runs	   through	   all	   the	   different	  components	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry,	  and	  lays	  the	  terrain	  in	  which	  the	  current	   events	   play	   out.	   However,	   differentiating	   its	   proposition	   from	   other	  post-­‐colonial	  assertions,	  the	  study	  argues	  that	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  de-­‐colonial,107	  rather	   than	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  position,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  divest	   the	  Coloniality	   in	  Law	   from	   the	   historical	   event	   of	   colonialism.	   Building	   on	   the	   frameworks	  provided	   by	   Anibal	   Quijano,108	   Walter	   Mignolo	   and	   others,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	  Coloniality	  in	  Law	  introduced	  three	  different	  tendencies	  within	  the	  legal	  terrain	  of	  the	  sub-­‐continent:	  First,	  it	  generated	  a	  Colonial	  Logic	  within	  	  legal	  institutions	  and	   frameworks,	   that	   alienated	   them	   from	   the	   people	   and	   focussed	   them	   on	  self-­‐preservation;	   second,	   it	   transformed	   the	   rationalities	   that	   lay	   behind	   the	  multiple	  legalities,	  and	  thus	  instituted	  a	  colonial	  and	  totalitarian	  nature	  of	  law;	  and	   finally,	   it	   led	   to	   the	   Fetishisation	   of	   the	   legal	   form,	   because	   of	   which	   an	  undue	   focus	   remains	   on	   the	   structure	   and	   form	   of	   law	   rather	   than	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Chapter	  8	  on	  page	  251.	  107	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105).	  108	  See,	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2007)	  (n	  12).	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alignment	  to	  notions	  of	   justice.	  (Re)reading	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  through	  these	  lenses,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  what	  characterises	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  predicaments	  is	  a	  contestation	  between	  totalitarian	  and	  colonial	  legalities,	  and	  the	  crisis	  of	  state	  formation	  that	  is	  still	  caught	  within	  the	  colonial	  logic.	  	  
1.6. Conclusion	  
The	   facets	   outlined	   in	   the	   discussion	   above	  will	   be	   clarified	   and	   discussed	   in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  But	  before	  the	  identified	  narratives	  of	  law	  and	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  can	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ground	  it	  in	   the	   context	   which	   they	   claim	   to	   read	   and	   analyse.	   The	   next	   two	   chapters	  would	  therefore	  present	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  crises	  that	  Pakistan	   has	   faced	   since	   independence,	   and	   then	   conduct	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	  different	  facets	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  normative	  tapestry	  of	  the	  country.	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Chapter	  2: A	   History	   of	   Legal	   Uncertainty:	   Post-­‐Independence	  
Turmoil	  in	  Pakistan	  	  
2.1. Chapter	  Synopsis	  
In	   order	   to	   discuss	   and	   analyse	   the	   narratives	   of	   law	   introduced	   in	   the	  preceding	   chapter	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan,109	   it	   is	  important	   to	   first	   lay	   out	   and	   ascertain	   the	   phenomena	   that	   constitute	   the	  context	   of	   the	   study.	   The	   identification,	   elaboration	   and	   examination	   of	   the	  context	  provide	  the	  subject	  matter	  for	  the	  current	  chapter	  and	  the	  chapter	  that	  follows.	  The	  present	  chapter	  presents	  a	  brief	  history	  of	   the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  turmoil	  that	  has	  gripped	  Pakistan	  since	  its	  independence.	  It	  encompasses	  the	  major	  political	  and	  legal	  upheavals	  that	  the	  country	  has	  witnessed	  in	  its	  66	  year	   history,	   the	   power	   struggle	   between	   the	   political	   cadre	   and	   the	   armed	  forces,	  and	  the	  oscillations	  between	  secular	  and	  religious	  discourses	  on	  law	  and	  their	  interplay	  in	  the	  legal	  arena.	  The	  main	  purpose	  behind	  providing	  this	  brief	  description	  is	  to	  offer	  the	  reader	  a	  snapshot	  into	  not	  only	  the	  turbulent	  history	  of	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   structures	   of	   Pakistan,	   but	   also	   to	   emphasise	   the	  complexity	  of	   the	  subject	  matter,	   in	  order	   to	  convey	  the	  reason	  why	  divesting	  law	   from	   the	   discourse	   of	   politics	   is	   fraught	   with	   difficulty	   in	   this	   context.	  Chapter	   3	  will	   build	   on	   this	   description	   and	   develop	   the	   context	   of	   the	   study	  further,	  by	  discussing	   the	  multiple	  normative	  and	   legal	  orderings	   that	  exist	   in	  the	  country	  and	  form	  distinct	  yet	  interconnected	  threads	  within	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  See,	  Chapter	  1,	  Four	  Narratives	  and	  Four	  Assertions	  on	  page	  42.	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2.2. A	  History	  of	  Legal	  and	  Constitutional	  Uncertainty	  
Entrants	   to	   the	   field	   of	   socio-­‐legal	   study	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Pakistan	   are	   faced	  with	  a	  two-­‐fold	  challenge:	  First,	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  extensive	  research	  and	  literature	  base	  to	  build	  further	  research	  on;	  and	  second,	  the	  difficulty	  in	  disentangling	  the	  complexity	   of	   the	   subject	   matter.	   The	   first	   difficulty	   facing	   those	   involved	   in	  legal-­‐theoretical	  or	  socio-­‐legal	   study	  of	  Pakistan	  arises	   from	  the	  unavailability	  of	  a	  sizeable	  research	  literature	  and	  scarcity	  of	  rigorous	  prior	  analyses,	  on	  the	  subject,	   that	   may	   provide	   sound	   footing	   for	   further	   analysis.110	   	   Despite	   the	  importance	   and	   the	   need	   for	   using	   socio-­‐legal	   analysis	   to	   understand	   the	  complex	   legal	   orders	   in	   post-­‐colonial	   countries,111	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  literature	   on	   law	   from	   or	   on	   Pakistan	   further	   highlights	   this	   issue.	   It	   reveals,	  along	  with	   less	   than	   a	   handful	   of	   studies	   on	   socio-­‐legal	   aspects,112	   books	   and	  publications	  on	  issues	  of	  taxation,	  family	  law,	  finance,	  analysis	  of	  legal	  decisions	  and	   commentaries	   on	   the	   criminal	   codes	   and	  procedures,	   and	   so	   forth.	  These	  texts	   are	   interspersed	   with	   academic	   and	   newspaper	   articles	   on	   different	  aspects	   of	   law,	   particularly	   the	   struggles	   between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  The	  bulk	  of	  research	  corpus	  in	  this	  sphere	  comes	  from	  a	  relatively	  small	  community	  of	  notable	  socio-­‐legal	  scholars,	  who	  have	  provided	  us	  deep	  insights	  into	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  plurality	  and	  the	  workings	  of	  particular	  legal	  orderings	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  This	  includes	  the	  work	  of	  Prof	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (University	  of	  Warwick),	  Prof	  Anita	  Weiss	  (University	  of	  Oregon),	  Prof	  Martin	  Lau	  (SOAS,	  London),	  Prof	  Werner	  Menski	  (SOAS,	  London),	  Prof	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (Brunel	  University)	  and	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (University	  of	  Copenhagen).	  Some	  noteworthy	  publications	  have	  emerged	  from	  Ihsan	  Yilmaz,	  (Fatih	  University,	  Turkey),	  Osama	  Siddique	  (Lahore	  University	  of	  Management	  Sciences,	  Pakistan),	  Ayesha	  Shahid	  (Brunel	  University)	  and	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (Quaid-­‐e-­‐Azam	  University,	  Pakistan),	  among	  others.	  The	  relevant	  works	  of	  these	  scholars	  will	  be	  cited	  in	  the	  relevant	  sections	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  However,	  the	  argument,	  that	  this	  above-­‐mentioned	  list	  of	  scholars	  covers	  a	  great	  percentage	  of	  the	  overall	  socio-­‐legal	  corpus	  on	  Pakistan,	  is	  presented	  primarily	  to	  underscore	  the	  scarcity	  of	  publications	  in	  this	  field.	  111	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Santos’s	  description	  of	  the	  limitation	  of	  conventional	  view	  of	  law	  (and	  even	  law	  and	  society)	  and	  his	  assertion	  of	  interlegality	  and	  plurality	  of	  legal	  orders.	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos,	  'Law:	  A	  Map	  of	  Misreading.	  Toward	  a	  Postmodern	  Conception	  of	  Law'	  (1987)	  14	  (3)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  279.	  112	  See,	  footnote	  96.	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government,	   which	   have	   seen	   an	   exponential	   increase	   since	   the	   Lawyers’	  Movement	  of	  2007.113	  Granting	  the	  importance	  of	  literature	  on	  doctrinal	  law	  in	  the	   sphere	   of	   legal	   practise,	   the	   assertion	  made	   here	   is	   that	   this	   rather	   one-­‐dimensional	   picture	   of	   the	   legal	   system	   is	   symptomatic	   of	   the	   dominant	  narrative	  on	   law	   in	   the	   country.	  This	  narrative,	  based	  on	   the	   legal	  positivistic	  approach	   to	   law,	   focuses	   primarily	   on	   state-­‐authored	   and	   state-­‐oriented	   law,	  and	  does	  not	  permit	  one	  to	  grasp	  a	  more	  nuanced	  and	  complete	  picture	  of	  legal	  systems	  in	  their	  societal	  context.	  	  	  There	   are	   some	   recent	   contributions,	   however,	   that	   recognise	   this	   void	   and	  attempt	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   law	   and	   its	   sociological	   or	   theoretical	  analysis.	  There	  have	  been	  efforts	  to	  trace	  the	  role	  of	  religious	  legal	  conceptions	  and	   Islamisation	   in	   the	   Constitution,	   laws	   and	   judicial	   approach	   in	   Pakistan,	  though	   some	   of	   these	   accounts	   are	   caught	   within	   particular	   ideological	  perspectives	   and	   are	   unable	   to	   transcend	   these	   confines.114	   Other	   recent	  studies,	   carried	   out	   primarily	   to	   advocate	   human	   rights	   and	   women’s	   rights	  issues,	   have	   also	   brought	   the	   issues	   of	   legal	   pluralism	   in	   the	   country	   to	   the	  fore.115	   There	   are	   publications	   tracing	   the	   colonial	   history	   of	   the	   laws	   in	  Pakistan,	  mainly	  focussing	  on	  the	  genealogies	  of	  particular	  laws,	  which	  include	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  See,	  footnote	  18.	  114	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Mohammad	  Amin,	  Islamization	  of	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  (Sang-­‐e-­‐Meel	  Publications,	  Lahore	  1989);	  Rashida	  Patel,	  Islamisation	  of	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  (Faiza	  Publishers,	  Karachi	  1986).	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  excellent	  expositions	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  legal	  system	  of	  Pakistan.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (1994)	  (n	  97).	  115	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Ethnic	  
Minorities	  of	  Pakistan:	  Constitutional	  and	  Legal	  Perspectives	  (Curzon,	  Richmond	  2001);	  Shaheen	  
Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99);	  Nafisa	  Shah,	  'Making	  of	  Crime,	  Custom	  and	  Culture:	  The	  Case	  of	  Karo	  Kari	  Killings	  of	  Upper	  Sindh'	  in	  Jennifer	  Bennett	  (ed)	  Scratching	  the	  Surface:	  Democracy,	  
Traditions,	  Gender	  (Heinrich	  Boll	  Foundation,	  Lahore	  2007).	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some	  controversial	   Islamic	   laws	  and	  regulations	  governing	   the	  Tribal	  Regions	  of	   the	   country.116	   However,	   all	   these	   studies	   on	   aspects	   of	   Islamisation,	  Pluralism	   and	   Colonialism	   of	   Pakistan’s	   laws	   taken	   together	   would	   in	   all	  probability	  number	  in	  tens	  rather	  than	  hundreds.117	  	  	  The	  second	  key	  challenge	  that	   impedes	  sociological	  and	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  which	  acts	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  behind	  the	  deficiency	  of	  research	   focus	   on	   this	   topic,	   is	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   subject	   matter.	   This	  complexity	  of	  the	  historical	  and	  political	  situation	  of	  Pakistan	  hinders	  any	  clear	  analysis,	  evaluation	  or	  (re)thinking	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state	  without	  falling	  prey	  to	  any	  of	   the	  numerous	   traps	   that	   the	   current	   socio-­‐political	   environment	  of	   the	  country	   lays	   out.	   The	   persistent	   and	   numerous	   issues	   that	   the	   country	   is	  troubled	  with	   render	   that	   the	   discussions	   on	   law	   and	   the	   state	   are	   generally	  conducted	   from	   the	   lens	   of	   politics	   and	   ideological	   standpoints,	   rather	   than	  being	  conducted	  as	  socio-­‐legal,	  critical	  or	  theoretical	  debates.	  	  	  The	   unaccountability	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   hijacking	   by	   individuals	   with	   socio-­‐economic	   power,	   and	   the	   dominance	   of	   the	   country’s	   armed	   forces	   in	   every	  aspect	  of	  the	  state	  and	  society	  represent	  just	  one	  part	  of	  the	  picture.118	  This	  is	  coupled	   with	   blatant	   intervention	   of	   neo-­‐imperialist	   policies	   in	   the	   country,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97);	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2013)	  (n	  98).	  117	  For	  instance,	  the	  British	  Library,	  the	  largest	  library	  in	  the	  world,	  holds	  only	  451	  books	  in	  different	  languages	  relevant	  to	  different	  topics	  of	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  (last	  accessed	  on	  5	  August	  2013).	  Out	  of	  these,	  less	  than	  ten	  percent	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  broadly	  linked	  to	  any	  notions	  of	  socio-­‐legal	  or	  theoretical	  research	  on	  Law	  in	  Pakistan.	  118	  On	  the	  dominant	  role	  of	  the	  military	  in	  Pakistani	  politics	  and	  economy,	  see	  generally,	  Hassan-­‐Askari	  Rizvi,	  The	  Military	  and	  Politics	  in	  Pakistan,	  1947-­‐86	  (Konark	  Publishers,	  New	  Delhi,	  India	  1988);	  Ayesha	  Siddiqa	  Agha	  (2007)	  (n	  16).	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backed	   by	   military	   force	   and	   economic	   sanctions.119	   The	   situation	   is	   further	  complicated	  by	   the	   rise	   of	  militancy	   and	   insurgencies,	   an	   analysis	   of	  which	   is	  often	  obscured	  by	  the	  use	  of	  religious	  terminology.120	  There	  is	  an	  alarming	  rise	  of	  religious	  and	  political	  intolerance	  amongst	  sections	  of	  the	  populace	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  religious	  and	  sectarian	  conflicts	  and	  violence.	  In	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  there	   has	   been	   an	   exponential	   increase	   in	   lootings,	   kidnappings	   and	  religious/political	   target-­‐killings,	   being	  provided	  new	   recruits	   every	  day	   from	  amongst	  an	  ever-­‐starving	  and	  marginalised	  population.121	  	  	  In	   recent	  years,	   the	  havoc	  wreaked	  by	  natural	  disasters	  and	  calamities	  due	   to	  climate	  shift,	  ill	  planning	  and	  self-­‐interest	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  powers	  that	  govern	  have	   further	   added	   to	   the	   destabilisation	   of	   the	   societal	   frameworks.122	  Amongst	   all	   this,	   the	   functions	   of	   the	   government	   are	   held	   hostage	   to	   the	  struggle	   between	   main	   political	   parties	   to	   get	   into	   power	   for	   self-­‐serving	  reasons,123	  and	  corruption	  acquiring	  a	  state	  of	  normalcy	  –	  from	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  occupying	  the	  lowest	  socio-­‐economic	  strata	  to	  being	  institutionalised	  at	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   governing	   bodies.124	   The	   people	   of	   Pakistan	   are	   also	  burdened	  with	  a	  general	   lack	  of	  availability	  and	   increase	   in	  prices	  of	  common	  and	   basic	   amenities,	   lack	   of	   education	   and	   a	   rise	   in	   illiteracy,	   inflation,	   food	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Frequent	  drone	  strikes	  and	  economic	  sanctions	  by	  the	  US	  are	  the	  most	  appropriate	  cases	  in	  point.	  See,	  Yousuf	  Nazar	  (2011)	  (n	  90)	  17-­‐24.	  120	  Christine	  C.	  Fair,	  Neil	  Malhotra	  and	  Jacob	  N.	  Shapiro	  (2010)	  (n	  22)	  513	  and	  517.	  121	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  78)	  59-­‐68.	  122	  James	  Lewis,	  'Corruption	  :	  the	  hidden	  perpetrator	  of	  under-­‐development	  and	  vulnerability	  to	  natural	  hazards	  and	  disasters:	  the	  Pat	  Reid	  lecture	  2010'	  (2011)	  3	  (2)	  Jamba:	  Journal	  of	  Disaster	  
Risk	  Studies	  464,	  472.	  123	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  226-­‐256.	  124	  Deborah	  Hardoon	  and	  Finn	  Heinrich,	  'Daily	  Lives	  and	  Corruption:	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  South	  Asia'	  (Transparency	  International,	  Berlin	  2011)	  12.	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shortage,	  unemployment,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  adequate	  and	  cheap	  health-­‐care.125	  The	  increase	  in	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  fear	  and	  insecurity,	  in	  the	  major	  metropolitan	  centres	  amongst	  others,	  paints	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  society	  as	  being	  trapped	  in	  a	  Hobbesian	   ‘state	   of	   nature’,126	   which	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   calls	   from	   political	  commentators	   for	   a	   stronger	   state,	  modelled	   on	   the	  Hobbesian	   conception.127	  These	  factors	  indeed	  create	  a	  complicated	  situation.	  	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain,	  even	  if	  we	  just	  focus	  on	   the	   state	   posited	   law	   and	   the	   Constitution	   of	   Pakistan,	   the	   constitutional	  arrangement	   and	   the	   legal	   system	   appears	   to	   be	   at	   once	   colonial	   and	   post-­‐colonial;	  it	  is	  contextualised	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  decidedly	  foreign;	  it	  is	  Islamic,	  with	   several	   reservations	   and	  modifications,	   but	   also	   includes	  major	   facets	   of	  Western	   legal	   traditions,	   primarily	   the	   remnants	   of	   the	   colonial	   state.	   The	  system	   is	   democratic,	   but	   the	   constitutional	   preamble	   clearly	   states	   that	  sovereignty	   in	   this	  country	  does	  not	   lie	  directly	  with	   the	  people,	  but	   is	  vested	  with	   the	   Almighty,	   from	   which	   the	   people	   only	   exercise	   a	   borrowed	  authority.128	  The	  mainstream	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  arrangements	  are	  further	  challenged	  by	  some	  of	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  British	  Indian	  legal	  framework	  as	  a	  legacy	  of	   the	   colonial	   era,	  which	   are	   still	   active	   and	  blatantly	   colonial	   in	   their	  nature.129	   This	   is	   drawn	   into	   greater	   difficulty	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   traditional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Yousuf	  Nazar	  (2011)	  (n	  90)	  vii-­‐xxvii.	  126	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  Hobbes's	  Leviathan.	  Reprinted	  from	  the	  edition	  of	  1651	  (With	  an	  essay	  by	  the	  
late	  W.	  G.	  Pogson	  Smith)	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford	  1909)	  xi.	  127	  Hajrah	  Mumtaz,	  'A	  collapsing	  contract'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  24	  January	  2010)	  <http://m.dawn.com/news/516022/a-­‐collapsing-­‐contract>	  last	  accessed	  8	  May	  2013.	  128	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  129	  For	  instance,	  the	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulation	  1901,	  which	  is	  still	  in	  force	  in	  the	  tribal	  regions	  of	  the	  country.	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(legal)	   institutions	   that	   cater	   to	   a	   large	   section	   of	   the	   populace,	   but	   whose	  human	  rights	  record	  is	  troubling,	  and	  whose	  existence	  is	  either	  denied	  or	  their	  functions	   challenged	   by	   the	   national	   courts.130	   The	   state-­‐oriented	   legal	  structure	   has	   oscillated	   between	   the	   presidential	   and	   parliamentary	   systems	  several	  times	  in	  its	  history,	  and	  the	  constitution	  has	  also	  been	  ‘abrogated’,131	  or	  ‘held	  in	  abeyance’,132	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  by	  military	  regimes.	  In	  short,	  the	  nature	   of	   the	   constitution	   as	   a	   charter	   of	   agreement	  between	   the	  people,	   and	  the	  state	  and	  law	  that	  flow	  from	  it,	  have	  varied	  on	  so	  many	  occasions	  that	  their	  foundational	   facets	   have	   become	   blurred.	   A	   brief	   historical	   account	   of	   this	  constitutional	  and	   legal	   turmoil	  will	  be	  elaborated	   in	   the	   following	  sections	   in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
2.3. Crafting	   a	  Post-­‐Colonial	   State:	  A	  brief	   history	  of	   constitutional	  
crises,	  1947-­‐1973	  
The	   Constitution,	   legal	   system	   and	   common	   law	   traditions	   that	   Pakistan	  inherited	  at	  the	  time	  of	  independence	  have	  not	  survived	  unscathed	  through	  the	  course	  of	   its	  turbulent	  history.	  Pakistan	  gained	  independence	  in	  1947	  through	  the	  partition	  of	  British	  India,	  and	  consisted	  of	  two	  major	  territories	  at	  the	  time	  of	   its	   creation	   –	   East	   and	   West	   Pakistan,	   separated	   by	   a	   thousand	   miles	   of	  Indian	   territory.	   The	   geographical	   divide	   between	   the	   two	   units	   not	   only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  This	  will	  be	  elaborated	  further	  in	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  96	  (Socio-­‐legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan)	  and	  Chapter	  6	  on	  page	  204	  (Narrative	  of	  Legal	  Pluralism).	  131	  By	  General	  Ayub	  Khan	  in	  1958	  and	  General	  Zia-­‐ul-­‐Haq	  in	  1979,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  132	  By	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf	  in	  1999,	  through	  the	  Provisional	  Constitutional	  Order	  1999.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	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signalled	   towards	   the	   problems	   of	   governance	   and	   planning	   that	   were	   to	  emerge	   after	   independence,	   but	   also	   reflected	   the	   existing	   cultural,	   linguistic	  and	   ethnic	   divisions	   between	   the	   populations	   of	   the	   two	   regions,	   with	   Islam	  being	  the	  major	  common	  denominator.133	  	  	  In	   the	  dominant	   and	  official	   historical	   account,	   Pakistan	  was	   the	   result	   of	   the	  demands	  of	  the	  Muslims	  of	  the	  Indian	  Sub-­‐continent	  for	  a	  separate	  state,	  where	  they	  would	   have	   the	   freedom	   to	   preserve,	   follow	   and	   propagate	   their	   culture	  and	  religion.134	  This	  notion	  of	  a	  state	  for	  Muslims	  was	  actively	  employed	  by	  the	  All	   India	   Muslim	   League	   to	   foment	   a	   political	   struggle,135	   and	   was	   carried	  through	   to	   the	   post-­‐independence	   constitutional	   development	   of	   the	   country.	  This	   was	   clearly	   reflected	   in	   the	   debates	   of	   the	   country’s	   first	   Constituent	  Assembly,	  which	  was	   tasked	  with	   drafting	   the	   first	   constitutional	   framework.	  Liaquat	  Ali	  Khan,	  Pakistan’s	   first	  Prime	  Minister,	  said	   in	  his	  speech	  at	  the	  fifth	  session	  of	  the	  Assembly:	  ‘The	  State	  will	  create	  such	  conditions	  as	  are	  conducive	  to	  the	  building	  up	  (sic.)	  of	  a	  truly	  Islamic	  society,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  State	  will	  have	  to	  play	  a	  positive	  part	  in	  this	  effort.’136	  	  	  However,	   the	   shape	   and	   nature	   of	   this	   idea	   of	   Islamic	   Society	   never	   became	  clear.	   Mohammad	   Ali	   Jinnah,	   Pakistan’s	   first	   Governor	   General	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Aziz	  Ahmad,	  'India	  and	  Pakistan'	  in	  P.	  M.	  Holt,	  Ann	  K.	  S.	  Lambton	  and	  Bernard	  Lewis	  (eds),	  
The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  Islam:	  The	  Indian	  Sub-­‐Continent,	  South-­‐East	  Asia,	  Africa	  and	  the	  Muslim	  
West	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  1977)	  111.	  134	  Ilhan	  Niaz,	  The	  culture	  of	  power	  and	  governance	  of	  Pakistan,	  1947-­‐2008	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2010)	  64-­‐68.	  135	  Ibid.	  136	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman,	  Objectives	  Resolution	  and	  its	  Impact	  on	  Pakistan	  Constitution	  and	  Law	  (Royal	  Book	  Company,	  Karachi	  1996)	  6-­‐7	  (emphasis	  added).	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President	   of	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly,	   had	   stated	   in	   1948	   that	   his	   vision	   of	  Pakistan	  was	  not	  that	  of	  a	  ‘theocratic	  state	  to	  be	  ruled	  by	  priests	  with	  a	  divine	  mission.	   We	   have	   many	   non-­‐Muslims	   –	   Hindus,	   Christians	   and	   Parsis	  [Zoroastrians]	  but	   they	  are	  all	  Pakistanis.	  They	  will	  enjoy	   the	  same	  rights	  and	  privileges	  as	  any	  other	  citizens	  and	  will	  play	  their	  rightful	  part	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Pakistan.’137	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   stance	   of	   the	   Islamic	   political	   parties	   and	  religious	  leaders	  was	  evidently	  different,	  as	  they	  asserted	  that	  	   	  
The	  Islamic	  State	  means	  a	  state	  which	  is	  run	  on	  the	  exalted	  and	  excellent	  principles	  of	   Islam	   .	   .	   .	  people	  who	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  those	   ideas	  may	  have	  a	  place	  in	  the	  administrative	  machinery	  of	  the	  State	  but	  they	  cannot	  be	  entrusted	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  framing	  the	  general	  policy	  of	  the	  State	  on	  dealing	  with	  matters	  vital	  to	  its	  safety	  and	  integrity.138	  	  The	  uncertainty	  and	  lack	  of	  clarity	  emerging	  from	  this	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  the	  pre-­‐independence	   struggle,	   as	   well	   nature	   of	   Pakistan’s	   post-­‐independence	  relation	  with	  Islam,	  continues	  to	  this	  day.	  Based	  on	  this,	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	   scholars	  working	   on	   colonial	   and	   post-­‐colonial	   history	   of	   the	   subcontinent	  challenge	   the	  very	  basis	  of	   linking	   Islam	  with	   the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan.	  Hamza	  Alavi,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  renowned	  historians	  of	  Pakistan,	  used	  the	  term	  salariat	  to	  describe	   the	   particular	   class	   of	   Muslim	   urban	   professionals	   and	   salaried	  individuals	  that	  spearheaded	  the	  movement	  for	  Pakistan’s	  independence.139	  He	  claims	   that	   the	  main	   rationale	   that	   guided	   this	   salariat	   was	   to	   create	   a	   state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  G.	  W.	  Choudhury,	  'Constitution-­‐Making	  Dilemmas	  in	  Pakistan'	  (1955)	  8	  (4)	  The	  Western	  
Political	  Quarterly	  589,	  590.	  138	  Ibid.	  139	  Hamza	  Alavi,	  'Ethnicity,	  Muslim	  Society,	  and	  the	  Pakistan	  Ideology'	  in	  Anita	  Weiss	  (ed)	  
Islamic	  Reassertion	  in	  Pakistan	  (Syracuse	  University	  press,	  Syracuse	  1986)	  24.	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apparatus	  that	  would	  allow	  it	  more	  power	  and	  influence.140	  In	  this	  view,	  Islam	  was	   used	   primarily	   as	   a	   political	   slogan	   rather	   than	   a	   religious	   ideology;	   a	  political	   symbol	   employed	   to	   forge	   a	   ‘community	   of	   believers’141	   and	   citizens	  from	   an	   inherently	   ‘inoperative	   community’.142	   Alavi	   also	   argued	   that	   despite	  the	  mainstream	  rhetoric	  of	  Islam	  being	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  Pakistan,	  most	   of	   the	   Islamic	   political	   groups	   of	   the	   pre-­‐partition	   subcontinent	   were	  staunchly	   against	   partition	   and	   creation	   of	   a	   separate	   state,	   as	   a	   division	   of	  Muslim	  population	  would	  hamper	  their	  aims	  of	  creating	  a	  global	  Muslim	  Umma	  (literally,	   a	   community	   of	   Believers).143	   This	   confusion	   about	   the	   ideology	   or	  true	   ethos	   behind	   the	   independence	  movement	   is	   coupled	  with	   a	   graver	   and	  more	  prominent	  question	  that	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  debates	  mentioned	  above:	  If	  Pakistan	   was	   to	   be	   a	   separate	   state	   for	   Muslims,	   was	   it	   to	   be	   an	   Islamic	  theocratic	  state,	  or	  a	  democratic	  state	  with	  special	  safeguards	  for	  Muslims?	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  consensus	  on	  these	  questions	  captures	  the	  discussions	  today,	  just	  as	   it	   lay	   at	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   constitutional	   problems	   and	   deadlocks	   that	  gripped	  the	  State	  from	  the	  beginning.	  	  
2.3.1. From	  Independent	  State	  to	  a	  Crown	  Dominion	  The	  Constituent	  Assembly	   formulated	  at	   the	   time	  of	   independence	  and	  tasked	  with	   providing	   the	   country	   its	   first	   constitution,	   also	   struggled	   with	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Ibid.	  141	  The	  term	  ‘Community	  of	  Believers’	  is	  generally	  taken	  as	  a	  translation	  of	  Umma,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  pan-­‐Islamic	  Muslim	  community.	  142	  See	  Nancy’s	  critique	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  community	  can	  be	  created	  or	  fashioned	  through	  such	  symbolism,	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  'The	  Inoperative	  Community'	  in	  Peter	  Connor	  (ed)	  The	  Inoperative	  
Community	  (University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  Minnesota	  1991).	  143	  Hamza	  Alavi	  (1986)	  (n	  139)	  30.	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notions.	   It	   sought	   to	   bring	   together	   the	   ethnically	   diverse	   and	   geographically	  differentiated	  communities	  through	  a	  national	  framework	  based	  on	  a	  religious	  ideology.144	  However,	  with	  issues	  of	  official	  language,	  provincial	  autonomy	  and	  regional	  disparity	  (between	  West	  Pakistan	  and	  East	  Pakistan,	  now	  Bangladesh)	  inherited	  as	  a	  colonial	  legacy,	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  was	  unable	  to	  provide	  the	   country	   a	   workable	   charter.145	   For	   the	   first	   9	   years	   after	   independence,	  Pakistan	   remained	   without	   an	   overarching	   constitution.	   The	   legislative	  framework	   that	   governed	   Pakistan	   during	   this	   initial	   period	   was	   the	  Government	  of	  India	  Act	  of	  1935,	  as	  amended	  by	  the	  Indian	  Independence	  Act	  of	   1947.	   The	   only	   constitutional	   instrument	   that	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly	  could	  successfully	  promulgate	  during	  this	  period	  was	  the	  Objectives	  Resolution	  of	  1949,	  which	  was	  conceived	  as	  the	  statement	  of	  ideology	  and	  principles	  that	  would	  underline	  the	   future	   laws	  and	  governing	  mechanisms	  of	   the	  country.146	  However,	   even	   this	   Resolution	  was	   not	  without	   its	   controversies.	   Vesting	   the	  State	   with	   a	   borrowed	   sovereignty	   as	   ‘a	   sacred	   trust’	   from	   the	   Almighty,	   the	  Objectives	   Resolution	   expressly	   linked	   the	   State	   with	   Islamic	   social	  principles.147	   In	   reply	   to	   concerns	   raised	   by	   non-­‐Muslim	   members	   of	   the	  Constituent	   Assembly	   on	   linking	   politics	   and	   religion,	   one	   member	   counter-­‐argued	   that	   the	   ‘Constitution	  may	  be	   interpreted,	   as	   it	  will	  be,	  by	  people	  who	  come	  after	  us.	  We	  cannot	  bind	  our	  successors;	  but	  these	  interpretations	  must	  at	  least	  follow	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  which	  have	  been	  embodied	  for	  anybody	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  religious	  struggle,	  issue	  of	  regional	  representation,	  distribution	  of	  powers	  and	  problems	  of	  national	  language	  that	  significantly	  hampered	  constitution	  making	  after	  independence,	  see	  G.	  W.	  Choudhury	  (1955)	  (n	  137).	  145	  Ibid.	  589;	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  18-­‐20.	  146	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136)	  4.	  147	  Objectives	  Resolution	  of	  1949,	  subsequently	  appended	  to	  the	  1956	  Constitution	  of	  Pakistan	  as	  Preamble.	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to	  study	  in	  our	  [Islamic]	  Scriptures	  (sic.).’148	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  despite	  the	   importance	   attributed	   to	   it,	   the	   Objectives	   Resolution	   did	   not	   become	   a	  justiciable	  and	  substantive	  part	  of	  the	  Constitution	  until	  the	  1980s.149	  	  The	   Indian	   Independence	   Act	   of	   1947	   had	   vested	   in	   the	   legislatures	   of	   the	  nascent	  states	  of	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  the	  complete	  authority	  to	  frame	  their	  laws	  and	  constitutions,150	  with	  the	  proviso	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  British	  Indian	  state	  would	  remain	   in	   force	   until	   the	   legislatures	   could	   formulate	   their	   own	   legal	  frameworks.151	   India	   successfully	   formulated	   its	   Constitution	   soon	   after	  independence	   and	   formally	   enacted	   it	   in	   November	   1949.152	   The	   Constituent	  Assembly	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  embroiled	   in	  political	  and	  ideological	  struggles	  that	  reflected	  the	  conflicts	  within	  the	  larger	  society,	  proved	  unable	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  on	  a	  constitutional	   framework	  until	  October	  1954,153	  when	  the	   Assembly	   was	   dissolved	   by	   the	   Governor	   General	   of	   Pakistan,	   Ghulam	  Mohammad.154	   Ghulam	   Mohammad	   declared	   that	   it	   ‘had	   become	  unrepresentative’	  and	  mired	  in	  political	  and	  power	  struggle.155	  Historians	  claim,	  however,	   that	   ‘real	   objection	   was	   that	   the	   Assembly	   was	   about	   to	   adopt	   a	  constitution	  of	  which	  he	  disapproved’156	  as	  it	  sought	  to	  curtail	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136)	  10.	  149	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  justiciability	  of	  the	  Objectives	  Resolution	  and	  the	  manifestation	  of	  this	  debate	  in	  cases	  before	  the	  superior	  judiciary,	  see	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97)	  47-­‐54.	  150	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Indian	  Independence	  Act,	  1947.	  151	  Ibid.	  Article	  18(3).	  152	  Preamble	  to	  The	  Constitution	  of	  India,	  1949.	  153	  Zulfikar	  Khalid	  Maluka,	  The	  Myth	  of	  Constitutionalism	  in	  Pakistan	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Karachi,	  Pakistan	  1995)	  118-­‐119.	  154	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  23.	  155	  Leslie	  Wolf-­‐Phillips,	  'Constitutional	  Legitimacy:	  A	  study	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  necessity'	  (1979)	  1	  (4)	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  97,	  98;	  G.	  W.	  Choudhury	  (1955)	  (n	  137)	  589.	  156	  Leslie	  Wolf-­‐Phillips	  (1979)	  (n	  155)	  98;	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136)	  40-­‐41.	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Governor	   General’s	   office.	   It	   is	   noted	   by	   scholars	   that	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  dissolution	  of	   the	  Assembly,	  a	  Draft	  Constitution	  had	  already	  been	   formulated	  and	  made	  public,	  with	  a	  view	  that	  it	  would	  be	  formally	  adopted	  in	  December	  of	  that	  year.157	  	  Maulvi	  Tamizuddin	  Khan,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  challenged	  the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Assembly	   and	   filed	   a	   petition	   in	   the	   Sindh	   Chief	   Court,	  alleging	   that	   the	   Governor	   General’s	   actions	   were	   in	   contravention	   of	   the	  sovereign	  right	  of	  the	  Assembly.158	  The	  Chief	  Court	  gave	  a	  unanimous	  decision	  against	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Assembly,	   and	   reversed	   the	   steps	   taken	   by	   the	  Governor	  General.159	  It	  acknowledged	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  as	  a	  ‘sovereign	  body’160	  and	  declared	  that	  the	  ‘people	  of	  India	  were	  given	  the	  freedom	  and	  the	  independence	   to	   frame	   any	   Constitution	   they	   liked’,	   with	   complete	   freedom	  from	  the	  Crown	  or	  Governor	  General.161	  Ghulam	  Mohammad,	  adamant	  that	  his	  actions	  were	   taken	  under	  his	   sovereign	  prerogative	  as	  a	   representative	  of	   the	  British	  Crown	  in	  dominion,	  appealed	  against	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  Federal	  Court.	  The	   Federal	   Court’s	   judgement	   on	   this	   issue	   is	   a	   landmark	   in	   the	   country’s	  constitutional	   and	   legal	   history	   for	   two	   key	   reasons.	   First,	   it	   treated	   the	   legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136)	  40-­‐41.	  158	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  42.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  Tamizuddin	  Khan	  had	  to	  sneak	  past	  the	  intelligence	  agents	  stationed	  at	  the	  gates	  of	  the	  Sindh	  High	  Court	  ‘through	  a	  side	  gate	  clad	  in	  a	  burqa	  [veil]’	  to	  submit	  his	  petition.	  Sharifuddin	  Pirzada,	  quoted	  in	  Ilhan	  Niaz	  (2010)	  (n	  134)	  180.	  Albeit	  anecdotal	  evidence,	  it	  portrays	  the	  power	  disparity	  between	  bureaucracy/armed	  forces	  and	  political	  representatives,	  which	  is	  more	  ironic	  in	  this	  instance	  as	  it	  concerns	  the	  person	  heading	  the	  committee	  responsible	  for	  drafting	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  framework	  for	  the	  country.	  	  159	  Moulvi	  Tamizuddin	  Khan	  v.	  The	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  (PLD	  1955	  Sind	  96)	  160	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  43.	  161	  Ibid.	  	  43.	  The	  stance	  taken	  by	  the	  Sindh	  Chief	  Court	  was	  that	  the	  legislative	  assembly,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Indian	  Independence	  Act	  of	  1947,	  had	  complete	  ‘sovereignty’	  to	  make	  laws	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  Crown,	  or	  the	  Governor	  General	  as	  its	  alleged	  representative	  in	  the	  dominion.	  
Moulvi	  Tamizuddin	  Khan	  v.	  The	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  (n	  159).	  
63	  	  
status	  of	  Pakistan	   as	   a	  Crown	  Dominion	   rather	   than	  an	   independent	   state,	   by	  considering	   the	  Governor	  General	   as	   a	   representative	  of	   the	  British	  Crown.162	  Through	  this	  step,	  the	  judgement	  stripped	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  as	  the	  only	  sitting	   parliamentary	   body,	   of	   its	   sovereignty	   to	   formulate	   valid	   laws,	   unless	  they	  had	  been	  granted	  an	  assent	  by	   the	  office	  of	   the	  Governor	  General.163	  The	  Court	   stated	   that	   the	   Assembly	   could	   not	   be	   considered	   a	   sovereign	   body	  because,	   as	   the	   rules	   it	   formulated	   had	   to	   be	   given	   assent	   by	   the	   Governor	  General,	  the	  real	  sovereignty	  therefore	  lay	  with	  him.164	  This	  was	  a	  novel	  reading	  of	  the	  Indian	  Independence	  Act	  and	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  sovereignty,	  dominion	  and	  independence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court.	  Second,	  this	  judgement	  created	  the	   problematic	   nexus	   between	   the	   superior	   judiciary	   and	   the	   executive,	   and	  began	  the	  controversial	  practise	  of	  the	  apex	  court	  validating	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  executive	   to	  dismiss	   the	   legislatures	   and	   constituent	   assemblies	   –	   an	   exercise	  which	   has	   been	   repeated	   a	   number	   of	   times	   in	   the	   country’s	   history	   since	  then.165	  	  Following	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  and	  the	  annulment	  of	  its	  legislation,	  Pakistan	  was	  without	  any	  effective	   laws	  and	  without	  a	   law-­‐making	  body.	  The	  Federation	  tried	  to	  overcome	  this	  legal	  void	  by	  granting	  retrospective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  v.	  Moulvi	  Tamziddun	  Khan	  (PLD	  1955	  FC	  240).	  163	  The	  remarkable	  reasoning	  used	  by	  the	  Federal	  Court	  was	  that	  as	  the	  Governor	  General	  never	  gave	  his	  assent	  to	  the	  laws	  under	  which	  Tamizuddin	  Khan	  filed	  his	  petition,	  the	  Sindh	  Chief	  Court	  was	  misplaced	  in	  considering	  the	  petition	  and	  applying	  these	  laws	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  v.	  Moulvi	  Tamziddun	  Khan	  (n	  162).	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	  reasoning	  was	  that	  all	  the	  laws	  that	  were	  not	  given	  an	  express	  assent	  by	  the	  Governor	  General	  became	  invalid,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  problematic	  legal	  vacuum.	  164	  A	  point	  on	  which	  Justice	  Cornelius	  presented	  a	  dissenting	  opinion,	  arguing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  power,	  with	  the	  Governor	  General	  only	  holding	  the	  power	  to	  give	  assent.	  Ibid.	  165	  See	  generally,	  Leslie	  Wolf-­‐Phillips	  (1979)	  (n	  155);	  Hassan-­‐Askari	  Rizvi	  (1988)	  (n	  118).	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assent	   to	   validate	   the	   laws	   formulated	   by	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly.166	   This	  decision	   was	   overturned	   by	   the	   Federal	   Court	   in	  Usif	   Patel	   and	   others	   v.	   the	  
Crown,167	  when	   the	  Court	  declared	   that	  even	   the	  authority	  and	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Governor	  General,	  although	  extended	  to	  the	  power	  of	  assent	  and	  validation,	  was	  limited	  in	  terms	  of	  law-­‐making	  capacities.168	  It	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  judgement	  that	   ‘a	  more	   incongruous	  position	   in	  a	  democratic	  state	   is	  difficult	   to	  conceive	  particularly	   when	   the	   legislature	   itself,	   which	   can	   control	   the	   Governor	  General’s	   actions,	   is	   alleged	   to	   have	   been	   dissolved.’169	   The	   absence	   of	   a	   law-­‐making	  body	  and	  the	  limitation	  of	  Governor	  General’s	  authority	  to	  formulate	  or	  recognise	   laws,	   led	  to	  a	   legislative	  vacuum	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  State.	  To	  resolve	  this	  deadlock,	   the	  Governor	  General	  submitted	  a	  Reference	  before	   the	  Federal	  Court	  to	  request	  its	  advice	  on	  this	  issue.170	  In	  its	  advice	  on	  the	  Reference,	  while	  upholding	   the	   legality	   of	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Assembly	   by	   a	   majority,	   the	  Federal	   Court	   generated	   another	   legal	   anomaly	   that	   continued	   to	   have	  ramifications	   in	   the	   following	   decades.	   Importing	   the	   maxims	   of	   salus	   populi	  
suprema	   est	   lex	   (the	   health	   of	   the	   people	   is	   the	   supreme	   law)	   and	   ‘necessity	  makes	   lawful	   what	   is	   otherwise	   unlawful’,171	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   coined	   the	  (in)famous	  Doctrine	  of	  State	  Necessity.	  He	  stated	  in	  the	  judgement	  that	  
[S]ubject	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  absoluteness,	  extremeness	  and	  imminence,	  an	  act	  which	  would	  otherwise	  be	  illegal	  becomes	  legal	  if	  it	  is	  done	  bona	  fide	   under	   the	   stress	   of	   necessity,	   the	   necessity	   being	   referable	   to	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  51.	  167	  Usif	  Patel	  and	  others	  v.	  the	  Crown	  (PLD	  1955	  FC	  387).	  168	  Usif	  Patel	  and	  others	  v.	  the	  Crown	  (n	  167).	  169	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  51.	  The	  Court	  failed	  to	  appreciate,	  however,	  that	  this	  ‘incongruous	  position’	  stemmed	  from	  the	  Court’s	  own	  (mis)reading	  of	  sovereignty,	  independence	  and	  power	  to	  assent.	  170	  Reference	  by	  His	  Excellency	  the	  Governor	  General	  of	  Pakistan	  (PLD	  1955	  FC	  435).	  171	  Ibid..	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intention	   to	   preserve	   the	   constitution,	   the	   State	   or	   the	   Society	   and	   to	  prevent	  it	  from	  dissolution,	  and	  affirms	  Chitty’s	  statement	  that	  necessity	  knows	   no	   law	   and	   the	   maxim	   cited	   by	   Bracton	   that	   necessity	   makes	  lawful	  which	  otherwise	  is	  not	  lawful	  (sic.).172	  	  He	  further	  noted	  that	  
If	   the	   law	   as	   stated	   by	   Chitty	   that	   the	   Crown	   is	   the	   only	   branch	   of	  Legislature	   that	   is	   capable	   of	   performing	   any	   act	   at	   a	   time	   when	  Parliament	   is	   not	   in	   being	   is	   correct	   (sic.),	   legislative	   powers	   of	   the	  Crown	   in	   an	  emergency	  are	   a	  necessary	   corollary	   from	   that	   statement,	  and	  the	  same	  result	   flows	  from	  Dicey’s	  statement	  that	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  a	  discretionary	  or	  prerogative	  power	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture	  is	  essential	  	  to	  the	  	  executive	  Government	  of	  every	  civilized	  country….173	  	  Based	  on	  this	  reasoning,	  the	  Court	  held	  by	  a	  majority	  that	  under	  the	   ‘common	  law	  of	  civil	  or	  State	  necessity’,	  the	  Governor	  General	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Crown	   in	   dominion	   had	   the	   power	   to	   grant	   retrospective	   assent	   to	   the	   laws	  made	   by	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly,	   until	   a	   new	   legislature	   assumes	   its	   law-­‐making	  role.174	  The	  notions	  of	  State	  Necessity,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  emergency	  powers	  by	   the	   bureaucracy	   and	   armed	   forces	   to	   dissolve	   assemblies,	   disregard	  constitutional	  principles	  as	  well	  as	  assume	  the	  law-­‐making	  function,	  have	  been	  used	  several	  times	  since	  then	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  martial	  laws	  and	  political	  crises	   that	   have	   dominated	   the	   history	   of	   the	   country.175	   The	   most	   recent	  reiteration	   of	   these	   practises	   came	   with	   the	   imposition	   of	   martial	   law	   by	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf,	  when	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  again	  validated	  the	  legality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  Ibid..	  173	  Ibid..	  174	  Ibid..	  	  175	  In	  its	  66	  year	  history,	  Pakistan	  has	  been	  under	  direct	  (or	  constitutionally	  validated)	  military	  rule	  for	  almost	  34	  years.	  2013	  saw	  the	  first	  transition	  of	  power	  in	  the	  country’s	  history	  from	  one	  politically	  elected	  government	  to	  another,	  and	  from	  one	  civilian	  President	  to	  another.	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of	  the	  military	  coup	  and	  declared	  it	  ‘inevitable’.176	  In	  a	  judgement	  that	  echoed	  a	  similar	   verdict	   given	   half-­‐a-­‐century	   ago,	   the	   Court	   justified	   its	   position	   by	  claiming	  that	  the	  	  
Doctrine	   of	   State	   Necessity	   is	   recognised	   not	   only	   in	   Islam	   and	   other	  religions	   of	   the	   world	   but	   also	   accepted	   by	   the	   eminent	   international	  jurists	   including	  Hugo	  Grotius,	   Chitty	   and	   de	   Smith	   and	   some	   superior	  Courts	  from	  foreign	  jurisdictions	  to	  fill	  a	  political	  vacuum	  and	  bridge	  the	  gap	  (sic.).177	  	  
2.3.2. First	  Martial	  Law	  and	  the	  Division	  of	  Pakistan	  Following	   the	   Reference	   issue	   in	   1955,	   a	   second	   Constituent	   Assembly	   was	  elected	   in	   the	   country,	   which	   successfully	   formulated	   and	   adopted	   Pakistan’s	  first	   Constitution	   in	   1956.178	   This	   Constitution	   finally	   ended	   Pakistan’s	  dominion	   status,	   and	   instituted	   the	   Islamic	   Republic	   of	   Pakistan	   as	   a	  Federation.179	   The	   Constitution	   of	   1956	   provided	   for	   a	   unicameral	   legislature	  based	  on	  the	  parliamentary	  system	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  government,	   and	   abolished	   the	   office	   of	   the	   Governor	   General.180	   While	   it	  incorporated	   the	   Objectives	   Resolution	   of	   1949	   as	   its	   Preamble,	   and	   made	  provisions	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  laws	  are	  not	  repugnant	  to	  Islamic	  injunctions,	  the	   1956	   Constitution	   did	   not	   declare	   Islam	   as	   the	   State	   Religion.181	   The	  presence	   of	   a	   constitutional	   framework,	   however,	   could	   not	   resolve	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Syed	  Zafar	  Ali	  Shah	  and	  others	  v.	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf,	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  (PLD	  2000	  SC	  869).	  177	  Syed	  Zafar	  Ali	  Shah	  case	  (n	  176).	  178	  Abdullah	  Ahsan,	  'Pakistan	  since	  Independence:	  An	  Historical	  Analysis'	  (2003)	  93	  (3-­‐4)	  The	  
Muslim	  World	  351,	  353.	  179	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1956.	  180	  Ibid.	  Chapters	  I	  and	  II.	  181	  Ibid.	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multitude	  of	  political	  and	  social	  crises	  and	  the	  power	  struggle	  that	  had	  become	  deep-­‐rooted	  by	  this	  time.182	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  life	  of	  the	  Constitution	  proved	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived,	  and	  it	  was	  abrogated	  in	  October	  1958	  by	  the	  first	  President	  of	  Pakistan,	   Iskander	   Mirza.183	   Mirza	   dissolved	   the	   parliament	   and	   the	  constitutional	   framework,	   and	   imposed	   Martial	   Law,	   installing	   General	   Ayub	  Khan	   as	   the	   head	   of	   the	   armed	   forces	   and	   the	   Chief	   Martial	   Law	  Administrator.184	   He	   outlawed	   all	   political	   parties	   and	   suspended	   civil	   rights,	  and	  blamed	  the	   ‘ruthless	  struggle	   for	  power’	  and	   ‘the	  prostitution	  of	   Islam	  for	  political	   ends’	   for	   creating	   the	   necessity	   of	  military	   rule.185	   This	  was	   the	   first	  direct	   inroad	   for	   the	   military	   to	   enter	   politics	   and	   control	   state	   power.	   But	  Iskander	  Mirza	  did	  not	   foresee	   the	   consequences	  of	   this	  action	   for	  himself,	   as	  less	  than	  a	  month	  later	  he	  was	  deposed	  by	  Ayub	  Khan,	  arrested	  and	  then	  exiled	  to	  Great	  Britain	  where	  he	  lived	  in	  relative	  obscurity	  until	  his	  death.186	  	  General	  Ayub	  Khan’s	   rise	   to	   power	  paved	   the	  way	   for	   the	   country’s	   powerful	  military	   to	   delve	   into	   politics.187	  With	   the	   ‘resentment	   and	  distrust	   that	   army	  and	  civil	  service	  officers	  have	  harboured	  towards	  politicians,’188	  the	  first	  steps	  that	  Ayub	  Khan	  adopted	  were	  geared	  towards	  a	  radical	  overhaul	  of	  the	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  growing	  difficulties	  between	  East	  and	  West	  Pakistan,	  see	  Farhan	  Hanif	  Siddiqi,	  'The	  Failed	  Experiment	  with	  Federalism	  in	  Pakistan	  (1947-­‐1971)'	  in	  Emilian	  Kavalski	  and	  Magdalena	  Zolkos	  (eds),	  Defunct	  Federalisms:	  Critical	  Perspectives	  on	  Federal	  
Failure	  (Ashgate,	  Aldershot	  2008)	  71-­‐86.	  183	  Wayne	  Ayres	  Wilcox,	  'The	  Pakistan	  Coup	  d'Etat	  of	  1958'	  (1965)	  38	  (2)	  Pacific	  Affairs	  142,	  142-­‐143.	  184	  Ibid.	  142-­‐43.	  185	  Ibid.	  142.	  186	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Pakistan	  (Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  Washington,	  D.	  C.	  2004)	  60;	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  72.	  187	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  military’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  political	  sphere,	  see	  generally	  Hassan-­‐Askari	  
Rizvi	  (1988)	  (n	  118)	  .	  188	  Khalid	  B.	  Sayeed,	  'Pakistan's	  Basic	  Democracy'	  (1961)	  15	  (3)	  The	  Middle	  East	  Journal	  249,	  250;	  see	  also,	  Farhan	  Hanif	  Siddiqi	  (2008)	  (n	  182)	  73.	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and	  legal	  framework.	  He	  banned	  all	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  country	  and	  curtailed	  the	  power	  of	  the	  judiciary	  to	  challenge	  martial	   law	  regulations.189	  He	  assumed	  the	  additional	  role	  as	  the	  President	  of	  Pakistan	  and,	  on	  the	  very	  same	  day,	  the	  Supreme	   Court	   gave	   its	   judgement	   in	   the	   Dosso	   case.190	   In	   this	   landmark	  judgement,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  chose	  another	  angle	  to	   justify	  the	  military	  rule,	  by	   employing	   Hans	   Kelsen’s	   theoretical	   framework.	   Kelsen	   argued	   that	   the	  norms	   regulating	   societal	   conduct	   flow	   from	   a	   basic	   norm,	  which	   ‘constitutes	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  [behaviour	  regulating]	  norms’.191	  He	  termed	  this	  foundational	  rule	  as	  Grundnorm,	  which	  provides	  the	   ‘reason	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  all	  norms	  belonging	   to	   the	  same	   legal	  order’.192	   	  This	  notion	  of	  Grundnorm,	   as	  well	   as	   Kelsen’s	   proposition	   that	   ‘a	   revolution	   occurs…	   whenever	   the	   legal	  order	  of	  a	  community	  is	  nullified	  and	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  order	  in	  an	  illegitimate	  way,’193	   were	   taken	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   as	   prescriptions	   and	   justifications	  rather	   than	   theoretical	  conceptions.	  Building	  on	   these	   two	   ideas,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  as	  the	  military	  coup	  had	  effectively	  changed	  the	  basic	  norm	  of	  laws	  implemented	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  that	  this	  action	  could	  only	  be	  construed	  as	   ‘extra-­‐constitutional’,	   the	   Court	   had	   no	   authority	   but	   to	   work	   within	   the	  confines	  of	   this	  new	   law	  and	  Grundnorm.194	  Thus	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   adopted	  this	  unique	  reading	  of	  legal	  positivism,	  Kelsen’s	  conceptual	  framework,	  as	  well	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  72.	  190	  State	  v.	  Dosso	  and	  another	  (PLD	  1958	  SC	  533).	  191	  Hans	  Kelsen,	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law.	  Translation	  from	  the	  Second	  German	  Edition	  by	  Max	  Knight.	  (The	  Lawbook	  Exchange,	  New	  Jersey	  2005)	  205.	  192	  Ibid.	  193	  Hans	  Kelsen,	  General	  Theory	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  State	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  Mass.	  1949)	  117.	  194	  State	  v.	  Dosso	  (n	  190)	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as	   its	   own	   relation	   to	   legality	   and	   constitution,	   to	   declare	   the	  martial	   law	   as	  valid.	  	  Ayub	   Khan	   also	   introduced	   radical	   changes	   in	   the	   political	   structure	   of	   the	  country.	   Through	   a	   Presidential	   Order	   in	   1959,	   he	   promulgated	   a	   new	   local	  body	  system	  termed	  ‘Basic	  Democracy’.195	  Through	  the	  Basic	  Democracies	  Plan,	  a	   five-­‐tiered	   local	   government	   system	  was	   instituted	  with	   the	  Union	   Councils	  (for	   rural	   areas)	   or	   Town	   Committees	   (for	   urban	   areas)	   at	   the	   lowest	   strata,	  progressing	   upward	   through	   Tehsil/Thana	   Councils,	   District	   Councils,	  Divisional	  Councils,	  to	  Provincial	  Development	  Council	  at	  the	  top.196	  The	  system	  created	  a	  body	  of	  80,000	  Basic	  Democrats,	  both	  elected	  and	  nominated,	  with	  the	  system	   of	   elections	   generally	   restricted	   to	   the	   lowest	   tier	   of	   the	   local	  government.	   This	   ‘neat	   hierarchical	   form’	   of	   this	   local	   government	   structure	  corresponded	   to	   the	   General’s	   ‘desire	   to	   see	   the	   country	   as	   organised	   as	   her	  army.’197	  	  While	  the	  Basic	  Democracy	  system	  was	  promoted	  as	  devolution	  of	  power	  from	  the	  centre	  to	  the	   localities,	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  primary	  rationale	  behind	  it	  was	  to	  limit	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  political	  parties	  and	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  military	   government.198	   This	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   1961,	   the	   Basic	  Democrats	   were	   selected	   as	   the	   only	   Electoral	   College	   for	   a	   Presidential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  Khalid	  B.	  Sayeed	  (1961)	  (n	  188)	  249.	  196	  Ibid.	  250-­‐251.	  197	  Ibid.	  250.	  198	  S.	  Akbar	  Zaidi,	  'The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Decentralization	  in	  Pakistan'	  (Transversal	  Theme	  "Decentralisation	  and	  Social	  Movements"	  Working	  Paper	  No	  1,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2005)	  15-­‐17.	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Referendum,	  which	  ultimately	  gave	  Ayub	  Khan	  the	  legitimacy	  to	  shift	  from	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Martial	  Law	  Administrator	  to	  that	  of	  an	  elected	  President	  of	  the	  country.199	   In	   essence,	   then,	   Ayub	   Khan’s	   government	   ‘rested	   on	   the	  foundations	   of	   Basic	  Democracies’	   and	   the	  military,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   local	   elites	  who	  dominated	  the	  local	  government	  structures,	  mutually	  benefitted	  from	  this	  arrangement.200	   Although	   he	   admitted	   ‘hating	   the	   Constitution	   and	  constitutionalism’,201	   following	   his	   election	   Ayub	   Khan	   paradoxically	  formulated	  a	  new	  Constitution	  for	  Pakistan	  in	  1962.	  This	  Constitution	  declared	  Pakistan	   to	   be	   a	   Federal	   Republic,	   and	   instituted	   a	   presidential	   form	   of	  government.202	  The	  powers	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  President	  were	  vastly	  increased,	  who	   was	   also	   granted	   the	   formal	   authority	   to	   dissolve	   legislative	   assemblies	  and	   declare	   emergency	   to	   by-­‐pass	   any	   existing	   legal	   and	   constitutional	  frameworks.203	  	  Elections	   for	   a	   new	   legislative	   assembly	   were	   conducted	   in	   1965,	   where	   the	  Basic	  Democrats	  served	  once	  again	  as	  the	  indirect	  Electoral	  College.204	  Though	  Ayub	   Khan	   now	   held	   the	   office	   of	   the	   President	   and	   had	   a	   favourable	  Constitution	  and	  legislature	  in	  place,	  1965	  saw	  a	  bitter	  war	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  as	  well	  as	  worsening	  of	  relations	  between	  East	  and	  West	  Pakistan.205	  With	   the	   political	   and	   social	   unrest	   continuing	   and	   opposition	   growing,	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199	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  80-­‐86.	  200	  S.	  Akbar	  Zaidi	  (2005)	  (n	  198)	  15-­‐17.	  201	  Zulfikar	  Khalid	  Maluka	  (1995)	  (n	  153)	  171.	  202	  Rather	  than	  an	  Islamic	  Republic,	  as	  held	  in	  the	  previous	  constitution.	  However,	  this	  was	  later	  changed	  back	  to	  Islamic	  Republic	  amidst	  protests.	  See,	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1962.	  203	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1962.	  204	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  80-­‐86.	  205	  Farhan	  Hanif	  Siddiqi	  (2008)	  (n	  182)	  77-­‐85.	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Khan	  was	   deposed	   by	   the	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   Armed	   Forces,	   General	  Yahya	   Khan,	   who	   imposed	   martial	   law	   in	   1969	   and	   abrogated	   the	  Constitution.206	  In	  March	  1970,	  Yahya	  Khan	  promulgated	  the	  Legal	  Framework	  Order,	   proposing	   a	   new	   structure	   for	   the	   assemblies	   and	   a	   new	   scheme	   for	  elections.	   It	   was	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   constitution	   and	   law	   making	  responsibilities	   should	   be	   vested	   with	   the	   federal	   and	   provincial	   legislatures	  elected	  under	  the	  LFO.207	  	  In	   December	   1970,	   after	   23	   years	   of	   power	   struggle,	   the	   first	   ever	   general	  elections	   were	   held	   in	   the	   country.	   Conducted	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   proportional	  representation,	   and	   largely	   considered	   to	  be	   fair,	   the	  elections	   resulted	   in	   the	  Pakistan	   People’s	   Party	  winning	   a	  majority	   of	   seats	   in	  West	   Pakistan	   and	   the	  Awami	   League	   gained	   both	   a	   majority	   in	   East	   Pakistan	   as	   well	   as	   an	   overall	  majority.208	   The	   election	   results	   reflected	   the	   void	   between	   Pakistan’s	   two	  territories,	  which	  had	   grown	   socially	   and	   linguistically	   apart	   in	   the	  preceding	  decades.	   With	   both	   Zulfikar	   Ali	   Bhutto	   (People’s	   Party)	   and	   Sheikh	   Mujibur	  Rahman	   (Awami	   League)	   claiming	   to	   be	   the	   majority	   holders,	   a	   deadlock	  ensued	   between	   the	   two	   political	   parties.	   This	   struggle	   turned	   into	   protests,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  a	  bitter	  war	  of	  secession	  in	  1971.209	  As	  the	  army’s	  operation	  to	  quell	  the	  unrest	  in	  East	  Pakistan	  became	  harsher,	  the	  leaders	  of	  East	  Pakistan	  (with	  alleged	  help	  from	  India)	  responded	  with	  armed	  resistance.	   In	  December	  1971,	   the	   West	   Pakistani	   forces	   surrendered	   and	   East	   Pakistan	   declared	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  8.	  207	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  114.	  208	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  8.	  209	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  115-­‐118.	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independence	  as	  Bangladesh.210	  Siddiqi	  points	  out	   that	   the	   tragic	   irony	  of	   this	  scenario	   is	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  minority	  rights	  struggle,	  but	  that	  as	  51%	  of	  the	  population	  of	  Pakistan	  resided	  in	  East	  Pakistan,	  it	  was	  the	  ‘majority	  group	  [that]	  seceded	  from	  the	  state’.211	  	  Four	  days	  after	  the	  secession	  of	  Bangladesh,	  Yahya	  Khan	  handed	  over	  power	  to	  Bhutto,	   who	   was	   posited	   as	   the	   President	   and	   civilian	   Chief	   Martial	   Law	  Administrator.212	  With	  no	  constitution	  in	  place,	  defeat	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  the	  country	  divided	  in	  half	  and	  more	  significantly,	  the	  Islamic	  ideology	  of	  the	  State	  called	  into	  question,213	  Bhutto	  and	  the	  incumbent	  government	  worked	  to	  piece	  together	   a	   new	   constitution	   for	   the	   country.214	   Declared	   in	   1973,	   the	   new	  Constitution	   was	   unanimously	   approved	   by	   the	   different	   parties	   within	   the	  assembly.215	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  the	  Constitution	  of	   1973	   is	   largely	   based	   on	   the	   western	   constitutional	   principles	   of	  representative	  democracy	  and	  separation	  of	  powers.	  It	  establishes	  the	  national	  assembly	   and	   the	   senate	   as	   the	   main	   representative	   bodies,	   and	   institutes	   a	  Parliamentary	   form	   of	   government.	   Part	   II	   of	   the	   document	   guarantees	  fundamental	  rights,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  religion,	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  movement	  and	  the	   like.	   The	   Constitution	   also	   establishes	   a	   hierarchical	   judicial	   structure,	  modelled	  on	  a	  common	  law	  system,	  with	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  the	  court	   system.	   The	   1973	   Constitution,	   considered	   a	   consensus	   document	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  8-­‐9.	  211	  Farhan	  Hanif	  Siddiqi	  (2008)	  (n	  182)	  71.	  212	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  115-­‐120.	  213	  Ibid.	  118.	  214	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  76-­‐83.	  215	  Zulfikar	  Khalid	  Maluka	  (1995)	  (n	  153)	  241.	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between	  various	  political	  parties	  of	  the	  country	  (including	  the	  religious	  political	  parties,	   such	  as	   the	   Jamaat-­‐e-­‐Islami),	   is	   the	  one	   that	   still	   governs	   the	   country.	  However,	   it	   has	   been	   abrogated	   or	   temporarily	   suspended	   by	   two	   different	  martial	   law	  regimes	   since	   then.	   It	  has	  also	  gone	   through	   several	   amendments	  and	  extensive	  modifications	  under	  General	  Zia’s	   Islamisation	  campaign,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  
2.4. On	   Religion	   and	   State	   Law:	   A	   brief	   history	   of	   Islamisation	   of	  
laws,	  1973-­‐1999	  
It	  is	  argued	  by	  some	  scholars	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  Pakistan,	  the	  aspiration	  of	   the	  Muslim	  League	  was	  not	   to	  create	  a	   theocratic	  state,	  even	  though	   it	   had	   propagated	   the	   cause	   of	   a	   separate	   territory	   for	   Muslims.216	  Jinnah,	   who	   is	   credited	   as	   the	   Founder	   of	   the	   Nation,	   was	   adamant	   that	  secularism	  and	   freedom	   for	  minorities	   should	  direct	   the	  policies	  of	   the	  newly	  found	   state.217	   In	   one	   of	   his	   well-­‐known	   speeches	   before	   the	   Constituent	  Assembly,	  he	  had	  asserted	   that	   the	  religion	  or	  caste	  of	  any	  citizen	  of	  Pakistan	  ‘has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   business	   of	   the	   State.’218	   However,	   with	   Jinnah’s	  death	   in	   September	   1948219	   and	   with	   no	   other	   political	   figure	   in	   place	   to	  command	   the	   same	   personal	   authority,	   the	   power	   struggle	   that	   had	   raged	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Hamza	  Alavi	  (1986)	  (n	  139)	  24.	  217	  G.	  W.	  Choudhury	  (1955)	  (n	  137)	  590.	  218	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Jinnah,	  'First	  Presidential	  Address	  to	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  of	  Pakistan	  '	  (Karachi,	  11	  August	  1947).	  219	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  7.	  Jinnah	  had	  suffered	  from	  Tubercolosis	  for	  some	  time,	  although	  the	  news	  of	  his	  illness	  had	  not	  been	  made	  public	  while	  the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  British	  continued.	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between	   the	   self-­‐serving	   sections	   of	   military,	   politicians	   and	   Islamic	   forces,	  increased	  in	  intensity.	  	  Owing	   to	   the	   problems	   faced	   by	   the	   Constituent	   Assembly	   shortly	   after	  creation,220	  the	  religious	  sections	  began	  their	  ascendancy	  and	  Jinnah’s	  absence	  rendered	  that	  the	  political	  leadership	  proved	  unable	  to	  counter	  their	  demands.	  In	  an	  echo	  of	  the	  discussion	  on	  Constituent	  Assembly	  debates	  mentioned	  above,	  the	   religious	   political	   parties	   and	   groups	   asserted	   that	   since	   Pakistan	   was	  created	   as	   a	   separate	   homeland	   for	   the	   Muslims	   of	   the	   sub-­‐continent,	   its	  framework	   should	   be	   guided	   by	   Islamic	   principles.	   They	   demanded	   the	  imposition	  of	   the	  Shariah	   (Islamic	   Jurisprudence),	  and	   their	   first	  victory	  came	  with	  the	  passage	  of	   the	  Objectives	  Resolution	   in	  1949,	  which	  was	   loaded	  with	  ‘theological	  undertones’.221	  The	  articles	  of	   the	  Resolution,	   initially	   intended	   to	  serve	   as	   guiding	   principles,	   vested	   sovereignty	   with	   the	   Almighty	   and	  introduced	  principles	  of	  Islam	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  the	  state.222	  	  As	  discussed	   in	  the	  previous	  section,	  a	  multitude	  of	  political	  crises	  meant	  that	  Pakistan	   was	   unable	   to	   acquire	   its	   first	   constitution	   until	   1956.	   This	  Constitution	   declared	   Pakistan	   an	   Islamic	   Republic,	   and	   introduced	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220	  See,	  Crafting	  a	  Post-­‐Colonial	  State:	  A	  brief	  history	  of	  constitutional	  crises,	  1947-­‐1973,	  on	  page	  56.	  221	  Zulfikar	  Khalid	  Maluka	  (1995)	  (n	  153)	  125-­‐126;	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97);	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136).	  	  	  222	  The	  Objectives	  Resolution,	  which	  now	  forms	  the	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  begins	  by	  the	  statement:	  ‘Whereas	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  entire	  Universe	  belongs	  to	  Almighty	  Allah	  alone,	  and	  the	  authority	  to	  be	  exercised	  by	  the	  people	  of	  Pakistan	  within	  the	  limits	  prescribed	  by	  Him	  is	  a	  sacred	  trust.’	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possibility	  of	  a	  system	  of	  separate	  electorates	  for	  the	  non-­‐Muslim	  minorities.223	  However,	   the	  Constitution	  of	  1962	  promulgated	  under	  General	  Ayub’s	  martial	  law	  regime,	  which	  superseded	  the	  1956	  Constitution,	  attempted	  to	  tone	  down	  the	  religious	  undercurrent.	  It	  declared	  Pakistan	  to	  be	  a	  Republic	  rather	  than	  an	  Islamic	   Republic.224	   The	   political	   upheavals	   continued	   until	   the	   early	   1970s,	  which	   also	   saw	   East	   Pakistan	   secede	   to	   become	   the	   independent	   state	   of	  Bangladesh	   in	  1971.	  With	  Zulfikar	  Ali	  Bhutto	  at	   the	  helm	  of	  power	   in	  the	  new	  setup,	  a	   ‘consensus	  based’	  Constitution	  was	  formulated	  in	  1973,225	  and	  Bhutto	  was	  sworn	  in	  as	  the	  country’s	  first	  democratically	  elected	  Prime	  Minister	  later	  that	  year.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus,	  the	  incumbent	  regime	  had	  to	  concede	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   clergy	   and	   religious	   political	   parties	   that	   had	  gained	   support	   within	   the	   larger	   society	   in	   the	   preceding	   years.226	   The	   1973	  Constitution	   again	   proclaimed	   Pakistan	   as	   an	   Islamic	   Republic	   and	   instituted	  the	   Council	   of	   Islamic	   Ideology	   as	   an	   advisory	   body	   to	   the	   executive	   and	  legislature,	  whose	  task	  was	  to	  bring	  the	  existing	  and	  future	  laws	  in	  conformity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  Articles	  1	  and	  142,	  respectively,	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1956.	  224	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1962.	  Protests	  and	  demands	  from	  the	  religious	  sections,	  however,	  meant	  that	  the	  title	  of	  Islamic	  Republic	  was	  reinstated	  later	  during	  Ayub	  Khan’s	  regime.	  225	  Osama	  Siddique,	  'The	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Dissolutions:	  Presidential	  Power	  to	  dissolve	  Assemblies	  under	  the	  Pakistan	  Constitution	  and	  its	  discontents'	  (2006)	  23	  (3)	  Arizona	  Journal	  of	  
International	  &	  Comparative	  Law	  615,	  628.	  226	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Pakistan	  movement	  was	  the	  widely	  held	  belief	  that	  Muslims	  of	  the	  sub-­‐continent	  should	  have	  a	  separate	  homeland	  wherein	  they	  would	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  practice	  their	  beliefs.	  Though	  the	  Islamic	  political	  parties	  were	  initially	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  would	  split	  Muslims	  into	  two	  different	  countries	  (they	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  declare	  Jinnah	  an	  ‘infidel’),	  after	  independence	  they	  stepped	  up	  their	  activities.	  The	  inability	  of	  the	  Muslim	  League	  to	  connect	  with	  the	  masses	  (compared	  to	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  across	  the	  border)	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  power	  between	  the	  politicians	  and	  the	  military	  meant	  that	  the	  support	  from	  Islamic	  political	  parties	  increased	  in	  significance.	  See,	  Lawrence	  Ziring,	  'From	  Islamic	  Republic	  to	  Islamic	  State	  in	  Pakistan'	  (1984)	  24	  (9)	  Asian	  Survey	  931,	  931-­‐946.	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with	   Islamic	   principles.	   227	   In	   an	   unprecedented	   and	   significant	   move,	   the	  Constitution	  also	  declared	  Islam	  as	  the	  ‘State	  Religion’	  of	  the	  country.228	  	  The	  struggle	  for	  dominance	  between	  liberal	  and	  secular	  sections	  and	  the	  clergy	  continued	   during	   the	   1970s.	   Bhutto,	   whose	   party	   carried	   the	   slogan	   of	   ‘Roti,	  Kapra,	  Makan’	   (Bread,	   Clothing,	   Shelter),	   became	   increasingly	   isolated	   for	   not	  being	   able	   to	   fulfil	   his	   pro-­‐poor	   rhetoric.	  His	   rule	  was	   criticised	   for	  becoming	  increasingly	   authoritarian	   and,	   despite	   the	   measures	   to	   introduce	   further	  Islamic	  aspects	  in	  the	  legal	  system,	  he	  was	  vehemently	  opposed	  by	  the	  religious	  sections	  for	  what	  they	  perceived	  were	  Western,	  secular	  or	  socialist	  inclinations.	  His	  grip	  on	  power	  weakened	  and	  during	  the	   last	  days	  of	  his	  rule,	  Bhutto,	  who	  himself	  had	  previously	  claimed	  publicly	  that	  ‘Yes…it	  is	  sharab	  [alcohol,	  that	  I	  am	  drinking]!	   Unlike	   you	   [clerics],	   I	   don’t	   drink	   the	   blood	   of	   the	   people’,229	  announced	  complete	  prohibition	  against	   the	  manufacture	  and	  consumption	  of	  alcohol,	  in	  a	  move	  to	  appease	  the	  religious	  groups.	  In	  another	  symbolic	  gesture,	  the	  weekly	  holiday	  was	  moved	  from	  Sunday	  to	  Friday,	  as	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  day	  of	  prayer	  for	  Muslims.230	  	  	  One	  aspect	  that	  has	  been	  the	  most	  significant	  in	  terms	  of	  affecting	  the	  status	  or	  rights	  of	  minorities,	  or	  in	  fact	  affecting	  the	  larger	  narratives	  around	  religion	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  228	  Ibid.	  229	  Tariq	  Ali,	  'Imperial	  Delusions'	  (2005)	  16	  Macalester	  International	  Journal	  29	  41.	  230	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  170.	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citizenship,	  was	  the	  official	  declaration	  of	  Ahmadis	  as	  non-­‐Muslims	   in	  1974.231	  
Ahmadis,	   who	   assert	   that	   they	   are	   ‘followers	   of	   Islam’,232	   are	   denounced	   by	  Islamic	   scholars	   within	   Pakistan	   as	   apostates	   for	   disputing	   the	   finality	   of	  Prophethood	   –	   a	   central	   tenet	   of	   Islamic	   faith.233	   Although	   the	   region	   had	  witnessed	   large-­‐scale	   anti-­‐Ahmadi	   riots	   previously,	   both	   before	   partition	   (in	  1934)	  as	  well	  as	  after	  Pakistan	  came	  into	  existence	  (in	  1953),234	  the	  new	  legal	  amendments	  officially	  categorised	  them	  as	  non-­‐Muslims	  in	  the	  Constitution.235	  This	   provided	   the	   constitutional	   foundation	   which	   was	   later	   built	   upon	   by	  General	   Zia-­‐ul-­‐Haq,	   who	   introduced	   further	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   changes,	  effectively	   declaring	   it	   a	   punishable	   offence	   for	   Ahmadis	   to	   employ	   Islamic	  terminology,	  texts,	  or	  even	  call	  their	  places	  of	  worship	  ‘Mosques’.236	  	  Bhutto	  continued	  to	  run	  the	  country	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  ‘Islamic	  Socialism’	  until	  1977,237	   when	   the	   army	   once	   again	   took	   over	   the	   state	   and	   declared	  Martial	  Law.	  Bhutto	  was	  arrested	  and	  subsequently	   tried	   for	   the	  murder	  of	  a	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  Javaid	  Rehman,	  'Accommodating	  Religious	  Identities	  in	  an	  Islamic	  State:	  International	  Law,	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	  the	  Rights	  of	  Religious	  Minorities'	  (2000)	  7	  International	  Journal	  on	  
Minority	  and	  Group	  Rights	  139,	  146.	  232	  Ibid.	  233	  Rehman	  writes	  that	  the	  declaration	  of	  Ahmadiyya	  community	  as	  non-­‐Muslim	  was	  dictated	  by	  ‘political	  concerns	  and	  motivations.’	  He	  notes	  that	  before	  their	  status	  as	  Muslims	  was	  disputed,	  
Ahmadis	  had	  been	  part	  of	  governmental	  and	  bureaucratic	  setup,	  and	  had	  played	  an	  ‘influential	  role’	  in	  the	  pre-­‐independence	  struggle.	  Ibid.	  156.	  234	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20)	  240.	  See	  also,	  S.	  E.	  Brush,	  'Ahmadiyyat	  In	  Pakistan'	  (1955)	  45	  (2)	  The	  Muslim	  World	  145.	  235	  The	  2nd	  Amendment	  to	  the	  1973	  Constitution	  appended	  the	  following	  clause	  to	  Article	  260:	  ‘A	  person	  who	  does	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  absolute	  and	  unqualified	  finality	  of	  The	  Prophethood	  of	  Muhammad	  (Peace	  be	  upon	  him),	  the	  last	  of	  the	  Prophets,	  or	  claims	  to	  be	  a	  Prophet	  in	  any	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  or	  of	  any	  description	  whatsoever,	  after	  Muhammad	  (Peace	  be	  upon	  him),	  or	  recognizes	  such	  a	  claimant	  as	  a	  Prophet	  or	  religious	  reformer,	  is	  not	  a	  Muslim	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Constitution	  or	  law.’	  Constitution,	  (Second	  Amendment)	  Act,	  1974,	  Pakistan.	  236	  Article	  298A	  and	  298B	  of	  the	  Pakistan	  Penal	  Code.	  Also	  see,	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2000)	  (n	  231)	  156.	  237	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar,	  Asha	  Amirali	  and	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Raza,	  'Reading	  between	  the	  lines:	  The	  mullah–military	  alliance	  in	  Pakistan'	  (2006)	  15	  (4)	  Contemporary	  South	  Asia	  383,	  387.	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opponent.	  In	  a	  trial	  which	  he	  denounced	  for	  being	  ‘barbarous’,238	  he	  was	  found	  guilty	   of	  murder	   by	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   and	   executed	   in	  April	   1979.	  With	   the	  fate	   of	   Pakistan’s	   first	   democratically	   elected	   Prime	   Minister	   thus	   decided,	  General	  Zia-­‐ul-­‐Haq	  opened	  yet	  another	  chapter	  of	  military	  rule	  that	  lasted	  until	  1988.	   The	  most	   vocal	   support	   for	   General	   Zia’s	   coup	   came	   from	   the	   religious	  groups	   and	   clergy	   who	   had	   become	   vehement	   opponents	   of	   Bhutto’s	  government,	   and	   who	   were	   rewarded	   in	   return	   through	   Zia’s	   Islamisation	  programme	   and	   ‘patronage	   politics’.239	   A	   significant	   event	   that	   guided	   Zia	  regime’s	   policies	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   was	   its	   support	   to	   the	   United	   States’	  efforts	   to	   counter	   the	   Soviet	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan.240	  Towards	   this	   end,	   his	  regime	   relied	   on	   a	   strong	   narrative	   of	   the	   conflict	   being	   a	   holy	   struggle	   of	  Muslims	   against	   the	   atheist	   communist	   ideology.	   It	   used	   religious	   slogans	   to	  generate	   the	   sense	   of	   an	   ideological	   war,	   and	   employed	   this	   discourse	   to	  support	   the	   Afghan	   Mujahideen	   (religious	   warriors).	   The	   regime	   actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  Madrassahs	  (religious	  seminaries)	  in	  Pakistan,	  where	   Afghan	   Mujahideen	   and	   militants	   from	   the	   two	   countries	   could	   be	  trained	   for	  battle.241	  Based	  on	   the	  problems	  of	  weaponisation,	  criminality	  and	  religious	  conflict	  that	  these	  steps	  generated	  in	  the	  country,	  Yousuf	  Nazar	  argues	  that	   the	   ‘“Afghan	   jihad”	   turned	   Pakistan	   into	   a	   brutalised	   and	   criminalised	  society.’242	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  Zulfikar	  Ali	  Bhutto,	  My	  Dearest	  Daughter:	  A	  letter	  from	  the	  death	  cell	  (2007)	  7.	  239	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar,	  Asha	  Amirali	  and	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Raza	  (2006)	  (n	  237)	  387.	  240	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  9-­‐10.	  241	  Ibid.	  183-­‐184.	  242	  Yousuf	  Nazar	  (2011)	  (n	  90)	  viii.	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In	  this	  backdrop	  of	  patronage	  politics	  and	  religious	  conflict,	  during	  the	  11	  years	  of	   Zia’s	   regime	   the	  move	   towards	   Islamisation	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	  frameworks	   gained	   significant	   momentum.	   Through	   the	   implementation	   of	  
Nizam-­‐e-­‐Mustapha	   (literally,	   the	   System	   of	   Prophet	   Muhammad	   of	   Islam,	  PBUH),243	  Zia	  radically	  altered	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  dominant	  legal	  architecture	  of	  the	  country.	  He	  passed	  a	  series	  of	  Presidential	  Ordinances	  in	  1979	  that	  included	  an	   Islamic	   classification	   of	   crimes	   and	   punishments	   in	   the	   criminal	   code.244	  Though	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  ‘minor	  impact’	  at	  the	  time,245	  these	  changes	  in	  the	  penal	   code	   appear	   in	   hindsight	   to	   be	   ‘counter-­‐productive’	   to	   the	   goals	   of	  engendering	  equality	  of	  citizenship	  for	  religious	  minorities,	  as	  the	  controversial	  blasphemy	  laws	  highlight.246	  He	  also	  established	  the	  Federal	  Shariat	  Court	  and	  the	   Acceleration	   of	   Islamisation	   Committee	   as	   constitutional	   bodies,	   geared	  towards	  ensuring	  that	  the	  legal	  and	  political	   frameworks	  in	  the	  country	  are	  in	  conformity	   with	   Islamic	   principles.247	   These	   Islamisation	   measures	   will	   be	  discussed	   in	   greater	   detail	   in	   following	   chapter	   on	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	  tapestry.	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  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar,	  Asha	  Amirali	  and	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Raza	  (2006)	  (n387.	  244	  Charles	  H.	  Kennedy,	  'Islamization	  and	  Legal	  Reform	  in	  Pakistan,	  1979-­‐1989'	  (1990)	  63	  (1)	  
Pacific	  Affairs	  62,	  62.	  245	  Ibid.	  246	  Abdullah	  Ahsan	  (2003)	  (n	  178)	  365.	  I	  have	  written	  elsewhere	  that	  a	  genealogical	  examination	  of	  the	  Blasphemy	  Laws	  of	  Pakistan,	  probably	  the	  most	  controversial	  and	  recognised	  facets	  of	  the	  country’s	  legal	  code,	  reflects	  that	  this	  much	  criticised	  law	  is	  an	  Islamised	  version	  of	  the	  Blasphemy	  provisions	  of	  British	  colonial	  government’s	  Indian	  Penal	  Code.	  Furthermore,	  the	  lineage	  of	  these	  Acts	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  Blasphemy	  Act	  of	  1697,	  part	  of	  English	  common	  and	  Canon	  laws	  which	  were	  part	  of	  the	  English	  law	  until	  2008.	  Raza	  Saeed,	  'Metamorphosis	  of	  the	  Ideals	  and	  the	  Actuals:	  Blasphemy	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  Transplantation	  of	  Justice	  in	  British	  India'	  (2013)	  7	  (2)	  Pólemos:	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Literature	  and	  
Culture	  235.	  247	  Zulfikar	  Khalid	  Maluka	  (1995)	  (n	  153)	  260-­‐266.	  For	  a	  list	  of	  the	  multiple	  institutions	  and	  committees	  instituted	  by	  General	  Zia	  during	  his	  Islamisation	  campaign,	  see	  Mohammad	  Amin	  (1989)	  (n	  114)	  63.	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Like	  his	  predecessors,	  Zia	  promulgated	  a	  greatly	  amended	  Constitution	  in	  1985,	  following	   which	   he	   assumed	   the	   office	   of	   the	   President	   and	   held	   general	  elections	  on	  a	  non-­‐party	  basis.248	  He	  remained	  in	  power	  as	  the	  President	  of	  the	  country,249	   until	   his	   assassination	   in	   1988,	   following	   which	   the	   government	  once	  again	  reverted	   to	  civilian	  rule,	  with	  Benazir	  Bhutto	   (daughter	  of	  Zulfikar	  Ali	  Bhutto)	  as	  the	  elected	  Prime	  Minister.250	  However,	  the	  civilian	  governments,	  bureaucracy,	   army	   and	   the	   clergy	   remained	   tangled	   in	   a	   vicious	   battle	   for	  power.	   The	   decade	   between	   1988	   and	   1998	   saw	   four	   different	   civilian	  governments	  take	  power	  through	  general	  elections,	  though	  none	  of	  them	  were	  able	   to	   complete	   their	   terms.	   The	   country	   had	   nine	   different	   Prime	  Ministers	  during	  this	  ten-­‐year	  period.	  Benazir	  Bhutto	  and	  her	  Pakistan	  People’s	  Party	  also	  formed	  governments	   twice	   in	   that	  decade,	   only	   to	  be	  dismissed	  by	   the	   sitting	  Presidents	  on	  charges	  of	  corruption	  and	  inefficiency.251	  Despite	  the	  promise	  of	  progress	  and	  slogans	  of	   liberalism	  and	  democracy,	  none	  of	  these	  governments	  proved	   able	   or	  willing	   to	   curtail	   or	   undo	   the	   tide	   of	   Islamisation	   of	   the	   legal	  system,	  or	  provide	  greater	  protection	  to	  minorities	  or	  women.	  	  	  Two	  significant	   legal	  developments	  during	   this	  decade	  of	  political	  uncertainty	  were	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Courts	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  15th	  Amendment	   to	   the	  Constitution	   (Shariah	  Bill).	  The	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Courts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248	  Rasul	  B.	  Rais,	  'Pakistan	  in	  1988:	  From	  Command	  to	  Conciliation	  Politics'	  (1989)	  29	  (2)	  Asian	  
Survey	  199,	  199-­‐200.	  249	  One	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  1985	  Constitutional	  Amendment	  was	  that	  it	  significantly	  enhanced	  Presidential	  powers	  to	  dissolve	  standing	  legislatures,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Article	  58(2)(b)	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  In	  the	  following	  decades,	  this	  provision	  was	  used	  several	  times	  by	  sitting	  Presidents	  to	  dissolve	  elected	  assemblies	  (until	  its	  repeal	  in	  2010).	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  Article	  58(2)(b)	  and	  its	  political	  ramifications,	  see	  generally,	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225).	  250	  Rasul	  B.	  Rais	  (1989)	  (n	  248)	  199-­‐205.	  251	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  this	  decade	  of	  political	  upheaval,	  see	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225).	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were	  established	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Act,	  1997,	   that	  granted	  wide	  ranging	  powers	  to	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  permitting	  them	  to	  try	  suspects	  in	  their	  absence252	  and	  search	  premises	  without	  warrants.253	  The	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Courts	   were	   initially	   given	   the	   sole	   jurisdiction	   to	   try	   terrorism	   related	  incidents,	   which	   were	   not	   subject	   to	   review	   by	   the	   superior	   courts.254	   This	  institution	   of	   a	   parallel	   judiciary	   was	   challenged	   by	   the	   superior	   courts,	   and	  declared	   unconstitutional	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   1998.255	   The	   law,	   as	  subsequently	  modified	  by	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  (Amendment)	  Ordinance	  of	  1999	  proclaimed	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   General	   Pervez	   Musharraf’s	   military	   regime,	  brought	  these	  courts	  within	  the	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  provincial	  High	  Courts,	  and	  significantly	  expanded	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  ‘Terrorist	  Act’.256	  	  The	   other	   notable	   development	   of	   this	   period	   was	   Shariah	   Bill,	   which	   was	  introduced	   in	   the	   parliament	   soon	   after	   Pakistan	   conducted	   nuclear	   tests	   in	  1998,	  following	  which	  an	  emergency	  had	  been	  declared	  in	  the	  country	  by	  Prime	  Minister	   Nawaz	   Sharif’s	   government.	   Although	   the	   Bill	   was	   never	   passed,	   it	  sought	   to	   give	   the	   Federal	   Government	   the	   power	   and	   the	   responsibility	   to	  impose	   Islamic	   laws	   in	   the	   country.	   The	   Bill	   established	   that	   in	   line	  with	   the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Objectives	  Resolution,	  Quran	  and	  Sunnah	  will	  be	  the	  ‘Supreme	  Law’	  of	   Pakistan,257	   having	   effect	   ‘notwithstanding	   anything	   contained	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252	  Article	  19(10)	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Act,	  1997.	  253	  Ibid.	  Article	  10.	  254	  Ibid.	  Article	  12	  and	  25.	  255	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97)	  105-­‐106.	  256	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  (Amendment)	  Ordinance	  1999	  included	  ‘gang	  rape,	  child	  molestation,	  or	  robbery	  coupled	  with	  rape’	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  Terrorist	  Act.	  257	  Article	  2(1)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  (Fifteenth	  Amendment)	  Bill,	  1998.	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Constitution,	   any	   law	   or	   judgement	   of	   any	   Court’.258	   It	   further	   obliged	   the	  Federal	  Government	  to	  ‘enforce	  Shariah,	  establish	  salat	  [prayer],	  to	  administer	  
zakat	   [annual	   taxation]’	   and	   to	   promote	   the	   Islamic	   principle	   of	   prescribing	  ‘what	  is	  right	  and	  [forbidding]	  what	  is	  wrong.’259	  It	  also	  attempted	  to	  modify	  the	  requirement	   of	   two-­‐thirds	   majority	   in	   the	   parliament	   needed	   to	   pass	  constitutional	  amendments,	  to	  a	  simple	  majority	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Islamic	  laws.260	  This	  Bill	  was	  never	  approved	  by	  the	  parliament,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  criticism	  it	   received,261	   and	   partly	   because	   of	   the	   political	   fallout	   between	   the	  government	   and	   armed	   forces	   as	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Kargil	   conflict.262	   The	  Kargil	   conflict	   also	   provided	   the	   impetus	   for	   yet	   another	   Martial	   Law	   in	   the	  country,	  when	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf	  deposed	  Nawaz	  Sharif	  in	  1999.	  	  
2.5. Between	   Islamisation	   and	   ‘Enlightened	   Moderation’:	   A	   brief	  
history	  of	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  –	  1999-­‐2013	  
In	   1999,	   after	   a	   decade	   of	   constant	   changes	   in	   governments,	   dissolution	   of	  assemblies	   and	   a	   power	   struggle	   between	   political	   parties,	   bureaucracy	   and	  armed	   forces,	  General	  Musharraf	   led	  Pakistan’s	   fourth	  military	   coup	   since	   the	  country’s	   independence.	   The	   military	   and	   the	   government	   of	   Prime	   Minister	  Nawaz	   Sharif	   were	   at	   loggerheads	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Kargil	   conflict	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  Ibid.	  Article	  2(5).	  	  259	  Ibid.	  Article	  2(1).	  260	  Ibid.	  Article	  3.	  261	  Political	  commentators	  denounced	  what	  seemed	  to	  be	  an	  attempt	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Nawaz	  Sharif	  to	  use	  Islamic	  slogans	  to	  further	  his	  political	  interests.	  Eqbal	  Ahmad,	  Eqbal	  Ahmad:	  
Confronting	  Empire	  –	  Interviews	  with	  David	  Barsamian	  (South	  End	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts	  2000)	  160.	  262	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  Kargil	  conflict,	  see	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  107-­‐123.	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between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  in	  1998.263	  It	  is	  noted	  by	  commentators	  that	  at	  the	  time	  the	  conflict	  erupted,	  the	  political	  leaders	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  were	  trying	  to	   ease	   the	   relations	   and	   address	   the	   Kashmir	   dispute	   through	   back-­‐channel	  diplomacy.264	   When	   the	   Kargil	   conflict	   came	   to	   international	   attention,	   the	  political	  leadership	  had	  to	  intervene	  and	  order	  the	  Pakistani	  forces	  to	  withdraw,	  a	  move	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  saw	  as	  surrender	  and	  ‘betrayal	  by	  an	  uninformed	  civilian.’265	   The	   incident	   that	   provided	   an	   inroad	   for	   Musharraf’s	   takeover	   of	  political	   power	   occurred	   when	   Nawaz	   Sharif	   attempted	   to	   depose	   General	  Musharraf	   from	  his	   position	   as	   the	   Chief	   of	   the	   Army	   Staff.266	   The	   deposition	  order	  was	  passed	  and	  a	  new	  army	  chief	  sworn	  in	  on	  12th	  October	  1999,	  while	  General	  Musharraf	  was	  on	  a	  civilian	  plane	  returning	  from	  an	  official	  visit	  to	  Sri	  Lanka.	  His	  plane	  was	  not	  permitted	  to	  land	  in	  Pakistani	  airspace,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  capture	  of	  civilian	  air	  command	  and	  other	   institutions	  by	   takeover	  sections	  of	  the	   army	   loyal	   to	   Musharraf.267	   The	   army	   arrested	   Nawaz	   Sharif	   and	   his	  supporters	  and	  dissolved	  the	  parliament,	  with	  Musharraf	  assuming	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  Pakistan.268	  The	  argument	  that	  General	  Musharraf’s	  plane	  was	  not	  permitted	  to	  land	  with	  only	  limited	  fuel	  remaining	  became	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  hijacking	  trial,	  where	  the	  newly	  established	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Court	  convicted	  Nawaz	   Sharif	   and	   awarded	   him	   a	   life	   sentence.269	   Sharif	   was	   later	   exiled	   to	  Saudi	  Arabia	  after	  entering	  a	  political	  arrangement	  with	  Musharraf.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  88.	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  Kargil	  conflict,	  see	  Owen	  
Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  107-­‐123.	  264	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  114-­‐116.	  265	  Stephen	  Philip	  Cohen	  (2004)	  (n	  186)	  151.	  266	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  this	  incident,	  see	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  291-­‐298.	  267	  Ibid.	  	  	  	  268	  Proclamation	  of	  Emergency,	  October	  14,	  1999.	  269	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16).	  	  
84	  	  
	  The	   Proclamation	   of	   Emergency	   Order	   of	   1999	   through	   which	   General	  Musharraf	   dissolved	   the	   legislature	   and	   the	   government	   did	   not	   abrogate	   the	  Constitution;	   rather,	   in	   a	   novel	   use	   of	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   reasoning,	   it	  declared	  that	  the	  ‘Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan	  shall	  remain	  in	   abeyance’.270	   This	   ‘deliberately	   softer	   image’271	   of	   the	   Martial	   Law	   was	  perhaps	  based	  on	  the	  knowledge	  gained	  from	  the	  issue	  of	  legal	  vacuum	  created	  by	  the	  first	  military	  rule.272	  The	  Provisional	  Constitutional	  Order	  (PCO)	  of	  1999,	  proclaimed	  on	  the	  same	  date,273	  declared	  that	  ‘Notwithstanding	  the	  abeyance	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	   the	  Constitution…	  Pakistan	   shall…	  be	  governed,	   as	  nearly	  as	  may	  be,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Constitution.’274	  The	  PCO	  also	  denied	  courts	  the	  authority	   to	   challenge	   any	   orders	   that	  may	   emerge	   from	   the	   Proclamation	   of	  Emergency.275	   Following	   the	   promulgation	   of	   the	   PCO,	   Musharraf	   installed	   a	  new	  government	  with	  handpicked	  individuals	  as	  cabinet	  members,	  and	  forced	  the	   judiciary	   to	   take	   a	   new	   oath	   of	   office	   in	   2000	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  PCO.276	   Forced	   to	   renege	   on	   their	   oath	   taken	   under	   the	   1973	   Constitution,	  several	  judges	  refused	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  military	  regime	  and	  resigned.277	  Although	  the	  newly	  installed	  judges	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  validated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270	  Clause	  (a)	  of	  the	  Proclamation	  of	  Emergency,	  October	  14,	  1999.	  271	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225)	  695.	  272	  Discussed	  in	  the	  Dosso	  and	  Reference	  cases	  above,	  this	  paradoxical	  and	  ironic	  term	  allowed	  him	  to	  make	  amendments	  to	  the	  Constitution.	  273	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225)	  695.	  	  274	  Article	  2(1)	  of	  the	  Provisional	  Constitutional	  Order,	  1999.	  275	  Ibid.	  Article	  4.	  276	  Taiyyaba	  Ahmed	  Qureshi,	  'State	  of	  Emergency:	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf's	  Executive	  Assault	  on	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Pakistan'	  (2010)	  35	  (2)	  North	  Carolina	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  
and	  Comercial	  Regulation	  485,	  491;	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225)	  696.	  	  277	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225)	  696.	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the	   legality	  of	  Musharraf’s	   coup	   in	  Zafar	  Ali	   Shah,278	   the	   struggle	  between	   the	  military	  and	  the	  judiciary	  that	  the	  oath-­‐of-­‐office	  issue	  highlighted,	  remained	  an	  undercurrent	  for	  the	  Musharraf	  era.	  The	  discussion	  will	  return	  to	  this	  presently.	  	  Soon	   after	   Musharraf	   took	   power,	   a	   major	   event	   that	   changed	   the	   course	   of	  global	  politics,	  and	  which	  had	  even	  greater	  ramifications	  for	  Pakistan,	  was	  the	  September	  11,	  2001,	  attacks	  on	   the	  World	  Trade	  Centre	   in	  New	  York.279	  With	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   acceptance	   of	   responsibility	   for	   these	   attacks,280	   and	   with	   the	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   leadership	   said	   to	   be	   given	   shelter	   by	   the	   Taliban	   regime	   in	  Afghanistan,281	   Pakistan	   was	   given	   a	   Hobson’s	   choice.	   The	   United	   States	  administration,	   emphasising	   the	  US	   intent	   to	   invade	  Afghanistan,	   conveyed	   to	  the	  Pakistani	  Ambassador:	  ‘You	  are	  either	  100	  per	  cent	  with	  us	  or	  100	  per	  cent	  against	   us…	   there	   is	   no	   grey	   area.’282	   Despite	   its	   previous	   support	   for	   the	  Taliban	   government	   in	   Afghanistan,	   the	  military	   regime	   preferred	   the	   former	  option.	  	  This	   event	  played	  a	  major	   role	   in	   guiding	   the	  overall	   direction	  of	  Musharraf’s	  rule.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  above,	  the	  previous	  military	  rule	  of	  General	  Zia-­‐ul-­‐Haq	   was	   geared	   towards	   an	   increasing	   Islamisation	   of	   the	   country	   and	  society,	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  needs	  of	  the	  time.	  Pakistan	  during	  his	  era	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278	  Syed	  Zafar	  Ali	  Shah	  and	  others	  v.	  General	  Pervez	  Musharraf,	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  (PLD	  2000	  SC	  869).	  279	  Though	  none	  of	  the	  attackers	  involved	  in	  the	  incident	  were	  Pakistani	  nationals,	  it	  was	  later	  claimed	  that	  the	  perpetrators	  had	  received	  training	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  alleged	  mastermind	  of	  the	  attacks	  was	  later	  captured	  from	  Karachi.	  280	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  40.	  281	  Ibid.	  75.	  282	  Ibid.	  2.	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required	   a	   ready	   army	   of	   religiously	   motivated	   Mujahideen	   to	   fight	   against	  Soviet	  Union	  and	   the	  communist	   ideology.283	  Musharraf’s	   rule	  was	  marked	  by	  opposite	  needs	  of	  the	  time.	  With	  the	  Islamic	  discourse	  of	  the	  previous	  decades	  now	   considered	  dangerous	   in	   the	  new	   climate,	   the	  post-­‐September	  11	  period	  required	   a	   toning	   down	   of	   the	   religious	   narrative.	   Thus	   ‘Enlightened	  Moderation’	  –	  an	  attempt	  to	  convey	  a	  moderate	  version	  of	  Islam	  –	  became	  the	  guiding	   phrase	   for	   Musharraf’s	   policies,	   and	   the	   new	   mantra	   for	   the	   same	  military	  power	  that	  had	  led	  the	  Islamisation	  campaign.284	  	  	  The	   biggest	   clash	   between	   the	   two	   competing	   slogans	   of	   Islamisation	   and	  ‘Enlightened	  Moderation’	  occurred	  during	  the	  Lal	  Masjid	  (Red	  Mosque)	  incident	  in	   Islamabad	   in	   2007,	   when	   the	   religious	   seminaries	   associated	   with	   the	  Mosque	   were	   sieged	   and	   captured	   by	   the	   armed	   forces.285	   Jamia	   Hafsa,	   the	  women’s	   seminary	   associated	   with	   the	   Mosque,	   is	   claimed	   to	   be	   the	   largest	  Islamic	  institution	  for	  women	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  almost	  6,000	  students.286	  In	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283	  See,	  On	  Religion	  and	  State	  Law:	  A	  brief	  history	  of	  Islamisation	  of	  laws,	  1973-­‐1999,	  on	  page	  73.	  284	  General	  Musharraf’s	  own	  elaboration	  of	  the	  phrase	  provides	  an	  interesting	  read.	  He	  writes	  that	  the	  ‘idea	  of	  “enlightened	  moderation”	  dawned	  on	  me	  in	  my	  study	  one	  night	  when	  I	  was	  meditating	  on	  all	  this	  [violence].	  To	  stop	  violence,	  we	  need	  a	  global	  solution.	  The	  turmoil	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  arises	  primarily	  because	  of	  unresolved,	  long-­‐standing	  political	  disputes	  that	  have	  created	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice,	  alienation,	  deprivation,	  powerlessness,	  and	  hopelessness	  in	  the	  masses.	  …	  Enlightened	  moderation	  is	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  strategy	  that	  I	  sincerely	  believe	  is	  also	  a	  win-­‐win	  strategy.	  One	  prong,	  to	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  is	  the	  rejection	  of	  terrorism	  and	  extremism	  in	  order	  to	  concentrate	  fully	  on	  internal	  socioeconomic	  development.	  The	  other	  prong,	  to	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  West	  in	  general	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  particular,	  is	  to	  put	  their	  full	  weight	  behind	  finding	  a	  just	  resolution	  of	  all	  political	  disputes	  afflicting	  Muslim	  societies.’	  Pervez	  Musharraf,	  In	  the	  Line	  of	  Fire:	  A	  Memoir	  (Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  London	  2006)	  295-­‐296.	  285	  Ashok	  K.	  Behuria,	  'The	  Rise	  of	  Pakistani	  Taliban	  and	  the	  Response	  of	  the	  State'	  (2007)	  31	  (5)	  
Strategic	  Analysis	  699,	  712-­‐713.	  286	  Fawzia	  Afzal-­‐Khan,	  'What	  lies	  beneath:	  Dispatch	  from	  the	  front	  lines	  of	  the	  Burqa	  Brigade'	  (2008)	  14	  (1)	  Social	  Identities	  3,	  5.	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period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  2007	  siege,	  the	  Mosque287	  and	  the	  seminary	  became	  a	  hub	  of	  militant	  activity.288	  Despite	  being	  situated	   in	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  Capital	  of	  Pakistan,	   the	   students	   from	   the	   seminary	   (particularly	   female	   students)	  increasingly	   challenged	   government	   authority	   and	   kidnapped	   and	   attacked	  those	   individuals	   in	   the	   vicinity	   who	   were	   considered	   to	   be	   ‘secular’289	   and	  suspected	   of	   ‘sexual-­‐depravity’.290	   Through	   its	   attempts	   at	   ‘cleansing’	   the	  society	  of	  its	  ‘immoral	  sexuality’	  and	  ‘sexual	  corruption’,291	  led	  by	  heavily	  armed	  students,292	   the	   Mosque	   increasingly	   challenged	   government	   authority,	  denounced	  its	  legitimacy,	  and	  argued	  for	  a	  complete	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  imposition	  of	  Shariah.293	  In	  2007,	  after	  negotiations	  between	  the	  government	   and	   the	   clerics,	   for	   surrender	   of	   arms	   and	   curtailment	   of	   the	  Mosque’s	  activities,	   failed,	   the	  government	   launched	  an	  army-­‐led	  operation.294	  The	   bloodied	   operation	   in	   which	   scores	   of	   soldiers,	   seminary	   students	   and	  militants	  were	  killed,	  including	  one	  of	  the	  two	  leaders	  of	  the	  Mosque,	  has	  since	  gained	  symbolic	  value	  as	  a	  rallying	  point	  for	  Islamic	  militant	  groups	  operating	  in	   Pakistan.295	   It	   is	   used	   by	   Islamic	  militant	   groups	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   State’s	  insincerity	   towards	   Islamisation	   measures.	   Despite	   such	   incidents	   and	   the	  claims	   of	   ‘Enlightened	   Moderation’,	   however,	   the	   Musharraf	   regime	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287	  Established	  by	  Maulana	  Abdullah,	  a	  religious	  cleric	  and	  a	  confidant	  of	  General	  Zia-­‐ul-­‐Haq,	  Lal	  Masjid	  had	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  recruitment	  and	  training	  of	  Mujahideen	  during	  the	  Soviet-­‐Afghan	  War	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Maulana	  Abdullah,	  who	  was	  alleged	  to	  have	  links	  with	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  leadership,	  was	  assassinated	  in	  1998	  by	  unknown	  assailants.	  288	  Farida	  Shaheed,	  'Contested	  Identities:	  Gendered	  Politics,	  Gendered	  Religion	  in	  Pakistan'	  (2010)	  31	  (6)	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  851,	  862-­‐863.	  	  289	  Ibid.	  290	  Fawzia	  Afzal-­‐Khan	  (2008)	  (n	  286)	  3.	  291	  Farida	  Shaheed	  (2010)	  (n	  288)	  862-­‐863.	  292	  Fawzia	  Afzal-­‐Khan	  (2008)	  (n	  286)	  4.	  293	  Ashok	  K.	  Behuria	  (2007)	  (n	  285)	  712.	  294	  The	  operation	  was	  codenamed	  ‘operation	  silence’.	  Ibid.	  713.	  	  295	  Ibid.	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Pakistan’s	  intelligence	  agencies	  are	  accused	  of	  playing	  a	  double	  game	  with	  their	  continued	   support	   for	  Taliban	  and	  other	   religious	  militant	   groups	  as	   they	  are	  considered	  as	  strategic	  assets	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Kashmir.296	  	  The	   conflicts	   between	   the	   Islamic	   and	   ‘Moderate’	   discourses	   were	   also	  witnessed	   in	   some	   of	   the	   legal	   developments	   of	   the	   era,	   the	  most	   notable	   of	  which	  were	   the	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   Protection	   of	  Women	   (Criminal	   Laws	  Amendment)	   Act	   of	   2006.	   This	   Act	   challenged	   some	   of	   the	   problematic	  frameworks	  of	  Islamic	   law	  in	  the	  country,	  particularly	  the	  Hudood	  Ordinances	  of	  1979.297	  One	  of	  the	  major	  issues	  that	  emerged	  from	  these	  Ordinances,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  related	  to	  miscarriage	  of	  justice	  and	  violation	  of	  women’s	  rights	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  women’s	  reporting	  of	  an	  offence	  of	  rape	  against	  them	  was	  often	  construed	  as	  an	  admission	  of	  guilt,	  through	  which	  they	   themselves	   were	   tried	   for	   adultery	   or	   fornication.298	   The	   2006	   Act	  categorically	   established	   the	   difference	   between	   Zina-­‐bil-­‐jabr	   (rape)	   and	   Zina	  (fornication),	   and	   amended	   the	   procedures	   surrounding	   evidence	   and	  punishment.299	  However,	   some	  scholars	  argue	   that	   the	   ‘feeble’	  Act	  was	   ‘full	  of	  loopholes	  and	  lacunas’,	  and	  more	  akin	  to	  an	  exercise	  in	  politics	  to	  appease	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296	  Ibid.	  713-­‐714.	  297	  Moeen	  Cheema,	  'Beyond	  Beliefs:	  Deconstructing	  the	  Dominant	  Narratives	  of	  the	  Islamisation	  of	  Pakistan's	  Law'	  (2012)	  LX	  (4)	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  875,	  892;	  Rubya	  Mehdi,	  'The	  Protection	  of	  Women	  (Criminal	  Laws	  Amendment)	  Act,	  2006	  in	  Pakistan'	  Droit	  et	  
cultures	  [En	  ligne]	  59,	  1	  June	  2010	  <http://droitcultures.revues.org/2016>	  last	  accessed	  14	  November	  2013.	  298	  Moeen	  Cheema	  (2012)	  (n	  297)	  892.	  299	  Ibid.	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religious	  groups	  and	  women’s	  rights	  activists,	  as	  it	  did	  not	  target	  the	  underlying	  discriminatory	  structure	  of	  the	  Hudood	  Ordinances.300	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   Islamic/Moderate	   dispute,	   the	   major	   feature	   that	   marked	  Musharraf’s	  regime	  was	  its	  oscillating	  relationship	  with	  the	  superior	   judiciary.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   after	   the	  promulgation	  of	   the	  PCO,	   several	   judges	  of	   the	  judiciary	  including	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Pakistan	  had	  refused	  to	  take	  a	  new	  oath	  of	   office.	   The	   new	   judiciary	   that	   subsequently	   took	   office	   gave	   a	   notable	  judgement	  in	  2000,	  when	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  Martial	  Law	  was	  challenged	  in	  the	  Supreme	   Court.301	   The	   Court,	   in	   a	   move	   reminiscent	   of	   its	   previous	  incarnations,	   went	   back	   to	   the	   Doctrine	   of	   State	   necessity302	   to	   justify	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  coup.	  It	  declared	  that	  
We	  are	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  machinery	  of	  the	  Government	  at	  the	  Centre	  and	  the	  Provinces	  had	  completely	  broken	  down	  and	  the	  Constitution	  had	  been	   made	   unworkable.	   A	   situation	   arose	   for	   which	   the	   Constitution	  provided	  no	  solution	  and	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  had	  to	  intervene	  to	  save	  the	  State	  from	  further	  chaos,	  for	  maintenance	  of	  peace	  and	  order,	  economic	  stability,	   justice	   and	   good	   governance	   and	   to	   safeguard	   integrity	   and	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  country	  dictated	  by	  highest	  considerations	  of	  the	  State	  necessity…303	  	  This	   amiable	   relationship	  between	   the	  new	   judiciary	   and	   the	  military	   regime,	  however,	  did	  not	  last.	  In	  2002,	  Musharraf	  assumed	  the	  office	  of	  the	  President	  of	  Pakistan	   following	   a	   referendum	   in	   the	   country304	   in	  which,	   as	  with	   previous	  referendums	   under	  military	   regimes,	   only	   one	   question	  was	   presented	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (2010)	  (n	  297).	  301	  Syed	  Zafar	  Ali	  Shah	  case	  (n	  176).	  302	  Coined	  in	  State	  v	  Dosso	  (n	  190).	  303	  Syed	  Zafar	  Ali	  Shah	  case	  (n	  176).	  304	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2006)	  (n	  225)	  620.	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population	   –	   whether	   they	   supported	   moderation	   in	   Islam	   and	   consequently	  supported	   Pervez	  Musharraf’s	   election	   as	   President.	   Soon	   after	   assuming	   the	  new	   role,	   Musharraf	   promulgated	   wide-­‐ranging	   constitutional	   amendments	  through	   the	   Legal	   Framework	   Ordinance	   of	   2002.	   This	   Ordinance,	   while	  reinstating	   the	   1973	  Constitution,	   increased	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   President,	   and	  indemnified	   Musharraf	   for	   all	   actions	   taken	   before	   his	   election	   as	   the	  President.305	   The	   Ordinance	   was	   struck	   down	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   which	  ruled	   that	   the	   constitutional	   amendment	   required	   ratification	   by	   the	  parliament,	   although	   it	   was	   subsequently	   passed	   in	   2003	   when	   politicians	  supported	  by	  Musharraf	  formed	  the	  new	  legislature.	  	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  Musharraf	  regime	  continued	  its	  oscillation	   until	   2005,	   during	   which	   three	   different	   Chief	   Justices	   assumed	  office.	   Iftikhar	   Muhammad	   Chaudhary	   took	   charge	   as	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	  Pakistan	   in	   2005,	   and	   although	   not	   challenging	   the	   Executive	   authority	  expressly,	  he	  increasingly	  questioned	  the	  government	  and	  the	  armed	  forces	  on	  the	   issue	  of	   the	   ‘forced	  disappearances’	  of	  people	   in	  Balochistan.306	  During	  his	  tenure,	   the	  SC	  also	  challenged	  and	  annulled	  a	  number	  of	   celebrated	  economic	  measures	   taken	   by	   the	   government,	   the	   most	   notable	   of	   which	   was	   the	  privatisation	  of	   the	  Pakistan	  Steel	  Mills.307	  Fearful	   that	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  might	  not	  support	  the	  legality	  of	  Musharraf’s	  candidacy	  for	  the	  oncoming	  Presidential	  re-­‐election,	  the	  armed	  forces	  asked	  the	  CJ	  to	  resign	  on	  allegations	  of	  misuse	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305	  Taiyyaba	  Ahmed	  Qureshi	  (2010)	  (n	  276)	  492-­‐493.	  306	  Thought	  to	  be	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  the	  army	  and	  the	  para-­‐military	  forces,	  detained	  during	  counter-­‐insurgency	  measures.	  Kersi	  B.	  Shroff	  and	  Krishan	  S.	  Nehra	  (2007)	  (n	  19).	  307	  Taiyyaba	  Ahmed	  Qureshi	  (2010)	  (n	  276)	  493-­‐494.	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authority.308	   On	   his	   refusal,	   a	   series	   of	   measures	   were	   adopted	   against	   him,	  which	   included	  his	  house	   arrest	   and	   the	   initiation	  of	   a	  Presidential	  Reference	  for	   his	   removal.309	   The	  protests	   and	  movement	   sparked	  by	   the	  CJ’s	   refusal	   to	  submit	   to	   the	   authority	  of	   a	  military	  General,	   gained	  momentum	  amongst	   the	  students,	  political	  parties,	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  with	  lawyers	  being	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  struggle.310	  The	  struggle	  culminated	  in	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  CJ	  to	   his	   office	   in	   July	   2007	   although,	   soon	   after,	   Musharraf	   imposed	   a	  Constitutional	  Emergency	  in	  the	  country	  in	  November	  2007,	  and	  suspended	  all	  courts	  and	  sitting	  judges.311	  	  	  Protests	  against	  Musharraf’s	  regime	  erupted	  again.	  The	  assassination	  of	  Benazir	  Bhutto	   in	   December	   2007	   provided	   not	   only	   fresh	   impetus	   to	   the	   Lawyers’	  Movement,	  but	  also	  resulted	  in	  her	  Pakistan	  People’s	  Party	   later	  sweeping	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  February	  2008.312	  Musharraf	  resigned	  from	  his	  post	  as	   President	   in	   2008	   and	   while	   the	   new	   President,	   Asif	   Ali	   Zardari,	   initially	  proved	   reluctant	   to	   reinstate	   the	   deposed	   judges,	   the	   continuation	   of	   mass	  protests	  resulted	  in	  the	  restoration	  of	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  judiciary	  to	  office	  in	  2009.313	  	  The	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  developments	  in	  the	  years	  since	  then	  have	  been	  in	  three	  main	  tangents:	  Greater	  strength	  gained	  by	  political	  parties	   in	  relation	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308	  Ibid.	  487.	  309	  Kersi	  B.	  Shroff	  and	  Krishan	  S.	  Nehra	  (2007)	  (n	  19).	  310	  See,	  generally,	  Zahid	  Shahab	  Ahmed	  and	  Maria	  J.	  Stephan	  (2010)	  (n	  18);	  Shoaib	  A.	  Ghias	  (2010)	  (n	  71).	  311	  Shoaib	  A.	  Ghias	  (2010)	  (n	  71)	  986.	  312	  Zahid	  Shahab	  Ahmed	  and	  Maria	  J.	  Stephan	  (2010)	  (n	  18)	  498.	  313	  Ibid.	  	  499-­‐505.	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the	  armed	  forces,	  a	  renewed	  focus	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  the	  efforts	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   increasing	   problems	   of	   lawlessness	   and	   militancy.	   A	  greater	   willingness	   on	   the	   part	   of	   political	   parties	   to	   settle	   disputes	   without	  seeking	  a	  recourse	  through	  the	  support	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  culminated,	  not	  just	  in	  the	  completion	  of	  electoral	  term	  for	  an	  elected	  government	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Pakistan’s	  history,314	  but	  also	  resulted	   in	   the	  Eighteenth	  Amendment	   to	   the	  Constitution	   in	   2010.	   This	   Amendment	   has	   introduced	   a	   set	   of	   wide-­‐ranging	  reforms	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  which	  relate	  to:	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Presidential	  power	  to	  dissolve	  the	  elected	  assemblies	  and	  greater	  powers	  to	   the	   Prime	   Minister;315	   a	   renaming	   of	   Khyber-­‐Pakhtunkhwa	   province	   from	  North	  West	  Frontier	  Province,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  demand	  from	  the	  people	  of	  the	  region;316	   a	   repeal	   of	   Legal	   Framework	   Order	   implemented	   by	   Musharraf;317	  and	  an	  express	  linking	  of	  the	  abrogation	  or	  suspension	  of	  the	  Constitution	  to	  the	  High	  Crime	  of	  Treason.318	  	  The	   second	   key	   feature	   of	   legal	   development	   in	   the	   past	   few	   years	   is	   the	  renewed	   focus	   on	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary,	  which	  has	  made	   judicial	  activism	   far	   more	   pronounced	   than	   it	   was	   in	   the	   preceding	   decades.319	   The	  Human	   Rights	   Cell	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Pakistan,	   though	   established	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314	  For	  a	  history	  of	  elections	  and	  electoral	  politics	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  PILDAT,	  'The	  First	  10	  General	  Elections	  of	  Pakistan:	  A	  Story	  of	  Pakistan's	  Transition	  from	  Democracy	  Above	  Rule	  of	  Law	  to	  Democracy	  Under	  Rule	  of	  Law	  -­‐	  1970-­‐2013'	  (Pakistan	  Institute	  of	  Legislative	  Development	  and	  Transparency,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2013).	  315	  Article	  17	  of	  the	  Constitution	  (Eighteenth	  Amendment)	  Act,	  2010.	  316	  Ibid.	  Article	  3	  	  317	  Ibid.	  Article	  2.	  318	  Ibid.	  Article	  3(1).	  Early	  in	  2014,	  General	  Musharraf	  was	  charged	  with	  Treason	  for	  imposition	  of	  Emergency	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  the	  trial	  is	  currently	  sub	  judice.	  319	  Charles	  H.	  Kennedy	  (2012)	  (n	  72)	  158.	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2005,	   is	   said	   to	   be	   working	   with	   ‘renewed	   zeal	   and	   fervour’	   since	   the	  restoration	   of	   the	   judiciary	   in	   2009.320	   SC	   has	   used	   the	   provision	   of	   original	  jurisdiction	   to	   take	   Suo	   Motu	   notices	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   issues,	   ranging	   from	  transgression	  or	  abuse	  of	  government	  authority	   to	  human	  rights	  violations.321	  The	   SC	   has	   also	   increasingly	   challenged	   the	   executive	   power,	   measures	   that	  have	   attracted	   both	   praise	   and	   criticism	   from	   the	   legal	   fraternity.	   It	   forced	   a	  sitting	   Prime	   Minister	   to	   resign	   in	   2012	   for	   not	   pursuing	   the	   allegations	   of	  corruption	  and	  money	  laundering	  against	  the	  President	  of	  Pakistan	  at	  the	  time,	  Asif	  Ali	  Zardari.322	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  cases	  currently	  in	  the	  SC	  relates	  to	  the	  charges	  of	  treason	  against	  Pervez	  Musharraf	  for	  the	  2007	  promulgation	  of	   Emergency	   and	   suspension	   of	   the	   courts,	   though	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   case	  depends	  on	  international	  and	  domestic	  political	  considerations	  as	  much	  as	  legal	  frameworks	  and	  judicial	  activism.	  	  The	  issues	  of	   lawlessness	  and	  militancy	  have	  also	  provided	  a	  key	  direction	  for	  legal	   and	   constitutional	   developments	   in	   Pakistan.	   During	   its	   tenure,	   the	  previous	   government	   had	   strengthened	   the	   powers	   afforded	   to	   the	   armed	  forces	  to	  detain,	  interrogate	  and	  question	  those	  individuals	  who	  were	  suspected	  of	   involvement	   in	   terrorism	  and	  militancy.323	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Courts	  have	  also	  gained	   increased	   powers	   and	   visibility	   in	   the	   legal	   discourse,	  where	   they	   are	  able	   to	   try	   cases	   ranging	   from	   burglary	   and	   kidnapping	   to	   instances	   of	  mass	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320	  Human	  Rights	  Cell,	  'Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  Human	  Rights	  Cell	  Annual	  Report'	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan,	  Islamabad	  2010/11)	  132.	  321	  Discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7	  on	  page	  235.	  322	  Anas	  Malik,	  'Pakistan	  in	  2012:	  An	  Assertive	  Judiciary	  in	  a	  Pre-­‐Election	  Year'	  (2013)	  53	  (1)	  
Asian	  Survey	  34,	  39-­‐40.	  323	  For	  instance,	  the	  Actions	  in	  Aid	  of	  Civil	  Power	  Ordinance,	  2011,	  grant	  extensive	  powers	  to	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  detain	  suspects	  for	  unspecified	  periods	  of	  time.	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violence.324	   Currently,	   there	   are	   parliamentary	   debates	   surrounding	   the	  enactment	   of	   Pakistan	   Protection	   Ordinance.	   Criticised	   by	   human	   rights	  activists	   and	   sections	   from	   the	   legal	   fraternity,	   the	   Pakistan	   Protection	  Ordinance	   seeks	   to	   give	   wide-­‐ranging	   power	   to	   the	   government	   and	   armed	  forces	  to	  detain	  and	  charge	  anyone	  suspected	  of	  working	  against	  the	  integrity,	  or	  even	   the	   ideology,	  of	   the	   country.325	  Despite	   the	  opposition,	   it	   seems	   likely	  that	  the	  act	  will	  go	  through	  the	  parliament,	  given	  the	  discourse	  that	  exists	  in	  the	  country	   to	   strengthen	   the	  Writ	   of	   the	   State	   to	  deal	  with	   issues	  of	   lawlessness	  and	  militancy.	  	  	  
2.6. Conclusion	  
The	   purpose	   behind	   the	   preceding	   exposition	   on	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   and	  constitutional	  history	  was	  to	  highlight	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  mainstream	  legal	  frameworks.	   The	   incessant	   shifts	   between	   military	   rule	   and	   political	  governments	   and	   between	   secular	   and	   Islamic	   notions	   of	   law	   emphasise	   the	  problems	   that	   grip,	   not	   just	   the	   constitutional	   terrain,	   but	   also	   socio-­‐legal	  analyses	  in	  the	  country.	  Moreover,	  the	  chapter	  sought	  to	  introduce	  some	  of	  the	  key	   conceptions,	   cases,	   the	   reasoning	   employed	   by	   the	   superior	   judiciary,	   as	  well	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  link	  with	  Islam,	  which	  will	  emerge	  again	  through	  the	  course	  of	  this	  study.	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  Ahmad	  Nazir	  Warraich,	  'Crossing	  the	  fine	  line:	  There	  is	  an	  inverse	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐terrorism	  legislation	  and	  protecting	  civil	  liberties.	  Is	  there	  a	  way	  out?'	  The	  News	  (Pakistan	  20	  October	  2013)	  <http://jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2013-­‐weekly/nos-­‐20-­‐10-­‐2013/dia.htm#2>	  last	  accessed	  20	  October	  2013.	  325	  Imran	  Mukhtar,	  'NA	  body	  defers	  PPO	  till	  next	  week'	  The	  Nation	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  27	  March	  2014)	  <http://www.nation.com.pk/editors-­‐picks/27-­‐Mar-­‐2014/na-­‐body-­‐defers-­‐ppo-­‐till-­‐next-­‐week>	  last	  accessed	  27	  March	  2014.	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  Building	  on	  the	   idea	  of	  uncertainty	  of	  mainstream	  legal	  ordering	  developed	   in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  following	  chapter	  will	  present	  a	  sketch	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry.	  It	  will	  take	  a	  conceptual	  journey	  through	  the	  different	  elements	  of	  the	  country’s	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  –	  western	  and	  common	  law	  traditions,	  Islamic	  law,	  traditional	   legality,	   colonial	   law	   as	   exteriority	   within	   the	   constitution,	   and	  lawlessness.	  The	   study	   contends	   that	   these	  multiple	   components	   form	  part	  of	  the	   overall	   legal	   architecture	   of	   Pakistan,	   and	   that	   if	   they	   are	   excluded	   from	  legal	  analysis,	   it	   leaves	  us	  with	  a	  foundation	  that	  is	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  build	  sound	  legal	  analyses	  on.	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Chapter	  3: The	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  
3.1. Chapter	  Synopsis:	  The	  Plurality	  of	  Pakistan’s	  Legal	  Architecture	  
The	   previous	   chapter	   presented	   a	   brief	   history	   of	   the	   political,	   legal	   and	  constitutional	  uncertainty	  that	  has	  gripped	  Pakistan	  since	   its	   inception.326	  The	  purpose	   behind	   this	   discussion	  was	   to	   highlight	   the	  major	   factors	   that	   stymy	  socio-­‐legal	   analysis	   by	   capturing	   it	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   political	   and	  constitutional	   discussions.	   It	   was	   further	   highlighted	   that	   the	   state-­‐oriented	  legal	   and	   constitutional	   systems	   have	   faced	   their	   fair	   share	   of	   hurdles	   since	  Pakistan’s	  independence.	  The	  constitutional	  history	  has	  been	  marred	  by	  power	  struggles	   and	   incessant	   political	   and	   constitutional	   turmoil;	   moves	   between	  democratic	   to	   military	   dictatorships;	   shifts	   between	   presidential	   and	  parliamentary	  authority;	  and	  oscillations	  between	  religious	  and	  secular	   ideals.	  However,	  it	  is	  argued	  in	  this	  study	  that	  the	  Constitution	  and	  state-­‐oriented	  law	  form	  only	  one	  aspect,	   albeit	   the	  dominant	  one,	  of	   the	  overall	   legal	   tapestry	  of	  the	   country.	   In	   order	   to	   grasp	   the	   holistic	   picture	   of	   law	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Pakistan,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  multiple	  normative	  and	  legal	  orderings	  in	  the	  country,	  in	  addition	  to	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  turmoil	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  building	  on	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  turbulent	  history	  of	  law	  and	  the	  Constitution	   of	   Pakistan,	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   bring	   together	   the	  diverse	   forms	   of	   legality	   that	   exist	   in	   Pakistan	   on	   one	   platform,	   in	   order	   to	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  Chapter	  2	  on	  page	  50.	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enable	   us	   to	   discuss	   the	   diverse	   narratives	   that	   are	   commonly	   employed	   to	  understand	  them.	  It	  is	  only	  through	  building	  and	  grasping	  an	  overall	  picture	  of	  the	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   that	  we	   can	   ground	   the	   various	  narratives	   of	   law,	  offer	   critiques,	   understand	   their	   limitations,	   and	   realise	   the	   need	   to	   move	  towards	  more	  nuanced	  narratives	  and	  approaches	  to	  law	  in	  Pakistan.	  There	  are	  five	   different	   yet	   interrelated	   spheres	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   that	   will	   be	  discussed	  below:	  Constitutional	  and	  common	  law	  frameworks	  that	  have	  largely	  been	   inherited	   by	   Pakistan	   from	   the	   pre-­‐independence	   era;	   structures	   and	  instruments	  related	  to	  Islamic	  law,	  that	  have	  gained	  prominence	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades;	  traditional	  and	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	  that	  prevail	  in	  the	  country	  despite	  being	  challenged	  by	  the	  dominant	  legal	  system;	  the	  laws	  governing	  the	  Tribal	   Areas,	   which	   still	   carry	   an	   evidently	   colonial	   nature;	   and	   finally,	   the	  spheres	   of	   ‘lawlessness’,	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   absence	   of	   law	   and	  order,	   but	   which	   need	   to	   be	   considered	   here	   because	   of	   their	   role	   in	   the	  multiple	   narratives	   of	   law	   in	   Pakistan.	   Despite	   the	   structure	   of	   this	   chapter	  based	  along	  these	  five	  distinct	   topics,	   the	  aim	  behind	  considering	  them	  within	  the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   is	   to	   argue	   that	   these	   spheres	   of	   legality	   are	  interconnected,	  and	  cannot	  be	  completely	  divested	  from	  one	  another.	  	  
3.2. Constitutional	  Arrangement	  and	  Common	  law	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   struggle	   between	   religious	   and	   secular	   notions,	   the	  constitutional	  and	  common	   law	   traditions	  Pakistan	   inherited	   from	   its	   colonial	  legacy	   constitute	   the	   dominant	   legal	   system	   of	   the	   country.	   Based	   on	   their	  historical	   legacy,	   the	   state-­‐oriented	   legal	   system	   is	   largely	   formulated	   on	   the	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principles	  of	  English	   constitutional	   and	   legal	   traditions.327	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1973,	  which	  is	  currently	  in	  force,	  designates	  the	  country	  an	  Islamic	  Republic328	  and	   institutes	   a	   Parliamentary	   system	   of	   Governance329	   and	   a	   hierarchy	   of	  Courts.330	  Article	  175(1)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  establishes	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  at	  the	  Federal	  level,	  and	  five	  High	  Courts	  –	  one	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  Provinces,	  and	  one	  High	   Court	   for	   the	   Islamabad	   Capital	   Territory.331	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   has	  Original	   (Suo	   Motu)	   Jurisdiction	   on	   matters	   of	   dispute	   between	   Federal	  Government	   and	   Provincial	   Governments,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   matters	   of	   public	  importance,332	  and	  appellate	   jurisdiction	  on	  decisions	  of	   the	  High	  Courts.333	   It	  also	   has	   advisory	   jurisdiction	   on	   questions	   referred	   to	   the	   Court	   by	   the	  President.334	  Below	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  there’s	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  civil	  and	  criminal	  courts,	   culminating	   with	   the	   High	   Courts	   at	   the	   top	   within	   their	   respective	  regions.335	  	  	  The	   common	   law	   tradition	   means	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   stare	   decisis	   (legal	  precedent)	  is	  followed	  by	  the	  courts	  according	  to	  their	  hierarchy.336	  Article	  188	  of	  the	  Constitution	  makes	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  on	  the	  questions	  of	   law	  binding	   on	   all	   subordinate	   courts.	   The	   decisions	   of	   the	  High	   Court	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  Martin	  Lau,	  'Introduction	  to	  the	  Pakistani	  Legal	  System,	  with	  special	  reference	  to	  the	  Law	  of	  Contract'	  in	  Eugene	  Cotran	  and	  Chibli	  Mallat	  (eds),	  Yearbook	  of	  Islamic	  and	  Middle	  Eastern	  Law	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  London	  1994)	  3.	  328	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  329	  Ibid.	  Part	  III,	  Chapter	  2.	  330	  Ibid.	  Part	  VI,	  Chapters	  1-­‐4.	  331	  Ibid.	  Article	  175(1).	  Islamabad	  High	  Court	  established	  through	  the	  Constitution	  (Eighteenth	  Amendment)	  Act,	  2010.	  332	  Ibid.	  Article	  184.	  333	  Ibid.	  Article	  185.	  334	  Ibid.	  Article	  186.	  335	  For	  a	  graphical	  description	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  Courts	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  Martin	  Lau	  (1994)	  (n	  327)	  4	  and	  7.	  336	  Articles	  109,	  201,	  203(GG)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	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binding	   on	   itself,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   subordinate	   courts	   that	   lie	   under	   its	  jurisdiction,	  but	  not	  on	  the	  High	  Courts	  from	  other	  provinces.337	  The	  decisions	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council,	  which	  was	  the	  apex	  court	  for	  the	  British	  Indian	  state	  and	  continued	   this	   role	   even	   after	   partition	   until	   1950,	   are	   treated	   with	   ‘due	  respect’,	  as	  they	  are	  considered	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  be	  ‘expositions	  of	  the	  law	   by	   one	   of	   the	   highest	   judicial	   tribunals	   in	   the	   world	   composed	   of	  distinguished	  men	  who	  had	  special	  knowledge	  about	  our	  public	  law.’338	  But	  the	  Privy	   Council	   judgements	   do	   not	   bind	   the	   courts	   and	   cannot	   prevail	   over	   the	  Supreme	   or	   Federal	   Court	   decisions.339	   The	   superior	   courts	   have	   also	  highlighted	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   foundational	   norms	   and	   ideologies	   of	  the	  pre	  and	  post-­‐partition	   judicial	  systems	  of	  the	  country,	  stating	  that	   ‘We	  are	  governed	  by	  a	  written	  Constitution;	  and	  have	  an	  ideology	  based	  on	  the	  religion	  of	  Islam.	  Common	  law	  of	  England	  is	  not,	  and	  cannot	  be,	  the	  common	  law	  or	  the	  national	  law	  of	  Pakistan.’340	  	  	  	  But	   there	   are	   other	   streams	   within	   the	   Judicature	   which	   make	   the	   structure	  more	   complicated.	   The	   Federal	   Shariat	   Court	   (FSC)	   is	   commonly	   criticised	   as	  being	   a	   parallel	   judiciary	  within	   the	   country.	   The	   FSC,	   established	   in	   1980,341	  has	  been	  given	  the	  remit	  to	  examine	  any	  and	  all	  laws	  that	  may	  be	  repugnant	  to	  Islamic	   injunctions.342	   The	   decisions	   of	   the	   FSC,	   which	   also	   has	   suo	   motu	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337	  Subject	  to	  the	  convention	  noted	  by	  the	  Lahore	  High	  Court	  in	  (PLD	  1960	  Lah	  687),	  quoted	  in	  
Martin	  Lau	  (1994)	  (n	  327)	  12-­‐13.	  338	  Ibid.	  9.	  339	  Ibid.	  340	  Ibid.	  10.	  341	  Through	  the	  Presidential	  Order	  No.	  1	  of	  1980	  (incorporated	  into	  Article	  203,	  Chapter	  3-­‐A	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution).	  342	  Article	  203D	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	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jurisdiction,343	  can	  only	  be	  reviewed	  through	  the	  Shariat	  Appellate	  Bench	  of	  the	  Supreme	   Court344	   and	   particular	   issues	   with	   this	   judicial	   framework	   will	   be	  further	   discussed	   below.	   The	   judicial	   system	   also	   includes	   special	   Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Courts	  (ATCs)	  which	  were	  established	  in	  1997.345	  Initially,	  the	  ATCs	  were	  constituted	  as	  special	  military	  tribunals,	  the	  judgements	  from	  which	  could	  not	   be	   appealed	   to	   the	   superior	   courts	   in	   Pakistan.346	   However,	   after	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	   ruling	   of	   unconstitutionality	   against	  ATCs	   in	   the	  Mehram	  Ali	  case347	  and	  the	  subsequent	  amendments	  to	  the	  concerned	  legislations,	  the	  ATCs	  now	   fall	  within	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	  High	  Courts.	   The	  ATCs	   specifically	   deal	  with	  issues	  of	  ‘Terrorism’	  under	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  legislation,	  broadly	  defined	  to	  cover	  not	  just	  terrorist	  activities	  but	  even	  robbery	  and	  dacoity.348	  	  There	   are	   two	   further	   anomalies	   in	   the	  national	   judicature,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  controversial	   nature	   of	   FSC	   and	   ATCs.	   The	   Provincially	   Administered	   Tribal	  Areas	   (PATA)	   and	   the	   Federally	   Administered	   Tribal	   Areas	   (FATA)349	   of	   the	  country	   are	   directly	   governed	   under	   the	   President	   and	   Provincial	   Governor’s	  executive	   authority.350	  The	   judicial	  matters	  within	   these	   regions	   are	  managed	  by	  appointed	  Jirgas,	  the	  committee	  of	  elders	  selected	  for	  this	  purpose,	  working	  under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Commissioner.351	   The	   decisions	   of	   Jirgas	   can	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  Ibid.	  Article	  203D(1).	  344	  Ibid.	  Article	  203F(3).	  345	  Reconstituted	  in	  1999	  by	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  (Amendment)	  Ordinance	  1999.	  346	  Articles	  12	  and	  25	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Act,	  1997.	  347	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97)	  105-­‐106.	  348	  Shabana	  Fayyaz,	  'Responding	  to	  Terrorism:	  Pakistan's	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Laws'	  (Pakistan	  Insitute	  for	  Peace	  Studies,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2008)	  5.	  349	  Defined	  through	  Article	  246	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  350	  Ibid.	  Article	  247.	  351	  The	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulation,	  1901.	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appealed	  to	  the	  Commissioner,	  but	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  High	  Courts	  do	  not	   have	   any	   jurisdiction	   to	   review	   these	   decisions,	   unless	   stipulated	   by	   the	  President	   or	   the	   Parliament.352	   This	   anomaly	  will	   be	   further	   discussed	   in	   the	  section	  on	  colonial	  law	  below.	  Moreover,	  the	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  (literally,	  the	  System	  of	   Justice)	   Regulation	   of	   2009	   introduced	   yet	   another	   mechanism	   of	   justice	  administration	   based	   on	   Islamic	   conceptions,	   in	   the	   Malakand	   region	   of	   the	  country.353	  These	  regulations	  established	  the	  office	  of	  Qazis	  (Islamic	  Judges)	  as	  the	  main	  judicial	  body,	  who	  would	  consider	  cases	  based	  on	  a	  different	  notion	  of	  procedure	  and	  evidence	  as	  required	  by	  national	  laws.354	  	  This	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	   dominant	   state-­‐oriented	   legal	   system	   shows	   that	  even	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  state	   law,	  different	   tendencies	  and	  mechanisms	  of	   law	  can	   be	   identified.	   With	   common	   law	   and	   British	   constitutional	   traditions	  operating	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  superior	  courts,	   the	  manifestations	  of	   Islamic	   law	  are	   evident	   through	   the	   presence	   of	   Federal	   Shariat	   Court	   and	   the	   recently	  instituted	   Qazi	   courts.	   The	   contestation	   between	   the	   Islamic	   and	   secular	   (for	  lack	   of	   a	   better	   word)	   notions	   of	   law	   is	   also	   evident	   in	   the	   instances	   of	   the	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	   Ordinance,	  which	  was	   implemented	   due	   to	   a	   demand	   by	   Islamic	  militant	  groups,355	  as	  well	  as	   the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism	  Ordinance	  existing	  under	   the	  same	   legal	   framework.	  Moreover,	   the	   Regulations	   governing	   the	   Tribal	   Areas	  depict	  both	  the	  legacy	  of	  colonial	  laws	  instituted	  by	  the	  British	  Indian	  state,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	  by	  using	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352	  Article	  247(7)	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	  353	  The	  Shariah	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Ordinance,	  2009.	  	  354	  Ibid.	  Article	  6.	  355	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	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terminology	  and	  systems	  of	  jirgas.	  The	  sections	  below	  will	  elaborate	  on	  each	  of	  these	   spheres	   of	   law	   and	   legality	   in	   order	   to	   lay	   out	   a	   holistic	   picture	   of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry.	  	  
3.3. Islamic	  law	  
The	   gradual	   ascendancy	   of	   the	   Islamic	   religious	   ideology	   since	   independence	  has	  meant	   that	   the	  country	  has	  oscillated	  between	  notions	  of	   secular	   law	  and	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  religious	  law	  on	  the	  other.356	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	   religious	   law	   principles	   are	   solely	   considered	   to	   have	   their	  foundations	  in	  Islam,357	  and	  predominantly	  in	  the	  religious	  interpretation	  of	  the	  largest	  Muslim	   sect	   in	   the	   country	   (i.e.,	  Muslims	   from	   the	   Sunni-­‐Hanafi	   sect).	  Any	   laws	   thus	   created	   in	   Pakistan	   in	   the	   name	   of	   Islam	   often	   have	   troubling	  consequences	   for	   minorities	   in	   the	   country.358	   The	   influence	   of	   Islam	   on	   the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  system(s)	  is	  pervasive,	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  disentangle	  it	  to	  contrast	  with	  the	  common	  law	  or	  secular	  traditions.	  However,	  I	  will	  highlight	  some	   of	   its	   salient	   features	   as	   evident	   at	   three	   different	   levels:	   Constitution,	  Judiciary	  and	  Penal	  Laws.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  on	  page	  82.	  357	  Article	  227(1)	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution	  states	  that	  ‘All	  existing	  laws	  shall	  be	  brought	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  Injunctions	  of	  Islam	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Holy	  Quran	  and	  Sunnah,	  in	  this	  Part	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Injunctions	  of	  Islam,	  and	  no	  law	  shall	  be	  enacted	  which	  is	  repugnant	  to	  such	  Injunctions.’	  358	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  religious	  minorities	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  Javaid	  
Rehman	  (2000)	  (n	  233).	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3.3.1. Islam	  and	  the	  Constitution	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1973,	  which	  is	  currently	  in	  place,	  carries	  heavy	  theological	  tones.	  The	  Objectives	  Resolution	  forms	  the	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  which	  vests	  sovereignty	  with	  the	  Almighty	  and	  contains	  provisions	  that	  expressly	  link	  religion	  and	  the	  state.	  The	  first	  few	  lines	  of	  the	  Preamble	  read:	  
Whereas	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  entire	  Universe	  belongs	  to	  Almighty	  Allah	  alone,	  and	  the	  authority	  to	  be	  exercised	  by	  the	  people	  of	  Pakistan	  within	  the	  limits	  prescribed	  by	  Him	  is	  a	  sacred	  trust;	  	  And	   whereas	   it	   is	   the	   will	   of	   the	   people	   of	   Pakistan	   to	   establish	   an	  order…	  Wherein	   the	   principles	   of	   democracy,	   freedom,	   equality,	   tolerance	   and	  social	  justice,	  as	  enunciated	  by	  Islam,	  shall	  be	  fully	  observed;	  	  Wherein	   the	   Muslims	   shall	   be	   enabled	   to	   order	   their	   lives	   in	   the	  individual	   and	   collective	   spheres	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   teachings	   and	  requirements	  of	  Islam	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Holy	  Quran	  and	  Sunnah…359	  	  
Although	   the	   Preamble	   then	   includes	   statements	   about	   rights	   and	   safeguards	  for	  minorities	   as	  well	   as	   fundamental	   rights	   of	   citizens,	   it	   reverts	   to	   religious	  notions	  and	  concludes	  by:	  
Now,	  therefore,	  we,	  the	  people	  of	  Pakistan,	  Cognisant	  of	  our	  responsibility	  before	  Almighty	  Allah	  and	  men;	  Cognisant	  of	  the	  sacrifices	  made	  by	  the	  people	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  Pakistan;	  	  Faithful	   to	   the	   declaration	   made	   by	   the	   Founder	   of	   Pakistan,	   Quaid-­‐i-­‐Azam	  Mohammad	  Ali	  Jinnah,	  that	  Pakistan	  would	  be	  a	  democratic	  State	  based	  on	  Islamic	  principles	  of	  social	  justice;	  	  …adopt,	  enact	  and	  give	  to	  ourselves,	  this	  Constitution.360	  	  	  
With	   the	   Objectives	   Resolution	   considered	   as	   the	   ‘cornerstone	   of	   Pakistan’s	  legal	   edifice’361	   and	   ‘the	   bond	   which	   binds	   the	   nation’,362	   its	   message	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  360	  Ibid.	  361	  A.	  K.	  Brohi,	  former	  Law	  Minister	  of	  Pakistan,	  quoted	  in	  Rashida	  Patel	  (1986)	  (n	  114)	  7.	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religious	   shade	   cannot	   be	   disregarded.	   Ever	   since	   the	  Resolution	  was	  made	   a	  justiciable	   and	   substantive	   part	   of	   the	   Constitution	   in	   1985,363	   the	   religious	  discourse	   has	   gained	   further	   prominence	   within	   the	   legal	   realm,	   with	   the	  superior	   courts	   declaring	   that	   the	   Resolution	   is	   the	   country’s	   ‘Supra	  Constitutional	   document’,364	   and	   that	   it	   ‘provides	   a	   new	   approach	   to	  constitutional	  interpretation’	  based	  on	  Islamic	  injunctions.365	  	  	  However,	  the	  Islamic	  tone	  of	  the	  Constitution	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  Preamble,	  and	  equally	  pervades	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  charter.	  Article	  1(1)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  declares	  the	  country	  to	  be	  a	  Federation	  known	  as	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan.366	  In	  an	  express	  move	  to	   link	  state	  and	  religion,	  Article	  2	  proclaims	  Islam	  to	  be	  the	  ‘State	  Religion’	  of	  the	  country.367	  Article	  31	  of	  the	  Constitution	  highlights	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  State	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  enable	  Muslims	  ‘to	  order	  their	  lives	  in	  accordance	  with	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   and	   basic	   concepts	   of	   Islam….’368	  This	   Article	   also	   binds	   the	   State	   to	  make	   the	   teaching	   of	   Quran	   and	   Islamiat	  (Islamic	   Studies)	   compulsory	   in	   educational	   institutions	   and	   to	   promote	   the	  ‘observance	  of	  the	  Islamic	  moral	  standards’.369	  	  In	  a	  step	  to	  bring	  the	  entire	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  country	  in	  conformity	  with	  Islamic	   principles,	   the	   elaborate	   Part	   IX	   of	   the	   Constitution	   deals	   solely	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362	  Yahya	  Bakhtiar,	  former	  Attorney	  General	  of	  Pakistan,	  quoted	  in	  ibid.	  363	  By	  virtue	  of	  Article	  2A	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  364	  Ziaur	  Rehman	  vs.	  State	  (PLD	  1986	  Lah.428)	  365	  Farhat	  Jaleel	  and	  others	  v.	  Province	  of	  Sindh	  and	  others	  (PLD	  1990	  Karachi	  342).	  	  366	  Article	  1(1)	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	  367	  Ibid.	  Article	  2.	  368	  Ibid.	  Article	  31(1).	  369	  Ibid.	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Islamic	  Provisions.	  As	  a	  subsection	  of	   this	  segment	  of	   the	  Constitution,	  Article	  227(1)	  affirms	  that	  all	  laws	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  Islamic	  injunctions.	  It	  reads:	  
All	  existing	   laws	  shall	  be	  brought	   in	  conformity	  with	   the	   Injunctions	  of	  Islam	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Holy	  Quran	  and	  Sunnah,	  in	  this	  Part	  referred	  to	  as	   the	   Injunctions	   of	   Islam,	   and	   no	   law	   shall	   be	   enacted	   which	   is	  repugnant	  to	  such	  injunctions.370	  	  Moreover,	   the	   Constitution	   also	   institutes	   the	   Council	   of	   Islamic	   Ideology	  (referred	  to	  as	  the	  Islamic	  Council),371	  outlining	  its	  function	  as	  an	  advisory	  body	  to	   guide	   the	   Parliament,	   Provincial	   Assemblies	   and	   the	   Executive	   on	   steps	   to	  bring	  the	  existing	  and	  future	  laws	  in	  line	  with	  Islamic	  injunctions.372	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   above	   facets,	   there	   are	   three	   further	   features	   that	   emerge	  from	  the	  intertwining	  of	  Islam	  with	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Pakistan.	  First,	  the	  two	  houses	   of	   the	   legislature	   are	   officially	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   ‘Majlis-­‐e-­‐Shoora	  (Parliament)’	   throughout	   the	   document,	   by	   virtue	   of	   a	   1985	   Presidential	  Ordinance.373	  This	  combination	  of	  Arabic	  words	  Majlis	  (gathering,	  council)	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  Ibid.	  Article	  227(1).	  371	  Ibid.	  Article	  228.	  372	  Ibid.	  Article	  230.	  The	  Council	  of	  Islamic	  ideology	  has	  recently	  come	  under	  increased	  public	  scrutiny	  because	  of	  its	  two	  controversial	  decisions.	  In	  2013,	  the	  Council	  ruled	  that	  DNA	  cannot	  be	  accepted	  as	  primary	  evidence	  in	  rape	  cases,	  and	  that	  the	  evidence	  should	  be	  in	  conformity	  with	  Islamic	  notions	  of	  law,	  which	  give	  primacy	  to	  witness	  testimony	  (of	  Muslim	  males,	  more	  so	  than	  any	  other	  sections	  of	  the	  society).	  APP,	  'CII	  rules	  out	  DNA	  as	  primary	  evidence	  in	  rape	  cases'	  Dawn	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  23	  September	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1044879/cii-­‐rules-­‐out-­‐dna-­‐as-­‐primary-­‐evidence-­‐in-­‐rape-­‐cases>	  last	  accessed	  23	  September	  2013.	  Second,	  the	  Council	  decided	  in	  early	  2014	  that	  laws	  prohibiting	  marriage	  before	  the	  age	  of	  consent	  are	  un-­‐Islamic,	  as	  a	  minimum	  age	  of	  consent	  is	  not	  prescribed	  in	  Islam.	  Kalbe	  Ali,	  'Pakistani	  laws	  prohibiting	  underage	  marriage	  un-­‐Islamic:	  CII'	  Dawn	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  11	  March	  2014)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1092468/pakistani-­‐laws-­‐prohibiting-­‐underage-­‐marriage-­‐un-­‐islamic-­‐cii>	  last	  accessed	  11	  March	  2014.	  There	  has	  been	  an	  outcry	  against	  this	  from	  human	  rights	  activists	  as	  well	  as	  some	  politicians,	  and	  the	  matter	  is	  currently	  being	  debated	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  373	  Article	  50	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	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Shoora/Shura	  (consultation)	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Parliament	  emanate	  from	  a	  need	  to	  accentuate	   and	   emphasize	   the	   express	   link	   between	   Islam	   and	   the	   Pakistani	  legal	  system.	  Second,	  while	  the	  Constitution	  (re)iterates	  the	  rights	  of	  minorities	  in	   its	   provisions,	   it	   assumes	   for	   itself	   the	   authority	   to	   distinguish	   between	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims.	  Article	  260	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  definitions	   of	   different	   terms	   and	   entities	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   document,	   also	  
defines	  who	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  Muslim.374	  Article	  260(3)(a)	  offers	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  Muslim,	  while	  the	  next	  clause	  proclaims	  that	  any	   ‘person	  belonging	  to	  the	  Christian,	   Hindu,	   Sikh,	   Budhist	   or	   Parsi	   community,	   a	   person	   of	   the	   Quadiani	  group	   or	   the	   Lahori	   group	   (who	   call	   themselves	   ‘Ahmadis’	   or	   by	   any	   other	  name),	  or	  a	  Bahai,	  and	  a	  person	  belonging	  to	  any	  of	  the	  scheduled	  castes’	  will	  be	  termed	   as	   non-­‐Muslims	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   law	   and	   the	   constitution.375	   A	  similar	   caveat	   is	   placed	   on	   some	   fundamental	   rights	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	   free	  speech,	  which	  is	  granted	  to	  every	  citizen	  of	  the	  country,	  although	  made	  ‘subject	  to	   any	   reasonable	   restrictions	   imposed	   by	   law	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   glory	   of	  Islam	  or	  the	  integrity,	  security	  or	  defence	  of	  Pakistan….’376	  The	  third	  aspect	  of	  the	  interweaving	  of	  Islamic	  and	  common	  law	  notions	  deals	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	   Federal	   Shariat	   Court,	  which	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   next	   area	   of	   discussion:	   the	  link	  between	  Islamic	  discourse	  and	  the	  Judicature.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374	  Ibid.	  Article	  260.	  375	  Ibid.	  Article	  226(3)(a)	  and	  Article	  226(3)(b).	  376	  Ibid.	  Article	  19.	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3.3.2. Islamic	  law,	  Judicature	  and	  parallel	  mechanisms	  of	  Justice	  There	  have	  been	  several	  expositions	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  practises	   of	   the	   judiciary	   in	   Pakistan.	   Martin	   Lau,	   through	   an	   illuminating	  examination	   of	   Pakistani	   case	   law	   since	   independence,	   argues	   that	   the	  Islamisation	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  has	  primarily	  been	  a	   ‘judge-­‐led	  process’.377	  He	  argues	   that	   the	   purpose	   behind	   the	   judiciary’s	   turn	   towards	   Islamisation	  was	  ‘judicial	   self-­‐assertion’378	   and	   a	   desire	   to	   reach	   for	   certainty	   in	   a	   context	   of	  perpetual	  political	  uncertainty	  and	   flux.379	   It	   is	   important,	  however,	   to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  analysis	  and	  recognise	   that	   in	  addition	   to	   the	   judiciary’s	  role,	   the	  ascendancy	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  legal	  discourse	  also	  has	  roots	  in	  the	  social,	  political,	  religious	   and	   ideological	   struggles	   that	   Pakistan	   has	   witnessed	   since	  independence.	   The	   case	   of	   Objectives	   Resolution	   and	   post-­‐independence	  constitutional	  debates,	  discussed	  previously,	  are	  prime	  examples	  in	  this	  regard.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Federal	  Shariat	  Court	  is	  a	  measure	  that	  has	  roots	  both	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  narrative	  in	  the	  society	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  the	  regimes	  in	  power.	  	  The	   Federal	   Shariat	   Court	   (FSC)	   was	   established	   in	   1980	   by	   General	   Zia’s	  Presidential	   Order	   and	   was	   subsequently	   protected	   under	   the	   Eighth	  Amendment	   to	   the	   Constitution	   in	   1985.	   Article	   203A	   of	   the	   current	  Constitution	  establishes	  the	  FSC,	  comprising	  eight	  judges	  in	  total,	  selected	  from	  the	   judges	   of	   the	   superior	   courts	   as	   well	   as	   three	   Ulema	   (Islamic	   religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97)	  1.	  378	  Ibid.	  211.	  379	  Ibid.	  15.	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scholars).380	  Article	  203D(1)	  grants	  the	  FSC	  Suo	  Motu	  and	  original	   jurisdiction	  to	  ‘examine	  and	  decide	  the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  any	  law	  or	  provision	  of	  law	  is	   repugnant	   to	   the	   Injunctions	   of	   Islam,	   as	   laid	   down	   in	   the	  Holy	  Quran	   and	  Sunnah….’381	  If	  the	  Court	  finds	  that	  any	  law	  conflicts	  with	  Islamic	  injunctions,	  it	  may	  afford	  the	  government	  the	  opportunity	  to	  explain	  its	  position.382	  However,	  if	   the	   Court	   reaches	   a	   decision	   that	   the	   law	   is	   still	   repugnant	   to	   Islamic	  conceptions,	  the	  government	  has	  to	  adopt	  measures	  to	  bring	  the	  particular	  law	  in	  line	  with	  Islamic	  injunctions.	  Article	  203D(3)(b)	  further	  states	  that	  any	  ‘such	  law	  or	  provision	  shall,	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  held	  to	  be	  so	  repugnant,	  cease	  
to	  have	  effect	  on	  the	  day	  on	  which	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  takes	  effect.’383	  	  	  The	  FSC	  is	  also	  granted	  the	  wide-­‐reaching	  authority	  to	  ‘call	  for	  and	  examine	  the	  record	  of	  any	  case	  decided	  by	  any	  criminal	  court	  under	  any	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  Hudood’,384	  following	  which	  it	  may	  reduce,	  suspend	  or	  enhance	  the	  sentence.385	  The	  Constitution	  further	  declares	  that	  all	   	  decisions	  of	  the	  FSC	  are	  binding	  on	  all	  High	  Courts	  and	  any	  courts	  subordinate	  to	  them.386	  Since	  the	  establishment	   of	   the	   FSC,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   it	   institutes	   a	   system	   of	  parallel	  judiciary	  in	  Pakistan	  that	  ‘raised	  a	  haunting	  spectre	  of	  an	  orthodox	  and	  anti-­‐democratic	   Islamist	   judiciary.’387	  The	  proponents	  of	   the	  FSC,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   maintain	   that	   the	   question	   of	   parallel	   judiciary	   does	   not	   arise	   as	   any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380	  Article	  203A	  of	  Chapter	  3A	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	  381	  Ibid.	  Article	  203D(1).	  382	  Ibid.	  Article	  203D(2).	  383	  Ibid.	  Article	  203D(3)(b)	  (emphasis	  added).	  384	  Article	  203DD(1).	  385	  Article	  203DD(1)	  and	  Article	  203DD(2).	  386	  Article	  203GG.	  387	  Moeen	  Cheema	  (2012)	  (n	  297)	  880.	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judgement	  of	  the	  FSC	  may	  be	  appealed	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court.388	  However,	  it	   is	   pertinent	   to	   note	   that	   an	   appeal	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   to	   review	   an	   FSC	  judgement	   can	   only	   be	   heard	   by	   the	   special	   Shariat	   Appellate	   Bench	   of	   the	  Supreme	   Court.	   The	   Shariat	   Appellate	   Bench	   can	   comprise	   of	   ‘three	   Muslim	  Judges	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’,	  and	  no	  more	  than	  two	  Ulema,	  who	  can	  either	  be	  selected	  through	  a	  consultation	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  or	  they	  may	  be	   selected	   from	  amongst	   the	   judges	  of	   the	  FSC	   itself.389	   It	   is	   fair	   to	  argue,	   then,	   that	  while	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   does	   sit	   at	   the	   apex	   of	   the	   judicial	  system,	  a	  niche	  has	  been	  carved	  out	   in	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   in	  relation	  to	  cases	  relating	  to	  Islamic	  provisions,	  thus	  giving	  some	  credence	  to	  claims	  of	  instituting	  a	  parallel	  judiciary	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Intriguingly,	   however,	   the	   FSC	   is	   not	   the	   only	   instance	   of	   a	   parallel	   (Islamic)	  judicial	   system	   within	   Pakistan,	   with	   Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	   (lit.	   system	   of	   justice)	  constituting	   another	   lacuna	  within	   the	   legal	   system.	   The	   historical	   context	   in	  which	   this	   system	  was	   instituted	   evolved	   from	   the	   ongoing	   struggle	   between	  Islamic	   militant	   groups	   and	   the	   State.	   	   Between	   2007	   and	   2009,	   the	   armed	  forces	  and	  the	  Taliban	  were	   locked	   in	  a	   fierce	  battle	   in	   the	  Swat	  region	  of	   the	  Khyber-­‐Pukhtunkhwa	   province	   of	   Pakistan.390	   In	   February	   2009,	   a	   truce	  was	  called	  between	   the	   government	   and	   the	  militants,	   and	   the	   Swat	  Peace	  Accord	  was	  agreed	  between	   the	   leader	  of	   the	  Tehreek-­‐e-­‐Nifaz-­‐e-­‐Shariat-­‐e-­‐Muhammadi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388	  By	  virtue	  of	  Article	  203F	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	  389	  Article	  203F(3)(a)	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	  	  390	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  40.	  The	  Taliban	  and	  its	  allied	  groups	  had	  increasingly	  strengthened	  their	  hold	  in	  Swat	  and	  its	  adjoining	  valleys	  in	  the	  preceding	  years.	  Following	  Pakistan	  Army’s	  operation	  in	  2007	  to	  force	  the	  militants	  out	  of	  the	  area,	  the	  militants	  gradually	  re-­‐entered	  the	  region,	  increased	  their	  hostilities	  against	  the	  state	  and	  established	  their	  own	  system	  of	  justice.	  Ibid.	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(TNSM)	   and	   the	   Provincial	   Governor.391	   One	   of	   the	   conditions	   of	   this	   Accord	  was	   the	   imposition	   of	   Shariah	   in	   the	   region.392	   The	   Sharia	   Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulation	  of	  2009	  was	  officially	  proclaimed	  by	  the	  President	  in	  2009	  towards	  this	   end,	   and	  was	   supported	  by	   the	  National	   assembly	   through	  a	  non-­‐binding	  resolution.393	   The	   Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	   Regulation,	   applicable	   to	   selected	   Provincially	  Administered	  Tribal	  Areas	  (PATA),394	  established	  a	   five-­‐tiered	  court	  system	  in	  the	   region.	  The	  Court	  of	   the	  Executive	  Magistrate	   forms	   the	   lowest	   tier	  of	   the	  structure,	   progressing	   through	   the	   Courts	   of	   Illaqa	   Qazi	   (Area	   Judge),	   Aa’la	  Illaqa	  Qazi	   (Superior	   Area	   Judge),	   Izafi	   Zilla	   Qazi	   (Additional	   Regional	   Judge),	  with	  the	  Court	  of	  Zilla	  Qazi	  (Regional	  Judge)	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  structure.395	  The	  appellate	  jurisdiction	  to	  review	  the	  decisions	  of	  these	  courts	  lie	  with	  the	  Dar-­‐ul-­‐Qaza	   (House	   of	   Qazis),	   leading	   to	   the	   Dar-­‐ul-­‐Dar-­‐ul-­‐Qaza	   (Superior	   House	   of	  Qazis)	  at	  the	  apex.396	  	  The	  Islamist	  groups	  largely	  welcomed	  the	  establishment	  of	  this	  legal	  framework	  to	   apply	   Islamic	   law	   in	   the	   region	   and	   dispense	   speedy	   justice.	   On	   the	   other	  side,	  however,	  civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  human	  rights	  groups	  have	  greatly	  denounced	   the	  controversial	   laws	  as	   surrendering	   to	   the	  militant	  demands.397	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  Swat	  Peace	  Accord,	  the	  incidents	  leading	  up	  to	  it,	  and	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulation,	  see	  Noor	  Ul	  Haq	  and	  Yasir	  Imtiaz,	  'Swat	  Peace	  Accord'	  (Islamabad	  Policy	  Research	  Institute,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2009).	  392	  From	  the	  Text	  of	  Swat	  Peace	  Accord,	  cited	  in	  ibid.	  1.	  393	  Ibid.	  19.	  394	  Primarily	  Malakand	  and	  its	  adjoining	  areas.	  395	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Sharia	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulation,	  2009.	  396	  Ibid.	  Article	  2.	  	  397	  Asma	  Jahangir,	  'HRCP	  sees	  risk	  to	  basic	  rights	  and	  constitution'	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  
Pakistan,	  Lahore,	  Pakistan,	  20	  February	  2009	  <http://hrcpblog.wordpress.com/2009/02/20/hrcp-­‐sees-­‐risk-­‐to-­‐basic-­‐rights-­‐and-­‐constitution/>	  last	  accessed	  17	  August	  2013.	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The	   government	   has	   tried	   to	   downplay	   the	   argument	   that	   Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulations	  create	  a	  parallel	  judicial	  system	  in	  the	  region,	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  country’s	  superior	  judicature	  is	  already	  built	  into	  the	  Regulation.398	  It	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   Dar-­‐ul-­‐Dar-­‐ul-­‐Qaza	   is	   established	   pursuant	   to	   Article	  183(2)	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  as	  a	  Bench	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  while	  Dar-­‐ul-­‐Qaza	  actually	  refers	  to	  a	  High	  Court	  Bench,	  and	  is	  established	  under	  Article	  198(4)	  of	  the	   Constitution.399	   However,	   there	   are	   three	   features	   of	   the	   Regulation	   that	  reinforce	  the	  claims	  of	  a	  parallel	   judicial	  system.	  First,	   the	  Regulation	  declares	  void	  any	  laws	  and	  constitutional	  provisions	  previously	  applicable	  to	  the	  region	  that	   do	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	   ‘Injunctions	   of	   Quran	  Majeed	   or	   Sunnah’.400	   It	  further	   affirms	   that	   the	   proceedings	   of	   the	   Qazi	   Courts	   should	   be	   guided	   by	  principles	   of	   Islamic	   law,	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   precedent	   or	   any	  procedural	   or	   substantive	   law	   of	   the	   state.401	   Second,	   the	   Regulation	   grants	  wide-­‐ranging	   authority	   to	   the	   Executive	   Magistrate	   to	   carry	   out	   its	   duty	   of	  ‘Sadd-­‐e-­‐Zara-­‐Jinayat’,	   which	   ‘means	   and	   includes	   all	   actions	   and	   steps	   taken	  under	   the	   Shariah	   laws	   and	   any	   other	   law	   in	   force	   for	   the	   time	   being	   for	   the	  control	   of	   crimes.’402	   Third,	   the	   TNSM	   and	   Taliban	   leaders	   have	   repeatedly	  denounced	   the	  Supreme	  and	  High	  Courts	  of	  Pakistan	   for	   following	   ‘un-­‐Islamic	  laws’,403	  	  and	  the	  express	  appellate	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  superior	  courts	  would	  not	  have	   been	   acceptable	   to	   them.	   The	   promulgation	   of	   Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	   might	   be	  considered	   an	   attempt	   to	   placate	   the	   situation,	   but	   the	   fact	   remains	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398	  Noor	  Ul	  Haq	  and	  Yasir	  Imtiaz	  (2009)	  (n	  391)	  30.	  399	  Ibid.	  400	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  Sharia	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulation,	  2009.	  401	  Ibid.	  Article	  9(1).	  402	  Ibid.	  Article	  7(3).	  403	  See,	  generally,	  Ashok	  K.	  Behuria	  (2007)	  (n	  285).	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Supreme	   Court	   and	   High	   Courts	   are	   not	   expressly	   named	   in	   the	   Regulations	  even	  on	  a	  single	  occasion.	  	  The	  future	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulation	  on	  the	  region,	  as	  well	  as	  its	   impact	   on	   the	   wider	   legal	   system,	   remains	   uncertain.404	   However,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   note	   in	   July	   2013	   the	   President	   signed	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	  Regulation,	   aimed	   at	   ‘expediting	   the	   submission	   of	   challans	   by	   police	   to	  courts’.405	   Based	   on	   this,	   it	   can	   be	   said	   that	   although	   the	   application	   of	   this	  Regulation	  may	  be	  uncertain	  in	  practise,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  laws	  are	  taken	  as	  part	  of	  the	  current	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  country	  by	  the	  State.	  	  
3.3.3. Islamic	  provisions	  and	  the	  Penal	  law	  of	  Pakistan	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   Constitution	   and	   Judicature,	   the	   penal	   and	   criminal	   law	  frameworks	  of	  Pakistan	  also	  carry	  evidence	  of	  the	  Islamisation	  measures	  of	  the	  preceding	  decades.	  Pakistan	   inherited	   its	  main	   structure	  of	   criminal	   law	   from	  the	  British	  Indian	  state.406	  The	  Pakistan	  Penal	  Code	  (PPC)	   is	  an	  adoption	  from	  the	  Indian	  Penal	  Code	  of	  1860	  and	  forms	  the	  main	  corpus	  of	  criminal	  laws	  in	  the	  country.	   The	   biggest	   change	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   PPC	   occurred	   in	   the	   1980s,	  during	   the	   Zia	   regime’s	   application	   of	   Nizam-­‐e-­‐Mustapha.407	   Through	  Presidential	   Ordinances	   in	   1979,	   1982	   and	   1986,	   attempts	   were	   made	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404	  As	  the	  truce	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  militants	  has	  not	  held	  true,	  leading	  to	  another	  Army	  Operation	  later	  in	  2009.	  405	  APP,	  'Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Regulation:	  Police	  bound	  to	  submit	  challans	  within	  14	  days'	  The	  Express	  
Tribune	  (17	  July	  2013)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/578158/nizam-­‐e-­‐adl-­‐regulation-­‐police-­‐bound-­‐to-­‐submit-­‐challans-­‐within-­‐14/>	  last	  accessed	  17	  July	  2013.	  406	  Martin	  Lau	  (1994)	  (n	  327)	  6.	  407	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar,	  Asha	  Amirali	  and	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Raza	  (2006)	  (n387.	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Islamise	   the	   code	  which	  had	   its	  origin	   in	   common	   law	  and	  colonial	  politics.	  A	  series	  of	  five	  ordinances,	  collectively	  known	  as	  the	  Hudood	  Ordinances	  of	  1979	  –	   Zina,	   Qazf,	   Prohibition	   Order,	   Offence	   Against	   Property,	   and	   Execution	   of	  Punishment	   of	   Whipping	   –	   were	   instrumental	   in	   changing	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  criminal	  code.408	  	  	  The	  most	  (in)famous	  amongst	  these	  laws	  is	  The	  Offence	  of	  Zina	  (Enforcement	  of	  Hudood)	  Ordinance,	   1979.	  This	  Ordinance	   aimed	   to	   ‘bring	   in	   conformity	  with	  the	   injunctions	   of	   Islam	   the	   law	   relating	   to	   the	   Offence	   of	   Zina’,409	   with	   Zina	  referring	   to	   the	   acts	   of	   adultery	   or	   fornication.	   Controversially,	   although	   the	  Zina	  Ordinance	  also	  included	  punishment	  for	  the	  offence	  of	  Zina-­‐bil-­‐jabr	  (rape),	  the	  evidentiary	  requirements	  and	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  was	  so	  problematic	  that	  it	   led	   to	   numerous	   cases	   of	   miscarriage	   of	   justice.410	   In	   several	   cases,	   if	   the	  prosecution	   against	   the	   accused	   proved	   unsuccessful,	   the	   accusation	   by	   the	  victims	   (mostly	  women)	  was	   considered	   an	   admission	   of	   guilt	   and	   they	  were	  charged	   with	   adultery	   or	   fornication.411	   The	   Protection	   of	   Women	   (Criminal	  Laws	   Amendment)	   Act	   of	   2006	   has	   gone	   some	  way	   to	   amend	   the	   provisions	  surrounding	  rape	  offences	  and	  evidentiary	  requirements	  and	  bring	  them	  in	  line	  with	  the	  human	  rights	  guarantees	  and	  narratives,412	  however	  critics	  argue	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  Hudood	  Ordinances,	  see	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (2010)	  (n	  408);	  Martin	  Lau,	  'Twenty-­‐Five	  Years	  of	  Hudood	  Ordinances	  -­‐	  A	  Review'	  (2007)	  64	  (4)	  Washington	  and	  Lee	  Law	  
Review	  1291.	  409	  The	  Offence	  of	  Zina	  (Enforcement	  Of	  Hudood)	  Ordinance,	  No.	  VII	  of	  1979.	  410	  Moeen	  Cheema	  (2012)	  (n	  297)	  879-­‐881.	  411	  Martin	  Lau	  (2007)	  (n	  408)	  1296-­‐1298.	  412	  Ibid.	  1306-­‐1313.	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this	   amendment	   has	   not	   challenged	   the	   underlying	   structure	   of	   the	   Hudood	  laws	  which	  is	  inherently	  discriminatory	  towards	  women	  and	  minorities.413	  	  The	  Blasphemy	  Laws	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  another	  example	  within	  the	  criminal	  code	  which	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	   Islamisation.	   These	   laws	   are	   built	   on	   the	  structure	   introduced	   in	   the	   Indian	   Penal	   Code	   by	   the	   British	   colonial	   state	  during	  the	  1920s.	  Article	  295	  of	  the	  Indian	  Penal	  Code	  proscribed	  damaging	  or	  defiling	   a	   place	   of	   worship,	   outraging	   religious	   feelings	   or	   defaming	   holy	  personages	   of	   any	   religion.414	   The	   Islamisation	   carried	   out	   during	   the	   1980s	  amended	   the	   laws	   to	   make	   the	   defiling	   of	   the	   Quran	   or	   defaming	   Prophet	  Muhammad	  (PBUH)	  a	  criminal	  offence.415	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  laws	  now	  serve	  to	  protect	  only	  the	  dominant	  religion	  of	  Pakistan	  is	  one	  issue.	  The	  other	  problem	  with	   these	   laws	   lies	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  an	  allegation	  of	  Blasphemy	  causes	  such	  public	   outrage	   that	   it	   has	   led	   to	   several	   instances	   of	  mob	   justice,	   vigilantism,	  and	  attacks	  on	  the	  accused.416	  Human	  rights	  groups	  and	  some	  political	  parties	  have	  been	  demanding	  a	  revision	  to	  these	  laws	  for	  several	  years	  –	  a	  demand	  that	  is	   vehemently	   opposed	   by	   Muslim	   religious	   groups,	   and	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	  considered	  by	  the	  government	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.417	  It	  is	  argued	  by	  some	  scholars	   that	   the	   purpose	   behind	   these	   laws,	   intended	   by	   the	   British	   Indian	  state,	  was	  to	  ensure	  harmony	  between	  different	  faiths	  and	  diverse	  cultures	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (2010)	  (n	  408).	  	  	  414	  Article	  295	  of	  the	  Indian	  Penal	  Code	  of	  1860.	  415	  Charles	  H.	  Kennedy	  (1990)	  (n	  244)	  62-­‐63.	  416	  Osama	  Siddique	  and	  Zahra	  Hayat,	  'Unholy	  Speech	  and	  Holy	  Laws:	  Blasphemy	  Laws	  in	  Pakistan	  -­‐	  Controversial	  Origins,	  Design	  Defects,	  and	  Free	  Speech	  Implications'	  (2008)	  17	  (2)	  
Minnesota	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  303,	  383.	  417	  In	  2011,	  the	  sitting	  Governor	  of	  Punjab	  was	  assassinated	  by	  a	  member	  of	  his	  own	  security	  detail	  for	  allegedly	  expressing	  a	  desire	  to	  reconsider	  the	  Blasphemy	  laws.	  I	  will	  consider	  this	  instance	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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inhabited	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent.418	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere,419	  the	   Blasphemy	   laws,	  with	   their	   roots	   not	   just	   in	   colonial	   law	   but	   also	   British	  canon	   law,	   provide	   us	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   the	   uneasy	   relationship	   between	  state’s	  legal	  authority,	  colonial	  law,	  Islamic	  law	  and	  human	  rights.	  	  Pakistan’s	   formal	   legal	   system,	  be	   it	   the	  mainstream	   juridical	   structure	  or	   the	  officially	  recognised	  Islamic	  systems	  that	  run	  parallel	  to	  it,	  is	  not	  the	  only	  area	  where	  an	  impression	  of	  religious	  conceptions	  of	   law	  has	  been	  imprinted.	  With	  the	  presence	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent	  dating	  back	  several	  centuries,	  Islamic	  conceptions	  are	  also	  interwoven	  in	  the	  traditional	  and	  customary	  legal	  systems.	   As	   a	   separate	   normative/legal	   system	   –	   or,	   a	   plethora	   of	   normative	  systems	   –	   the	   traditional	   courts	   are	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	   country’s	   legal	  architecture,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  below.	  	  
3.4. Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  
Traditional	  law	  is	  a	  difficult	  concept	  to	  define	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  Part	  of	  this	   difficulty	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   phenomenon	   has	   not	   been	   examined	  systematically	  and	  the	  studies	  that	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  this	  sphere	  are	  few	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  Osama	  Siddique	  and	  Zahra	  Hayat	  (2008)	  (n	  416)	  337.	  The	  Indian	  Law	  Commission,	  which	  was	  responsible	  for	  drafting	  the	  Indian	  Penal	  Code,	  stated	  in	  the	  preface	  to	  the	  chapter	  containing	  these	  laws:	  ‘The	  principle	  on	  which	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  framed	  is	  a	  principle	  on	  which	  it	  would	  be	  desirable	  that	  all	  governments	  should	  act	  but	  from	  which	  the	  British	  Government	  in	  India	  cannot	  depart	  without	  risking	  the	  dissolution	  of	  society;	  it	  is	  this,	  that	  every	  man	  should	  be	  suffered	  to	  profess	  his	  own	  religion,	  and	  that	  no	  man	  should	  be	  suffered	  to	  insult	  the	  religion	  of	  another’.	  Ibid.	  336.	  419	  Raza	  Saeed	  (2013)	  (n	  246).	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far	   between.420	   In	   1965,	   Adamson	   Hoebel	   wrote	   of	   the	   ‘folk	   law’	   of	   West	  Pakistan	  as	  being	  ‘an	  uncharted	  universe’;421	  and	  the	  situation	  has	  not	  changed	  significantly	   since	   then.	   Moreover,	   the	  mainstream	   legal	   and	   judicial	   systems	  generally	   tend	   to	   downplay	   the	   role	   of	   traditional	   tribunals	   or	   declare	   them	  illegal,422	  which	   contributes	   both	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   clarity	   on	   this	   area	   as	  well	   as	  precludes	  the	  attempts	  to	  understand	  them	  as	  valid	  alternative	  normative	  and	  legal	  systems.	  Despite	  being	  marginalised	  in	  the	  state-­‐oriented	  legal	  analyses	  of	  the	   Pakistani	   legal	   architecture,	   the	   traditional	   courts	   are	   pervasive	   in	   the	  country.	   A	   large	   section	   of	   the	   populace	   expresses	   its	   ‘confidence	   in	   the	  panchayat	  system	  in	  case	  of	  a	  dispute.’423	  Justice	  Nasira	  Iqbal,	  although	  critical	  of	   traditional	   tribunals	   from	   the	   vantage	   point	   of	   common	   law,	   notes	   that	   in	  ‘rural	  areas,	  where	  sixty	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  resides,	  the	  Jirga/Panchayat	  system	  prevails’.424	  Based	  on	  his	  ethnographic	  research,	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  goes	  further	  and	  considers	  the	  traditional	  legal	  systems	  as	  the	  dominant	  mechanisms	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan.425	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  has	  provided	  an	  insightful	  legal-­‐anthoropoligical	  account	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  traditional	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  Punjab.	  See,	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary,	  Justice	  in	  
Practice:	  Legal	  Ethnography	  of	  a	  Pakistan	  Punjabi	  Village	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  1999).	  For	  the	  formal	  legal	  system’s	  reading	  of	  local	  tribunals,	  see	  Justice	  Saleem	  Akhtar	  and	  others,	  'Study	  on	  Informal	  Justice	  System	  in	  Pakistan'	  (Sindh	  Judicial	  Academy,	  Karachi,	  Pakistan	  2009).	  421	  Adamson	  Hoebel,	  'Fundamental	  Culture	  Postulates	  and	  Judicial	  Lawmaking	  in	  Pakistan'	  (1965)	  67	  (6)	  American	  Anthropologist,	  Part	  2:	  The	  Ethnography	  of	  Law	  43,	  44.	  422	  Mst.	  Shazia	  v.	  Station	  House	  Officer	  and	  others	  Pakistan	  Criminal	  Law	  Journal	  (Sindh	  High	  Court).	  423	  Samar	  Minallah,	  'Judiciary	  as	  a	  Catalyst	  for	  Social	  Change'	  (International	  Judicial	  Conference,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan,	  2006).	  424	  Nasira	  Iqbal	  (2007)	  (n	  99)	  106.	  425	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary,	  'The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Problems	  in	  Pakistan:	  An	  Anthropological	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Daughter’s	  Traditional	  Share	  in	  the	  Patrimony	  in	  the	  Punjab'	  (2009)	  XXX	  (2)	  
Pakistan	  Journal	  of	  History	  and	  Culture	  101,	  101-­‐102.	  
117	  	  
The	   traditional	   and	   customary	   law	   in	   Pakistan	   appears	   in	   the	   shape	   of	  normative	   orders	   of	   the	   community	   or	   locality,	   primarily	   adjudicated	   by	  informal	  village	  or	  community	  courts.426	  This	  adds	  a	  mechanism	  of	  adjudication	  to	  the	  already	  complex	  judicial	  system	  of	  the	  country.	  There	  are	  layers	  of	  village	  courts,	   panchayats	   and	   jirgas	   (courts	   of	   elders),	   and	   ad	   hoc	   tribunals,	   which	  come	   together	   for	   resolution	   of	   disputes	   that	   arise	   within	   the	   community	   or	  locality.	  These	  normative	  orderings	  do	  not	  present	  a	  uniform	  structure	  or	  exist	  in	  a	  codified	  form,	  as	  ‘uniformity	  is	  as	  unnatural	  to	  the	  village	  as	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  Government’.427	  Hoebel	  writes	   that	   ‘deeply	  embedded	   in	   the	  village	  and	   tribal	  areas	  of	  Pakistan	  is	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  local	  folk	  systems	  of	  law	  varying	  from	  village	  to	  village	  and	  area	  to	  area’.428	  Because	  of	  this,	  terms	  such	  as	  traditional	  or	  local	  law	  are	  used	   in	   the	  current	   study	  as	   ‘simplified	   term[s]	   for	  a	   large	  number	  of	  differently	  practised	  versions	  of	  folk	  law’.429	  	  	  In	   the	   province	   of	   Punjab,	   the	   informal	   tribunal	   is	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	  
Panchayat	   (literally,	   the	  council	  of	   five),	  although	  the	  number	  and	  structure	  of	  these	  councils	  vary	  from	  area	  to	  area,	  depending	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  disputes	  in	  question.430	  The	  traditional	  tribunals	  in	  Sindh	  province	  are	  generally	   called	   Faislo	   (literally,	   decision	   or	   settlement).431	   Jirgas,	   as	   tribal	  councils	  or	  gatherings,	  are	  common	  to	  the	  provinces	  of	  Baluchistan	  and	  Khyber-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99),	  186-­‐188.	  427	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420)	  85.	  428	  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421)	  44.	  429	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420).	  430	  Justice	  Saleem	  Akhtar	  and	  others	  (2009)	  (n	  420)	  22-­‐23.	  431	  Ibid.	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Pukhtunkhwa,	   though	   they	   differ	   in	   their	   structure	   and	   the	   normative	   codes	  they	  follow.432	  	  The	   history	   of	  Panchayats,	   Jirgas	   and	   Faislos	   in	   the	   South	   Asian	   region	   dates	  back	  centuries,	  and	  predates	   the	   formalisation	  of	   law	  during	  colonial	   times.433	  Elphinstone,	   during	   his	   journey	   through	   the	   Frontier	   region	   of	   the	   sub-­‐continent	   in	   1809,	   regarded	   the	   Jirga	   to	   be	   in	   a	   ‘remarkably	   high	   state	   of	  organisation’.434	   The	   British	   Imperial	   Gazetteer	   of	   India,	   first	   published	   in	  1880s,	  mentioned	  that	  ‘for	  the	  ordinary	  rustic,	  it	  is	  caste	  and	  the	  Panchayat	  or	  caste-­‐council	   that	   enforce	   the	   only	  moral	   code	  which	   he	   understands.’435	   The	  Gazetteer	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  ‘most	  civil	  suits	  are	  referred	  by	  the	  Hakims	  of	  districts	  to	  a	  panchayat	  (council	  of	  elders).’436	  However,	  as	  these	  tribunals	  were	  primarily	   based	   on	   an	   oral	   tradition	   of	   law,437	   few	   traces	   of	   the	   pre-­‐colonial	  traditional	   legal	   systems	   remain.	   In	   the	   regions	   which	   now	   formulate	   the	  provinces	  of	  Punjab	  and	  Sindh,	   the	  British	  were	  able	   to	  establish	   the	  multiple	  institutions	  necessary	   for	   the	  running	  of	   the	  colonial	  state:	  revenue	  extraction	  mechanism,	  courts,	  policing	  institutions,	  etc.438	  The	  existence	  of	  panchayats	  and	  faislos,	   therefore,	   was	   not	   essential	   for	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   the	  Frontier	  and	  Balochistan	  regions,	  however,	   the	  British	  regime	  was	  not	  able	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432	  Ibid.	  433	  Ibid.	  23.	  For	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  of	  panchayats,	  see	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  
Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  92-­‐97.	  434	  Elphinstone,	  quoted	  in	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99),	  187.	  435	  W.	  Crooke,	  'Religions'	  in	  Herbert	  Risley	  and	  others	  (eds),	  The	  Imperial	  Gazetteer	  of	  India:	  The	  
Indian	  Empire	  Vol	  I	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford	  1909)	  433.	  	  436	  E.	  H.	  S.	  Clarke,	  'Afghanistan'	  in	  Herbert	  Risley	  and	  others	  (eds),	  The	  Imperial	  Gazetteer	  of	  
India:	  The	  Indian	  Empire	  Vol	  V	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford	  1909)	  60.	  437Justice	  Saleem	  Akhtar	  and	  others	  (2009)	  (n	  433)	  24.	  438	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  93-­‐94.	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expand	   its	  rule	   in	   the	  same	  manner,	  and	  the	  colonial	  state	  resorted	  to	   include	  the	   system	   of	   jirgas	   within	   its	   legal	   framework	   to	   control	   this	   region.	   These	  appropriated	   ‘official	   jirgas’	   are	   differentiated	   from	   the	   ‘traditional	   jirgas’,439	  and	   they	   still	   exist	   as	   a	  parallel	   system	  of	   law	   in	  Pakistan	   as	  part	   of	   the	   legal	  framework	  governing	  the	  Tribal	  Regions.	  This	  topic	  will	  be	  continued	  in	  further	  depth	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  The	   systems	   of	   jirgas,	   panchayats	   and	   faislos,	   along	   with	   various	   other	  traditional	  and	  indigenous	  normative	  systems,	  exist	  today	  as	  mediated	  by	  two	  centuries	   of	   colonial	   rule.	   After	   independence,	   these	   tribunals	   faced	   different	  trajectories.	   In	   India,	   the	   panchayat	   was	   considered	   a	   necessary	   part	   of	   the	  village	  life	  and	  local	  government,	  and	  thus	  it	  was	  included	  and	  subsumed	  within	  the	  local	  government	  structure.440	  In	  Pakistan,	  although	  panchayats	  and	  faislos	  are	   considered	   part	   of	   rural	   life	   as	   a	   de	   facto	   condition,	   the	   state	   does	   not	  formally	   accept	   their	   legitimacy	   or	   legality.441	   The	   jirgas	   in	   the	   Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Areas,	  however,	  are	  considered	  a	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  with	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations	  as	   a	   colonial	   legacy.	  Whether	   the	   claim	   is	   for	   their	   legality	   or	   necessity,	   it	   is	  evident	   that	   these	   tribunals	   nevertheless	   do	   exist	   in	   society	   in	   diverse	  manifestations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  188.	  440	  For	  instance,	  see	  A.	  R.	  Desai,	  Rural	  Sociology	  in	  India	  (Popular	  Prakashan,	  Mumbai	  1969).	  441	  The	  Basic	  Democracies	  Plan,	  implemented	  by	  General	  Ayub	  Khan	  (discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  on	  page	  66)	  abolished	  the	  system	  of	  panchayats	  in	  1959.	  See,	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  
Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  91.	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Along	  with	   the	  difference	  between	   the	  multiple	   forms	  and	   structures	  of	   these	  tribunals,	   they	   also	   differ	   from	  period	   to	   period,	   from	   region	   to	   region,	  while	  their	  substantive	  nature	  remains	  fluid	  as	  well.	  Some	  researchers	  claim	  that	  the	  traditional	   tribunals	   are	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   local	   disputes,	   while	   others	  claim	   that	   they	   are	   also	   convened	   to	   resolve	   inter-­‐village	   or	   inter-­‐tribal	  disputes,	   albeit	   disputes	   of	   non-­‐criminal	   nature.	   However,	   from	   the	   evidence	  gained	   from	   the	   handful	   of	   anthropological	   and	   ethnographic	   accounts	   of	  traditional	  law	  available,	  it	  can	  be	  discerned	  that	  these	  tribunals	  do	  indeed	  deal	  with	   issues	   that	   fall	   within	   the	   criminal	   law	   purview	   of	   the	   state.442	   But	   the	  purpose	  behind	  traditional	  tribunals	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  the	  courts	  or	  criminal	  law	  of	  the	  state.	  Scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  panchayats,	  jirgas	  and	  faislos	  is	  not	  to	  find	  guilt	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  common	  law	  systems,	  but	  to	  correct	  societal	  imbalance,	  though	  through	  this	  they	  often	  violate	  the	  norms	  or	  laws	  of	  the	  state	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  accused.	  For	  instance,	  Rabia	  Ali	  argues	  that	  in	  some	  faislos	  in	  Sindh,	  murder	  or	  honour	  killing	  is	  not	  the	  main	  crime	  being	  judged.443	  Critical	  of	  the	  traditional	  tribunals,	  she	  notes	  that	  the	  faislo	   ‘is	  not	  intended	  to	  determine	  guilt	  or	  innocence,	  but	  to	  restore	  the	  balance	  in	  society	  that	  has	  been	  disturbed	  by	   the	  necessity	  of	  an	  honour	  killing.	  Murder	   is	  not	   the	  crime	  here;	  rather	  the	  crime	  is	  the	  damage	  done	  to	  property	  and	  honour	  of	  those	  who	  have	  had	  to	  kill	  their	  woman.’444	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420)	  100-­‐103.	  443	  Rabia	  Ali,	  'The	  Dark	  Side	  of	  Honour'	  (Shirkat	  Gah	  Women's	  Resource	  Centre:	  Women	  victims	  in	  Pakistan,	  Lahore,	  Pakistan	  2001)	  25.	  444	  Ibid.	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Shaheen	   Ali	   also	   argues	   in	   the	   same	   vein	   that,	   ‘a	   subtle	   point,	   which	   is	  frequently	   obscured	   by	   the	   semi-­‐judicial	   role	   of	   the	   Jirga,	   is	   that	   the	   body’s	  function	  is	  to	  settle	  peacefully	  an	  existing	  situation	  more	  than	  to	  judge	  right	  or	  wrong,	   determine	   guilt,	   or	   pass	   sentence.’445	  However,	   in	   some	   instances,	   the	  local	   courts	   do	   pass	   punishments	   and	   sentences	   to	   restore	   this	   perceived	  societal	  balance:	  ‘Decisions	  are	  usually	  very	  simple:	  Mahmud	  had	  a	  right	  to	  kill	  Afzal	   because	   Afzal	   had	   killed	   Mahmud’s	   uncle,	   and	   no	   more	   is	   made	   of	   the	  affair….’446	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  also	  mentions	   the	  diverse	  nature	  of	  punishments	  and	  sanctions	  that	  panchayats	  in	  Punjab	  award,	  either	  to	  the	  offending	  party	  or	  to	  the	  party	  that	  refuses	  to	  accept	  the	  decision.447	  These	  range	  from	  ostracism,	  social	   boycott,	   and	   public	   disgrace	   to	   fines	   and	   other	   harsher	   means	   of	  coercion.448	   In	   September	   2013,	   two	   cases	  were	   reported	   in	   the	   press	  where	  tribunals	  in	  Sindh	  attempted	  to	  establish	  guilt	  by	  the	  age-­‐old	  method	  of	  making	  the	  accused	  walk	  bare-­‐foot	  on	  coal.449	  However,	  Chaudhary	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  panchayat	  is	  the	  normalisation	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  parties,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   larger	   community,	   and	   in	   this	   manner	   the	   tribunals	   or	   their	  decisions	   ‘are	   not	   abrupt	   but	   a	   gradual	   development	   in	   which	   [the]	   meeting	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  last	  step	  of	  the	  process.’450	  	  Apart	   from	  the	  few	  ethnographic,	  anthropological	  and	   legal-­‐pluralistic	  studies,	  the	   main	   area	   of	   research	   that	   sheds	   light	   on	   the	   traditional	   law	   aspect	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  188.	  446	  Ibid.	  447	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420)	  101-­‐104.	  448	  Ibid.	  449	  Rasul	  Bakhsh	  Rais,	  ‘Trial	  by	  Fire’	  The	  Express	  Tribune	  (Karachi,	  Pakistan	  24	  September	  2013)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/608168/trial-­‐by-­‐fire/>	  last	  accessed	  24	  September	  2013.	  450	  Ibid.	  102.	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Pakistan’s	   legal	   framework	   stems	   from	   examinations	   conducted	   from	   a	  women’s	   rights	   perspective.	   Challenging	   the	   romanticised	   notion	   of	   local	  tribunals,	  such	  studies	  argue	  that	  far	  from	  being	  the	  ‘Folk	  Law	  of	  the	  People’,451	  traditional	   courts	   replicate	   the	   patriarchy	   embedded	   within	   the	   societal	  culture,452	  and	  contribute	  towards	  the	  oppression	  of	  women	  and	  marginalised	  sections	   of	   the	   society.	   There	   have	   been	   numerous	   instances	   where	   local	  tribunals	   or	   panchayats	   have	   subjected	   defendants	   to	   cruel	   and	   inhumane	  punishments,	   more	   often	   to	   preserve	   a	   skewed	   sense	   of	   ‘honour’	   of	   the	  community	  or	  the	  family.453	  In	  2002,	  in	  a	  case	  that	  generated	  headlines	  across	  the	  world,	  a	  village	  council	  of	  Mirwala	  ordered	  the	  rape	  of	  Mukhtar	  Mai.454	  The	  charge	   for	  which	  she	  was	  punished	  was	   that	  her	  younger	  brother,	   an	  11	  year	  old	  boy,	  was	  accused	  of	  having	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  girl	  ten	  years	  senior	  to	  him,	  who	   belonged	   to	   the	   influential	   Mastoi	   clan.455	   Mukhtar	   Mai	   was	   offered	   as	  ‘compensation’	   to	   balance	   out	   the	   injustice	   committed	   against	   the	   ‘honour’	   of	  the	  powerful	  caste,	   following	  which	  she	  was	  brutalised	  and	  thrown	  out	  naked	  on	  the	  street	  in	  the	  name	  of	  justice.456	  There	  have	  been	  several	  such	  horrendous	  instances	  where	  inhumane	  punishments	  have	  been	  imposed	  on	  women	  to	  settle	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451	  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421)	  44.	  452	  Saima	  Jasam,	  'Cultural	  Violence,	  Legal	  Pluralism	  and	  Women	  Rights:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Pakistan'	  (Heinrich	  Boll	  Foundation,	  Lahore,	  Pakistan	  2009)	  2.	  453	  Ibid.	  6.	  454	  Nadia	  Blétry,	  'Pakistan's	  Panchayat	  Justice:	  Good	  Faith	  Arbitration	  or	  Brutal	  Tribal	  Law'	  <http://www.worldcrunch.com/pakistans-­‐panchayat-­‐justice-­‐good-­‐faith-­‐arbitration-­‐or-­‐brutal-­‐tribal-­‐law/world-­‐affairs/pakistan-­‐039-­‐s-­‐panchayat-­‐justice-­‐good-­‐faith-­‐arbitration-­‐or-­‐brutal-­‐tribal-­‐law-­‐/c1s5988/#.ULKG_qW7NlI>	  last	  accessed	  15	  August	  2013.	  455	  Ibid.	  456	  Ibid.	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family	  disputes,	  land	  issues,	  personal	  enmities	  and	  the	  twisted	  sense	  of	  honour	  of	  the	  family.457	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	   the	   superior	   courts	   of	  Pakistan	  have	   challenged	   the	  legality	   of	   informal	   traditional	   courts	   based	   on	   an	   assertion	   that	   such	  punishments	   violate	  women’s	   rights,	   and	   therefore	   are	   in	   direct	   conflict	  with	  state	  laws.	  In	  a	  notable	  judgment	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  cited	  previously,	  the	   provincial	   High	   Court	   of	   Sindh	   declared	   jirgahs	   and	   panchayats	   as	  ‘unconstitutional’.458	  The	  Court	  declared	  
Private	  persons	  have	  no	  authority	   to	  execute	   the	  decision	  of	   jirgas	   nor	  the	  jirgas	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  execute	  their	  own	  decisions	  through	  their	  own	   sources.	   If	   such	   decisions	   are	   carried	   out	   and	   executed	   by	   killing	  persons,	  then	  the	  offence	  of	  murder	  will	  be	  committed	  and	  they	  will	  be	  liable	  for	  action	  as	  per	  the	  law…	  the	  jirgas	  have	  also	  usurped	  the	  powers	  of	   the	   executing	   authorities	   which	   is	   not	   permissible	   under	   the	  Constitution	  or	  the	  law.459	  	  Despite	   the	   declarations	   of	   illegality	   and	   demands	   from	   human	   rights	   and	  women’s	  rights	  groups	  that	   traditional	   tribunals	  should	  be	  completely	  banned	  from	  the	  country,	  there	  are	  various	  reasons	  why	  they	  still	  persist	  in	  the	  society.	  First,	   the	   adherents	   of	   these	   legal	   and	   normative	   structures	   have	   minimal	  contact	  with	  state	  institutions	  or	  courts,	  be	  it	  civil	  or	  criminal.460	  For	  them,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  choice	  between	  formal	  or	  traditional	  courts,	  but	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457	  WUNRN,	  'Pakistan	  -­‐	  News'	  Women's	  UN	  Report	  Network,	  26	  January	  2011	  <http://www.wunrn.com/news/2011/01_11/01_24/012411_pakistan2.htm>	  last	  accessed	  12	  February	  2013.	  458	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  (n	  1).	  459	  Ibid.	  See	  also,	  Asian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  and	  Pakistan	  Human	  Rights	  Education	  Forum,	  'Recent	  cases	  of	  ‘honour	  killing’	  in	  Sindh	  Province,	  Pakistan'	  (2004)	  3	  (3)	  Article	  2	  32,	  33.	  460	  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421).	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immediate	  or	  direct	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  tribunals,	  where	  the	  state	  courts	  are	   far	   removed	   from	   the	   equation.	   Although,	   in	   some	   instances,	   people	   use	  both	   official	   and	   traditional	   means	   of	   dispute	   resolution	   simultaneously,	   the	  state	  legal	  system	  is	  approached	  mainly	  to	  influence	  the	  dispute	  as	  a	  ‘pressure	  instrument’.461	   In	   the	   circles	   where	   traditional	   legal	   and	   normative	   systems	  hold	  their	  dominance,	   the	  distrust	  of	   the	  police	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  alienation	  from	  the	  formal	  system	  remain.462	  	  The	   second	   reason	   for	   the	   continuation	   of	   traditional	   systems	   is	   that	   the	  traditional	   courts	   generally	   follow	   codes	   that	   are	   based	   on	   the	   history,	  traditions	  and	  the	  version	  of	  religious	  understanding	  followed	  in	  that	  particular	  community.463	   For	   instance,	   the	   jirgas	   among	   Pushtun	   tribes	   follow	   the	  indigenous	   customary	   code	   of	  Pashtunwali,	   while	   those	   in	   Balochistan	   follow	  the	   Baloch	  Mayar.464	   A	   colonial	   officer	  wrote	   about	   some	   facets	   of	   the	  Mayar	  during	  his	  compilation	  of	  the	  Sibi	  Gazette:	  ‘To	  avenge	  blood;	  to	  fight	  to	  death	  for	  a	  person	  who	  has	  taken	  refuge	  with	  him….	  To	  be	  hospitable	  and	  to	  provide	  for	  the	   safety	  of	   the	  person….	  To	   refrain	   from	  killing	  a	  man	  who	  had	  entered	   the	  shrine	   of	   a	   Pir	   so	   long	   as	   he	   remained	   within	   its	   precincts….to	   punish	   an	  adulterer	  with	  death.’465	  Several	  of	  these	  traditional	  ideas	  of	  honour,	  hospitality	  and	   revenge	   often	   do	   not	   have	   a	   commonality	   with	   the	   legal/illegal	  differentiation	  of	  the	  state	  laws.	  In	  this	  context,	  too,	  the	  state	  laws	  are	  taken	  as	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  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420)	  77.	  462	  Ibid.	  71.	  463	  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421).	  464	  Nafisa	  Shah	  (2007)	  (n	  115)	  138-­‐139.	  465	  Ibid.	  139.	  
125	  	  
alien	  impositions,	  that	  is	  if	  their	  existence	  is	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  it	   is	   argued	   that	   ‘the	   law	   of	   the	   police	   and	   the	   courts	   is	   not	   the	   law	   of	   the	  people’.466	  	  	  It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that,	   while	   there	   are	   aspects	   of	   traditional	  customs	   that	   employ	   Islamic	   conceptions	   and	   Shariah,	   religion	   as	   understood	  and	   followed	  within	   communities	   and	   rural	   areas	   is	   not	   always	   in	   agreement	  with	  the	  mainstream	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Sharia	  or	  Islamic	  Jurisprudence.	  For	  instance,	   in	   an	   18th	   century	   account	   of	   the	   Pashtun	   region,	   one	   woman	  inhabitant	   of	   the	   locality	   explained	   that	   ‘[t]he	   nikah	   (religious	   ceremony	   of	   a	  wedding),	  for	  instance,	  is	  Shariat,	  but	  our	  celebration	  with	  guns	  and	  drums	  and	  singing	  and	  dancing	  is	  rawaj	  [custom].	  Death	  and	  funeral	  rites	  are	  Shariat,	  but	  our	   weeping	   and	   lamenting	   is	   our	   own	   custom,	   quite	   against	   the	   law	   in	  Islam.’467	   Hoebel	   also	   argued	   that,	   while	   traditional	   normativity	   incorporated	  ideas	  of	  Islamic	  Law,	  ‘the	  folk	  ignorance	  of	  Islam	  is	  in	  fact	  profound.	  The	  Great	  Tradition	   and	   the	   Little	   Traditions	   are,	   as	   is	   to	   be	   expected,	   two	   different	  things.’468	  	  The	   third	   and	   most	   important	   reason	   behind	   the	   persistence	   of	   traditional	  tribunals	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   traditional	  codes	  are	  deeply	   intertwined	  with	   the	  power	  structures	  as	  they	  exist	  in	  the	  locality.469	  These	  tribunals	  often	  reflect	  the	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  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421)	  45.	  467	  Quoted	  in	  Robert	  Nichols,	  Settling	  the	  Frontier:	  Land,	  Law,	  and	  Society	  in	  the	  Peshawar	  Valley,	  
1500-­‐1900	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2001)	  46.	  468	  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421)	  44.	  469	  Nasira	  Iqbal	  (2007)	  (n	  99)	  101.	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misogynist	   and	   patriarchal	   relations	   that	   they	   exist	   in,	   and	   their	   customs	  become	  deeply	  problematic	  in	  terms	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  larger	  human	  rights	  issues.	   The	   power	   structures	   mainly	   revolve	   around	   the	   patron-­‐client	   and	  landlord-­‐peasant	   relationships	   and	   in	   most	   cases	   it	   is	   the	   wealthy	   and	   the	  powerful	  who	  possess	  the	  authority	  to	  become	  adjudicators	  in	  these	  courts.470	  Although	   some	   of	   these	   may	   be	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	   democratic	   ‘round	   table	  conference’	  without	  a	  ‘chairman	  or	  a	  presiding	  officer’,	  and	  as	  an	  assembly	  that	  is	   ‘probably	  the	  closest	  thing	  to	  Athenian	  democracy	  that	  has	  existed	  since	  the	  original’,471	   this	  does	  not	  hold	   true	   for	   traditional	   tribunals.	   It	   is	  generally	   the	  
sardars	   or	  waderos	   (local	   or	   tribal	   chiefs)	   who	   preside	   over	   jirgas	   and	   other	  tribunals,	  mediate	  the	  disputes,	  pass	  judgements,	  and	  have	  a	  great	  stake	  in	  the	  continuation	  of	  these	  systems.472	  Some	  of	  these	  local	  chiefs	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  political	   set-­‐up	  of	   the	  country,	  who	  are	  not	   ‘interested	   in	  changing	   the	  almost	  medieval	  world	  they	  themselves	  inhabit’.473	  There	  have	  been	  several	  instances	  in	  which	  sitting	  members	  of	  National	  and	  Provincial	  Assemblies	  of	  the	  country	  have	   been	   reported	   to	   preside	   over	   	   tribunals.474	   This	   intertwining	   of	   local	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  patriarchal	  power	  structures	  is	  the	  primary	  reason	  that	  makes	  traditional	  tribunals	  deeply	  problematic	  and	  brings	  them	  in	  conflict	  with	  state	  laws	  and	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative.	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  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421)	  44.	  471	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  187.	  472	  Rabia	  Ali	  (2001)	  (n	  443)	  25.	  473	  Ibid.	  25.	  474	  Dawn,	  'PPP	  MPA	  presides	  over	  jirga'	  Dawn	  (Dadu,	  Pakistan	  31	  March	  2009)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/894479/ppp-­‐mpa-­‐presides-­‐over-­‐jirga>	  last	  accessed	  15	  March	  2013.	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In	  2012,	  the	  National	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Women	  filed	  a	  petition	  in	  the	  Supreme	   Court	   of	   Pakistan,	   requesting	   the	   apex	   court	   to	   support	   the	   2004	  judgement	   of	   the	   Sindh	   High	   Court	   and	   declare	   the	   jirgahs	   and	   panchayats	  illegal	   throughout	   the	   country.475	   Though	   the	   judgement	   in	   this	   case	   is	   still	  pending,	   it	   is	  unclear	  as	  to	  what	  effect	  it	  would	  have	  in	  curbing	  the	  traditional	  tribunals,	   as	   they	   seem	   to	   fill	   a	   void	   that	   provincial	   and	   national	   courts	   are	  unable	   to	   bridge.	   Despite	   the	   declaration	   of	   illegality,	   the	   traditional	   courts	  continue	  to	  exist,	  as	  they	  provide	  a	   ‘quick	  and	  free	  form	  of	  justice’476	  for	  those	  who	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  time	  and	  resources	  required	  to	  take	  the	  formal	  litigation	  route.477	   In	   2013,	   a	   women’s	   group	   in	   the	   Swat	   region	   held	   the	   first	   ever	  women’s	  Jirga	  to	  address	  the	  abuses	  suffered	  by	  two	  women	  in	  the	  community.	  Termed	  as	  Khwaindo	  Tolana	  (circle	  of	  sisters),478	  this	  was	  a	  symbolic	  gesture	  to	  indict	  the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  male-­‐oriented	  local	  tribunals,	  after	  these	  women	  could	  not	   get	   any	   respite	   from	   the	   local	   jirgas	   or	   the	   state	   legal	   system.	   I	  will	  return	   to	   this	   example	   in	   Chapter	   8,	   as	   an	   evidence	   of	   the	   potentiality	   of	  alternative	  justice	  systems	  to	  think	  creatively	  and	  move	  away	  from	  the	  confines	  and	  categories	  imposed	  by	  the	  dominant	  approaches	  to	  law.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475	  National	  Commission	  on	  Status	  of	  Women	  through	  its	  Chairperson	  v.	  Govt.	  of	  Pakistan	  through	  
its	  Secretary	  Law	  &	  Justice,	  etc.	  (Constitutional	  Petition	  No.	  24	  of	  2012,	  instituted	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  14	  March	  2012).	  476	  Nadia	  Blétry	  (2012)	  (n	  454).	  477	  There	  have	  even	  been	  demands	  from	  political	  parties	  to	  employ	  traditional	  tribunals	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issues	  of	  terrorism	  and	  militancy	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  2002	  Loya	  Jirga	  (Grand	  Jirga)	  of	  the	  Pashtun	  people	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  Afghanistan,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  two	  governments,	  reflects	  that	  the	  continued	  acceptability	  and	  demand	  of	  these	  traditional	  systems	  still	  persists	  in	  the	  region.	  478	  Syed	  Mohammad	  Ali,	  'Significance	  of	  the	  female	  jirga'	  (Pakistan	  09	  August	  2013)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/588473/significance-­‐of-­‐the-­‐female-­‐jirga/>	  last	  accessed	  12	  November	  2013.	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3.5. Colonial	  Law	  and	  the	  Tribal	  Regions	  
The	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  frameworks	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  torn	  between	  multiple	  tendencies	   that	   affect	   them,	   pulling	   them	   into	   different	   and	   often	   opposite	  directions.	   The	   ideas	   that	   emerge	   within	   the	   conceptions	   of	   Islamic	   law,	  common	   law	   and	   traditional	   law,	   are	   all	   caught	   in	   an	   uneasy	   relation,	   each	  trying	   to	   safeguard	   its	   existence,	   if	   not	   trying	   to	   assert	   its	   domination	   on	   the	  other.	   One	   aspect	   that	   binds	   them	   together	   is	   the	   shared	   history,	   or	   even	  origin,479	   based	   on	   the	   colonial	   past	   of	   the	   sub-­‐continent.	   While	   the	  constitutional	   and	   common	   law	   traditions	   of	   Pakistan	   evidently	   owe	   their	  existence	   to	   the	  British	   colonial	   era,480	   even	   Islamic	   law481	   and	   the	   traditional	  laws482	   of	   the	   region	   have	   not	   remained	   immune	   to	   this	   influence.	   The	  codification	  of	  the	  Muhammadan	  Law,	  and	  the	  differentiation	  and	  application	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Hindu	  Personal	  Laws,483	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  facets	  through	  which	  the	  colonial	  legal	  architecture	  attempted	  to	  govern	  the	  population.	  The	  colonial	  law	  also	  arguably	  established	  the	  rudimentary	   forms	  of	  parallel	   legal	  systems,	  not	   just	   through	   the	   separation	   of	   Muslim	   and	   Hindu	   laws,	   but	   also	   by	  delimiting	   the	   substantive	   areas	   where	   religious	   laws	   could	   be	   applicable	   –	  inheritance,	  marriage,	  adoption,	  etc.484	  In	  other	  instances,	  or	  where	  there	  was	  a	  conflict	   of	   law,	   the	   common	   law	   of	   the	   British	   colonial	   government	   reigned	  supreme.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  this	  idea	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  480	  Martin	  Lau	  (1994)	  (n	  327)	  3.	  481	  Michael	  Anderson,	  'Islamic	  Law	  and	  the	  Colonial	  Encounter	  in	  British	  India'	  in	  Chibli	  Mallat	  and	  Jane	  Connors	  (eds),	  Islamic	  Family	  Law	  (Graham	  &	  Trotman	  Limited,	  London	  1993)	  214.	  482	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  93-­‐94.	  483	  H.	  W.	  C.	  Carnduff,	  'Legislation	  and	  Justice'	  in	  Herbert	  Risley	  and	  others	  (eds),	  The	  Imperial	  
Gazetteer	  of	  India:	  The	  Indian	  Empire	  Vol	  IV	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford	  1909)	  127.	  484	  See,	  Michael	  Anderson	  (1993)	  (n	  481).	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  The	   colonial	   encounter	  also	   radically	   altered	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   traditional	   and	  customary	  laws	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  region.485	  The	  traditional	  systems	  that	  could	  prove	   to	   be	   beneficial	   for	   the	   governance	   needs	   of	   the	   colonial	   state	   were	  altered	   and	   subsumed	   within	   the	   overall	   state	   structure,486	   while	   those	   that	  were	  not	  needed	   for	  administrative	  or	   regulatory	  purposes	  were	  disregarded.	  This	   manner	   of	   selective	   engagement	   with	   traditional	   normative	   orders	   has	  continued	   in	   Pakistan	   in	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period.	   However,	   there	   are	  some	   laws	   that	   form	   part	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   architecture	   today	   that	   are	   still	  blatantly	  colonial,	  not	   just	   in	  terms	  of	  history	  but	  also	   in	  their	  nature,	  and	  the	  laws	  governing	  the	  Tribal	  Areas	  of	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  most	  relevant	  example	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  The	  Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Areas	  (FATA)	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  recognised	  in	  the	  world	  today	  because	  of	  their	   link	  with	  Islamist	  militancy.	  Marred	  by	  tribal	  infighting,	   these	   territories	   are	   also	   recognised	   as	   the	   strongholds	   of	   the	  Pakistani	   Taliban	   and	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   allied	   groups	   that	   clash	  with	   both	   the	   armed	  forces	   of	   the	   country	   as	   well	   as	   the	   inhabitants	   who	   resist	   against	   them.487	  These	   regions	   are	   afflicted	   with	   routine	   drone	   strikes,	   in	   which	   over	   3,000	  people	   have	   been	   killed	   to	   date,	   though	   the	   problems	   of	   access	   to	   the	   region	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  51-­‐55.	  486	  Ibid.	  94.	  487	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  25-­‐42.	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mean	  that	  this	  figure	  is	  difficult	  to	  confirm.488	  And	  these	  areas	  are	  still	  governed	  by	  draconian	  laws489	  that	  the	  British	  colonial	  state	  implemented	  in	  the	  region.	  	  The	   case	   of	   the	   FATA	   territories	   is	   uniquely	   interesting	   because	   it	   not	   only	  provides	  us	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  colonial	  law,	  but	  also	  creates	  an	  ‘exteriority’490	   within	   the	   constitutional	   and	   legal	   framework	   of	   the	   country.	  Exteriority	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  that	  which	  is	  not	  subsumed	  within	  law;	  that	  which	  exists	  in	  a	  ‘relation	  of	  exception’	  as	  Agamben	  notes	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  this	   is	   an	   ‘extreme	   form	   of	   relation	   by	   which	   something	   is	   included	   solely	  through	   its	  exclusion.’491	  The	  notion	  of	  Tribal	  Regions	  as	  exteriority,	  however,	  moves	  away	  from	  how	  critical	  theory	  conceptualises	  exteriority	  –	  as	  that	  which	  is	  always	  in	  a	  dialectical	  and	  formative	  engagement	  with	   law;492	  as	  that	  which	  lies	   outside	   law,	   though	   it	   ‘institutes	   [law]	   as	   a	   form’,	   as	   law	   ‘exists	   only	   in	  regard	  to	  its	  transgression-­‐infraction.’493	  The	  exteriority	  of	  Tribal	  Areas	  exists,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  Christine	  Fair	  et.	  al.	  note	  that	  according	  to	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Investigative	  Journalism	  ‘there	  have	  been	  352	  drone	  strikes	  in	  Pakistan,	  of	  which	  300	  have	  taken	  place	  under	  the	  Obama	  administration.	  Together,	  these	  drone	  strikes	  have	  killed	  between	  2,590	  and	  3,383	  persons,	  of	  whom	  anywhere	  between	  472	  and	  885	  have	  been	  civilians,	  including	  176	  children.	  In	  addition,	  the	  BIJ	  assesses	  that	  between	  1,255	  and	  1,408	  persons	  have	  been	  injured	  by	  drones.’	  C.	  Christine	  Fair,	  Karl	  Kaltenthaler	  and	  William	  J.	  Miller,	  'Pakistani	  Opposition	  to	  American	  Drone	  Strikes'	  (2014)	  129	  (1)	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  1,	  16.	  489	  Because	  of	  their	  harsh	  provisions,	  these	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulation	  is	  generally	  called	  ‘black	  law’.	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  189.	  490	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick,	  'Dominions:	  Law,	  Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death'	  (2004)	  31	  (1)	  Journal	  
of	  Law	  and	  Society	  142,	  146.	  491	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  Homo	  Sacer:	  Sovereign	  Power	  and	  Bare	  Life	  (Stanford	  University	  Press,	  Stanford,	  Calif.	  1998)	  18.	  492	  For	  a	  discussion	  and	  critique	  of	  the	  conceptual	  category	  of	  ‘exteriority’,	  see	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2013)	  (n	  94).	  493	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  (2004)	  (n	  490)	  3-­‐4.	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not	   as	   something	   that	   law	   is	   yet	   to	   subsume;	   rather	   it	   is	   that	  which	   law	   has	  subsumed,	  and	  declared	  exterior	  within	  its	  boundaries.494	  	  	  The	  FATA	  region	   is	  home	  to	  about	  3.3	  million	  people,	  or	  roughly	  about	  2%	  of	  the	  country’s	  population.	  This	  figure,	  though	  appearing	  small,	  is	  significant	  if	  we	  take	   into	   account	   that	   the	   population	   of	   FATA	   is	   roughly	   equivalent	   to	   the	  combined	   Hindu	   and	   Christian	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole.495	  Considered	   by	   some	   to	   be	   the	  most	   dangerous	   place	   on	   earth,496	   the	   general	  opinion	  of	  commentators	  (and	  spectators,	  alike)	   is	   that	   the	  problems	   faced	  by	  the	  people	  of	  this	  region	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  through	  strengthening	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  emerges	   from	  the	  common	  understanding	   that	   the	  problems	  of	   the	  region	   emerge	   from	   the	   lack	   of	   effective	   governance	   and	   law	   –	   an	   idea	   also	  implicit	   in	   the	   term	   ‘lawless	   tribal	  areas’	   that	   is	  generally	  used	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  region.497	  	  This	  approach,	  however,	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  absence	  of	  law	  that	  creates	  problems	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  rather	  the	  nature	  and	  the	   logic	  of	  law	  that	  has	  governed	  the	  region	  since	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  and	  is	  still	  in	  place	  after	  more	  than	  a	  century.	  	  	  The	   territories	   in	  question	   lie	   in	   the	  North	  West	  of	  Pakistan,	  on	   the	  Pakistan-­‐Afghan	  border.	  The	  British	  colonial	  government	   in	  1840s	  and	  1850s	  occupied	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494	  In	  this	  sense,	  perhaps	  the	  category	  of	  Homo	  Sacer	  is	  a	  relevant	  concept	  to	  understand	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  this	  region.	  However,	  as	  the	  lives	  of	  these	  people	  are	  plagued	  both	  with	  Islamic	  militancy	  and	  state	  violence,	  the	  concept	  as	  well	  as	  the	  context	  require	  further	  analysis	  and	  consideration,	  which	  lie	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  See,	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (1998)	  (n	  491).	  495	  US	  Department	  of	  State,	  International	  religious	  Freedom	  Report	  2002	  (Washington	  DC	  2002)	  496	  Ron	  Moreau	  and	  Michael	  Hirsch	  (2007)	  (n	  80).	  497	  Noor	  Ul	  Haq	  and	  Yasir	  Imtiaz	  (2009)	  (n	  391)	  90.	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the	   regions	   of	   Sindh	   and	   Punjab.498	   In	   the	   North-­‐West	   of	   this	   British	   Indian	  territory,	  though	  the	  British	  captured	  the	  FATA	  territories	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	   they	   were	   unable	   to	   fully	   capture	   the	   region	   that	   now	   forms	  Afghanistan.499	   In	   order	   to	   create	   an	   effective	   defence	   of	   their	   captured	  territories,	  the	  colonial	  regime	  adopted	  a	  Frontier	  approach,	  creating	  a	  series	  of	  frontier	   outposts	   to	   keep	   the	   mountain	   tribes	   in	   check.500	   This	   strategy,	  however,	   did	   not	   work	   well.	   It	   is	   reported	   that	   between	   1857	   and	   1881	   the	  British	   sent	   23	   expeditions	   into	   the	  mountain	   regions,	  most	   of	  which	   proved	  unsuccessful.501	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  British	   interests	   in	   India	   faced	   a	   threat	  from	  the	  advance	  of	  the	  Russian	  Empire,	  which	  by	  1870s	  had	  captured	  several	  important	   cities	   in	   present	   day	   Afghanistan.	   In	   order	   to	   create	   an	   effective	  buffer	  between	  the	  British	  colonial	  territory	  and	  the	  Russian	  Empire,	  a	  pact	  was	  signed	   between	   the	   British	   and	   the	   Amir	   (ruler)	   of	   Afghanistan.502	   This	   pact	  (called	   the	  Durand	   Pact	   of	   1893)	   created	   a	   1900	  mile	   boundary	   between	   the	  territories	  and	  cut	  through	  the	  tribal	  habitations	  arbitrarily.	  Named	  the	  Durand	  Line	  after	  Mortimer	  Durand,	  the	  British	  diplomat	  who	  negotiated	  the	  pact,	  this	  line	  acts	  to	  this	  day	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  border	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  Afghanistan.503	  	  In	  1907,	  Lord	  Curzon	  (who	  had	  been	  the	  Viceroy	  of	   India	  from	  1899	  to	  1905)	  apprised	  the	  audience	  in	  a	  lecture	  at	  Oxford	  about	  the	  result	  of	  the	  pact:	  
The	   result	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Indian	   Empire	   is	   probably	   without	  precedent,	   for	   it	   gives	   to	   Great	   Britain	   not	   a	   single	   or	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   but	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498	  Bijan	  Omrani,	  'The	  Durand	  Line:	  History	  And	  Problems	  Of	  The	  Afghan-­‐Pakistan	  Border'	  (2009)	  40	  (2)	  Asian	  Affairs	  177,	  181-­‐183.	  499	  Robert	  Nichols	  (2001)	  (n	  467)	  172-­‐173.	  500	  Bijan	  Omrani	  (2009)	  (n	  498)	  183-­‐187.	  501	  Ibid.	  183.	  502	  Ibid.	  184-­‐185.	  503	  Ibid.	  183-­‐184.	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threefold	  Frontier,	  (1)	  the	  administrative	  border	  of	  British	  India,	  (2)	  the	  Durand	   Line,	   or	   Frontier	   of	   active	   protection,	   (3)	   the	   Afghan	   border,	  which	  is	  the	  outer	  or	  advanced	  strategical	  (sic.)	  Frontier.504	  	  Simply	   put,	   the	   arrangement	   that	   was	   reached	  was	   that,	   between	   the	   British	  Indian	   ‘subjects’	  and	  the	  Russian	  Empire,	   there	  would	  be	  Afghan	  territory	  and	  ‘tribal’	   people	   as	   a	   buffer	   zone	   (as	   the	   Frontier	   of	   active	   protection).505	  What	  Lord	   Curzon	   failed	   to	   mention	   in	   his	   account	   was	   that	   through	   the	   unique	  mechanism	   that	   was	   implemented	   in	   the	   region,	   the	   ‘tribal’	   people	   were	   not	  considered	  ‘subjects’	  of	  either	  the	  British	  Empire,	  or	  the	  Afghan	  Amir,	  although	  they	   were	   subject	   to	   coercion	   and	   criminal	   legal	   penalties	   from	   both	  sovereigns.506	  The	  Tribal	  Regions	  were	  thus	  included	  in	  the	  British	  Empire	  in	  a	  ‘relation	  of	  exception’507	   from	   the	  very	  beginning.	  They	  became	  subject	   to	   the	  Frontier	   Crimes	   Regulations,	   first	   enacted	   in	   1848,	   but	   later	   promulgated	   in	  their	  more	  recognised	  form	  in	  1901.508	  The	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations	  (FCR)	  vested	   complete	   executive	   and	   judicial	   authority	   in	   the	   Governor	   or	  Commissioner	   of	   the	   region.	   The	   Commissioner,	   who	   acted	   as	   the	   main	  representative	   of	   the	   Crown,	   was	   to	   act	   in	   conjunction	   with	   unelected	   tribal	  
jirgas,	   the	  members	  of	  which	  were	  nominated	  by	   the	  authority	  of	   the	  colonial	  state.509	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  this	  appropriated	  category	  of	  ‘Official	  Jirga’	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504	  George	  Nathaniel	  Curzon,	  'Lord	  Curzon	  of	  Kedleston	  (Viceroy	  of	  India	  1898-­‐1905):	  1907	  Romanes	  Lecture	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  Frontiers'	  (Oxford,	  1907).	  505	  Robert	  Nichols	  (2001)	  (n	  467)	  172.	  506	  Ibid.;	  Bijan	  Omrani	  (2009)	  (n	  498)	  187-­‐188.	  507	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (1998)	  (n	  491)	  18.	  508	  Robert	  Nichols	  (2001)	  (n	  467)	  183-­‐188.	  509	  Amir	  Mohammed	  Khan,	  'Justice	  Denied'	  Newsline	  <http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2004/12/justice-­‐denied/>	  last	  accessed	  25	  November	  2013.	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distinct	  from	  the	  traditional	  Jirga	  of	  the	  region,	  mainly	  because	  it	  is	  hierarchical	  and	  does	  not	  carry	  the	  same	  legitimacy	  in	  terms	  of	  customary	  norms.510	  	  There	  were	   several	   other	  problematic	   aspects	   contained	  within	   the	  FCR	   from	  the	   outset.	   Section	   21	   of	   the	   FCR	   allowed	   the	   executive	   to	   blockade,	  excommunicate,	   debar,	   or	   seize	   the	   persons	   or	   property	   of	   any	   tribe	   whose	  members	   would	   act	   ‘in	   a	   hostile	   or	   unfriendly	   manner	   towards	   the	   British	  Government	   or	   towards	   persons	   residing	  within	   British	   India’.511	   Introducing	  the	   problematic	   notion	   of	   collective	   punishment,	   Section	   22	   permitted	   the	  Deputy	  Commissioner	  or	  Commissioner	  to	   impose	  fines	  on	  any	  village	   if	  some	  of	  its	  inhabitants	  were	  believed	  to	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  a	  criminal	  offence.512	  Section	  23	  continued	  this	  problematic	  idea	  even	  further,	  and	  stated	  that	  
Where,	   within	   the	   area	   occupied	   by	   a	   village	   community	   or	   part	   of	   a	  village-­‐community,	   a	   person	   is	   dangerously	   or	   fatally	   wounded	   by	   an	  unlawful	   act,	   or	   the	   body	   is	   found	   of	   a	   person	   believed	   to	   have	   been	  unlawfully	  killed,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  village	  community	  or	  part	  thereof	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  committed	  an	  offence	  under	  Section	  22,	  unless	  the	  headmen	  of	  the	  village-­‐community	  or	  part	  thereof	  can	  show	  that	  the	  members	  thereof	  –	  (a)	   had	   not	   an	   opportunity	   of	   preventing	   the	   offence	   or	   arresting	   the	  offender;	  or	  	  (b)	  have	  used	  all	  reasonable	  means	  to	  bring	  the	  offender	  to	  justice.513	  	  In	   addition	   to	   collective	   punishment,	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   laws	   also	   shift	   the	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	   the	  particular	  community	  which	   is	   then	  required	   to	  prove	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  188.	  511	  Section	  21	  of	  the	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations,	  1901.	  512	  Ibid.	  Section	  22.	  513	  Ibid.	  Section	  23.	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that	   it	   had	   employed	   reasonable	  means	   to	   prevent	   the	   offence,	   or	   punish	   the	  offender.	   Through	   similar	   drastic	   provisions,	   the	   FCR	   authorised	   the	  Commissioner	  to	  halt	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  village,	  or	  direct	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  village,	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  security	  of	  the	  British	  Indian	  territories.514	  Article	   48	   of	   the	   FCR	   barred	   any	   appeals	   from	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   Deputy	  Commissioners	   and	   Commissioners,	   while	   Article	   60	   carried	   it	   further	   and	  stated	  that	  no	  decisions	  under	  FCR	  could	  be	  set	  aside	  by	  any	  Civil	  or	  Criminal	  Court	  of	  British	  India.	  	  After	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  British	  from	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent,	  the	  FCR	  were	  adopted	   by	   the	   State	   of	   Pakistan,	   and	   the	   territories	   have	   continued	   to	   be	  governed	   without	   any	   change	   in	   this	   colonial	   legacy	   or	   any	   significant	  modification	   in	   the	   FCR.	   The	   exceptional	   status	   of	   the	   Tribal	   Areas	   is	   given	  constitutional	  validity,	  with	  the	  Constitution	  extending	  the	  executive	  authority	  of	   the	   President	   to	   FATA,	   while	   expressly	   stating	   that	   ‘[n]o	   Act	   of	   Majlis-­‐e-­‐Shoora	  (Parliament)	  shall	  apply	  to	  any	  Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Area	  or	  to	  any	   part	   thereof,	   unless	   the	   President	   so	   directs…’.515	   The	   issue	   of	   judicial	  recourse	   is	  an	  equally	   troubling	  matter,	  as	   ‘[n]either	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  nor	  a	  High	  Court	  shall	  exercise	  any	  jurisdiction	  under	  the	  Constitution	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  Tribal	  Area,	  unless	  Majlis-­‐e-­‐Shoora	  (Parliament)	  by	  law	  otherwise	  provides.’516	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  Ibid.	  Sections	  31	  and	  32	  respectively.	  515	  Article	  247(3)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  516	  Ibid.	  Article	  247(7).	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In	  2011,	  the	  President	  of	  Pakistan	  further	  increased	  the	  brutal	  nature	  of	  these	  laws	   when	   an	   ordinance	   was	   passed	   granting	   the	   country’s	   armed	   forces	  unbridled	   authority	   to	   detain	   anyone	   suspected	   of	   involvement	   in	   terrorism	  offences.517	   These	   laws,	   entitled	   Actions	   in	   Aid	   of	   Civil	   Power	   Ordinance	  (AACPO)	   2011,	   have	   meant	   that	   those	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   region	   who	   were	  charged	  with	   terrorism	   offences,	   had	   no	   recourse	   to	   judicial	   trials.	  Moreover,	  the	   suspects	   can	   be	   detained	   for	   unspecified	   periods	   of	   time	   and	   can	   be	  sentenced	  to	  death	  at	  the	  armed	  forces’	  discretion.518	  In	  another	  twisted	  logic,	  the	  AACPO	  allows	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  detain	  anyone	  who	  is	  suspected	  of	  having	  connections	  with	  the	  FATA	  territories,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  present	  in	  the	  region	  themselves.519	  	  Due	   to	   the	  cruel	  and	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  FCR,	  political	  and	  human	  rights	  activists	  have	  often	  denounced	  these	  provisions	  as	  ‘black	  laws’.520	  A	  recent	  and	  notable	  case	  of	  Dr	  Shakil	  Afridi	  provides	  an	   instance	  of	   the	  operation	  of	   these	  Regulations	  in	  FATA	  region.	  In	  2011,	  Dr	  Afridi	  was	  alleged	  to	  have	  assisted	  the	  American	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  in	  tracking	  down	  Osama	  Bin	  Laden,	  while	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  polio	  vaccination	  campaign.	  The	  case	  was	  not	  brought	   to	   the	   judiciary	   for	   trial,	   but	   was	   rather	   judged	   under	   FCR,	   through	  which	   the	  Commissioner	   gave	  Afridi	   a	   summary	  punishment	  of	  33	  years.	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517	  Arif	  Taj,	  'SCBA	  threatens	  to	  challenge	  FATA,	  PATA	  Regulations'	  Pakistan	  Today	  (Pakistan	  15	  August	  2011)	  <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/08/15/national/scba-­‐threatens-­‐to-­‐challenge-­‐fata-­‐pata-­‐regulations/>	  last	  accessed	  13	  June	  2013.	  518	  Ibid.	  519	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Actions	  in	  Aid	  of	  Civil	  Power	  Ordinance.	  	  520	  Rahimullah	  Yusufzai,	  'Analysis:	  Pakistan's	  tribal	  frontiers'	  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1711316.stm#story>	  last	  accessed	  14	  December	  2001.	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national	  formal	  courts,	  till	  now,	  have	  not	  made	  evident	  their	  own	  reading	  of	  the	  issue	  and	  have	  not	  declared	  this	  case	  to	  be	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  generic	  principle	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.521	  	  	  The	  British	  colonial	   laws	  of	   these	   territories,	   then,	  were	  problematic	   from	  the	  outset.	  These	  Tribal	  territories	  were	  not	  settler	  or	  administrative	  colonies,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  question	  of	  direct	  or	  indirect	  rule	  involved	  here.522	  This	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  different,	  more	  blatant	   type	  of	   colonialism,	   radically	  unlike	   the	   two	   types	  of	  colonial	   governance	   which	   academic	   accounts	   elaborate	   on.523	   As	   these	  territories	  were	   created	   to	  ensure	  a	  buffer	   and	  a	   frontier	  between	   the	  British	  colonial	  interests	  and	  a	  competing	  Empire	  across	  the	  region,	  it	  was	  the	  strategic	  value	   of	   the	   territory	   rather	   than	   the	   people	   that	  mattered.	   A	  more	   troubling	  facet	  of	   this	  picture	   is	   that	   this	   colonial	   logic	   continued	  after	   independence	  of	  Pakistan.	   With	   the	   existence	   of	   cases	   such	   as	   Shakil	   Afridi’s,	   and	   the	  continuation	   of	   FCR,	   AACPO	   and	   other	   similar	   laws,	   FATA	  presents	   us	  with	   a	  uniquely	   problematic	   and	   intriguing	   scenario	   –	   not	   only	   does	   it	   continue	   the	  logic	  of	  colonialism	  in	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  setting,524	  but	  also	  creates	  an	  ‘exteriority’	  or	  an	  Agambian	  ‘exception’525	  within	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  architecture	  of	  Pakistan.	  And	  now	  the	   inhabitants	  of	   this	  region	  are	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  multiple	  repressive	  logics	  and	  their	  repercussions	  –	  colonialism,	  imperialism	  and	  Islamic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521	  Waseem	  Ahmad	  Shah,	  'Dr	  Shakil	  Afridi	  now	  to	  be	  probed	  for	  foreign	  links'	  Dawn	  (Peshawar,	  Pakistan	  21	  March	  2014)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1094553/dr-­‐shakil-­‐afridi-­‐now-­‐to-­‐be-­‐probed-­‐for-­‐foreign-­‐links>	  last	  accessed	  21	  March	  2014.	  522	  For	  instance,	  see	  Mithi	  Mukherjee,	  'Justice,	  War,	  and	  the	  Imperium:	  India	  and	  Britain	  in	  Edmund	  Burke's	  Prosecutorial	  Speechesin	  the	  Impeachment	  Trial	  of	  Warren	  Hastings'	  (2005)	  23	  (3)	  Law	  and	  History	  Review	  589.	  523	  For	  instance,	  see	  ibid.	  524	  I	  will	  build	  on	  this	  further	  in	  Chapter	  8	  on	  page	  251.	  525	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (1998)	  (n	  491)	  18.	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militancy.	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   instances	   such	  as	   these	   that	  make	   it	   impossible	   to	  reconcile	   the	   mainstream	   legal	   assumptions	   of	   positive	   law	   with	   the	   equally	  emphasised	  notion	  of	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  	  
3.6. ‘Lawlessness’	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  Leviathan	  
The	  exclusion	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Areas	  (FATA)	  from	   constitutional	   guarantees	   and	   fundamental	   rights	   is	   not	   the	   only	  consequence	  of	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  colonial	  logic.	  The	  last	  two	  decades	  have	  seen	  this	  region	  come	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  one	  of	  the	  most	  dangerous	  places	  in	  the	   world526	   and	   a	   ‘lawless	   frontier’,527	   owing	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   militant	   groups	  linked	  to	  Taliban	  and	  the	  Al-­‐Qaeda.528	  Said	  to	  be	  the	  ‘epicentre	  of	  global	  Islamic	  terrorism’,529	   this	   region	   has	   also	   faced	   the	   brunt	   of	   US	   led	   drone	   strikes,	   in	  which	   more	   than	   3,000	   people	   have	   died,	   with	   almost	   one-­‐third	   of	   them	  believed	  to	  be	  civilians.530	  The	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  militancy,	  linked	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	   Soviet-­‐Afghan	   War	   in	   1980s	   and	   United	   States	   led	   War-­‐on-­‐Terror	   since	  2001,	   has	   had	   devastating	   repercussions	   for	   the	   entire	   country.	   In	   the	   last	  decade,	  the	  militants	  of	  the	  region	  have	  mounted	  horrendous	  attacks	  on	  civilian	  population,	  armed	  forces	  and	  government	  personnel.	  It	   is	  estimated	  that	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526	  Ron	  Moreau	  and	  Michael	  Hirsch	  (2007)	  (n	  80).	  527	  Robert	  D.	  Kaplan	  (2000)	  (n	  82).	  528	  Owen	  Bennet	  Jones	  (2011)	  (n	  16)	  25-­‐35.	  529	  The	  Bureau	  of	  Investigative	  Journalism,	  'Obama	  2012	  Pakistan	  strikes'	  (The	  Bureau	  of	  Investigative	  Journalism	  2012)	  <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/01/11/obama-­‐2012-­‐strikes/>	  last	  accessed	  10	  October	  2012.	  530	  C.	  Christine	  Fair,	  Karl	  Kaltenthaler	  and	  William	  J.	  Miller	  (2014)	  (n	  488)	  16.	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than	  50,000	  people	  in	  Pakistan	  have	  died	  because	  of	  terrorism-­‐related	  incidents	  in	  the	  country	  since	  2001.531	  	  	  With	  religious	  militancy	  providing	  one	  explanation	   for	   the	   increasing	  violence	  in	   the	   country,	   the	   rise	   of	   criminal	   incidents	   and	   target	   killings	   adds	   to	   this	  troubling	   scenario.	   The	   ever	   decreasing	   capacity	   of	   the	   State	   of	   Pakistan	   to	  safeguard	   its	   territory	   and	   provide	   security	   to	   the	   populace	   is	   evident.	   For	  instance,	  in	  just	  one	  week	  in	  October,	  there	  were	  1810	  thefts	  and	  violent	  crimes	  reported	  in	  the	  4	  major	  cities	  of	  the	  country.	  532	  In	  Karachi,	  the	  economic	  centre	  and	  the	  most	  populated	  city	  of	  Pakistan,	  more	  than	  1200	  people	  were	  reported	  killed	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2012.533	  In	  a	  rather	  appropriate	  description,	  one	  news	  article	  described	  Karachi’s	  situation	  recently	  in	  these	  words:	  
Karachi,	   a	   sprawling	  port	   city	  on	   the	  Arabian	  Sea	  and	  economic	  hub	  of	  Pakistan,	   has	   long	   been	   beset	   by	   religious,	   sectarian	   and	   ethnic	   strife.	  Here	  armed	  wings	  of	  political	  parties	  battle	  for	  control	  of	  the	  city,	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  die	  in	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  sectarian	  killings,	  and	  Taliban	  gunmen	  attack	  banks	  and	  kill	  police	  officers.534	  	  Based	  on	  its	  significance	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  socio-­‐legal	  structures	  and	  narratives	  in	  the	  country,	  I	  argue	  that	  lawlessness	  and	  violence	  are	  interwoven	  in	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan.	  It	  is	  contended	  here	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531	  Dawn,	  'State	  and	  non-­‐state	  terrorism'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  5	  March	  2014)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1091119/state-­‐and-­‐non-­‐state-­‐terrorism>	  last	  accessed	  5	  March	  2014.	  532	  Pakistan	  Criminal	  Records,	  'PCR	  Exclusive	  -­‐	  Weekly	  Crime	  Statistics'	  5	  October	  2012)	  <http://pakistancriminalrecords.com/2012/10/05/pcr-­‐exclusive-­‐weekly-­‐crime-­‐statistics-­‐10/>	  last	  accessed	  16	  September	  2013.	  533	  Ibid.	  534	  Dawn,	  'Karachi	  police	  arrest	  MQM	  activist	  in	  Randhawa	  killing'	  Dawn	  (1	  October	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1046733/karachi-­‐police-­‐arrest-­‐mqm-­‐activist-­‐in-­‐randhawa-­‐killing-­‐case>	  last	  accessed	  2	  October	  2013.	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growing	   uncertainty	   and	   violence	   has	   seen	   the	   emergence,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  strengthening,	   of	   several	   narratives	   that	   the	   legal	   and	   judicial	   frameworks	   of	  Pakistan	  are	  now	  struggling	  with.	  First,	  this	  internal	  war	  has	  seen	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  Islamic	  discourse	   in	  Pakistan.535	  The	  militancy,	  which	  generally	  claims	   to	  be	  a	  struggle	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   Shariah	   in	   the	   country,	   has	   given	   ground	   to	  wider	  religious	  and	  sectarian	  conflicts.536	  It	  has	  also	  reinforced	  several	  violent	  religious	   groups	   that	   aim	   to	   implement	   their	   own	   versions	   of	   Islamic	   law	   in	  Pakistan,	   as	   the	   case	   of	   Red	   Mosque	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	  elaborated.	  	  Second,	  as	  violence	  –	  political,	  religious,	  sectarian,	  and	  criminal	  –	  has	  increased,	  so	  has	  the	  criticism	  of	  the	  state	  to	  provide	  security	  of	  person	  and	  property	  to	  its	  citizens.537	  With	   idea	   of	   ‘lawlessness’	   as	   ‘absence	   of	   law’	   becoming	   a	   term	   of	  common	   parlance	   in	   Pakistan,538	   the	   narrative	   of	   a	   ‘strong	   state’	   and	   ‘state-­‐sovereignty’	  has	  also	  gained	  prominence	  in	  political	  and	  legal	  discourse.539	  The	  government	  and	  the	  armed	  forces	  are	  increasingly	  criticised	  for	  their	  incapacity	  to	   safeguard	   Pakistan’s	   boundaries	   from	   external	   actors,	   and	   commentators	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Christine	  C.	  Fair,	  Neil	  Malhotra	  and	  Jacob	  N.	  Shapiro	  (2010)	  (n	  22);	  Pew	  Research	  Center,	  'Most	  Muslims	  Want	  Democracy,	  Personal	  Freedoms,	  and	  Islam	  in	  Political	  Life:	  Few	  Believe	  U.S.	  Backs	  Democracy'	  (Washington,	  D.C.	  2012).	  536	  Anas	  Malik	  (2013)	  (n	  322)	  45.	  537	  Waqas	  Naeem,	  'Hobbes’	  predictions:	  A	  strong	  ruler	  is	  needed	  to	  steer	  country	  out	  of	  crisis'	  
The	  Express	  Tribune	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  07	  September	  2013)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/600863/hobbes-­‐predictions-­‐a-­‐strong-­‐ruler-­‐is-­‐needed-­‐to-­‐steer-­‐country-­‐out-­‐of-­‐crisis/>	  last	  accessed	  07	  September	  2013.	  538	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Azhar	  Hassan	  Nadeem	  (2002)	  (n	  75).	  539	  Waqas	  Naeem	  (07	  September	  2013)	  (n	  537).	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demand	  that	  only	  by	  strengthening	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  state	  and	  ensuring	  rule	  of	  law	  can	  the	  country	  be	  saved	  from	  its	  troubles.540	  	  The	  human	  rights	  discourse	  has	  also	  gained	  further	  ascendancy	  because	  of	  this	  conflict.	   Human	   rights	   organisations	   claim	   that	   the	   state	   is,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  violating	   the	   rights	   and	   liberties	   of	   the	   people	   of	   the	   Frontier	   Regions	   in	   the	  name	  of	  security541	  while,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  proving	  unwilling	  and	  unable	  to	   safeguard	   the	   lives	   and	   security	   of	   its	   wider	   citizenry	   from	   attacks	   by	   the	  militants.542	  	  Finally,	  owing	  to	  all	  this,	   there	  has	  been	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  what	  I	  consider	  as	  the	  Hobbesian	  narrative	  on	  law	  and	  the	  state.	  Legal	  and	  political	  commentators	  consider	   the	   situation	   of	   Pakistan	   as	   ‘a	  war	   of	   all	   against	   all’,543	   in	  which	   the	  lives	   of	   the	   individuals	   have	   become	   akin	   to	   that	   in	   the	   Hobbesian	   state	   of	  nature	   –	   ‘solitary,	   nasty,	   poor,	   brutish	   and	   short’.544	   As	   the	   problems	   are	  considered	   to	   have	   emerged	   from	   a	   weak	   state	   and	   an	   incapacitated	  government,	   the	   solutions	   offered	   also	   carry	   the	   same	   tones:	   that	   Pakistan	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  stronger	  state;	  it	  needs	  a	  more	  expansive	  judicial	  system	  to	  deal	  with	  militancy,	  terrorism	  and	  violence;	  and	  that	  Pakistan	  needs	  a	  Leviathan.	  545	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540	  Hajrah	  Mumtaz	  (24	  January	  2010)	  (n	  127).	  541	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  16)	  323-­‐324.	  542	  Ibid.	  61.	  543	  I.A	  Rehman,	  'A	  dehumanised	  horde'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  26	  April	  2012)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/713520/a-­‐dehumanised-­‐horde>	  last	  accessed	  20	  December	  2013	  544	  Ibid.	  545	  Waqas	  Naeem	  (07	  September	  2013)	  (n	  537).	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3.7. Pakistan’s	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  and	  the	  Narratives	  of	  Law	  
The	   main	   purpose	   of	   the	   above	   discussion	   on	   historical	   and	   conceptual	  trajectories	   of	   different	   aspects	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   tapestry,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  history	   of	   legal	   uncertainty	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  was	   to	   lay	   out	  what	   the	   study	   takes	   as	   its	   context.	   It	   was	   highlighted	   in	   the	   foregoing	  discussion	   that	   even	   if	  we	   consider	   the	   dominant	   state-­‐oriented	   legal	   system,	  there	  are	  glimpses	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  local	  tribunals	  and	  colonial	  law	  that	  become	  evident.	  In	  order	  to	  approach	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  of	  the	  country,	  then,	  it	  is	   necessary	   to	   consider	   the	  multiple	   legal	   orderings	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   society.	  Common	  law,	  Islamic	  law,	  traditional	  courts,	  colonial	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  notions	  of	  legal	  exteriority	  and	  lawlessness	  are	  all	  constituent	  components	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	   tapestry,	   and	   exist	   in	   a	   situation	   of	  mutual	   encounter.	   Islamic	   law	  informs	   both	   the	   judicature	   and	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	   dominant	   legal	  frameworks,	   while	   also	   engaging	   with	   traditional	   normative	   systems;	   the	  traditional	  courts,	   though	  challenged	  by	   the	  state,	  provide	   judicial	   recourse	   to	  those	   who	   are	   removed	   from	   the	  mainstream	   legal	   system;	   and	   colonial	   law	  pervades	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   country,	   and	   is	   more	   expressly	   visible	   in	   the	   laws	  governing	   the	  Tribal	  Areas.	  Moreover,	   these	  multiple	  normative	  orderings	  are	  coupled	  with	   the	   rising	   issues	   of	   lawlessness	   and	   violence,	   which	   generate	   a	  multitude	   of	   legal	   narratives.	  As	  mentioned	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   I	   identify	   four	  main	  narratives	  that	  are	  employed	  within	  Pakistan	  to	  approach	  its	  (socio)legal	  setup:	  state-­‐oriented	  legal	  narrative,	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  law,	  legal-­‐pluralist	  approach	  and	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative	   of	   law.	   The	   following	   four	   chapters	  will	   now	  consider	  each	  of	  these	  narratives	  in	  turn,	  discussing	  their	  manifestations	  in	  the	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legal	   and	  political	  discourse,	  while	  also	   identifying	   some	  of	   the	   contradictions	  that	   emerge	   from	   an	   exclusive	   assertion	   on	   their	   underlying	   assumptions	   as	  well	  as	  from	  a	  partial	  view	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain.	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Chapter	  4: Tracing	   the	   limits	   of	   the	  Dominant	   Legal	   Narrative	  
in	  Pakistan	  	  
4.1. Chapter	  Synopsis	  
The	  previous	   two	   chapters	  have	  presented	  a	  history	  of	   the	   constitutional	   and	  legal	  turmoil	  that	  has	  beset	  Pakistan	  since	  its	  independence.	  They	  also	  outlined	  the	   multiple	   legal	   and	   normative	   orderings	   present	   in	   the	   country,	   and	  discussed	   their	   historical	   and	   conceptual	   trajectories	   to	   illustrate	   the	  complexity	  and	  diversity	  that	  inheres	  within	  the	  label	  of	  ‘Law’	  in	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  context	   of	   Pakistan.	   Building	   on	   this	   foundation,	   the	   thesis	  will	   now	   examine	  and	   problematise	   the	   prevalent	   narratives	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   employed	   to	  understand	   Law	   in	   Pakistan’s	   context.	   The	   present	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   the	  most	  prominent	  narrative	  amongst	  these	  –	  the	  notion	  that	  confines	  law	  within	  the	  categories	  of	   the	  state	  and	   the	  constitution.	   I	  will	  argue	   that	   the	  narrative	  manifests	   itself	   in	   Pakistan	   by	   linking	   law	   and	   justice	   to	   categories	   of	  exclusivity,	  administration	  of	  justice,	  issues	  of	  access	  and	  management	  of	  socio-­‐legal	   realities.	   It	   further	   holds	   that	   if	   these	   prerequisites	   are	   fulfilled,	   it	   will	  resolve	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  legal	  situation	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  	  It	  will	   be	   argued	   in	   the	   course	   of	   this	   chapter	   that	   the	   notions	   of	   access	   and	  administration	  do	  not	  highlight	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  problems,	  and	  are	  limited	  to	  treating	  its	  symptoms.	  Moreover,	  the	  assertion	  that	  a	  stronger	  state	  will	  lead	  to	   peace	   hides	   the	   contradictions	   that	   emerge	   from	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   state	   in	  Pakistan.	   It	   will	   also	   be	   highlighted	   in	   the	   following	   discussion	   that	   the	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dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  emerges	  from	  an	  unquestioned	  influence	  of	  the	  legal	  positivist	   approach	   to	   law.	   The	  most	   evident	   limitation	   of	   the	   dominant	   legal	  narrative	  in	  the	  country	  emanates	  from	  this	  approach,	  which	  makes	  it	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  plurality	  of	  legal	  and	  normative	  structures	  that	  exist	  and	  prevail	  in	   the	   country.	   This	   approach	   not	   only	   presents	   a	   one-­‐dimensional	   picture	   of	  the	  (socio)legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan,	  but	  if	  understood	  more	  thoroughly,	  it	  also	  brings	   to	   the	   fore	   several	   challenges	   and	   contradictions	  which	   it	   is	   unable	   to	  resolve.	  	  
4.2. ‘There	  is	  but	  one	  law	  for	  all…’	  
When	   the	   Law	   and	   Justice	   Commission	   of	   Pakistan546	   organised	   its	   annual	  International	  Judicial	  Conference	  in	  April	  2012,	  it	  chose	  ‘There	  is	  but	  one	  law	  for	  
all…’	   as	   its	   guiding	   theme.	   The	   Conference	   employed	   the	   phrase	   to	   convey	   a	  ‘resolve	   to	   [this]	   time-­‐honoured	   adage’	   and	   reaffirm	   the	   commitment	   of	   legal	  fraternity	  to	  the	  ‘principles	  of	  Rule	  of	  Law’.547	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  further	  strengthened	  this	  view	  when,	   in	  his	  keynote	  address	  at	   the	  Conference,	  he	   stated	   that	   through	   the	  adoption	  and	  application	  of	   this	  maxim,	   the	   country	   can	   ‘achieve	   the	   goals	   of	   good	   governance,	   democracy,	  social	   justice	  and	  the	  rule	  of	   law’.548	  Intriguingly,	  the	  phrase	  itself	   is	  borrowed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546	  The	  Law	  and	  Justice	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  is	  a	  Federal	  Government	  Institution,	  with	  the	  responsibility	  to	  review	  existing	  laws	  in	  the	  country	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  reform,	  codification	  and	  unification.	  LJCP,	  'Law	  and	  Justice	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan'	  <http://www.ljcp.gov.pk/>	  last	  accessed	  12	  September	  2013.	  547	  LJCP,	  'There	  is	  but	  one	  law	  for	  all...'	  (International	  Judicial	  Conference,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan,	  2012)	  121.	  548	  Ibid.	  18.	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from	   one	   of	   Edmund	   Burke’s	   speeches,549	   delivered	   in	   May	   1774	   before	   the	  House	   of	   Lords	   in	   Great	   Britain	   during	   the	   Impeachment	   Trial	   of	   Warren	  Hastings.550	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  phrase	  essentially	  argues	  for	  the	  timelessness	  and	  universality	  of	  natural	  law	  is	  just	  one	  interesting	  facet	  of	  its	  context.551	  A	  more	  remarkable	   aspect	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   current	   discussion	   is	   the	   prescient	  nature	  of	  the	  debates	  that	  surrounded	  this	  trial.	  	  	  Hastings,	   the	   first	  Governor-­‐General	  of	   the	  emerging	  British	  colonial	   set-­‐up	   in	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent,	  was	  charged	  with	   ‘high	  crimes	  and	  misdemeanor’,552	  including	   corruption,	   extortion,	   misuse	   of	   political	   and	   judicial	   power,	   and	  despotism.553	  His	  defence	  was	  mainly	  based	  on	  two	  arguments.	  First,	  asserting	  that	   the	   colonial	   possessions	   of	   the	   British	   East	   India	   Company	   amounted	   to	  private	   property,	   he	   disputed	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   British	   Government	   to	  challenge	  and	  control	  the	  colonial	  enterprise.554	  Second,	  he	  maintained	  that	  any	  colonial	  or	   sovereign	  authority	  exercised	   in	   the	  colonies	  by	   the	  Company	  was	  granted	  through	  treaties	  by	  the	  (defeated)	  Mughal	  Empire	  and	  Nawabs	  (rulers)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549	  Edmund	  Burke	  was	  a	  renowned	  18th	  century	  statesman	  and	  parliamentarian	  of	  Great	  Britain.	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Burke’s	  speeches	  and	  ideas	  in	  relation	  to	  East	  India	  Company’s	  colonial	  policies,	  see	  Siraj	  Ahmed,	  'The	  Theater	  of	  the	  Civilized	  Self:	  Edmund	  Burke	  and	  the	  East	  India	  Trials'	  (2002)	  78	  (1)	  Representations	  28.	  550	  The	  complete	  phrase	  reads:	  ‘I	  know	  no	  human	  being	  exempt	  from	  the	  law.	  The	  law	  is	  the	  security	  of	  the	  people	  of	  England;	  it	  is	  the	  security	  of	  the	  people	  of	  India;	  it	  is	  the	  security	  of	  every	  person	  that	  is	  governed,	  and	  of	  every	  person	  that	  governs.	  There	  is	  but	  one	  law	  for	  all,	  namely,	  that	  law	  which	  governs	  all	  law,	  the	  law	  of	  our	  Creator,	  the	  law	  of	  humanity,	  justice,	  equity,—the	  Law	  of	  Nature	  and	  of	  Nations.’	  Edmund	  Burke,	  The	  Works	  of	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  
Edmund	  Burke	  (Twelve	  Volumes)	  (John	  C.	  Nimmo,	  London	  1887)	  135.	  551	  Mithi	  Mukherjee	  (2005)	  (n	  522)	  610.	  552	  A	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  proceedings	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  articles	  
charged	  in	  the	  Impeachment	  of	  Warren	  Hastings,	  Esq.	  Woodfall's	  Parliamentary	  Reports,	  London,	  1795,	  3.	  553	  Ibid.	  3.	  554	  Mithi	  Mukherjee	  (2005)	  (n	  522)	  603.	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of	   Bengal.555	   By	   this	   argument,	   the	   sovereignty	   exercised	   by	   the	   East	   India	  Company	  was	  ultimately	  said	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  local	  laws	  and	  customs,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   local	   rulers.556	   Rather	   than	   denying	   incidences	   of	  corruption,	  extortion	  and	  violence,	  his	  defence	  sought	  to	  justify	  them	  as	  being	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  practises	  of	  indigenous	  rulers	  and	  as	  necessary,	  to	  expand	  and	   strengthen	   the	   Empire.557	   Edmund	   Burke	   as	   the	   chief	   prosecutor,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   argued	   that	   the	   British	   East	   India	   Company	   in	   fact	   exercised	  sovereign	  authority	  in	  the	  occupied	  lands	  and	  that	  apart	  from	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Crown	  there	  was	  a	  ‘natural	  law’	  that	  bound	  Hastings	  and	  the	  Company.558	  He	  therefore	  asserted	  that	  sovereign	  authority	  in	  India	  should	  not	   be	   exercised	   according	   to	   the	   practises	   of	   ‘usurpers’	   but	   by	   the	   laws	   of	  India,559	   and	   that	   to	   curb	   the	   transgressions	   of	   Hastings	   and	   the	   East	   India	  Company,560	   the	   legal	   and	   judicial	   authority	  of	   the	  British	  Government	   should	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  colonised	  lands.561	  	  	  Mukherjee	   argues	   that	   the	   two	  differing	   arguments	   by	  Hastings	   and	  Burke	   in	  fact	  represented	  two	  competing	  logics	  towards	  colonialism,	  being	  debated	  at	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555	  Ibid.	  603-­‐605.	  556	  Ibid.	  604.	  557	  Ibid.	  610-­‐611.	  558	  Burke	  denounced	  the	  ‘geographical	  morality’	  of	  the	  Company,	  criticising	  the	  general	  attitude	  that	  ‘as	  if,	  when	  you	  have	  crossed	  the	  equinoctial	  line,	  all	  the	  virtues	  die.’	  Nick	  Robins,	  The	  
Corporation	  that	  changed	  the	  World:	  How	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  shaped	  the	  Modern	  
Multinational	  (Pluto	  Press,	  London	  2006)	  133-­‐134.	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  Burke’s	  arguments	  against	  geographical	  morality,	  see	  also	  David	  Harvey,	  Cosmopolitanism	  and	  the	  geographies	  of	  
freedom	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  New	  York	  ;	  Chichester	  2009)	  42-­‐50.	  559	  P.	  J.	  Marshall,	  'The	  making	  of	  an	  imperial	  Icon:	  The	  case	  of	  Warren	  Hastings'	  (2008)	  27	  (3)	  
The	  Journal	  of	  Imperial	  and	  Commonwealth	  History	  1,	  10.	  560	  For	  an	  account	  of	  East	  India	  Company’s	  operations	  in	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent,	  see	  Nick	  
Robins	  (2006)	  (n	  558).	  561	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	  acquitted	  Hastings	  on	  all	  charges	  against	  him.	  For	  an	  exposition	  of	  voting	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  during	  this	  trial,	  see	  G.	  M.	  Ditchfield,	  'The	  House	  of	  Lords	  and	  the	  Impeachment	  of	  Warren	  Hastings'	  (1994)	  13	  (3)	  Parliamentary	  History	  277.	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time	  when	  the	  British	  hold	  on	  American	  settler-­‐colonies	  had	  declined	  and	  a	  new	  form	   of	   colonisation,	   based	   on	   indirect	   rule,	   was	   emerging.562	   He	   identifies	  these	   two	   sets	   of	   ‘competing	   and	   conflicting	   aims	   and	   strategies’	   as	   Colonial	  (represented	  by	  Hasting’s	  assertion	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  conquest	  and	  necessity	  of	   violence)	   and	   Imperial	   (illustrated	   by	   Burke’s	   insistence	   on	   governance	  through	  constitutional	  and	   judicial	  mechanisms).563	  Though	  the	  two	  strategies	  differed	  in	  their	  adopted	  tactics	  –	  one	  focussing	  on	  control	  through	  naked	  force	  and	  the	  other	  on	  control	  through	  the	  use	  of	  law	  and	  juridical	  mechanisms	  –	  they	  converged	   in	   their	   ultimate	   aim.	   This	   ultimate	   goal	  was	   the	   continuation	   and	  expansion	   of	   the	   colonial	   set-­‐up	   in	   India	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   metropole.564	  ‘There	   is	   but	   one	   law	   for	   all…’,	   then,	   hid	   behind	   it	   a	   plethora	   of	   disputes:	  between	   natural	   law	   and	   sovereign	   assertion;	   between	   respect	   for	   local	  customs	  and	  their	  employment	  to	  further	  one’s	  self-­‐interest;	  and	  between	  rule	  through	   conquest	   and	   judicial	   authority.	   The	   fact	   that	   makes	   this	   scenario	  intriguing	   is	   that	   the	  phrase	  and	   its	  utilisation	   to	  emphasise	   the	   incontestable	  nature	  of	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  assertion	  above,	  hides	  similar	  disputes	  two	  centuries	  thence.	  	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  Sovereignty,	  and	  Writ	  of	  the	  State	  are	  the	  current	  terms	  of	  choice	  in	  political	   and	   legal	   discussions	   in	   Pakistan.565	   Despite	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   the	   country	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapter,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562	  Mithi	  Mukherjee	  (2005)	  (n	  522)	  593.	  563	  Ibid.	  595.	  564	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman,	  Indigenous	  peoples	  and	  ethnic	  minorities	  of	  Pakistan:	  
constitutional	  and	  legal	  perspectives	  (Curzon,	  Richmond	  2001)	  12.	  565	  This	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	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dominant	   narrative	   of	   law	   in	   Pakistan	   from	   which	   the	   said	   terms	   emerge	  considers	  ‘Law’	  as	  an	  incontrovertible	  and	  indisputable	  term.	  Focussing	  on	  Law	  as	  it	  is	  instituted	  and	  implemented	  by	  the	  state,	  the	  narrative	  centres,	  not	  on	  the	  complex	   and	   uncertain	   socio-­‐political	   phenomena	   that	   underpin	   the	   legal	  architecture,	  but	  the	  ‘legal	  fiction’	  of	  certainty,	  predictability	  and	  uniformity.566	  I	  argue	   that	   the	   logic	   of	   this	   dominant	   narrative	   is	   underpinned	   by	   the	  assumptions	  of	   legal	  positivism,	  which	  guide	   the	  way	   it	  perceives	   the	   societal	  context,	   frames	   the	   issues,	   identifies	   deficiencies	   and	   proposes	   solutions	   to	  these	  identified	  problems.	  However,	  in	  this	  process,	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  and	  its	   underlying	   logic	   fail	   to	   explain	   their	   internal	   contradictions,	   and	   exclude	  some	   significant	   aspects	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   that	   challenge	   their	   neat	  categorisations.	   I	   will	   expand	   on	   these	   assertions	   below,	   prior	   to	   which	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  
4.3. The	  dominant	  narrative	  of	   Law	   in	  Pakistan:	   State-­‐Law	  as	   ‘The	  
Law’	  
The	  concept	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  deeply	  linked	  to	  the	  principle567	  of	  justice…	  [with]	   independence	  of	   the	   judiciary	  and	   the	  role	  of	   judicial	  process	  as	  fundamental	   characteristics	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law….	   The	   administration	   of	  inexpensive,	  unbiased	  and	  fair	  justice	  leads	  the	  society	  to	  a	  civilized	  form	  of	   governance.	   Equality,	   impartiality	   and	   integrity	   in	   dispensation	   of	  justice	   are	   vital	   elements	   for	   the	   good	   governance	   of	   a	   state.	   Good	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  (2004)	  (n	  490)	  145.	  567	  Note	  that	  ‘principle	  of	  justice’	  is	  in	  singular.	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governance	   leads	   to	   the	   maintenance	   of	   peace,	   tranquillity	   and	   nitty	  gritty	  (sic.)	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  activities.568	  	  The	   above	   teleological	   statement	   by	   the	   former	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   Pakistan,	  Iftikhar	  Chaudhary,	  provides	  a	  good	  summation	  of	  the	  dominant	  state-­‐oriented	  narrative	   of	   law	   in	   Pakistan.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   narrative	   in	   its	   common	  manifestation,	   as	   the	   statement	   brings	   to	   the	   fore,	   is	   hinged	   on	   four	   key	   and	  intermeshed	   notions.	   First,	   it	   assumes	   justice,	   and	   law	   as	   a	   corollary,	   to	   be	   a	  
singular	   and	   non-­‐contentious	   concept	   which	   flows	   from	   the	   Constitution	   and	  
Grundnorm569	  of	  the	  country.	  Linked	  to	  this	  is	  the	  assertion	  of	  exclusivity	  –	  that	  preservation	   of	   this	   singular	   justice	   and	   law	   (generally	   paired	  with	   order)	   is	  primarily	   the	   responsibility	   and	   the	   domain	   of	   the	   state,	   with	   the	   judiciary	  acting	  as	   the	  main	   institution	   tasked	   to	   safeguard	   them.	  Second,	   the	  narrative	  equates	  justice	  with	  the	  administration	  of	  law,	  which	  results	  in	  issues	  of	  access,	  provision	   and	   efficiency	   becoming	   paramount.570	   Third,	   the	   narrative	   links	  justice	   and	   administration	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   management,	   rule	   of	   law	   and	  ‘good’	   governance.571	  While	   exclusivity	   reserves	   for	   the	   state	   the	   authority	   to	  declare	   what	   is	   legal	   or	   illegal,	   the	   idea	   of	   governance	   takes	   it	   towards	   the	  imposition	   of	   this	   singular	   notion	   of	   law	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   other	   existent	  normative	   orderings.	   Finally,	   the	   narrative	   assumes	   that	   ensuring	   the	  administration	  of	  justice,	  rule	  of	  law,	  writ	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  good	  governance	  will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568	  LJCP	  (2012)	  (n	  547)	  18	  (emphasis	  added).	  569	  A	  concept	  theorised	  by	  Hans	  Kelsen,	  which	  was	  used	  actively	  by	  the	  superior	  courts	  in	  Pakistan	  to	  justify	  the	  military	  takeovers	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  later.	  See	  Hans	  Kelsen	  (2005)	  (n	  191)	  205.	  There	  have	  also	  been	  assertions	  by	  the	  courts	  that	  Islam	  provides	  the	  Grundnorm	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  mentioned	  previously	  570	  See,	  Law	  and	  the	  ‘Administration’	  of	  Justice,	  below	  on	  page	  155.	  571	  See,	  Justice,	  Management	  and	  Governance,	  below	  on	  page	  157.	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necessarily	   lead	   to	   order,	   which	   is	   then	   equated	   with	   socio-­‐economic	  improvement	   and	   peace.	   Based	   on	   equating	   violence	   and	   other	   problems	  prevalent	   in	   the	   country	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   law,	   or	   lawlessness,	   this	   notion	  presumes	   the	   provision	   and	   preservation	   of	   law	   as	   a	   panacea,	   despite	   the	  presence	  of	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.572	  Each	  of	  these	  four	  points	  will	  be	  briefly	  explored	  below,	  highlighting	  the	  assertions	  and	  the	  narrative	  that	  exists	  around	  them	  in	  Pakistan’s	  context.	  	  
4.3.1. The	  Exclusivity	  and	  Singularity	  of	  Law	  and	  Justice	  The	   primary	   notion	   of	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   on	   law	   in	   Pakistan	   is	   the	  assertion	   on	   singular	   and	   incontestable	   nature	   of	   justice,	   emerging	   from	   the	  exclusive	  linkage	  of	  law	  to	  state	  authority	  and	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  media	  and	  legal	   forums	   in	  Pakistan	  are	  replete	  with	  assertions	  vesting	   the	  State	  with	   the	  responsibility	   to	   preserve	   and	   provide	   justice,	   amongst	   the	   expansive	   list	   of	  duties	   that	   the	  State	   is	  required	  to	   fulfil.	   Ideas	  and	  demands	   in	  relation	  to	   the	  duties	  of	  the	  State	  range	  from	  ensuring	  food	  security573	  and	  equality,	  to	  human	  rights574	  and	  women’s	  welfare,575	  from	  safeguarding	  the	  rights	  of	  children576	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572	  See,	  Peace	  and	  Provision	  of	  Justice,	  below	  on	  page	  160.	  573	  Julia	  Lemétayer,	  'PAKISTAN:	  Half	  of	  the	  population	  is	  exposed	  to	  food	  insecurity	  because	  of	  bad	  governance	  and	  abuses'	  (Pakistan	  2010).	  574	  Ahmad	  Nazir	  Warraich	  (20	  October	  2013)	  (n	  324).	  575	  Pakistan	  Workers’	  Federation,	  One	  Voice	  of	  Workers	  -­‐	  Newsletter	  (Pakistan	  Workers'	  Federation,	  Lahore,	  Pakistan	  2009)	  2.	  576	  Business	  Recorder,	  'Experts	  underscore	  need	  for	  comprehensive	  survey	  to	  tackle	  child	  labour'	  Business	  Recorder	  (Pakistan	  13	  October	  2012)	  <http://www.brecorder.com/general-­‐news/172:pakistan/1247372:experts-­‐underscore-­‐need-­‐for-­‐comprehensive-­‐survey-­‐to-­‐tackle-­‐child-­‐labour/?date=2012-­‐10-­‐13>	  last	  accessed	  14	  April	  2013.	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a	   uniform	   education	   system.577	   Within	   this,	   the	   State	   and	   the	   judiciary	   are	  deemed	   responsible	   for	   enforcing	   ‘law	   to	   ensure	   peace’578	   and	   to	   provide	   a	  ‘right	  to	  adl	   [justice]’579	  to	  its	  citizens.	  Legal	  and	  political	  commentators	  stress	  that	  the	  entitlements	  of	  a	  state	   include	  not	  only	  a	  monopoly	  over	   ‘violence,’580	  but	  also	  taxation	  as	  its	  ‘sovereign	  prerogative,’	  the	  payment	  of	  which	  is	  a	  ‘test	  of	  loyalty	  of	  any	  citizen.’581	  The	  State	   is	  urged	   to	  create	   ‘an	  egalitarian	  society	   in	  which	   all	   are	   equal	   before	   the	   law’,	   and	   where	   justice	   is	   ‘speedy,	   affordable,	  honest	  and	  blind.’582	  Judiciary	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  important	  institution	  to	   achieve	   this	   end,	   and	   it	   has	   been	   called	   the	   ‘true	   arbitrator’	   of	   law	   and	  justice.583	  As	   the	   ‘ultimate	  protector	  of	   the	  rights	  of	  citizens’,584	   the	   judiciary’s	  role	   in	   safeguarding	   the	  constitutional	  principles	   is	  hailed	   to	  be	  of	  paramount	  importance,	   as	   ‘undiluted	   adherence	   to	   the	   norms	   and	   principles	   of	   the	  constitution	  and	  practise	  of	  rule	  of	   law	  are	  keystones’	   for	  ensuring	  justice	  and	  democracy.585	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577	  Humayun	  Gauhar,	  'Pakistan	  zindabad'	  Pakistan	  Today	  (Pakistan	  13	  August	  2011)	  <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/08/13/comment/pakistan-­‐zindabad/>	  last	  accessed	  19	  July	  2013.	  578	  Dawn,	  'Justice	  Jilani	  on	  'Peace	  thru	  Law':	  'Democracy	  is	  a	  way	  of	  life,	  not	  mere	  right	  to	  vote''	  
Dawn	  (Lahore,	  Pakistan	  20	  October	  2012)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/758068/justice-­‐jilani-­‐on-­‐peace-­‐thru-­‐law-­‐democracy-­‐is-­‐a-­‐way-­‐of-­‐life-­‐not-­‐mere-­‐right-­‐to-­‐vote>	  last	  accessed	  9	  October	  2013.	  579	  Ibid.	  580	  Amir	  Zia,	  'Delusion	  versus	  reality'	  The	  News	  (Pakistan	  09	  December	  2013)	  <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-­‐News-­‐9-­‐219067-­‐Delusion-­‐versus-­‐reality>	  last	  accessed	  09	  December	  2013.	  581	  Huzaima	  Bukhari	  and	  Dr.	  Ikramul	  Haq,	  'Democratizing	  political	  parties'	  (2011)	  July	  24-­‐30	  
Weekly	  Tax	  Journal	  223,	  224.	  582	  Dawn	  (20	  October	  2012)	  (n	  578).	  583	  The	  News,	  'Peace,	  security	  are	  state’s	  responsibility:	  CJ'	  The	  News	  (Lahore,	  Pakistan	  10	  September	  2011)	  <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=8686&Cat=13>	  last	  accessed	  14	  March	  2013.	  584	  Ibid.	  585	  Ibid.	  
153	  	  
It	  is	  granted	  that	  these	  assertions	  are	  far	  from	  novel,	  as	  a	  narrative	  on	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  judiciary	  permeates	  the	  wider	  academic	  and	   legal-­‐theoretical	  discussions	  on	   law	  and	  the	  state	  beyond	  the	  discourse	   in	  Pakistan.	  However,	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   notion	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   current	  discussion	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  law	  and	  justice	  are	  made	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  state,	  they	  also	  become	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  state.	  When	  justice	  is	  intrinsically	  tied	  to	  state-­‐authored	   law,	   it	  generates	  a	  singular	  and	  exclusive	   idea	  of	   justice	  which,	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   association	   with	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	   country,	   is	  considered	   beyond	   dispute.586	   In	   a	   2012	   judgement,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	  considered	  a	  diversity	  of	  meanings	  of	  the	  word	  ‘just’,	  with	  it	  correlating	  to	  ‘what	  is	  legal	  or	  lawful’,	  ‘righteous’,	  ‘fair’,	  that	  which	  conforms	  to	  ‘the	  requirements	  of	  right	   or	   of	   positive	   law’.587	  However,	   the	   judgement	   indicated	   that	   in	   its	   own	  jurisprudence,	   the	   Court	   has	   adhered	   to	   the	   understanding	   that	   ‘”just”	  means	  according	  to	  law.’588	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  wider	  political	  and	  legal	  discussions	  in	  the	  country	  on	  Rule	  of	  Law	  hardly	  ever	  raise	  questions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  nature	  and	   authority	   of	   the	   law	   whose	   Rule	   is	   so	   readily	   propounded.589	   One	  consequence	  of	  such	  assertions	  of	  singularity	  and	  exclusivity	  is	  that	  any	  notion	  of	  law	  or	  justice	  that	  emerges	  from	  outside	  these	  frameworks	  is	  discounted	  and	  declared	   illegal.590	   It	   has	   been	   argued	  by	   commentators	   and	   activists	   that	   the	  Pakistani	  State	  is	  not	  only	  duty-­‐bound	  to	  protect	  its	  citizens	  and	  provide	  them	  justice,	  but	  also	  to	  ‘save’	  them	  from	  other	  normative	  orderings	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
586	  The	  one	  prominent	  contestation	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  been	  between	  Islamic	  principles	  and	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  inherited	  at	  the	  time	  of	  independence,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  3.	  587	  Workers’	  Party	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  v.	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  (PLD	  2012	  SC	  681).	  588	  Utility	  Stores	  Corporation	  of	  Pakistan	  Ltd	  v.	  Punjab	  Labour	  Appellate	  Tribunal	  (PLD	  1987	  SC	  447),	  quoted	  in	  Workers’	  Party	  Pakistan	  (n	  587).	  589	  The	  News	  (10	  September	  2011)	  (n	  583).	  590	  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  in	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  115.	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society.591	  With	   the	   judiciary	   as	   the	   ultimate	   arbiter	   of	   legality,	   and	   the	  main	  institution	  vested	  with	  the	  responsibility	  to	  uphold	  the	  law,	  it	  also	  assumes	  the	  authority	   to	   bar	   any	   other	   form	   of	   normative	   ordering	   that	   does	   not	   fit	   its	  criteria.592	  	  	  Although	   not	   encompassed	  within	   the	   subject	  matter	   of	   the	   current	   study,	   it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	   that	   another	   consequence	  of	   the	  dominant	  narrative	  of	  law,	   and	   an	   unquestioning	   assertion	   on	   rule	   of	   law,	   is	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   the	  term	   sovereignty	   in	   Pakistan.	   It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   with	   exclusivity	   of	   law	  acting	  as	  an	   inward-­‐facing	   idea,	   the	  notion	  of	   sovereignty	   is	   employed	  mainly	  towards	   the	   threats	   faced	  by	  Pakistan	   from	  external	  actors,	  although	  this	   idea	  would	  require	  further	  examination.	  The	  terminology	  of	  sovereignty	   is	   invoked	  time	   and	   time	   again	   by	   political	   parties,	   political	   commentators,	   judiciary,	  lawyers	  and	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  address	  mainly	  the	  United	  States	  led	  drone	   strikes	   in	   the	   North-­‐Western	   region	   of	   Pakistan.	   The	   incumbent	   Prime	  Minister	   of	   Pakistan	   stated	   in	   2013	   that	   the	   ‘drone	   strikes	   violate	   the	  sovereignty	   of	   Pakistan,’593	   a	   statement	   that	   is	   supported	   by	   several	   rival	  political	   parties	   as	   well.	   Pakistan’s	   Ambassador	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   also	  seconded	   the	   view	   that	   drone	   strikes	   undermine	   the	   country’s	   sovereignty,	  when	  speaking	  at	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly594	  to	  discuss	  the	  resolution	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591	  Asma	  Jahangir	  (2009)	  (n	  397).	  592	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  (n	  1).	  593	  AFP,	  'Drone	  strikes	  against	  Pakistan's	  sovereignty:	  Nawaz'	  Dawn	  (London	  20	  October	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1050419/drone-­‐strikes-­‐against-­‐pakistans-­‐sovereignty-­‐nawaz>	  last	  accessed	  20	  October	  2013.	  594	  Parvez	  Jabri,	  'Drone	  hits	  violate	  Pak	  sovereignty,	  international	  law'	  Business	  Recorder	  (Pakistan	  20	  December	  2013)	  <http://www.brecorder.com/top-­‐news/1-­‐front-­‐top-­‐
155	  	  
Protection	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   while	   countering	  
terrorism.595	   The	   Pakistan	   Tehreek-­‐i-­‐Insaf	   (PTI),	   which	   emerged	   as	   the	   third	  largest	   party	   in	   the	   country	   after	   the	   2013	   general	   elections,	   has	   also	  denounced	  drone	  attacks	  in	  Pakistan	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  country’s	  sovereignty.	  It	  has	  made	   this	  argument	   its	  most	   important	  policy	   issue,	   and	  staged	  a	  month-­‐long	  sit-­‐in	  against	  the	  drone	  strike	  that	  killed	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  Taliban	  in	  November	  2013.596	  	  	  
4.3.2. Law	  and	  the	  ‘Administration’	  of	  Justice	  Returning	  to	  the	  main	  assertions	  that	  emanate	  from	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan,	  the	  second	  notion	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  account	  links	  law	  to	  issues	  of	  provision	  and	  administration	  of	  justice.	  Once	  the	  state	  is	  vested	  with	  the	  exclusive	  authority	  to	  formulate	  laws	  and	  provide	  justice,	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  focus	  on	   the	   idea	  of	  provision	  of	   justice	  as	  a	   corollary.597	  This	  perspective	  contends	  that	  the	  problems	  that	  pervade	  the	  societal	  structures	  of	  Pakistan	  emerge	  from	  a	  deficient	  application	  and	  dispensation	  of	  law,	  rather	  than	  any	  shortcomings	  in	  the	   laws	   themselves.598	   The	   ‘administration	  of	   justice’	   and	   ‘justice	   delivery’599	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  news/149648-­‐drone-­‐hits-­‐violate-­‐pak-­‐sovereignty-­‐international-­‐law.html>	  last	  accessed	  28	  December	  2013.	  595	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  'Protection	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  while	  countering	  terrorism	  -­‐	  Note	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General'	  (Promotion	  and	  protection	  of	  human	  rights:	  human	  rights	  situations	  and	  reports	  of	  special	  rapporteurs	  and	  representatives,	  2009).	  596	  B.	  Z.	  Abdullah,	  PTI	  sit-­‐in	  against	  drone	  strikes	  enters	  26th	  day	  (PTI,	  Khyber	  Pukhtoonkhwa,	  Pakistan	  2013).	  597	  See	  the	  quotation	  cited	  in	  Section	  ‘There	  is	  but	  one	  law	  for	  all…’	  (footnote	  568),	  LJCP	  (2012)	  (n	  547).	  598	  Iftikhar	  Muhammad	  Chaudhary,	  'Address	  by	  Mr.	  Justice	  Iftikhar	  Muhammad	  Chaudhry,	  Hon’ble	  Chief	  Justice	  Of	  Pakistan'	  (New	  Judicial	  Year	  Ceremony,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan,	  September	  2012).	  	  599	  Ibid.	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are	  then	  considered	  as	  ‘pre-­‐requisite[s]	  for	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  a	  society’,	  by	  providing	  which	  the	  ‘Judiciary	  plays	  central	  role	  in	  promoting	  social	  justice’.600	  When	  law	  and	  justice	  are	  conceived	  of	  as	  subjects	  of	  administration	  and	  delivery,	  then	  it	  is	  the	   issues	   of	   efficiency,	   access,	   resources	   and	   backlogs	   of	   cases	   that	   become	  paramount.	  The	  outgoing	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Lahore	  High	  Court	  stated	  in	  2012	  that	   ‘it	   was	   the	   inefficiency	   of	   the	   legal	   system	   that	   compromised	   its	  effectiveness.’601	   The	   former	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   Pakistan	   claimed	   that	   during	   his	  term	  in	  office,	  he	  adopted	  measures	  to	  ‘improve	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  country	  which	  includes	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  backlog	  of	  cases.’602	  He	  also	  praised	   the	   judges	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   for	   their	  work	   on	   a	   ‘war	   footing’	   to	  ‘expedite	  the	  disposal	  of	  cases.’603	  	  	  The	   emphasis	   on	   administration,	   provision,	   efficiency	   and	   case	   backlogs,	  correlate	   to	   the	   issues	   of	   access	   of	   justice,	   which	   assumes	   that	   the	   main	  problems	   of	   law	   pertain	   to	   the	   people’s	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   judicial	   and	   legal	  recourse.	   It	   is	   generally	   stated	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   traditional	   normative	  systems	  and	  even	  militancy604	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  inadequate	  provision	  of	   justice	  and	   lack	   of	   access.	   The	   apex	   court	   claimed	   in	   2013	   that	   	   local	   tribunals	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600	  Iftikhar	  A.	  Khan,	  'Pakistan,	  Azad	  Kashmir	  judiciaries	  join	  hands'	  Dawn	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  09	  August	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1041281/pakistan-­‐azad-­‐kashmir-­‐judiciaries-­‐join-­‐hands>	  last	  accessed	  09	  August	  2013.	  601	  Dawn,	  'LHC	  chief	  sees	  flaws	  in	  justice	  system'	  Dawn	  (Lahore,	  Pakistan	  25	  May	  2012)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/721450/lhc-­‐chief-­‐sees-­‐flaws-­‐in-­‐justice-­‐system>	  last	  accessed	  02	  January	  2013.	  602	  The	  Express	  Tribune,	  'Judicial	  allowance:	  ‘Should	  all	  court	  staff	  get	  special	  pay?’'	  The	  Express	  
Tribune	  (Pakistan	  14	  December	  2013)	  <http://pktimes.4com.co/tag/judicial>	  last	  accessed	  14	  December	  2013.	  603	  Ibid.	  604	  Rana	  Yasif,	  'Peace	  through	  law:	  Weak	  rule	  of	  law	  spawns	  militancy,	  says	  CJP'	  The	  Express	  
Tribune	  (Lahore,	  Pakistan	  21	  October	  2012)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/454673/peace-­‐through-­‐law-­‐weak-­‐rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐spawns-­‐militancy-­‐says-­‐cjp/>	  last	  accessed	  20	  December	  2013.	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courts	  exist	  ‘only	  in	  places	  where	  the	  police	  had	  failed’605	  to	  perform	  its	  duties.	  To	   counter	   such	   perceived	   problems,	   Pakistan	   has	   seen	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  multitude	   of	   Access	   to	   Justice	   and	   Alternative	   Dispute	   Resolution	   (ADR)	  projects	   in	   the	   past	   few	   years.606	   The	   Asian	   Development	   Bank’s	   Access	   to	  Justice	  Programme	  and	   the	   International	  Finance	  Corporation’s	   establishment	  of	  Karachi	  Centre	  for	  Dispute	  Resolution	  materialised	  from	  this	  very	  concept.607	  There	   have	   been	   several	   other	   initiatives	   towards	   ADR	   and	  Access	   to	   Justice,	  generally	   funded	   and	   supported	   by	   international	   development	   and	   donor	  organisations.608	  The	  recent	  example	  of	  mobile	  courts	  instituted	  in	  the	  province	  of	   Khyber-­‐Pakhtunkhwa	   is	   also	   part	   of	   this	   approach.	   Partly	   funded	   by	   the	  provincial	  government	  and	  partly	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Fund	  and	  other	  donor	  organisations,609	  the	  mobile	  courts	  aim	  towards	  providing	  access	  to	  courts	   to	   people	   living	   in	   remote	   areas	   and	   to	   deliver	   ‘justice	   at	   the	  doorsteps.’610	  	  
4.3.3. Justice,	  Management	  and	  Governance	  The	   third	   key	   assertion	   of	   the	   dominant	   state-­‐oriented	   narrative	   of	   law	   in	  Pakistan	  associates	  the	  idea	  of	  justice	  to	  governance	  and	  management.	  Building	  on	   the	   aspects	   of	   singularity,	   exclusivity,	   administration	   and	   provision,	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605	  Geo	  TV,	  'Government	  should	  act	  against	  illegal	  Jirgas:	  SC'	  <http://www.geo.tv/article-­‐108899-­‐Government-­‐should-­‐act-­‐against-­‐illegal-­‐Jirgas-­‐SC-­‐>	  last	  accessed	  11	  July	  2013.	  606	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2013)	  (n	  98).	  607	  I	  worked	  at	  the	  institution	  as	  its	  first	  Case	  Administrator	  in	  2007.	  608	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2013)	  (n	  98)	  263-­‐265.	  609	  AFP,	  'KPK’s	  drive	  for	  justice'	  Dawn	  (Peshawar,	  Pakistan	  29	  August	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1039186/kpks-­‐drive-­‐for-­‐justice>	  last	  accessed	  29	  August	  2013	  610	  The	  News,	  'KPK	  novel	  mobile	  court	  kicks	  off'	  The	  News	  (Peshawar,	  Pakistan	  27	  July	  2013)	  <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-­‐111229-­‐KPK-­‐novel-­‐mobile-­‐court-­‐kicks-­‐off>	  last	  accessed	  25	  August	  2013.	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principle	   imports	   the	   language	   of	   governance	   in	   relation	   to	   phenomena	   that	  may	  otherwise	  seem	  unmanageable	  or	  disparate.	  A	  conception	  that	  the	  ‘proper	  aim	  of	  the	  legal	  order…	  is	  to	  minimise	  the	  arbitrary	  elements	  in	  legal	  norms	  and	  decisions’,611	   shifts	   the	   focus	   of	   law	   and	   justice	   to	   order,	   certainty	   and	  predictability.	  The	  International	  Bar	  Association’s	  mission	  to	  Pakistan	  in	  1998,	  in	  its	  report	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  rule	  of	  law	  situation	  in	  Pakistan,	  asserted	  that	  the	   ‘law	  must	   possess	   characteristics	   of	   certainty,	   generality	   and	   equality.’612	  The	  provincial	  Peshawar	  High	  Court	  undertook	  an	  exercise	   in	  2011,	   the	  main	  rationale	   for	   which	   was	   to	   ‘promote	   consistency,	   certainty,	   stability	   and	  predictability	   in	   application	   and	   interpretation	   of	   laws’.613	   This	   view	   of	  certainty	   and	   predictability	   is	   carried	   further	   by	   legal	   and	   political	  commentators,	  who	  argue	  against	  any	  ‘uncertainty	  and	  unpredictability	  about	  a	  court’s	   actions’	   through	   claims	   such	   as	   ‘liberty	   finds	   no	   refuge	   in	  unpredictability.’614	  	  	  With	  the	  conceptual	  order	  and	  categories	  of	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  established,	  these	  are	  then	  employed	  to	  classify	  and	  judge	  the	  societal	  realities.	  The	  fluidity	  and	  complexity	  present	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  and	  legal	  context	  is	  conceived	  in	  a	  manner	   so	   as	   to	   conform	   to	   the	   ‘all-­‐too-­‐solid	   certainty’,615	   predictability,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611	  Philip	  Selznick,	  quoted	  in	  John	  Braithwaite,	  'Rules	  and	  Principles:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Legal	  Certainty'	  (2002)	  27	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Philosophy	  47,	  48.	  612	  International	  Bar	  Association	  (1998)	  (n	  76)	  7.	  613	  Peshawar	  High	  Court,	  'Judgements	  of	  Hon'ble	  Justice	  Ejaz	  Afzal	  Khan'	  PHC,	  Peshawar,	  
Pakistan	  2011	  <http://www.peshawarhighcourt.gov.pk/judgements_ejaz_afzal_khan.php>	  last	  accessed	  17	  August	  2013.	  614	  Khurram	  Hashmi,	  'The	  power	  of	  suo	  motu'	  The	  Express	  Tribune	  (Pakistan	  01	  May	  2012)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/372164/the-­‐power-­‐of-­‐suo-­‐motu/>	  last	  accessed	  17	  September	  2013.	  615	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  (2004)	  (n	  490)	  145.	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consistency	   and	   a	   definitive	   structure	   which	   is	   accorded	   to	   law	   in	   dominant	  legal	  understanding.	  The	  conceptions	  of	   law	  or	   the	  phenomena	   that	   challenge	  this	  certainty,	  predictability	  and	  categories	  of	  management,	  are	  proclaimed	  as	  illegalities.	   The	   importance	   of	   ‘governance	   instruments’	   is	   emphasised	   to	  ‘reduce	  normative	  conflicts’	  as	  ‘coping	  with	  normative	  plurality	  has	  shown	  to	  be	  an	   important	  precondition	  for	   legal	  certainty	  and	  Rule	  of	  Law’.616	  All	   that	   falls	  on	   the	   wrong	   side	   of	   the	   formal/informal	   categorisation	   of	   dominant	   law	   is	  proclaimed	   unlawful.	   As	   discussed	   previously,	   this	   approach	   has	   led	   to	   the	  declaration	  of	   illegality	  against	  all	   forms	  of	   local	   and	   indigenous	   tribunals	  not	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  State.617	   In	   the	  above-­‐cited	  2004	   judgement,	   the	  Sindh	  High	  Court	  gave	  a	  detailed	  opinion	  on	  the	  issue	  of	   local	  tribunals,	  and	  declared	  that	  the	   ‘jirga	   system	   is	  unlawful	   and	   illegal	  which	   is	   against	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  Constitution	   (sic.)	   and	   the	   law	   of	   the	   land.’618	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   similarly	  declared	   local	   tribunals	   to	   be	   ‘against	   humanity’,	   and	   decreed	   that	   ‘[n]o	   Jirga	  should	  be	  held	  and	  if	  that	  happens	  then	  police	  will	  be	  responsible	  (sic.)’.619	  This	  notion	  of	  governance	  and	  management	  of	  society	  through	  law	  raises	  significant	  concerns	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  complex	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Pakistan.620	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616	  Susanne	  Mahrwald,	  'Rule	  of	  Law:	  The	  Case	  of	  Pakistan'	  (Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  Berlin,	  October	  2009)	  8	  (emphasis	  added).	  617	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  (n	  1).	  618	  Ibid.	  619	  Terence	  J	  Sigamony,	  'Inhuman	  punishments	  by	  jirgas	  are	  illegal:	  SC'	  The	  Nation	  (Pakistan	  12	  July	  2013)	  <http://www.nation.com.pk/national/12-­‐Jul-­‐2013/inhuman-­‐punishments-­‐by-­‐
jirgas-­‐are-­‐illegal-­‐sc>	  last	  accessed	  20	  December	  2013.	  620	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  this	  instrumentalist	  view	  of	  law,	  see	  Sally	  Falk	  Moore,	  'Law	  and	  Social	  Change:	  The	  Semi-­‐Autonomous	  Social	  Field	  as	  an	  Appropriate	  Subject	  of	  Study'	  (1973)	  7	  (4)	  
Law	  and	  Society	  Review	  719.	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4.3.4. Peace	  and	  Provision	  of	  Justice	  Finally,	   the	   fourth	   key	   conception	   linked	   to	   the	  dominant	   narrative	   on	   law	   in	  Pakistan	  is	  that	  it	  is	  presumed	  that	  if	  issues	  of	  	  provision	  of	  justice	  are	  resolved,	  governance	  mechanisms	  are	  established	  and	  writ	  of	   the	   state	  enforced,	   it	  will	  necessarily	   lead	  towards	  socio-­‐economic	  betterment	  and,	  subsequently,	   ‘peace	  and	   tranquillity.’621	   It	   is	   presupposed	   that	   a	   ‘peaceful,	   stable	   and	   prosperous	  Pakistan	  can	  be	  delivered	  through…	  good	  governance	  and,	  most	  important,	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.’622	  This	  notion	  reduces	  the	  occurrences	  of	  militancy,	  insurgency	  and	   lawlessness	   to	  deficiencies	  of	   the	   legal	   system	  and	  absence	  of	  law,	   and	  maintains	   that	   in	   the	   enforcement	   and	   strengthening	   of	   law	   lies	   the	  panacea	   to	   these	   problems.	   Addressing	   the	   reasons	   behind	   the	   current	  militancy	  and	  violence	  faced	  by	  Pakistan,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  remarked	  at	  the	  2012	  Peace	   Through	   Law	   International	   Conference	   that	   the	   ‘cumulative	   effect	   of	  constitutional	   deviations	   and	   weak	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   the	   past	   has	   resulted	   in	  present	   day	   militant	   and	   terrorist	   tendencies,’623	   further	   arguing	   that	   an	  adherence	   to	   ‘national	   and	   international	   laws	   guarantees	   peace.’624	   There	   is,	  however,	   evidence	   to	   the	   contrary.	   The	   situation	   of	   law	   (and	   order)	   is	  problematic,	  not	  only	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  state	  is	  weak	  or	  absent,	  but	  also	  in	  major	  cosmopolitan	  centres	  of	  the	  country.	  Karachi,	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  economic	   lifeline	   of	   the	   country,	   has	   suffered	   a	   major	   share	   of	   violence	   and	  instability	   that	   has	   gripped	   the	   country.	   In	   2013,	   there	  were	  more	   than	  1200	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621	  See,	  The	  dominant	  narrative	  of	  Law	  in	  Pakistan:	  State-­‐Law	  as	  ‘The	  Law’,	  on	  page	  149.	  622	  Tariq	  Khosa,	  'Mandate	  for	  governance'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  20	  May	  2013)	  <http://m.dawn.com/news/1012413/mandate-­‐for-­‐governance>	  last	  accessed	  3	  July	  2013.	  623	  Rana	  Yasif	  (21	  October	  2012)	  (n	  604).	  624	  Ibid.	  See	  also	  Agencies,	  'Implementation	  of	  laws	  ensures	  peace:	  CJ'	  Pakistan	  Today	  (Pakistan	  20	  October	  2012)	  <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/10/20/national/implementation-­‐of-­‐laws-­‐ensures-­‐peace-­‐cj/>	  last	  accessed	  05	  June	  2013.	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people	  who	   lost	   their	   lives	   in	   sectarian	  or	  political	   strife,	   or	   through	   targeted	  killings	   and	   the	   prevalence	   of	   street	   crime.625	   Similarly,	   Lahore,	   the	   second	  biggest	  city	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  even	  the	  capital	  Islamabad,	  have	  suffered	  from	  crime	  and	   terrorist	   incidences	   in	   recent	  years.626	  Based	  on	   this,	   the	  argument	  presented	  by	  the	  dominant	  narrative,	  that	  all	  such	  occurrences	  emerge	  from	  an	  absence	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   lawlessness	   and	   the	  weakening	   of	   the	  writ	   of	   the	  state,	  do	  not	  hold	  ground.	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  in	  fact	  caught	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  what	  Jenny	  Pearce	  calls	  ‘perverse	  state	  formation’.627	  	  
4.4. Problematising	  the	  Dominant	  Narrative	  on	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  
The	  ideas	  of	  positivism	  and	  state	   law	  which	  argue	  for	  the	   imminence	  of	  peace	  and	   tranquillity	  once	  rule	  of	   law	  and	  sovereignty	  are	  established,	  do	  so	   in	   the	  presence	   of	   evidence	   to	   the	   contrary.	   As	   stated	   above,	   it	   is	   not	   only	   in	   areas	  where	   the	   state	   does	   not	   exist	   that	   violence	   takes	   place,	   but	   that	   the	   violence	  exists	  despite,	  and	  perhaps	  because	  of,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  current	  form	  of	  state	  
as	   it	   exists	   in	   Pakistan.	   The	   notion	   of	   perverse	   state	   formation	   presents	  primarily	   this	   idea.	   Through	   a	   detailed	   study	   of	   Latin	   American	   countries,	  Pearce	   argues	   against	   the	   commonly	   held	   view	   of	   ‘failed	   state	   threatened	   by	  urban	   social	   violence.’628	   She	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   Latin	   American	   scenario,	   the	  state	  has	  not	  sought	  to	  find	  solutions	  to	  violence	  or	  to	  monopolise	  it;	  rather	  the	  ‘state	   gains	   huge	  political	   capital	   from	   its	   ongoing	   confrontations	   at	   the	   same	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625	  Pakistan	  Criminal	  Records	  (5	  October	  2012)	  (n	  532).	  626	  Ibid.	  627	  Jenny	  Pearce,	  'Perverse	  state	  formation	  and	  securitized	  democracy	  in	  Latin	  America'	  (2010)	  17	  (2)	  Democratization	  286,	  297	  628	  Ibid.	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time	  as	  it	  allies	  with	  pathological	  and	  corrupt	  violent	  actors	  outside	  the	  state	  in	  order	   to	   gain	   temporary	   victories.’629	   The	   state,	   then,	   not	   only	   constructs	   the	  boundaries	  between	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐citizens,630	  but	   ‘positively	  contributes	   to	  the	   multiplication	   of	   deadly	   personal	   interactions	   and	   private	   violences	  (sic.).’631	   This	   account	   is	   equally	   applicable	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   if	  this	   is	   indeed	   the	   trend	   adopted	   by	   the	   state	   of	   Pakistan,	   the	   assertions	   of	   a	  stronger	  state	  and	  greater	  writ	  of	  the	  government	  will	  not	  resolve	  the	  crises.	  	  Another	  major	   issue	   that	   emerges	   from	   the	  dominant	  narrative’s	   approach	   to	  link	   law	  with	  governance,	  administration,	  Access	   to	   Justice	  and	  ADR	  concepts,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  foregoing	  analysis,	  is	  that	  these	  do	  not	  target	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problems.	  The	  focus	  of	  these	  projects	  is	  not	  on	  improving	  the	  democratic	  nature	  or	  accountability	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  access	  and	  inefficiency	  within	  it.	  They	  largely	  focus	  on	  commercial	  and	  civil	  cases,	  with	  the	   idea	   (or	   ideology)	   that	   contract	   enforcement	  and	  an	  efficient	   legal	   system	  will	   lead	   towards	   an	   improvement	   in	   the	   economy	   and	   attract	   foreign	   direct	  investment.632	  These	   initiatives	  do	  not	   question	  or	   challenge	   the	   foundational	  notions	   behind	   legislations,	   institutions,	   procedures,	   or	   the	   legal	   system	   as	   a	  whole,	   but	   emphasise	   the	   perception	   that	   it	   is	   the	   wrongful	   and	   inept	  implementation	  which	  is	  the	  problem.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629	  Ibid.	  299.	  630	  Ibid.	  631	  Ibid.	  300.	  632	  Investment	  Climate	  Advisory	  Services	  in	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  'Promoting	  Alternative	  Dispute	  Resolution	  through	  Mediation'	  <https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/IFC%20ADR%20Project%20Pakistan%20Fact%20Sheet%202010.pdf>	  last	  accessed	  17	  December	  2013.	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However,	  a	  more	  evident	  deficiency	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	   law	   in	   Pakistan	   is	   its	   inability	   to	   account	   for	   the	   plurality	   of	   legal	   and	  normative	   structures	   that	   exist	   within	   the	   country.	   The	   excessive	   focus	   on	  predictability	  and	  certainty,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  need	   to	  govern	   the	  disparate	  social	  realities,	  compels	  the	   legal	  and	  juridical	   institutions	  to	  co-­‐opt	  or	  reject	  all	   that	  does	   not	   fit	   their	   neat	   categorisation.	   But	   is	   it	   a	   fair	   criticism	   that	   the	   legal	  understanding	  does	  not	  take	  the	  fluidity	  of	  legal	  orderings	  into	  account?	  As	  Carl	  Schmitt	  notes,	  ‘all	  law	  is	  situational	  law’633	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  law	  or	  norm	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  chaos.634	  For	  law	  to	  maintain	  its	  functionality,	  it	  has	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  fluidity	  and	  existence	  of	  multiple	  normative	  orderings.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  for	  law	  to	  come	  into	  being	  it	  has	  to	  take	  the	  first	  and	  constitutive	  step	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  legal	  and	  illegal.	  For	  any	  notion	  of	  law	  to	  exist,	  there	  has	  to	  be	  the	  first	  distinction	  of	  what	  qualifies	  as	  law	  and	  what	  does	  not,	  what	  lies	  within	  its	  boundary	  and	  what	  lies	  outside	  it;	  it	  has	  to	  ‘draw	  any	  distinction	  and	  call	   it	   the	   first’.635	   To	   begin	   comprehension	   of	   the	   societal	   phenomena	   that	  confronts	   it,	   law	   has	   to	   define,	   delineate,	   structure	   and	   understand	  what	   it	   is	  referring	  to,	  and	  what	  lies	  outside	  its	  distinction.	  But	  this	  is	  where	  the	  problem	  lies,	  as	  in	  this	  exercise	  of	  demarcation,	  what	  is	  left	  out	  is	  as	  important	  as	  what	  is	  included	   inside.	   As	   Agamben	   notes,	   it	   is	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   exception	   that	   we	  understand	  the	  general	  and	  the	  generalisable.636	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633	  Quoted	  in	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (1998)	  (n	  491)	  16.	  634	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  Political	  Theology:	  Four	  Chapters	  on	  the	  Concept	  of	  Sovereignty	  (MIT	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  Mass.	  1988)	  13.	  635	  Spencer-­‐Brown,	  quoted	  in	  Andreas	  Philippopoulos-­‐Mihalopoulos,	  'The	  Successful	  Failing	  of	  Legal	  Theory'	  in	  Amita	  Dhanda	  and	  Archana	  Parashar	  (eds),	  Decolonisation	  of	  legal	  knowledge	  (Routledge,	  Abingdon	  2009)	  45.	  636	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (1998)	  (n	  491)	  15-­‐21.	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It	   is	   therefore	   argued	   here	   that	   the	  mainstream	   legal	   understanding	   and	   the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	   law	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	   is	  problematic	  primarily	  because	  the	  neat	  configuration	  it	  creates	  excludes	  much	  more	  than	  it	  includes,	  it	  hides	   more	   than	   it	   shows.	   The	   entire	   focus	   of	   legal	   understanding	   in	   the	  country’s	   context	   on	   Rule	   of	   Law,	   predictability,	   certainty,	   administration	   of	  justice637	   fails	   to	   raise	   the	   questions:	  Which	   laws,	   and	  whose	   laws,	   are	   being	  referred	  to	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law?	  Which	  notion	  of	  justice	  is	  being	  administered?	  What	   of	   the	   constitution	   and	   the	  Grundnorm638	   from	  which	   all	  these	   laws	   are	   said	   to	   originate?	  Who	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   these	   laws?	   And	  who	  decides	   on	   all	   these	   decisions	   and	   why?	   The	   problematic	   tendency	   to	   focus	  simply	  on	  the	  implementation	  and	  administrative	  issues	  related	  to	  justice,	   law	  and	  constitution	  portrays	  the	  predisposition	  to	  take	  these	  notions	  and	  concepts	  as	   given.	  As	   shown	  above,	  without	   questioning	  what	   they	   stand	   for	   and	  what	  their	   consequences	   may	   be,	   the	   issues	   of	   law	   are	   made	   out	   to	   be	   those	   of	  wrongful	   implementation	   and	   lack	   of	   access.	   An	   unquestioning	   adherence	   to	  this	  narrative	  means	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  Administration	  of	  Justice,	  Access	  to	  Justice,	  and	  Governance	  have	  become	  ends	  in	  themselves,	  rather	  than	  any	  goal	  that	  lay	  at	  their	  heart	  in	  the	  beginning.	  	  I	  argue	  that	   this	  exclusion	  of	   the	  socio-­‐legal	  realities	   through	  exclusivity,	   their	  omission	   through	   administration,	   and	   denunciation	   through	   governance,	   are	  some	  of	  the	  key	  limitations	  of	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   only	   weakness	   of	   this	   perspective.	   It	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637	  See,	  Law	  and	  the	  ‘Administration’	  of	  Justice,	  above	  638	  See,	  A	  History	  of	  Legal	  and	  Constitutional	  Uncertainty	  in	  Chapter	  2	  on	  page	  51.	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contended	  here	  that	  this	  dominant	  narrative,	  its	  foundational	  assumptions	  and	  corollaries	   are	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   legal	   positivist	   approach	   to	   law	   that	   has	  dominated	   legal	   and	   political	   imagination	   in	   the	   country.	   In	   this	   regard,	  approaching	   the	   theoretical	   basis	  of	   this	  narrative	   allows	  us	  not	  only	   to	   trace	  the	  source	  of	  this	  narrative,	  but	  also	  highlights	  the	  problematic	  reading	  of	  it	  that	  emerges	  within	  the	  country’s	  legal	  and	  political	  discourse.	  The	  need,	  then,	  is	  to	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  logics	  of	  this	  mode	  of	  legal	  conceptualisation	  in	  order	  to	  uncover	  the	  contradictions	  it	  presents	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  	  
4.5. The	  Dominant	  Narrative	  and	  Legal	  Positivism	  
Legal	  Positivism	  is	  not	  something	  that	  only	  has	  an	  indirect	  influence	  on	  the	  legal	  system	   and	   mainstream	   legal	   understanding	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Pakistan.	   The	  more	   affluent	   part	   of	   the	   legal	   community	   of	   the	   country	   is	   trained	   and	  educated	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  traditions	  of	  common	  law	  and	  positivism	  that	  guide	   the	   mainstream	   legal	   system.	   As	   a	   legacy	   of	   colonialism,	   even	   the	  domestic	   curriculum	  and	   system	  of	   legal	   education	   is	  primarily	  based	  around	  these	   systems,	   in	   which	   the	   ideas	   of	   legal	   positivism	   and	   the	   supremacy	   (or	  exclusivity)	   of	   state	   law	   dominate.639	   Not	   only	   do	   judges	   reiterate	   the	  conception	   of	   ‘There	   is	   but	   one	   law…’	   in	   their	   speeches,	   but	   there	   have	   been	  numerous	   instances	   in	   which	   the	   positivistic	   legal-­‐theoretical	   debates	   have	  openly	   featured	   in	   judgements.	   In	   the	   landmark	   case	   of	   State	   v.	   Dosso,	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639	  On	  the	  crises	  and	  problems	  of	  legal	  education	  in	  Pakistan,	  see	  generally	  Nasir	  Aslam	  Zahid,	  'The	  role	  of	  Legal	  Education	  in	  Pakistan'	  (1st	  Pakistan	  Judicial	  Academies	  Summit,	  Sindh	  Judicial	  Academy,	  Karachi,	  Pakistan,	  June	  2011);	  Osama	  Siddique,	  'Legal	  Education	  in	  Pakistan:	  The	  Domination	  of	  Practitioners	  and	  the	  “Critically	  Endangered”	  Academic'	  (2014)	  63	  (3)	  Journal	  of	  
Legal	  Education	  499.	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was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Pakistan	  expressly	  employed	  a	  unique	   interpretation	  of	  Kelsen’s	   theory	  of	   the	  Grundnorm	   to	   validate	  martial	  law	   in	   Pakistan.640	   But	   the	   influence	   of	   positivism	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   this	   one	  instance	   of	   judicial	   interpretation.	   References	   to	   Hobbes	   abound	   in	   legal	   and	  political	   discussions,	   as	   Pakistan	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   country	   caught	   in	   the	   ‘state	   of	  nature’.641	   The	   influence	   of	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   and	   its	   theoretical	  underpinnings,	   then,	   pervades	   the	   wider	   legal	   and	   political	   discourse	   in	   the	  country.	  	  
4.5.1. Of	  Grundnorm	  and	  Commands	  But	  before	  elaborating	  on	   the	  above-­‐mentioned	  points,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	  that	   legal	  positivism	   is	   far	   from	  a	  singular	   theory.	  There	  have	  been	  numerous	  expositions	  presented	   in	   the	  past	   several	   centuries	   that	   can	  be	  banded	  under	  this	   umbrella.642	   Nonetheless,	   there	   are	   three	   primary	   ideas	   that	   can	   be	  discerned	   from	   the	   different	   propositions	   within	   legal	   positivism:643	   the	  sovereign	  authority’s	  relation	  to	  the	  authorship	  of	  law,	  the	  focus	  on	  description	  of	  law	  rather	  than	  prescription,644	  and	  the	  divesting	  of	  law	  from	  morality.645	  For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640	  See,	  From	  Independent	  State	  to	  a	  Crown	  Dominion	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  above.	  641	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Waqas	  Naeem	  (07	  September	  2013)	  (n	  537).	  642	  See,	  generally,	  Neil	  MacCormick	  and	  Ota	  Weinberger,	  An	  Institutional	  Theory	  of	  Law:	  New	  
Approaches	  to	  Legal	  Positivism	  (Reidel	  Publishing,	  Dordrecht,	  Holland	  1992);	  Anthony	  J.	  Sebok,	  
Legal	  Positivism	  in	  American	  Jurisprudence	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  2008).	  643	  Andrei	  Marmor,	  'Legal	  Positivism:	  Still	  Descriptive	  and	  Morally	  Neutral'	  (2006)	  26	  (4)	  Oxford	  
Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  683,	  686.	  644	  Legal	  positivism	  asserts	  that	  law	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  it	  is	  posited,	  what	  law	  is,	  rather	  than	  what	  it	  ought	  to	  be.	  Kelsen,	  for	  instance,	  writes	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  The	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law	  that	  ‘as	  a	  theory,	  its	  exclusive	  purpose	  is	  to	  know	  and	  describe	  its	  object.	  The	  theory	  attempts	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  what	  and	  how	  the	  law	  is,	  not	  how	  it	  ought	  to	  be.	  It	  is	  a	  science	  of	  law	  (jurisprudence),	  not	  legal	  politics’.	  Hans	  Kelsen	  (2005)	  (n	  191)	  1.	  This	  resonates	  with	  John	  Austin’s	  approach	  as	  well,	  when	  he	  presents	  his	  ideas	  on	  general	  jurisprudence	  as	  readings	  of	  ‘law	  as	  it	  necessarily	  is’,	  	  while	  distinguishing	  the	  science	  of	  jurisprudence	  from	  the	  science	  of	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the	  purposes	  of	  our	  present	  dialogue,	  the	  discussion	  will	  only	  focus	  on	  the	  first	  of	  these	  foundational	  notions	  as	  it	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  debate	  in	  Pakistan’s	  legal	   and	   constitutional	   development,	   and	   because	   of	   its	   link	  with	   the	   overall	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  The	  question	  of	  sovereign	  authority	  to	  formulate	  and	  implement	  laws	  has	  been	  the	   focus	   for	   several	   theorists	   of	   legal	   positivism,	  with	   John	   Austin	   and	  Hans	  Kelsen	   being	   among	   the	   foremost.	   Austin’s	   Command	   Theory	   of	   Law,	   though	  widely	   challenged	   and	   enriched	   in	   subsequent	   centuries,	   conceived	   of	   law	   as	  orders	   of	   a	   sovereign,	   backed	   by	   a	   threat	   in	   the	   case	   of	   non-­‐compliance.	   He	  argued	  that	  laws	  are	  types	  of	  commands,	  which	  oblige	  or	  impose	  a	  duty	  upon	  a	  certain	   class	   of	   individuals,	   given	   affect	   by	   the	   threat	   of	   sanction	   or	   fear	   of	  punishment	   if	   they	   are	   not	   fulfilled.646	   These	   laws	   are	   implemented	   by	  superiors	  on	  their	  inferiors,	  the	  superiors	  primarily	  being	  categorised	  as	  those	  who	  have	   ‘might:	   the	  power	  of	  affecting	  others’.647	  Through	  this	  approach,	   the	  actual	   substantive	   content	   of	   the	   command	   becomes	   irrelevant;	   the	   focus	   is	  rather	   on	   the	   source	   of	   the	   command.	   As	   long	   as	   the	   command	   or	   the	   law	   is	  valid,	   i.e.	   it	   is	  given	  by	  a	  sovereign	  or	   those	  who	  possess	   the	  might	   to	  enforce	  their	  commands,	  it	  is	  valid	  law.	  In	  fact,	  Austin	  characterises	  positive	  law	  as	  ‘law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  legislation.	  John	  Austin,	  'Lecture	  I'	  in	  W.	  Rumble	  (ed)	  John	  Austin:	  The	  Province	  of	  Jurisprudence	  
Determined	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  1995)	  xiii.	  645	  For	  instance,	  John	  Austin,	  one	  of	  the	  foremost	  theorists	  of	  positivism,	  wrote:	  ‘The	  existence	  of	  law	  is	  one	  thing;	  its	  merit	  or	  demerit	  is	  another.	  Whether	  it	  be	  or	  be	  not	  is	  one	  enquiry;	  whether	  it	  be	  or	  be	  not	  conformable	  to	  an	  assumed	  standard,	  is	  a	  different	  enquiry.	  A	  law,	  which	  actually	  exists,	  is	  a	  law,	  though	  we	  happen	  to	  dislike	  it,	  or	  though	  it	  vary	  from	  the	  text,	  by	  which	  we	  regulate	  our	  approbation	  and	  disapprobation.’	  John	  Austin	  (1995)	  (n	  644)	  157.	  646	  Ibid.	  28-­‐30.	  647	  Ibid.	  30.	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existing	   by	   position’,	   being	   an	   ‘aggregate	   of	   rules,	   established	   by	   political	  superiors’.648	  	  Kelsen’s	  approach	  provided	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  account	  of	  law	  as	  commands.	  He	  argued	  that	  even	  though	  the	  commands	  given	  by	  a	  criminal	  and	  those	  given	  by	   a	   government	   official	  may	   have	   the	   ‘same	   subjective	  meaning,’649	   only	   the	  latter	   was	   a	   ‘norm-­‐positing’	   act	   derived	   from	   law.	   He	   conceived	   of	   law	   as	  consisting	   of	   norms	   that	   ‘regulate	   human	   behaviour,’	   650	   by	   laying	   out	   rules	  through	   which	   behaviour	   is	   ‘commanded,	   permitted	   or	   authorised.’651	   The	  norms	  possess	  a	  system	  of	  rewards	  for	  obedience,	  but	  their	  dominant	  feature	  is	  the	  provision	  of	  sanctions	  and	  punishments	  (although	  not	  always	  in	  the	  form	  of	  physical	  violence).	  He	  thus	  characterised	  law	  as	  ‘a	  coercive	  order’	  in	  which	  the	  ‘decisive	   criterion	   is	   the	   element	   of	   force’.652	   Kelsen	   argued	   that	   the	   norms	  regulating	  societal	  conduct	  flow	  from	  a	  basic	  norm,	  which	  ‘constitutes	  the	  unity	  of	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   [behaviour	   regulating]	   norms’.653	   He	   termed	   this	  foundational	  rule	  as	  Grundnorm,	  which	  provides	  the	   ‘reason	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  all	  norms	  belonging	   to	   the	   same	   legal	  order’.654	  Kelsen	  distinguished	  between	  the	  validity	  and	  the	  efficacy	  of	  a	  legal	  or	  normative	  system	  and	  contended	  that	  while	  validity	  implied	  a	  notion	  of	  ought	  rather	  than	  is,	  as	  a	  prescription	  of	  the	  behaviour	   in	   consideration,	   the	   efficacy	   of	   a	   norm	   related	   to	   the	   behaviour’s	  actual	   conformity	   with	   the	   prescribed	   norms.	   The	   efficacy,	   then,	   was	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648	  Ibid.	  19.	  649	  Hans	  Kelsen	  (2005)	  (n	  191)	  8.	  650	  Ibid.	  31.	  651	  Ibid.	  5.	  652	  Ibid.	  34.	  653	  Ibid.	  205.	  654	  Ibid.	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‘condition	  of	   validity.’655	   In	   sketching	  out	   his	   science	   of	   law,	   he	   also	  discussed	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  change	   in	   the	  Grundnorm	  or	   the	   imposition	  of	  a	  new	  valid	  legal	  order.	  He	  argued	   that	  a	   ‘revolution,	   in	   this	  wide	   sense,	  occurs	  whenever	  the	   legal	  order	  of	  a	  community	   is	  nullified	  and	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  order	   in	  an	  illegitimate	  way,	  that	   is	   in	  a	  way	  not	  prescribed	  by	  the	  first	  order	   itself.’656	  He	  further	  asserted	  that	   ‘[from]	  a	   juristic	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  decisive	  criterion	  of	  a	  revolution	  is	  that	  the	  order	  in	  force	  is	  overthrown	  and	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  order	  in	  a	  way	  which	  the	  former	  had	  not	  itself	  anticipated.’657	  	  The	   fact	   that	  makes	  Kelsen	  and	  Austin’s	  approaches	  relevant	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	   current	   discussion	   is	   that	   they	   have	   played	   a	   vital	   role	   in	   the	   history	   of	  constitutional	   and	   democratic	   turmoil	   in	   Pakistan.	   These	   propositions	   have	  been	  expressly	  relied	  upon	  by	  the	  superior	  judiciary	  to	  justify	  the	  imposition	  of	  martial	  law	  regimes,	  overthrow	  of	  democratic	  governments	  and	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  In	  State	  v.	  Dosso,658	  deciding	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  the	   1958	  martial	   law	   imposition,	   the	   incumbent	   Chief	   Justice	   cited	   extensive	  passages	  from	  Kelsen’s	  work	  to	  present	  a	  reasoning.	  The	  Court	  decided	  that	  as	  the	  military	  coup	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  altered	  the	  basic	  norm	  of	  the	  country’s	  legal	  system,	  the	  coup	  is	  valid	  as	  an	  extra-­‐constitutional	  measure.659	   It	   further	  argued	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   being	   a	   creature	   of	   the	   Constitution	   and	   the	  legal	  order,	  could	  not	  go	  beyond	  it	  and	  declare	  it	  illegal.	  He	  stated	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655	  Ibid.	  11.	  656	  Hans	  Kelsen	  (1949)	  (n	  193)	  117.	  657	  Ibid.	  117.	  658	  State	  v	  Dosso	  (n	  190).	  659	  Ibid.	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[A]	  victorious	  revolution	  or	  a	  successful	  coup	  d’état	  is	  an	  internationally	  recognised	   legal	  method	  of	  changing	  a	  Constitution….	  After	  a	  change	  of	  the	  character	  I	  have	  mentioned	  has	  taken	  place,	  the	  national	  Legal	  Order	  must	   for	   its	   validity	   depend	   upon	   the	   new	   law-­‐creating	   organ.	   Even	  Courts	  lose	  their	  existing	  jurisdiction,	  and	  can	  function	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  and	  in	  the	  manner	  determined	  by	  the	  new	  constitution.660	  	  	  Although	   a	   few	   decades	   later	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   retracted	   its	   problematic	  reading	   of	   Kelsen’s	   argument,661	   this	   instance	   signifies	   the	   manner	   in	   which	  legal-­‐theoretical	   propositions	  manifest	   themselves	   in	   the	   legal	   realities	   of	   the	  country.	   The	   path	   of	   judicial	   validation	   of	   martial	   law	   regimes	   that	   this	  judgement	  opened	  up	  was	  repeated	  later	  in	  1977.662	  In	  the	  Nusrat	  Bhutto	  case,	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   concluded	   that	   its	   previous	   reliance	   on	   Kelsen	  was	   based	  both	   on	   an	   incorrect	   reading	   as	   well	   as	   the	   wrong	   assumption	   that	   Kelsen’s	  theory	  was	  a	  proposition	  of	  legal	  theory	  rather	  than	  an	  established	  principle	  of	  law.663	  Despite	   this,	  however,	   it	  approved	  General	  Zia’s	  martial	   law	  regime	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  State	  Necessity.	   In	  the	  same	  judgement,	  one	  of	  the	  Justices	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  relied	  on	  the	  Rhodesian	  Court’s	  reading	  of	  Austin	  to	  approve	   the	  martial	   law	  regime	  noting	   that	   ‘it	   is	   clear	   that	   in	  Rhodesia	   the	  regimes	  edicts	  are	  laws	  (sic.)	  enforced	  in	  the	  Austinian	  sense	  by	  the	  Courts.’664	  Writing	  a	  concurring	  opinion,	  he	  quoted	  that	   ‘under	  English	  constitutional	  law	  respect	  is	  paid	  not	  to	  a	  constitution	  as	  such	  but	  to	  the	  Government	  which	  by	  its	  authority	   gives	   the	   constitution	   the	   force	   of	   law	   (sic.).’665	   He	   therefore	  concluded	  that	   ‘From	  the	  above	  with	  which	  I	   fully	  agree	   it	   is	  abundantly	  clear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660	  Ibid.	  661	  Asma	  Jillani	  v.	  The	  Government	  of	  Punjab	  (PLD	  1972	  SC	  139).	  662	  Begum	  Nusrat	  Bhutto	  v.	  Chief	  of	  Army	  Staff	  and	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  (PLD	  1977	  SC	  657).	  663	  Asma	  Jillani	  case	  (n	  661).	  664	  Nusrat	  Bhutto	  case	  (n	  662).	  665	  Ibid.	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that	   this	   Court	   derives	   its	   jurisdiction	   from	   the	   Laws	   (Continuance	   in	   Force)	  Order	  [of	  the	  military	  regime]	  and	  that	  it	  has	  to	  accept	  and	  enforce	  laws	  of	  the	  de	  facto	  Government	  for	  the	  time	  being.’666	  	  	  There	  have	  been	  several	  accounts	  on	  how	  the	  idea	  of	  revolutionary	  legality	  and	  law	   as	   posited	   command	   stemmed	   from	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   misreading	   of	  Kelsen’s	   descriptive	   theory	   of	   law,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   inability	   to	   differentiate	  positivistic	   theories	   from	   juristic	   sources.667	   The	   questions	   that	   this	   study	  raises,	   however,	   are	   far	   more	   evident	   in	   relation	   to	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	  context.	   First,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   state-­‐law	   that	   continually	   legitimises,	   and	   is	  overridden	  by,	  military	  coups	  and	  martial	   laws	  creates	  not	  a	  constitutional	  or	  legal	   regime	   but	   a	   rule	   based	   on	   absolute	   and	   naked	   power.	   Perhaps	   in	   this	  sense	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   system	   offers	   the	   most	   palpable	   example	   of	   Austin’s	  command	  theory,	  although	  the	  critiques	  offered	  against	  Austin’s	  position	  make	  it	  highly	  untenable.668	  	  	  Second,	  in	  a	  country	  where	  the	  basic	  norm	  of	  legality	  has	  altered	  from	  colonial	  law	  to	  martial	  law,	  from	  secular	  law	  to	  religious	  law,	  from	  dictatorship	   to	   democracy	   and	   back	   again,	   the	   ideas	   about	   supremacy	   of	   the	  constitution,	  rule	  of	  law,	  writ	  of	  the	  state	  cannot	  hold	  ground.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666	  Ibid.	  667	  See,	  for	  instance,	  T.	  K.	  K.	  Iyer,	  'Constitutional	  Law	  in	  Pakistan:	  Kelsen	  in	  the	  Courts'	  (1973)	  21	  (4)	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  759;	  also,	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20).	  668	  H.L.A	  Hart	  provided	  the	  most	  notable	  critique	  of	  Austin’s	  position	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Hart	  argued	  that	  though	  the	  categorisation	  of	  law	  as	  orders	  backed	  by	  threats	  possessed	  some	  semblance	  to	  criminal	  law	  statutes,	  this	  categorisation	  could	  not	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  criminal	  statutes	  equally	  apply	  to	  those	  who	  have	  enacted	  the	  laws.	  	  Similarly,	  he	  argued	  that	  Austin’s	  categorisation	  excludes	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  law	  that	  confer	  powers	  and	  lay	  out	  rules	  of	  operation	  for	  other	  laws.	  	  He	  asserted	  that	  the	  ‘key	  to	  the	  science	  of	  jurisprudence’	  did	  not	  lie	  in	  understanding	  law	  as	  a	  command	  backed	  by	  a	  threat,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  union	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  rules.	  See,	  H.	  L.	  A.	  Hart	  (2005)	  (n	  26)	  79.	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4.5.2. The	  demand	  for	  a	  Leviathan	  This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   most	   evident	   and	   pervasive	   manifestation	   of	   legal	  positivistic	  theories	  that	  underpin	  the	  foundations	  of	  Pakistan’s	  dominant	  legal	  narrative.	   The	   Hobbesian	   perspective	   employed	   to	   frame	   the	   problems	   of	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   is	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   the	   pervasiveness	   of	  positivistic	   thought	   in	   the	   country’s	   political	   and	   legal	   discourse.	   Political	  commentators	  in	  Pakistan	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  Pakistan	  can	  all	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   ‘collapse	   of	   the	   social	   contract,’669	   and	   that	   ‘Hobbes’s	  state	   of	   nature	   –	   characterised	   by	   incessant	   conflict,	   chaos	   and	   insecurity	   –	  seems	   prescient	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   countries	   suffering	   from	   lawlessness	  including	  Pakistan.’670	  It	  has	  also	  been	  stated	  that	  the	   ‘indifference	  with	  which	  loss	   of	   life	   is	   treated	   in	   Pakistan	   suggests	   that	   it	   was	   for	   people	   like	   us	   that	  Hobbes	   wrote:	   “No	   arts,	   no	   letters,	   no	   society,	   and	   which	   is	   worst	   of	   all,	  continual	   fear,	   (sic.)	  and	  danger	  of	  violent	  death;	  and	   the	   life	  of	  man,	   solitary,	  poor,	   nasty,	   brutish	   and	   short.”’671	   If	   the	   problems	   are	   framed	   with	   the	  approach	  that	  Pakistan	  faces	  ‘the	  same	  problems	  that	  the	  European	  society	  did	  in	  the	  17th	  century,’672	  the	  solutions	  also	  carry	  the	  Hobbesian	  tones	  –	  Pakistan	  then	  needs	  a	  ‘strong,	  incorruptible	  government	  which	  would	  restore	  peace	  and	  order,’673	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  state,	  better	  governance,	  stronger	  state,	  a	  Leviathan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669	  Hajrah	  Mumtaz	  (24	  January	  2010)	  (n	  127).	  670	  Waqas	  Naeem	  (07	  September	  2013)	  (n	  537).	  671	  I.A	  Rehman	  (26	  April	  2012)	  (n	  543).	  672	  Dawn,	  'Past	  Present:	  The	  fragile	  state'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  03	  March	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/789935/past-­‐present-­‐the-­‐fragile-­‐state>	  last	  accessed	  27	  March	  2013.	  673	  Ibid.	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Hobbes’s	  argument	  for	  a	  Leviathan	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  recognised	  symbols	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  and	   law.674	  He	  argued	  that	  an	  examination	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  man	  leads	   to	   an	   identification	   of	   three	   main	   causes	   of	   conflict	   –	   competition,	  diffidence,	  and	  glory.675	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  ‘common	  Power	  to	  keep	  them	  all	  in	  awe,’	  the	  nature	  of	  man	  to	  focus	  on	  personal	  interest	  and	  private	  gain	  leads	  to	  a	  perpetual	  conflict,	  a	  condition	  of	  war	  ‘as	  if	  of	  every	  man,	  against	  every	  man.’676	  In	  this	  time	  of	  conflict,	  no	  arts	  or	  industry	  can	  prevail	  because	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  their	  gains	  and	  what	  takes	  hold	  instead,	  ‘and	  which	  is	  worst	  of	  all,	  continuall	  feare,	   and	  danger	   of	   violent	   death;	  And	   the	   life	   of	  man,	   solitary,	   poore,	   nasty,	  brutish,	  and	  short.’677	  It	  is	  primarily	  on	  these	  apparent	  similarities	  between	  the	  Hobbesian	   state	   of	   nature	   and	   the	   conflicts	   in	   the	   Pakistani	   society	   that	  commentators	   appear	   compelled	   to	   revert	   to	   these	   ideas.	   However,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  take	  this	  a	  bit	  further	  and	  consider	  whether	  this	  seeming	  similarity	  really	  does	   translate	   into	   the	   theoretical	   arguments	   that	   commentators	  make.	  Hobbes	  argues	  that	  in	  this	  state	  of	  conflict,	  the	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  or	  injustice	  do	  not	  hold,	  and	  force	  and	  fraud	  become	  the	  ‘cardinal	  virtues’.678	  As,	  for	  Hobbes,	  justice	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  law,	  in	  the	  perpetual	  war	  ‘nothing	  can	  be	  Unjust.	  The	   notions	   of	   Right	   and	   Wrong,	   Justice	   and	   Injustice	   have	   there	   no	   place.	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  MacCormick	  and	  Sebok	  trace	  the	  roots	  of	  legal	  positivism	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  Jeremy	  Bentham	  (1748-­‐1832)	  and	  John	  Austin	  (1790-­‐1859),	  who	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘the	  founding	  fathers	  of	  English	  jurisprudence’.	  Neil	  MacCormick	  and	  Ota	  Weinberger	  (1992)	  (n	  642)	  182;	  Anthony	  J.	  
Sebok	  (2008)	  (n	  642)	  23.	  Some	  other	  accounts	  take	  it	  even	  further	  to	  David	  Hume	  (1711-­‐1776)	  and	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  (1588-­‐1679),	  with	  Lon	  Fuller	  claiming	  Hobbes	  to	  be	  the	  ‘father	  of	  legal	  positivism’.	  Whether	  Hobbes’s	  construction	  of	  the	  Leviathan	  is	  a	  construction	  under	  the	  paradigm	  of	  legal	  positivism	  or	  within	  the	  opposing	  approach	  of	  natural	  law,	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  extensive	  debate.	  	  Fuller	  argues	  that	  the	  construction	  overlaps	  the	  two	  approaches,	  with	  Hobbes	  founding	  his	  idea	  of	  ‘legal	  positivism	  on	  a	  natural-­‐law	  basis.’	  Lon	  Luvois	  Fuller,	  The	  
Law	  in	  Quest	  of	  Itself	  (The	  Lawbook	  Exchange,	  New	  Jersey	  1999)	  19-­‐20.	  675	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  (1909)	  (n	  126)	  96.	  676	  Ibid.	  677	  Ibid.	  99.	  678	  Ibid.	  96	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Where	   there	   is	   no	   common	   Power,	   there	   is	   no	   Law:	   where	   no	   Law,	   no	  Injustice.’679	  	  However,	  for	  Hobbes,	  even	  during	  this	  state	  of	  conflict,	  the	  ‘Passions	  that	  incline	  men	  to	  Peace’	  (the	  fear	  of	  death,	  a	  desire	  for	  harmonious	  living,	  and	  the	  hope	  of	  achieving	   this	   from	   their	   own	   efforts),	   aided	   by	   reason	  which	   guides	  men	   to	  identify	  common	  grounds	  of	  agreement,	  provide	  a	  course	  for	  resolution.680	  The	  solution	   lies	   in	   men’s	   curbing	   of	   their	   own	   liberties	   and	   making	   themselves	  subject	   to	   a	   higher	   authority	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   ‘Artificial	  Man’,	   ‘that	  great	  Leviathan	  called	  a	  Common-­‐Wealth,	  or	  State.’681	  For	  this	  artificial	  man,	  the	  judicature	  and	  executive	  serve	  as	   its	   ‘artificial	   joints’,	  equity	  as	   its	  reason,	  and	  law	  as	  its	  will.682	  The	  State	  or	  the	  Commonwealth	  is	  thus	  given	  sovereignty	  over	  people	   through	   a	   covenant	   amongst	   the	  people,	  who	   cannot	   enter	   into	   a	   new	  covenant	  or	  challenge	  the	  existing	  one	  lawfully	  or	  without	  committing	  injustice.	  The	  Commonwealth	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  people,	  though	  it	  cannot	  be	  subject	   to	  the	   laws	  that	   it	  creates	   itself	  as	  Sovereignty	  cannot	  be	  subject	   to	  any	  other	  power,	  including	  that	  of	  the	  judicature	  to	  decide	  on	  laws	  and	  impose	  punishments.	   Hobbes	   also	   maintains	   that	   while	   subjects	   may	   protest	   against	  political	   bodies	   and	   assemblies,	   they	   cannot	   protest	   against	   the	   Sovereign,	   as	  ‘every	  Subject	  is	  the	  Author’	  of	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  Sovereign.683	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679	  Ibid.	  680	  Ibid.	  	  681	  Ibid.	  132	  682	  Ibid.	  8.	  683	  Ibid.	  175.	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The	   primary	   critique	   levelled	   against	   the	   Hobbesian	   notion	   of	   State	   is	   that	   it	  provides	   a	   justification	   for	   an	   absolutist	   rule,	  where	   the	   subjects	   do	   not	   hold	  any	  real	  power	  to	  challenge	  the	  structure	  that	  governs	  them.	  Important	  as	  this	  argument	  is,	  I	  focus	  on	  a	  different	  set	  of	  problems	  that	  the	  Hobbesian	  approach	  presents	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  context.	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  the	  primary	  question	  for	  classical	  jurists,	  Hobbes	  included,	  was	  the	  ‘analysis	  of	  the	  contradictory	  nature	  of	   private	   property’.684	   Private	   property,	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   prevalent	   post-­‐Marxist	   analysis	   of	   it,	   correlated	   to	   a	   private	   right,	   a	   revolutionary	   idea	   of	  equality	   of	   every	   ‘man’	   as	   against	   the	   notions	   of	   hierarchy	   or	   privilege	  propounded	  by	  the	  natural	  rights	  perspectives.	  Fine	  asserts	  that	  classical	  jurists	  were	   not	   uncritical	   of	   the	   problems	   and	   contradictions	   of	   private	   property.	  They	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  ‘dark	  side’	  of	  private	  property	  –	  the	  issues	  of	  individual	  ‘egoism’	  and	  ‘self-­‐interest’.685	  The	  question	  that	  these	  contradictions	  raised	  was	  how	  to	  align	  the	  private	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  individual	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  collective	  sphere	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public.	  Conscious	  of	  the	  paradoxes	  of	   private	   right,	   and	   arguing	   against	   the	   constructions	   of	   divine	   order	   that	  preceded	   it,	   classical	   jurisprudence	   focussed	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   earthly	  authority	  –	   the	   state.	  The	  state	  was	   to	  be	  an	   institution	   that	  would	  be	  able	   to	  resolve	   these	  contradictions,	  and	  align	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   individual	  with	   the	  interests	  of	  the	  collective.	  And	  it	  is	  in	  this	  light	  that	  the	  Hobbesian	  proposition	  can	  be	  understood.	  Fine	  argues	  that	  Hobbes	  took	  the	  idea	  of	  private	  right,	  along	  with	  its	  associated	  egoism	  and	  self-­‐interest	  to	  an	  extreme,	  to	  its	  breaking	  point.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684	  Robert	  Fine,	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  law:	  Marx’s	  Critique	  of	  the	  Legal	  Form	  (Blackburn	  Press,	  New	  Jersey	  2002)	  11.	  685	  Ibid.	  12.	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He	  portrayed	  a	  society	  where	  the	  individual	  interest	  became	  supreme,	  trying	  to	  acquire	   and	   consume	   more	   through	   any	   means	   available.	   Consequently,	   it	  would	  reduce	  the	  society	  to	  a	  ‘war	  of	  all	  against	  all’	  and	  the	  life	  of	  the	  individual	  became	  ‘solitary,	  nasty,	  poor,	  brutish,	  and	  short’.	  The	  Leviathan	  is	  an	  entity	  that	  emerges	   from	   the	   pactum	   societatis	   of	   the	   individuals	   (a	   mutual	   agreement	  between	  the	  members	  of	  the	  society)	  willing	  to	  submit	  to	  a	  higher	  authority	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  this	  state	  of	  perpetual	  fear	  and	  war.	  The	  Leviathan	  represents	  the	  state	   as	   the	  will	   of	   the	   collective;	   it	   is	   vested	  with	   absolute	   authority	   to	   give	  commands,	   pass	   laws,	   and	  maintain	   order.	   The	  will	   of	   the	   state	   and	   the	   laws	  passed	  by	  it,	  then,	  are	  legitimate	  and	  absolute	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  	  	  In	   this	  backdrop,	   the	   thesis	  contends	   that	   the	  generic	   reading	  of	  Hobbes	   from	  which	   Pakistan’s	   mainstream	   accounts	   of	   a	   strong	   state	   emerge,	   is	   deeply	  flawed.	  First,	  the	  Hobbesian	  State	  of	  Nature	  which	  is	  so	  readily	  projected	  on	  to	  the	  Pakistani	  situation	  is,	  theoretically,	  radically	  different	  from	  the	  context	  that	  the	  country	  presents.	  For	  Hobbes,	  the	  war	  of	  man	  against	  man	  is	  the	  preceding	  stage	   of	   law	  where	   law,	   and	   consequently	   any	   conception	   of	   justice,	   does	   not	  exist.	  Where	  there	  is	  no	  law,	  there	  is	  no	  injustice	  warrants	  the	  idea	  that	  whatever	  acts	  are	  committed	  in	  the	  so-­‐termed	  state	  of	  nature	  are	  beyond	  our	  judgement	  of	   justice	   or	   injustice,	   as	   they	   are	   primarily	   driven	   by	   the	   natural	   law	  of	   self-­‐preservation.	  It	   is	  highly	  doubtful	  that	  the	  legal	  and	  political	  commentators	  be	  able	   to	   apply	   this	   reading	   to	   Pakistan	   and	   remove	   any	   connotations	   of	  right/wrong	   or	   just/unjust	   from	   the	   equation,	   as	   the	   demands	   for	   a	   stronger	  state	  primarily	  emerge	  from	  the	  perceived	  acts	  of	  injustice	  that	  are	  perpetrated	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against	   the	   populace.	   Second,	   and	   more	   significantly,	   with	   the	   Hobbesian	  approach,	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  precedes	  the	  law	  and	  the	  State	  and	  that	  from	  this	  warring	  stage	  a	  consensus	  and	  a	  contract	  emerge	   from	  within	   the	  people	   that	  vests	   their	   authority	   and	   rights	   in	   the	   Sovereign.	  The	   situation	  of	  Pakistan,	   in	  this	  sense,	  is	  not	  due	  to	  problems	  of	  the	  Hobbesian	  state	  of	  nature,	  but	  rather	  as	  problems	   emerging	   from	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   State.	   Pakistan	   presents	   a	   post-­‐Leviathan	   state	   of	   affairs	   where	   the	   social	   contract	   (if	   it	   existed	   at	   all)	   has	  seemingly	   fractured,	   primarily	   because	   of	   the	   contradictions	   which	   the	   State	  itself	   supported	   and	   ingrained.	  Demanding	   a	   stronger	   state	  without	   reflecting	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  law	  and	  the	  State	  in	  the	  country	  can	  only	  lead	  to	  a	  renewed	  and	  perpetual	  cycle	  of	  societal	  fractures	  and	  conflicts.	  	  	  
4.6. Legal	   Centralism:	   Moving	   from	   legal	   postivism	   to	   other	  
narratives	  
As	   has	   been	   discussed	   previously,	   the	   major	   challenge	   facing	   the	   dominant	  narrative	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  its	  positivist	  underpinnings,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  unable	  to	   account	   for	   the	   multiple	   legal	   orderings	   and	   realities	   of	   the	   country.	   The	  federal	  and	  provincial	  courts	  have	  declared	  on	  many	  occasions	  that	  any	  tribunal	  that	   does	   not	   have	   the	   sanction	   of	   the	   state	   is	   to	   be	   considered	   illegal.686	  Moreover,	  the	  assertion	  on	  state-­‐law	  and	  the	  constitution	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   frameworks	   have	   changed	   so	   radically	   through	  Pakistan’s	   history,	   that	   this	   undermines	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   a	   foundational	   legal	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  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  above.	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norm.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  country	  has	  had	  numerous	  constitutions	  is	  just	  one	  facet	  of	  the	  picture;	  the	  Grundnorm	   itself	  has	  changed	  from	  colonial	  to	  common	  law	  to	   now	   a	   hybrid	   between	   Islamic	   law	   and	   secular	   law,	   with	   it	   being	   unclear	  which	  one	   takes	  precedence.	  Furthermore,	   the	  narrative	   ignores,	  or	  hides,	   the	  contradictions	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  state	  itself.687	  This	  contradiction	  challenges	  the	  assumption	  that	  through	  an	  assertion	  on	  a	  stronger	  state	  and	  a	  Leviathan,	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  country	  could	  be	  resolved.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  emerge	  from	  the	  same	  difficulty	   that	   legal	   positivism	   faces	   in	   relation	   to	   complex	  post-­‐colonial	  societies	   such	   as	   Pakistan.	   This	   is	   because	   an	   excessive	   focus	   on	   posited	   and	  state-­‐authored	   law	   has	   taken	   the	   discourse	   towards	   ‘the	   ideology	   of	   legal	  centralism’,688	   and	   further	   away	   from	  other	   formulations	   of	   legality	   that	   exist	  outside	   it.	   Legal	   centralism	   situates	   the	   sovereign	   state	   at	   the	   centre,	   in	   the	  possession	  of	  the	  sole	  law-­‐making	  authority.	  In	  this	  view,	  it	  asserts	  that	  ‘law	  is	  and	  should	  be	  the	  law	  of	  the	  state,	  uniform	  for	  all	  persons,	  exclusive	  of	  all	  other	  law,	  and	  administered	  by	  a	  single	  set	  of	  state	  institutions’.689	  All	  laws	  are	  either	  derived	   from	  the	  sovereign	  command,	  or	  can	  ultimately	  be	   traced	  back	   to	   the	  sovereign	  constitution.	  Griffiths	  writes:	  
In	   the	   legal	   centralist	   conception,	   law	   is	   an	   exclusive,	   systematic	   and	  unified	   hierarchical	   ordering	   of	   normative	   propositions,	   which	   can	   be	  looked	  at	  either	  from	  the	  top	  downwards	  as	  depending	  from	  a	  sovereign	  command	   or	   from	   the	   bottom	   upwards	   as	   deriving	   their	   validity	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687	  See,	  Peace	  and	  Provision	  of	  Justice,	  above.	  688	  John	  Griffiths,	  'What	  is	  Legal	  Pluralism?'	  (1986)	  24	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Pluralism	  and	  Unofficial	  
Law	  1,	  3.	  689	  Ibid.	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ever	   more	   general	   layers	   of	   norms	   until	   one	   reaches	   some	   ultimate	  norm(s).690	  	  Austin’s	   proposition	   of	   law	   as	   the	   command	   of	   the	   sovereign,	   or	   Hobbesian	  assertion	  of	  it	  as	  the	  Will	  of	  the	  Leviathan691	  are	  the	  most	  evident	  examples	  of	  the	   top-­‐down	   approach	   to	   law.	   However,	   even	   other	   approaches	   follow	   the	  same	  basic	  idea.	  The	  Grundnorm	  in	  Kelsen’s	  approach	  also	  gives	  primacy	  to	  the	  state	  and	  sovereign	  constitution,	  from	  which	  all	  legality	  emanates.	  Through	  this	  emphasis	  on	   the	   ‘time-­‐space	  of	   the	  nation’	   and	   the	   state,692	   the	   state-­‐oriented	  narrative	   ignores	   any	   conception	   of	   law	   that	   emerges	   from	  outside	   the	   state-­‐authored	  versions	  of	  law	  and	  legality,	  and	  on	  the	  flipside,	  it	  justifies	  as	  legal	  any	  illegality	  that	  emerges	  from	  it.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  claim	  I	  have	  asserted	  above:	  that	  it	   is	  not	  only	  difficult	   for	   legal	  understanding	  based	  on	  positivism	  to	  grasp	  the	  fluidity	  of	  a	  complex	  admixture	  of	  multiple	   legal	  and	  normative	  orderings,	  but	  that	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   it	   to	   recognise	   the	   state	   and	   state-­‐law’s	   own	  contradictions	   in	  the	  Pakistani	  context.	  With	  this	  critique	  as	  the	  backdrop,	   the	  discussion	   will	   now	   turn	   to	   three	   alternative	   narratives	   of	   law	   that	   can	   be	  identified	   in	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	   Pakistan.	   These	   narratives,	   based	   on	  Islamic	   law,	   legal	   pluralism	   and	   human	   rights	   approach	   to	   law,	   will	   be	  elaborated	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690	  Ibid.	  691	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  (1909)	  (n	  126)	  6.	  692	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos,	  Toward	  a	  New	  Legal	  Common	  Sense:	  Law,	  Globalization	  and	  
Emancipation	  (Law	  in	  Context,	  Butterworths	  LexisNexis,	  London	  2002)	  86.	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Chapter	  5: Local	   Responses	   to	   an	   ‘Alien	   Law’:	   The	   Islamic	  
Narrative	  of	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  	  
5.1. Chapter	  Synopsis	  
Chapter	   3	   of	   the	   current	   thesis	   outlined	   the	   multiple	   legal	   and	   normative	  structures	   that	   comprise	   the	   prominent	   facets	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	  Pakistan.693	  As	  part	  of	  this	  discussion,	  it	  also	  considered	  the	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  Islamic	  Law	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  its	  interplay	  with	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  frameworks.	   The	   previous	   chapter	   identified	   and	   highlighted	   the	   dominant	  narrative	  of	   law	  that,	  borrowing	  insights	  from	  the	   legal	  positivistic	  conception	  of	   law,	   appears	   to	   be	   employed	   to	   understand	   and	   reform	   the	   socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  of	  the	  country.	  It	  focusses	  on	  the	  exclusive	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  to	  author	   and	   implement	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   frameworks.	   It	   also	   discussed	  some	   of	   the	   contradictions	   that	   emerge	   from	   an	   unquestioning	   adherence	   to	  both	   the	   narrative	   as	   well	   as	   its	   underlying	   theoretical	   propositions.	   	   In	   the	  current	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  main	  critique	  of	  state	  law	  as	  it	  is	  present	  in	  the	  country	  emerges	  from	  a	  different	  perspective,	  which	  links	  the	  law	  in	  its	  present	  form	   to	   its	   colonial	   past.	   By	   levelling	   a	   critique	   of	   alienation	   or	   foreignness	  against	  the	  mainstream	  legal	  system,	  this	  perspective	  provides	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  narratives	  of	   law.	  The	   first	  perspective,	  while	  arguing	   that	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  legal	  system	  lies	  in	  its	  secularism	  and	  colonial	  roots,	  takes	  it	  towards	  the	  Islamic	  narrative,	   and	   it	   forms	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   the	   current	   chapter.	   The	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693	  See,	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  96.	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perspective,	  claiming	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  law	  lies	  in	  its	  foreignness,	  focuses	  the	   narrative	   towards	   traditional	   and	   local	   mechanisms	   of	   law,	   and	   this	   will	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  6.	  	  	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  of	  law	   in	   Pakistan	   leads	   to	   three	   distinct	   difficulties	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   country’s	  socio-­‐legal	  context.	  First,	  although	  the	  main	  critique	  presented	  by	  this	  narrative	  against	   the	  dominant	   structures	  and	  narrative	  of	   law	  condemns	   their	   colonial	  heritage,	  the	  notions	  of	  Islamic	  law	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  applied	  in	  the	  country,	  are	   by-­‐products	   of	   the	   same	   colonial	   legacy.	   Second,	   by	   virtue	   of	   it	   being	  exclusive	   and	   isolationist,	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   further	  marginalises	   religious	  minorities,	   and	  comes	   into	  conflict	  with	  both	   the	  human	  rights	  approaches	  as	  well	   as	   ideas	   of	   citizenship.	   Finally,	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	  creates	   significant	   problems	   in	   the	   political	   domain,	   which	   lead	   to	   the	  amplification	   of	   the	   issues	   of	   lawlessness	   and	   militancy	   in	   the	   country.	   The	  chapter	  will	  return	  to	  a	  discussion	  on	  these	  contradictions,	  prior	  to	  which	  I	  will	  outline	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  of	  law	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  Pakistan.	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perspective, claiming that the problem of the law lies in its foreignness, focuses the narrative towards traditional and local mechanisms of law, and this will form the basis of discussion in chapter 5.   It will be argued in this chapter that that the ascendancy of the Islamic narrative to law leads to three distinct difficulties in relation to Pakistan’s	   socio-legal context. First, though the main critique presented by this narrative against the dominant structures and narrative of law is based on colonial heritage, the notions of Islamic law, as they are currently applied in the country, are a by-product of the same colonial legacy on which this critique is based. Second, by virtue of it being exclusive and isolationist, the Islamic narrative further marginalises religious minorities, and comes into conflict with both the human rights approaches as well as the ideas of citizenship. Finally, the ascendancy of the Islamic narrative creates significant problems in the political domain, which lead to the amplification of the issues of lawlessness and militancy in the country. The chapter will return o a discussion on these contradictions, prior to which I will outline the contours of the Islamic narrative of law as it exists in Pakistan.  
5.2. ‘A	  burden	  on	  the	  soul	  is	  alien	  law’ 
ںﮞﺎﯾﻳدﺩﻧﮨ  رﺭﮑﻧﻣ  زﺯ  نﻥوﻭﻧﺎﻗ  ﮓﻧرﺭﻓ  
دﺩرﺭﯾﻳﮕﻧرﺭدﺩ  رﺭﺣﺳ  وﻭ  نﻥوﻭﺳﻓاﺍ  ﮓﻧرﺭﻓ  
حﺡوﻭرﺭ  اﺍرﺭ  رﺭﺎﺑ  ںﮞاﺍرﺭﮔ  نﻥﯾﻳﺋآﺁ  رﺭﯾﻳﻏ  
ہﮧﭼرﺭﮔ  دﺩﯾﻳآﺁ  زﺯ  ںﮞﺎﻣﺳآﺁ  نﻥﯾﻳﺋآﺁ  رﺭﯾﻳﻏ    
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[The	  people	  of	  this	  land	  defy	  the	  law	  The	  West	  has	  given	  to	  them;	  they	  spurn	  its	  charms.	  A	  burden	  on	  the	  soul	  is	  alien	  law	  A	  sorrow	  e’en	  though	  it	  be	  heaven-­‐sent.]	  –	  Allama	  Muhammad	  Iqbal694	  	  The	  critique	  of	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan	  offered	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  not	  the	  only	  dimension	  from	  which	  the	  mainstream	  legal	  structures	  are	   analysed	   and	   challenged.	   The	   local	   responses	   from	  within	   the	   country	   to	  this	   mainstream	   legal	   discourse	   appear	   to	   have	   taken	   a	   different	   path.	   It	   is	  argued	  in	  the	  current	  examination	  that	  there	  are	  two	  main	  manifestations	  of	  the	  local	   responses.	   The	   first	   response,	   which	   forms	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   the	  current	   chapter,	   emerges	   from	   the	   Islamic	   conception	  of	   law	   that	  has	  been	   in	  conflict	   with	   Pakistan’s	   inherited	   legal	   traditions	   since	   independence.	   The	  second	   response	   argues	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   (or	   a	   return	   to)	   the	   traditional	  and	   local	   justice	   mechanisms.	   These	   local	   responses	   present	   the	   most	  prominent	   critique	   of	   the	   mainstream	   legal	   ordering	   and	   the	   dominant	  narrative	  on	   law	   in	   the	  country.	  At	   the	  heart	  of	  both	   these	  responses	   (Islamic	  conception	  as	  well	  as	  pluralism)	  lies	  a	  similar	  two-­‐fold	  critique	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  systems.	  These	  are	  the	  assertions	  of	  Alienation	  and	  Ethos.	  	  	  First,	   the	   local	  narratives	  of	   law	  highlight	  the	   link	  between	  the	  dominant	   legal	  system	  and	   its	  colonial	  history,	  and	  therefore	  challenge	  the	   legal	  system	  as	  an	  alien	  imposition.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  the	  legal	  and	  juridical	  institutions	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694	  S.	  Qudratullah	  Fatimi,	  'Islamic	  Universalism	  and	  Territorial	  Nationalism	  in	  Iqbal’s	  thought'	  
Iqbal	  Review	  <http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct76/index.html>	  last	  accessed	  15	  September	  2013.	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Pakistan	   are	   inherited	   from	   the	   British	   colonial	   state	   and	   even	   the	   civil	   and	  criminal	  codes	  are	  largely	  borrowed	  from	  the	  pre-­‐independence	  era.695	  Political	  commentators	  and	  legal	  researchers	  proclaim	  ‘that	  the	  foundations	  upon	  which	  our	   legal	   institution	   is	   constructed	   are	   foreign	   and,	   therefore,	   perhaps	  
inherently	  alien	   to	  us.’	   696	  They	  argue	   that	   the	  problems	   that	  emerge	   from	   the	  imposition	  of	  a	  foreign	  law	  in	  the	  region	  are	  not	  recent	  but	  that	  the	  ‘induction	  of	  legal	  procedures,	  the	  administration	  of	  criminal	  justice	  and	  the	  induction	  of	  an	  alien	  law’697	  	  contributed	  to	  the	  ‘destabilising’	  of	  Indian	  society	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  British	   rule	   in	   India,	   as	   this	   ‘negated	   the	   past-­‐established	   mode	   of	   deciding	  disputes.’698	   It	   is	   further	   contended	   from	   this	   perspective	   that	   the	   nexus	  between	   the	   dominant	   legal	   system	   and	   its	   colonial	   heritage	   also	   results	   in	  people	   seeking	   recourse	   through	   local	   justice	   systems	   –	   the	   ‘writ	   [of	   such	  tribunals]	  is	  more	  acceptable	  than	  the	  formal	  law	  as	  people	  consider	  formal	  law	  as	  an	  “alien”	   law.’699	  Some	  religious	   leaders	  and	  academics	  take	  this	  argument	  further	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   even	   attribute	   Pakistan’s	   historical	   conflict	  between	   democracy	   and	   dictatorship	   to	   this	   foreign	   imposition	   of	   law.	   They	  argue	   that	   any	   manifestation	   of	   ‘arbitrary	   power…	   is	   more	   a	   product	   of	  colonialization	   (sic.)	   and	   Westernization,	   and	   not	   of	   Muslim	   ideals’	   and	   that	  Muslims	   ‘regard	   the	   Western	   secular	   version	   of	   democracy	   as	   alien	   to	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695	  Martin	  Lau	  (1994)	  (n	  327)	  3.	  696	  Amber	  Darr,	  'Judiciary	  goes	  native'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  17	  June	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1018721/judiciary-­‐goes-­‐native>	  last	  accessed	  20	  July	  2013	  (emphasis	  added).	  697	  Aftab	  Nabi,	  'The	  Enigma	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Cattle	  Theft	  in	  Colonial	  Sindh,	  1843	  -­‐	  1947'	  (2011)	  3	  (1)	  Pakistan	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  35,	  47-­‐48.	  698	  Ibid.	  699	  Legal	  Empowerment	  of	  the	  Poor	  Programme,	  'Voices	  of	  the	  Unheard:	  Legal	  Empowerment	  of	  the	  Poor	  in	  Pakistan'	  (United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  and	  Insaf	  Network	  Pakistan,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2012)	  114.	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principles,	   values	   and	   traditions.’700	   Some	   writers	   take	   this	   to	   a	   different	  extreme	  and	  contradictory	  position	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  problems	  of	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   system	   that	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	   foreign	   law;	   rather,	  even	  that	  which	  is	  worthwhile	  within	  the	  foreign	  legal	  systems	  themselves	  also	  owes	   its	  existence	  to	   Islam.701	  The	  vice-­‐President	  of	  a	  prominent	  university	   in	  Pakistan	   stated	   at	   a	   conference	   in	   2013	   that	   the	   ‘present	   British	   law	   has	  borrowed	   many	   concepts	   of	   human	   rights	   from	   the	   Islamic	   teachings	   and	  traditions,’	   although	   they	   have	   been	   mutilated	   in	   the	   present	   era	   and	   ‘have	  become	  a	  tool	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  criminals.’702	  	  Second,	  and	  more	  significantly,	  once	  the	  dominant	  legal	  system	  is	  denounced	  as	  foreign,	  alien	  and	  disconnected	  from	  the	  society,	  the	  task	  that	  logically	  emerges	  from	  it	  is	  that	  of	  recovering	  or	  discovering	  what	  the	  native	  or	  familiar703	  form	  or	  foundation	   of	   law	   should	   be.	   This	   is	  where	   two	   differing	   local	   responses	   and	  their	   proposed	   solutions	   can	   be	   identified.	   The	   pluralistic	   perspective,	   rather	  than	  proclaiming	  a	  return	  to	  a	  true	  ethos	  of	  Pakistan,	  appeals	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  traditional	  linkages	  between	  people	  and	  local	  justice	  mechanisms.704	  As	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  it	  argues	  for	  the	  recognition	  and	  continuation	  of	  alternative	  justice	  systems	  which	  a	  great	  section	  of	  the	  populace	  continues	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700	  Khurshid	  Ahmad	  (2000)	  (n	  102)	  19.	  701	  Dawn,	  'British	  law	  borrowed	  HR	  concepts	  from	  Islam'	  Dawn	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  17	  September	  2006)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/210715/british-­‐law-­‐borrowed-­‐hr-­‐concepts-­‐from-­‐islam>	  last	  accessed	  05	  January	  2013.	  702	  Ibid.	  703	  I	  use	  this	  term	  here	  in	  the	  manner	  proposed	  by	  Hans	  Lindahl,	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  familiar/strange	  legal	  systems	  is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  the	  domestic/foreign	  categorisation.	  Hans	  Lindahl,	  Fault	  Lines	  of	  Globalization:	  Legal	  Order	  and	  the	  
Politics	  of	  A-­‐Legality	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2013)	  42.	  704	  See,	  Chapter	  6,	  below	  on	  page	  204.	  
185	  	  
rely	  on.705	  The	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  law,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  claims	  to	  represent	  the	  societal	  beliefs	  and	  the	  true	  ethos	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  country.706	  It	  argues	  not	   just	   for	   an	   alternative	   form	   of	   legal	   ordering,	   but	   primarily	   for	   the	  recognition	  of	  the	  Islamic	  ideological	  foundations	  of	  law	  and	  the	  constitution,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  claimed	  original	  basis	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  Pakistan.707	  	  It	   should	   be	   highlighted	   here	   that	   the	   category	   of	   ‘Islamic	   narrative’	   (in	   the	  singular)	  used	  here	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  ‘Islamic	   law’	   in	  the	  wider	  sense,	  and	   this	   is	  one	  of	   the	  main	  critiques	   that	   the	  current	   study	  presents.	  Scholars	  argue	   that	   the	   dynamics	   of	   Islam’s	   historical	   and	   dialectical	   evolution	   meant	  that	   ‘unity	   in	  diversity’708	   and	  differences	  of	   opinions	  became	  cornerstones	  of	  Islamic	   jurisprudence.	   This	   is	   precisely	  what	   is	   exhibited	  by	   concepts	   such	   as	  
Ikhtilaf	   (‘the	   tolerated	   diversity	   of	   human	   opinion’)709	   and	   the	   presence	   of	  multiple	  schools	  of	  thought	  (madhahib)	  in	  Islamic	  jurisprudence.	  The	  ‘narrative’	  discussed	  here,	  however,	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan,	  ignores	  or	  hides	  this	  diversity	  and	  attempts	  to	  present	  Islam	  as	  a	  single	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  practises	  and	   presents	   the	   idea	   of	   conformity	   as	   one	   of	   its	   key	   goals.	   As	   discussed	  previously,	   it	   is	  this	  narrative	  that	   is	  being	  problematised	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705	  For	  a	  detailed	  survey	  conducted	  on	  participant	  opinions	  about	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice,	  see	  Foqia	  Sadiq	  Khan,	  'Quest	  for	  Justice:	  Judicial	  System	  in	  Pakistan'	  (The	  Network	  Publications,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2004).	  706	  The	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  Islamic	  religious	  groups	  was	  discussed	  above	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  Constituent	  Assembly	  debates;	  see	  Chapter	  2.	  707	  See,	  Section	  1,	  Chapter	  2.	  708	   Shaheen	   Sardar	   Ali,	   ‘Cyberspace	   as	   Emerging	  Muslim	  Discursive	   Space?	  Online	   Fatawa	   on	  Women	   and	   Gender	   relations	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   Muslim	   Family	   Law	   Norms’	   (2010)	   24(3)	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Policy	  and	  Family	  338,	  340.	  709	  Werner	  Menski,	  ‘Law	  as	  a	  Kite:	  Managing	  Legal	  Pluralism	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Islamic	  Finance’	  in	  Valentino	  Cattelan	  (ed.)	  Islamic	  Finance	  in	  Europe	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  Cheltenham	  2013)	  74.	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study.	   The	   discussion	   will	   return	   to	   identify	   the	   roots	   of	   this	   present	  manifestation	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  	  The	   turn	   to	   an	   Islamic	   narrative,	   and	   its	   struggle	   with	   the	   inherited	  constitutional	   and	   common	   law	   traditions,	   commenced	   right	   after	   Pakistan’s	  independence,	  and	  has	  been	  gaining	  momentum	  ever	  since.	  Martin	  Lau,	   in	  his	  illuminating	  work	  on	  The	  Role	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Legal	  System	  of	  Pakistan,	  discusses	  an	   intriguing	  case	  brought	  before	  a	  Sessions	  Court	   in	  Pakistan	   in	  1950.710	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  criminal	  matter	  in	  which	  six	  people	  were	  accused	  of	  assaulting	  two	   landowners,	   an	   allegation	   disputed	   by	   the	   defence.	   Though	   the	   details	   of	  the	  case	  are	  not	  available	  in	  the	  Law	  Reports,	  it	  is	  recorded	  that	  the	  Magistrate	  and	   the	   advocates	   for	   the	   prosecution	   and	   the	   defence	   settled	   on	   an	   unusual	  method	   to	   reach	  a	  decision.711	   It	  was	  decided	   that	   the	   accused	  would	   take	  an	  oath	   of	   innocence	   before	   the	   crowd	   gathered	   outside	   the	   Court,	   and	   the	  prosecution	  agreed	  that	  such	  an	  oath	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  prove	  the	  innocence	  of	   the	   accused.712	   Two	   of	   the	   accused,	   instead	   of	   swearing	   an	   oath,	   pleaded	  guilty	   as	   ‘they	   feared	   the	  wrath	  of	  God’	   for	   a	   false	  denial	  of	   their	   guilt.713	  The	  statement	  given	  by	  the	  Magistrate	  to	  justify	  this	  unusual	  approach	  adopted	  for	  the	  trial	  deserves	  to	  be	  quoted	  at	  length:	  
I	  am	  quite	  alive	  to	  the	   fact	   that	  the	  procedure	  adopted	  by	  me	  is	  wholly	  unwarranted.	  I	  however	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  high	  time	  we	  ceased	  to	  sit	  merely	  as	   courts	   of	   law.	   For	   the	   sake	   of	   equity	   and	   justice	  we	   should	  have	  no	  hesitation	   in	   brushing	   aside	   the	   formal	   restrictions	   imposed	   by	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97)	  10-­‐11.	  711	  Ibid.	  10-­‐11.	  712	  Ibid.	  10.	  713	  Ibid.	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British-­‐made	   law.	   The	   God	   law	   which	   we	   Pakistanis	   must	   and	   shall	  eventually	  follow	  demands	  vehemently	  that	  justice	  and	  equity	  should	  be	  our	   sole	   and	   only	   aim,	   and	   in	   achieving	   this	   God-­‐made	   law	   knows	   no	  procedural	  restrictions	  and	  formalities.714	  	  This	  adoption	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘God-­‐made	  law’	  in	  place	  of	  established	  common	  law	   procedures	   to	   reach	   a	   conclusion	  was	   rejected	   by	   the	   superior	   courts.715	  The	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Lahore	   High	   Court	   in	   the	   Criminal	   Revision	   Division	  case,	   disapproved	   and	   reprimanded	   the	   ‘Magistrate’s	   reliance	   on	   a	   religious	  oath’	   and	   ordered	   a	   re-­‐trial.716	   However,	   the	   legal	   discourse	   has	   changed	  significantly	   in	   the	   following	   decades,	   as	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   has	   gained	  ascendancy.	  In	  a	  2012	  judgement,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  reiterated	  the	  approach	  it	  has	  adopted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  other	  cases	  ‘that	  the	  exercise	  of	  [any	  governmental]	  authority	   shall	   be	   informed	   and	   circumscribed	   by	   the	   principles	   of	   Islam.’717	  This	   shift	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   courts	   has	   occurred	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	  wider	   societal	   perceptions	   in	   the	   country.	   In	   2012,	   the	  Pew	   Global	   Attitudes	   Survey	   of	   six	   Muslim	   majority	   countries	   reported	   that	  82%	   respondents	   in	   Pakistan	   expressed	   the	   opinion	   that	   laws	   in	   the	   country	  should	  ‘strictly’	  follow	  Islamic	  sources	  and	  injunctions.718	  Significantly,	  none	  of	  the	  respondents	  in	  the	  particular	  study	  supported	  the	  view	  that	  laws	  should	  not	  follow	   the	   Islamic	   code.719	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   secular	   and	   anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714	  Ibid.	  	  715	  Ibid.	  	  716	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Lahore	  High	  Court	  stated	  that	  the	  Magistrate	  ‘is	  a	  complete	  misfit	  in	  the	  judicial	  system	  and	  a	  menace	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  criminal	  justice.	  It	  will	  be	  dangerous	  in	  the	  extreme	  to	  entrust	  him	  with	  any	  criminal	  case	  or	  trial	  under	  the	  law	  in	  force.’	  ibid.	  	  10.	  717	  Workers’	  Party	  Pakistan	  case	  (n	  587).	  718	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  (2012)	  (n	  535)	  18.	  719	  Ibid.	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theocratic720	   notion	   of	   law	   and	   the	   state	   espoused	   by	   Jinnah	   at	   the	   time	   of	  independence.	  Prior	  to	  elaborating	  further	  on	  such	  manifestations	  of	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	   on	   law	  within	   the	  wider	   public	   discourse,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   briefly	  consider	  its	  link	  to	  natural	  law	  conceptions.	  	  
5.3. A	  note	  on	  Islamic	  Narrative	  and	  ‘Natural	  Justice’	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  here	  that	  this	  study	  does	  not	  entail	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	   Islamic	   theology,	   of	   natural	   law	   theories,	   or	   the	   link	   between	   the	   two	  paradigms.	   Notwithstanding	   their	   importance,	   the	   expansive	   nature	   of	   these	  spheres	  of	  discussion721	  takes	  them	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  enquiry.722	  Nevertheless,	  with	  religion	  considered	  as	   ‘a	  perennial	  manifestation	  of	  natural	  law’723	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  realities,724	  it	  is	  important	  to	  at	   least	  acknowledge	   the	   link	  between	   Islamic	  narrative	  on	   law	   in	  Pakistan	  and	  natural	  law	  arguments.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720	  G.	  W.	  Choudhury	  (1955)	  (n	  137)	  590.	  721	  For	  an	  insightful	  discussion	  on	  Islamic	  natural	  law	  traditions,	  see	  Anver	  M.	  Emon,	  Islamic	  
Natural	  Law	  Theories	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2010).	  Emon	  argues	  that	  rather	  than	  approaching	  Islamic	  law	  through	  the	  natural	  law	  categories	  of	  Roman	  and	  Christian	  traditions,	  the	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  should	  be	  considered	  through	  its	  own	  terminologies.	  Ibid.	  190-­‐191.	  He	  uses	  the	  distinction	  of	  Soft	  Natural	  Law	  and	  Hard	  Natural	  Law	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  propositions	  offered	  by	  classical	  jurists	  of	  Islam,	  with	  the	  two	  positions	  marking	  different	  positions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  Islamic	  Scriptures	  and	  the	  contingency	  of	  Nature.	  Ibid.	  124.	  For	  an	  account	  of	  natural	  law	  jurisprudence	  through	  history,	  see	  Knud	  Haakonssen,	  
Natural	  Law	  and	  Moral	  Philosophy:	  From	  Grotius	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Enlightenment	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  1996).	  722	  Emon	  argues	  that	  the	  primary	  natural	  law	  debate	  in	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  was	  between	  the	  two	  rival	  schools	  of	  theology,	  Mu’tazilites	  and	  Ash’arites.	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  this	  theological	  and	  jurisprudential	  disputes,	  see	  Anver	  M.	  Emon,	  'Natural	  Law	  and	  Natural	  Rights	  in	  Islamic	  Law'	  (2004)	  20	  (2)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Religion	  351.	  723	  Werner	  Menski	  (2010)	  (n	  96)	  46.	  724	  Ibid.	  51-­‐52.	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In	  terms	  of	  legal-­‐theoretical	  debates,	  the	  assertions	  of	  Islamic	  narrative	  (and	  of	  Islamic	   law,	   to	   an	   even	   greater	   extent)	   bear	   a	   striking	   resemblance	   to	   the	  traditional	   natural	   law	   approaches.	   The	   propositions	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	  traditional	   natural	   law	   perspective	   had	   been	   predominantly	   occupied	   with	  reconciling	   the	   notions	   of	   morality	   with	   positive	   law,	   of	   sovereign	   assertion	  with	  the	  ‘ideal’725	  or	  ‘divine’.726	  By	  appealing	  to	  an	  idea	  of	  natural	  justice	  that	  lay	  beyond	  its	  manifestation	  in	  the	  sovereign	  assertion,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  this	  ideal	  justice	  could	  be	  revealed	  (through	  scriptures,	  for	  instance)727	  and	  which	  could	  be	  reached	  through	  the	  use	  of	  human	  reason.728	  With	  the	  diversity	  of	  theoretical	  positions	   linked	   to	   this	   approach,	   gathered	   over	   several	   centuries,	   one	   of	   the	  threads	  that	  run	  through	  these	  perspectives	  is	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  inadequacy	  of	   posited	   law.729	   Law,	   and	   particularly	   man-­‐made	   law	   in	   the	   context	   of	  theological	  natural	  law	  positions,	  is	  seen	  as	  distant	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  justice;	  there	  is	   a	   gap	   between	   the	   actuality	   of	   law	   and	   notions	   of	   the	   ideal	   that	   either	   lay	  behind	   the	   law,	   or	   stand	   to	   challenge	   it.730	   This	   perpetual	   void	   between	  sovereign	   assertion	   and	   justice	   creates	   opportunities	   for	   absolutism	   and	  injustice.	   This	   is	   the	   conceptual	   background	  where	   the	  most	   common	   phrase	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725	  Pound	  stated	  that	  there	  were	  two	  facets	  in	  which	  the	  foundation	  of	  natural	  law	  lied:	  One	  was	  revelation,	  which	  linked	  it	  to	  theological	  debates;	  while	  the	  other	  was	  discovery	  through	  reason.	  Roscoe	  Pound,	  'Revival	  of	  Natural	  Law'	  (1942)	  17	  (4)	  Notre	  Dame	  Lawyer	  287,	  290.	  726	  Roscoe	  Pound,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Law	  (Yale	  University	  Press,	  Connecticut	  1954)	  27;	  see	  also,	  Brian	  Bix,	  Jurisprudence:	  Theory	  and	  Context	  (Sweet	  and	  Maxwell,	  London	  2009)	  68.	  727	  Roscoe	  Pound	  (1942)	  (n	  725)	  290.	  728	  Knud	  Haakonssen	  (1996)	  (n	  721)	  4.	  729	  Although	  John	  Finnis	  and	  the	  recent	  natural	  law	  theorists	  take	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  approaches	  within	  natural	  law	  jurisprudence.	  For	  Finnis’s	  re-­‐articulation	  of	  the	  terminology	  of	  morality,	  through	  a	  proposition	  of	  ‘basic	  values’,	  see	  John	  Finnis,	  Natural	  Law	  and	  Natural	  
Rights	  (2nd	  edn	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York	  2011).	  730	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ideal	  notions	  of	  justice	  and	  actual	  manifestations	  of	  law,	  see	  Raza	  
Saeed	  (2013)	  (n	  246).	  See	  also,	  Neil	  MacCormick,	  'The	  Ideal	  and	  the	  Actual	  of	  Law	  and	  Society'	  in	  John	  Tasioulas	  (ed)	  Law,	  Values	  and	  Social	  Practices	  (Ashgate,	  London	  1997);	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2013)	  (n	  94).	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linked	  with	  natural	  justice	  emerges	  from:	  lex	  inuista	  non	  est	  lex	  (‘an	  unjust	  law	  is	  not	   law’),	   which	   is	   generally	   attributed	   to	   Thomas	   Aquinas.731	   Norman	  Kertzman,	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  Aquinas’s	  writings	  on	  natural	  law,	  argues	  against	   the	   incorrect	   attribution	   of	   this	   statement	   to	   Aquinas	   and	   presents	   a	  more	   nuanced	   picture.732	   He	   argues	   that	   Aquinas’s	   real	   assertion	   was	   that	   a	  ‘tyrannical	  law,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  in	  accord	  with	  reason’	  is	  ‘not	  unconditionally…	  a	  law	  but	  is,	  rather,	  a	  perversion	  of	  law…	  it	  has	  the	  nature	  of	  law	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  a	  dictate	  of	  someone	  who	  presides	  over	  subjects.’733	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  point	  presently.	  	  The	  preceding	  chapter	  saw	  a	  discussion	  on	  how	  the	  superior	  courts	  in	  Pakistan	  have	   expressly	   imported	   positivist	   legal-­‐theoretical	   ideas	   to	   justify	   their	  reasoning	   and	   decisions	   in	   particular	   cases.734	   It	   is	   intriguing	   to	   observe	   that	  there	  are	  some	  glimpses	  of	  natural	  law	  arguments	  within	  the	  judgements	  of	  the	  courts.	   In	  the	  Asma	  Jillani	  case,	  while	  retracting	  its	  previous	  reading	  of	  Kelsen	  as	   incorrect,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   expressly	   deliberated	   on	   natural	   law	  jurisprudence	  and	  noted	  that	  positivist	  legal-­‐theoretical	  arguments,	  particularly	  the	  one	  put	   forward	  by	  Kelsen,	  were	   ‘[d]iametrically	  opposed	  to	   the	   theory	  of	  natural	   law’.735	   Moreover,	   although	   a	   number	   of	   judgements	   of	   the	   superior	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731	  Brian	  Bix	  (2009)	  (n	  725)	  70.	  732	  Norman	  Kertzmann,	  'Lex	  Inuista	  Non	  Est	  Lex:	  Laws	  on	  Trial	  in	  Aquinas'	  (1988)	  33	  (1)	  
American	  Journal	  of	  Jurisprudence	  99.	  733	  Ibid.	  114-­‐115.	  734	  Tracing	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  Dominant	  Legal	  Narrative	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  144.	  735	  Asma	  Jillani	  case	  (n	  661).	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courts736	  have	  specifically	  discussed	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘natural	  justice’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	   procedural	   fairness,737	   the	   same	   terminology	   has	   also	   been	   employed	   to	  convey	  the	  conceptions	  of	  natural	  law.	  In	  Haji	  Nizam	  Khan	  Case,	  the	  Lahore	  High	  Court	  declared	  that	  	  
All	   expressions	   like	   natural,	   universal,	   rational,	   humane,	   moral,	  substantial,	   fundamental	   'justice';	   justice;	   natural	   laws;	   laws	   of	   God;	  natural	  or	  human	  jurisprudence;	  general	  principles	  of	  humanity;	  general	  law;	   equity;	   natural	   equity;	   fairplay;	   conscience;	   good	   conscience;	   and	  propriety/prudence	   shall	   have	   meanings	   and	   shades	   as	   available	   in	  Islamic	  philosophy	  and	  jurisprudence.738	  	  It	   then	  considered	  the	  generic	   idea	  of	  natural	   law,	  and	  stated	  that	   ‘the	   foreign	  and	  for	  that	  matter	  western	  ideas	  in	  this	  behalf	  would	  be	  relevant	  for	  beneficial	  purpose	  of	   comparison	   (sic.)…	   [but	   if]	   such	  an	   idea	   is	   in	   conflict	  with	   Islam	   it	  shall	  be	  rejected.’739	  The	  Federal	  Shariat	  Court	  has	  also	  noted	  that	   the	  code	  of	  conduct	  and	  duties	  of	   the	   judges	  are	  derived	   from	  religious	   injunctions,	   ‘since	  these	  rules	  are	  based	  on	  natural	  and	  eternal	  justice	  and	  emanate	  from	  the	  Most	  High,	  they	  are	  not	  susceptible	  of	  any	  change	  with	  the	  change	  of	  circumstances	  or	  time….’740	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Sindh	  High	  Court	  Bar	  Assocition	  v.	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  (PLD	  2009	  CS	  879);	  also,	  Supreme	  Court	  Bar	  Association	  v.	  the	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  (PLD	  2002	  SC	  939).	  737	  Although	  semantically	  similar,	  the	  terms	  ‘natural	  law’	  and	  ‘natural	  justice’	  are	  different	  concepts,	  with	  the	  latter	  referring	  to	  procedural	  fairness.	  It	  is	  said	  to	  include	  two	  basic	  concepts	  –	  audi	  alteram	  partem	  (‘hear	  the	  other	  side’)	  and	  nemo	  debet	  esse	  judex	  in	  propria	  sua	  causa	  or	  
nemo	  judex	  in	  re	  (‘no	  man	  should	  be	  judge	  of	  his	  own	  cause’).	  Frederick	  F.	  Schauer,	  'English	  Natural	  Justice	  and	  American	  Due	  Process:	  An	  Analytical	  Comparison'	  (1976)	  18	  William	  and	  
Mary	  Law	  Review	  47,	  48.	  These	  two	  concepts	  were	  considered	  at	  length	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  the	  Sindh	  High	  Court	  Bar	  Association	  case	  (n	  736).	  738	  Haji	  Nizam	  Khan	  v.	  Additional	  District	  Judge,	  Lyallpur,	  and	  others	  (1976	  PLD	  LHC	  930).	  739	  Ibid.	  740	  Federal	  Shariat	  Court,	  'FSC	  Annual	  Report	  2010'	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2010)	  1.	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Similarly,	   in	  the	  famous	  National	  Reconciliation	  Ordinance	  judgement	  in	  2009,	  one	   Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   delved	   into	   the	   broader	   issue	   of	   human	  existence	  and	  argued	  that	  the	   ‘body	  of	  human	  being	  otherwise	  consists	  of	  two	  parts.	   Body	   along	   with	   the	   elements	   and	   “Rooh	   –	   spirit”.’741	   In	   a	   turn	   that	  resonates	  with	   the	   natural	   law	   jurisprudence,	   he	   then	   applied	   this	   duality	   to	  expound	   his	   reading	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   in	   which	   the	   Preamble	   (Objectives	  Resolution)	   acts	   as	   the	   soul	   for	   the	   Constitution,	   without	   which	   the	   whole	  charter	  will	  be	   lifeless.742	   In	   the	  same	  case,	  one	  of	   the	  appointed	  Amici	  Curiae	  presented	  a	  lengthy	  treatise	  on	  natural	  law,	  which	  the	  Court	  included	  at	  length	  in	  its	  judgement,	  and	  it	  warrants	  inclusion	  
…there	  is	  no	  definition	  of	  man;	  even	  the	  Allah	  Almighty	  has	  said	  that	  the	  creation,	  which	  is	  being	  sent	  to	  this	  globe,	  is	  flawed,	  and	  is	  a	  blend	  of	  two	  great	   positive	   and	   negative	   reservoirs	   of	   instincts;	   one	   instinct	   is	  goodness,	   the	  good,	   the	   tranquillity,	  peace;	  and	   the	  other	   is	  greed,	   lust,	  bloodshed	   etc.;	   so	   the	   man	   is	   beautiful	   combination	   of	   both.	   …	   [A]	  philosopher	  has	  rightly	  said	  that	  “law	  is	  necessity	  of	  the	  man”	  because	  he	  can’t	  discipline	  himself;	  he	  can’t	  undertake	  his	  own	  examination;	  man	  is	  such	  a	  creature	  that	  he	  needs	  three	  instincts,	  i.e.	  instinct	  of	  preservation,	  instinct	  of	  peace	  and	  the	  instinct	  of	   law,	  which	  compel	  him	  to	  travel	  on	  the	  path	  of	  law.	  …	  [T]he	  morality	  of	  law	  has	  two	  aspects	  to	  be	  assumed	  as	  sine	  qua	  non;	  one	  is	  internal	  voice	  of	  a	  human	  being	  and	  the	  other	  is	  external	  voice	  i.e.	  conduct	  of	  a	  human	  being;	  these	  two	  can	  be	  called	  as	  a	  soul,	   conscience,	   discipline,	   etc.	   of	   human	   being;	   as	   the	   same	   are	  contemporaneous	   not	   simultaneous;	   naturally	   embodied	   in	   the	   human	  being,	  who	  is	  to	  be	  tested	  on	  these	  touchstones.743	  	  Albeit,	  emerging	   from	  within	   the	   Islamic	  narrative,	   it	   should	  be	  said	   that	  such	  remarkable	   treatise	   emerging	   from	   the	   Supreme	  Court’s	   case	   law	   are	   not	   too	  distinct	  from	  the	  arguments	  that	  have	  come	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  Western	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741	  Dr.	  Mobashir	  Hassan	  v.	  Federation	  of	  Pakistan	  (PLD	  2010	  SC	  265).	  742	  Ibid.	  743	  Ibid.	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natural	   law	   jurisprudence.	   However,	   notwithstanding	   the	   significance	   of	   such	  debates	   between	   sovereign	   assertion	   and	   conceptions	   of	   immanent	   justice	   in	  western	   jurisprudence	   as	   well	   as	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   Pakistan’s	   courts,	   it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  subject	  matter	  often	  has	  devastating	  consequences	  for	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  realities	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  same	  idea	  of	  a	  higher	  and	  divine	  law	  that	   supersedes	   any	   state	   or	   man-­‐made	   law,	   discussed	   above	   in	   relation	   to	  Thomas	   Aquinas’s	   ideas,	   manifests	   itself	   in	   the	  mainstream	   religious	   (mainly	  Islamic)	   morality	   in	   Pakistan	   and	   is	   employed	   by	   those	   who	   demand	   the	  imposition	   of	   Shariah	   in	   the	   country.744	   In	   the	   struggle	   that	   we	   witness	   in	  Pakistan	   today	   between	   Islamic	   narrative	   and	   state-­‐oriented	   law	   (as	   well	   as	  human	  rights	  discourse),	   the	  rhetoric	  of	  natural	   law	  and	  positive	   law	   is	  eerily	  evident.	  	  The	   assassination	   of	   the	   sitting	   Governor	   of	   the	   Punjab	   province,	   Salman	  Taseer,	  in	  January	  2011	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  illustration	  of	  this.	  In	  2010,	  Taseer	  had	   expressed	   the	   need	   for	   a	   public	   review	   of	   the	   controversial	   Blasphemy	  Laws	  of	  Pakistan,745	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Aasiya	  Bibi	  who	  was	  charged	  with	  an	  alleged	  desecration	  of	  the	  Quran.746	  Taseer	  was	  killed	  a	  few	  days	  later	  by	  his	  own	   bodyguard,	   who	   claimed	   that	   his	   duty	   to	   Islam	   and	   the	   sanctity	   of	   the	  Prophet	   (PBUH)	  was	  greater	   than	  any	   law	  of	   the	  state.	  Although	  convicted	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Red	  Mosque’s	  students	  in	  Farida	  Shaheed	  (2010)	  (n	  288)	  862-­‐863.	  745	  See,	  Islam	  and	  Penal	  Laws	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  above.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  Blasphemy	  Laws,	  see	  Osama	  Siddique	  and	  Zahra	  Hayat	  (2008)	  (n	  416);	  Raza	  Saeed	  (2013)	  (n	  246).	  	  	  746	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan,	  State	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  2012	  (HRCP,	  Lahore,	  Pakistan	  2013)	  112.	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the	   courts,	   there	   was	   an	   outpouring	   of	   support	   for	   Qadri.747	   In	   an	   intriguing	  turn	   of	   events,	   while	   Qadri	   was	   celebrated	   as	   a	   soldier	   of	   Islam	   for	   defying	  mortal	   law	   to	  preserve	  his	  belief,	   the	   judge	  who	  sentenced	  him	  was	   forced	   to	  flee	  the	  country	  after	  receiving	  threats	  against	  his	  life.748	  A	  few	  weeks	  later,	  this	  incident	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  assassination	  of	  Shahbaz	  Bhatti,	  a	  minority	  rights	  campaigner	   and	   a	  Minister	   of	   the	   Federal	   Cabinet,	   on	   the	   same	   issue.749	   The	  supporters	  of	  the	  Blasphemy	  Law	  use	  the	  notions	  of	  a	  higher	  duty	  to	  argue	  their	  cause	  and	  incite	  vigilante	  justice.	  	  	  A	  troubling	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  instances	  mentioned	  above	  are	  not	  isolated	  incidents.	  In	  a	  case	  reported	  in	  December	  2012	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Sindh,	  a	  mob	  set	  upon	  a	  man	   said	   to	  be	   intellectually	  disabled,	   beat	  him	   to	  death	   and	   then	  burned	  his	  body.750	   The	   allegation	   levelled	   against	   him	   was	   that	   he	   had	   desecrated	   the	  Quran.	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  victim	  was	  taken	  from	  police	  custody	  where	  he	  was	  held	   under	   that	   charge,751	   is	   testament	   to	   the	   logic	   that	   is	   at	   play	   in	   such	  instances	  –	  that	  in	  matters	  related	  to	  Islam,	  the	  executive	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  and	   the	   limits	   of	   posited	   law	   can	  be	   transcended.	  There	  have	  been	  numerous	  other	   such	   instances	   of	   religion-­‐inspired	  mob	   violence	   reported	   from	   around	  the	  country	  in	  recent	  years.752	  This	  attitude	  towards	  law	  and	  religion	  was	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747	  Robert	  D.	  Lamb	  and	  Sadika	  Hameed	  (2012)	  (n	  91)	  50.	  	  748	  C.	  Christine	  Fair,	  'Pakistan	  in	  2011:	  Ten	  Years	  of	  the	  “War	  on	  Terror”'	  (2012)	  52	  (1)	  Asian	  
Survey	  100,	  108-­‐109.	  749	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  78)	  112.	  750	  Al	  Jazeera,	  'Pakistan	  mob	  burns	  man	  for	  'blasphemy''	  (Al	  Jazeera	  22	  December	  2012)	  <http://m.aljazeera.com/story/20121222114547753697>	  last	  accessed	  7	  September	  2013.	  751	  Ibid.	  752	  Dawn,	  'Timeline:	  Accused	  under	  the	  Blasphemy	  Law'	  Dawn	  (18	  August	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/750512/timeline-­‐accused-­‐under-­‐the-­‐blasphemy-­‐law>	  last	  accessed	  28	  August	  2013.	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propounded	   by	   a	   sitting	   judge	   of	   the	   Lahore	  High	   Court,	  who	   had	   claimed	   in	  1997	   that	   those	   accused	   of	   blasphemy	   should	   be	   killed	   by	   the	   public	   before	  their	   cases	   could	   reach	   the	   courts.753	   Such	   incidents	   are	   evidence	   of	   the	  increasing	   strength	   of	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   in	   the	   society,	  which	   is	   then	   also	  reflected	  in	  legal	  discourse.	  The	  section	  below	  will	  provide	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	   Islamic	  narrative	  on	   law,	  highlighting	   some	   further	  problems	   that	   emerge	  from	  it.	  	  
5.4. An	  Islamic	  Grundnorm	  
The	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  law	  has	  been	  locked	  in	  a	  struggle	  for	  dominance	  with	  the	   State’s	   inherited	   legal	   and	   constitution	   frameworks	   since	   the	   time	   of	  Pakistan’s	   independence.	   The	  main	   assertion	   that	   can	   be	   discerned	   from	   this	  narrative	   harks	   back	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   pre-­‐independence	   struggle.	   By	  claiming	  that	  Pakistan	  was	  created	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Islam,754	  it	  assumes	  that	  any	  problems	  that	  beset	  the	  country’s	  socio-­‐legal	  situation	  are	  a	  consequence	  of	  un-­‐Islamic	   practises	   and	   laws	   and,	   consequently,	   an	   Islamisation	  of	   the	   laws	  will	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  their	  resolution.755	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753	  Although	  this	  statement	  was	  later	  retracted	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  it	  was	  not	  personally	  retracted	  by	  the	  judge	  in	  question.	  Iftikhar	  H.	  Malik,	  'Religious	  Minorities	  in	  Pakistan'	  (Minority	  Rights	  Group	  International,	  London	  2002)	  24.	  754	  Ilhan	  Niaz	  (2010)	  (n	  134)	  64-­‐68.	  755	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  argument	  that	  even	  the	  struggle	  between	  military	  authoritarianism	  and	  political	  governments	  is	  because	  of	  western	  values,	  Khurshid	  Ahmad	  (2000)	  (n	  102).	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As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   while	   Jinnah	   claimed	   that	   the	   country	   would	   be	  based	  on	  democratic	  ideals	  and	  that	  religion	  is	  ‘not	  the	  business	  of	  the	  state’,756	  Liaquat	  Ali	  Khan,	  Pakistan’s	  first	  Prime	  Minister,	  stated	  before	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  in	  1949	  that	  	  
the	   State	   is	   not	   to	   play	   the	   part	   of	   a	   neutral	   observer,	   wherein	   the	  Muslims	   may	   be	   merely	   free	   to	   profess	   and	   practise	   their	   religion,	  because	   such	   an	   attitude	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   State	   would	   be	   the	   very	  negation	  of	  the	  ideals	  which	  promoted	  the	  demand	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  it	  is	  these	  ideals	  which	  should	  be	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  State	  which	  we	  want	  to	   build.	   The	   State	  will	   create	   such	   conditions	   as	   are	   conducive	   to	   the	  building	   up	   of	   a	   truly	   Islamic	   society,	   which	  means	   that	   the	   State	  will	  have	  to	  play	  a	  positive	  part	  in	  this	  effort.757	  	  This	  uncertainty	  and	  oscillation	  between	  religious	  and	  secular	   ideals	  was	  also	  manifested	  in	  the	  constitutional	  developments	  of	  the	  country.758	  While	  the	  1956	  Constitution	   declared	   Pakistan	   to	   be	   an	   Islamic	   Republic,759	   the	   1962	  Constitution	   amended	   the	   official	   title	   to	   Republic	   of	   Pakistan,	   omitting	   any	  express	   connotations	   of	   the	   State’s	   linkages	   with	   Islam.760	   In	   one	   of	   its	  judgements	  of	  that	  time,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  declared	  that	  Islamic	  law	  could	  not	  be	   used	   to	   override	   or	   strike	   down	   any	   legal	   or	   constitutional	   provision	   that	  might	  be	  deemed	  repugnant	  to	  it.761	  This	  was	  further	  endorsed	  in	  1973	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  who	  categorically	  stated	  that	  the	  Objectives	  Resolution	  of	   1949,	   despite	  being	   the	  Preamble	  of	   the	  Constitution,	   could	  not	  ‘control	   the	   Constitution’	   and	   that	   it	   served	   the	   ‘same	   purpose	   as	   any	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Jinnah	  	  (n	  218).	  757	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136)	  6-­‐7.	  758	  See	  Chapter	  2	  on	  page	  82.	  759	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1956.	  760	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1962,	  promulgated	  during	  the	  military	  regime	  of	  General	  Ayub	  Khan.	  761	  Tanbir	  Ahmad	  Siddiky	  v.	  Province	  of	  East	  Pakistan	  and	  others	  (PLD	  1968	  SC	  185).	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preamble	  serves…	  [that]	  it	  may	  be	  looked	  at	  to	  ascertain	  the	  true	  intent	  [of	  the	  legislators]’.762	  In	  this	  judgement,	  the	  Court	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘Grundnorm’	  of	  the	  country	   –	   that	   is	   ‘the	   spirit	   and	   the	   fundamental	   norms	   of	   the	   constitutional	  concept	  of	  Pakistan’	  –	  lies	  beyond	  the	  Objectives	  Resolution	  or	  even	  the	  abstract	  religious	  conceptions	  of	  law.763	  	  The	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  law	  coupled	  with	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  the	  time,	  however,	  radically	  changed	  this	  perspective	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  The	   1973	   Constitution	   reverted	   the	   official	   title	   of	   the	   State	   back	   to	   Islamic	  Republic	   of	   Pakistan.764	   It	   also	   proclaimed,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   country’s	  history,	   Islam	   as	   the	   ‘State	   Religion’.765	   During	   Zia’s	   Islamisation	   campaign	   in	  the	   1980s,	   the	   Objectives	   Resolution	   was	   made	   a	   substantive	   and	   justiciable	  part	   of	   the	   Constitution.766	   This	   changed	   the	   claimed	   spirit	   of	   constitutional	  
concepts,	   and	   a	   senior	   Judge	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   wrote	   in	   1987	   that	  ‘henceforth	  any	  measure	  which	  conflicted	  with	  “the	  ideology,	  aim	  and	  the	  final	  object	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  nation”	  could	  be	  questioned.’767	  Another	  Justice	  of	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   remarked	   that	   the	   Objectives	   Resolution	   should	   be	  considered	  as	  a	   ‘Supra	  Constitutional	  document,’768	   in	  a	   radical	   contrast	   to	   its	  previous	   approach.	   Similarly,	   in	   the	   Asma	   Jillani	   case,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	  declared	   that	   any	   law	   in	   conflict	   with	   the	   Resolution	   or	   Islamic	   injunctions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
762	  State	  vs.	  Zia-­‐ur-­‐Rahman	  (PLD	  1973	  S.C.	  49)	  763	  Ibid.	  764	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  765	  Ibid.	  Article	  2.	  766	  Ibid.	  By	  virtue	  of	  Article	  2A.	  767	  Justice	  Nasim	  Hasan	  Shah,	  “The	  Objectives	  Resolution:	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  in	  Pakistan”	  (PLD	  1987	  S.C.	  Journal	  186-­‐187)	  quoted	  in	  Tanzilur-­‐Rahman	  (1996)	  (n	  136)	  76.	  768	  Zia-­‐ur-­‐Rahman	  vs.	  State	  (PLD	  1986	  Lah.428)	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could	   be	   struck	   down.769	   The	   Constitution	   of	   Pakistan	   currently	   in	   force	  expressly	  mentions	   that	   the	   State	   is	   duty	   bound	   to	   ensure	   an	   ‘Islamic	  way	   of	  life’770	   and	   to	   bring	   laws	   in	   conformity	   with	   Islamic	   Injunctions.771	   Even	   the	  Oaths	   listed	   in	   the	   Constitution	   for	   Presidential	   and	   Prime	  Ministerial	   offices	  include	  provisions	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  office	  holders	  will	   ‘strive	  to	  preserve	  the	  Islamic	  Ideology	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan.’772	  	  The	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  Islamic	  discourse	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  the	  Islamisation	  of	   the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   framework	   of	   the	   country	   during	   1980s	   have	  already	  been	  extensively	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,773	  and	  the	  prominence	  of	  this	  narrative	   has	   been	   visible	   since	   then.	   For	   instance,	   in	   1990	   the	   Chief	   Justice	  (Acting)	  of	  Sindh	  High	  Court	  stated	  in	  a	  judgement	  that	  after	  the	  constitutional	  measures	  adopted	  during	  General	  Zia’s	  regime,	  ‘the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Courts	  are	  to	  be	  based	  on	   the	   injunctions	  of	   Islamic	  Law	   [which]	  has	  become	   the	   rule	  of	  decision	   in	   particularly	   all	   matters	   (sic.).’774	   Through	   his	   extensive	   study	   of	  post-­‐independence	   case	   law	   in	   Pakistan,	   Lau	   argues	   that	   the	   judiciary	   has	  played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   Islamisation	   of	   the	   laws	   in	   Pakistan,	   primarily	   to	  increase	   the	   sphere	   of	   its	   own	   authority.775	   However,	   as	   the	   preceding	  discussion	   has	   shown,	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   on	   law	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
769	  Asma	  Jillani	  case	  (n	  661).	  770	  Article	  31	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	  	  771	  Ibid.	  Article	  227.	  772	  Ibid.	  Annexes	  for	  Article	  42	  and	  43.	  773	  See,	  On	  Religion	  and	  State	  Law:	  A	  brief	  history	  of	  Islamisation	  of	  laws,	  1973-­‐1999	  on	  page	  73.	  774	  Farhat	  Jaleel	  and	  others	  v.	  Province	  of	  Sindh	  and	  others	  (PLD	  1990	  Karachi	  342).	  	  775	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97).	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Pakistan	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  judiciary,	  but	  has	  increased	  concurrently	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Islamic	  discourse	  within	  the	  society.	  	  	  A	  2012	  Pew	  survey	  of	  perceptions	  in	  Muslim	  majority	  countries,	  reported	  that	  62%	  of	  the	  respondents	  in	  Pakistan	  considered	  that	  Islam	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  overall	  political	   life	  of	   the	   country	   (this	   trend	  was	  up	   from	  46%	  only	   two	  years	   ago).776	   Scholars	   of	   Pakistan’s	   history	   of	   Islamisation	   have	   been	  examining	  the	  intensification	  of	  Islamic	  narrative	  in	  relation	  to	  different	  facets	  of	   the	   state	   and	   society.777	   Similarly,	   educationalists	   in	   the	   country	   recognise	  and	  have	  campaigned	  against	  the	  Islamisation	  of	  education	  for	  several	  decades	  now,	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘text	  books	  in	  schools	  and	  universities	  of	  Pakistan	  teach	  [the]	  country	  [about]	  an	  ideological	  state	  created	  for	  Islam.’778	  In	  this	  backdrop,	  the	   Islamic	  narrative	   on	   law	  holds	   such	  prominence	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	   and	  legal	  discourse	   that	   it	  has	  effectively	   come	   to	  be	   recognised	  as	   the	   ideological	  foundation	  of	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  frameworks.779	  
	  
5.5. Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   and	   the	   challenges	   for	   Islamic	  
Narrative	  	  
The	   preceding	   discussion	   has	   briefly	   highlighted	   the	   engagement	   between	  traditional	  natural	  law	  approaches	  and	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  (2012)	  (n	  535).	  	  777	  See,	  for	  instance,	  on	  the	  link	  between	  Islam	  and	  military	  in	  Pakistan,	  Aasim	  Sajjad	  Akhtar,	  
Asha	  Amirali	  and	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Raza	  (2006)	  (n	  237).	  778	  Muhammad	  Imtiaz	  Zafar,	  'Can	  Pakistan	  be	  a	  secular	  state?'	  (2013)	  28	  (1)	  South	  Asian	  Studies	  165,	  165.	  779	  See,	  An	  Islamic	  Grundnorm	  on	  page	  195.	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law	   as	   it	   exists	   in	   Pakistan.780	   In	   an	   argument	   that	   holds	   similarity	   with	  traditional	  natural	   law	  jurisprudence,	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  looks	  to	  sources	  of	  legality	  other	  than	  law	  of	  the	  state,	  granting	  sovereignty	  to	  a	  Supreme	  Being,781	  linking	   the	   source	  of	   law	   to	  divine	   revelations.782	   It	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   this	  insistence	   of	   differentiating	   between	   sovereign	   assertion	   and	   transcendent	  morality	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Pakistan	   is	   ultimately	   linked	   to	   a	   particular	  interpretation	   of	   Islamic	   injunctions,	   results	   in	   difficulties	   for	   religious	  minorities.	   The	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   country’s	   Blasphemy	   laws,783	   and	   the	  instances	  of	  mob	  justice	  that	  this	  generates,	  is	  a	  key	  example	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  	  However,	  even	  if	  we	  divest	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  law	  from	  the	  sphere	  of	  natural	  law	  jurisprudence	  and	  consider	  it	  at	  its	  own	  merit,	  it	  brings	  to	  the	  fore	  several	  challenges	  for	  this	  perspective.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  issues	  for	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  on	  law	  is	  that	  Islamic	   law,	   in	   its	  current	  form	  in	  Pakistan,	  cannot	  disregard	  its	  roots	   in	   the	   same	   colonial	   history	   and	   logic	   that	   it	   denounces.784	   This	  undermines	   the	   critique	   of	   alienation	   that	   this	   perspective	   levels	   against	   the	  dominant	   legal	  system	  and	  on	  which	   its	   foundational	  claim	  is	  based.	   It	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  Chapter	  8	  that	  the	  British	  colonial	  state	  radically	  transformed	  the	  nature	   of	   religious	   laws	   that	   existed	   in	   the	   region,	   and	   the	   appropriation	   of	  these	  normativities	   led	  to	  their	   ‘fossilisation’	  and	  ossification.785	  The	  problems	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780	  See,	  A	  note	  on	  Islamic	  Narrative	  and	  ‘Natural	  Justice’	  on	  page	  188.	  781	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  782	  See,	  A	  note	  on	  Islamic	  Narrative	  and	  ‘Natural	  Justice’	  on	  page	  188.	  783	  Osama	  Siddique	  and	  Zahra	  Hayat	  (2008)	  (n	  416).	  784	  This	  will	  be	  elaborated	  further	  in	  Chapter	  8	  on	  page	  251.	  785	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali,	   'Overlapping	  Discursive	  Terrains	  of	  Culture,	  Law	  and	  Women's	  Rights:	  An	  Exploratory	  Study	  on	  Legal	  Pluralism	  at	  Play	  in	  Pakistan'	  in	  Jennifer	  Bennett	  (ed)	  Scratching	  
the	  Surface:	  Democracy,	  Traditions,	  Gender	  (Heinrich	  Boll	  Foundation,	  Lahore	  2007)	  78.	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of	  translation	  and	  an	  orientalist	  approach	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  institution	  and	  modification	  of	  Islamic	  law	  and	  its	  associated	  perspectives	  in	  the	  region.786	  This	   narrative	   is	   dismissive	   of	   any	   other	   normative	   system	   that,	   according	   to	  this	  perspective,	  does	  not	  represent	  the	  true	  practises	  and	  principles	  of	   Islam.	  Therefore,	   the	   central	   critique	   on	   which	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   is	   based	  undermines	  and	  contradicts	  its	  own	  assertions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  In	   its	   fossilised	   form,	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   betrays	   the	   same	   tendencies	   of	  centralism	   and	   alienation	   that	   it	   denounces	   in	   the	   mainstream	   and	   ‘secular’	  legal	   traditions,787	   which	   marks	   a	   second	   difficulty	   that	   emerges	   from	   this	  perspective.	   The	   isolationist	   and	   exclusive	   notion	   of	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   on	  law	   necessarily	   links	   the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   frameworks	   of	   the	   country	  with	  a	  particular	   ideology.788	  Through	  its	  attempts	  to	  capture	  the	  state	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  Shariah,	   the	  Islamic	  narrative	  necessarily	  challenges	  the	  wider	  concepts	  of	  citizenship	  and	  equality.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	   the	  imposition	  of	   a	  particular	   ideology	  on	   the	   legal	   and	  constitutional	   system	  has	   resulted	   in	  the	   ‘legal	   and	   constitutional’789	   marginalisation	   of	   the	   Ahmadi	   community	   in	  Pakistan.	   The	   adherents	   of	   this	   sect	   are	   constitutionally	   barred	   from	   using	  slogans,	   images	   and	   practises	   of	   Muslims790	   and	   someone	   who	   even	   ‘poses	  himself	   as	   Muslim’	   is	   liable	   for	   criminal	   punishment.791	   The	   theological	   and	  religious	   debate	   about	   the	   beliefs	   of	   the	  Ahmadi	   community	   is	   not	   something	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
786	  Michael	  Anderson	  (1993)	  (n	  481)	  214.	  787	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (2007)	  (n	  785)	  78.	  788	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  103,	  on	  page	  107,	  and	  on	  page	  112	  and	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  in	  the	  current	  chapter.	  789	  See	  page	  112.	  790	  Article	  298	  of	  the	  Pakistan	  Penal	  Code	  (Act	  XLV)	  of	  1860.	  791	  Ibid.	  Article	  298(C).	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that	   is	   being	   debated	   here.	  While	   the	   Constitution	   asserts	   itself	   to	   be	   against	  prejudice	  based	  on	  religion,	  colour,	  caste,	  creed	  or	  gender,	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  radically	  undermines	  the	  state’s	  relationship	  with	  its	  citizens.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  Islamic	  law	  narrative	  and	  its	  alliance	  with	  the	  state	  continues	  to	  be	  problematic	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   country.	   Its	   association	   with	   the	  armed	   forces	   of	   the	   country	   has	   resulted	   in	   political	   instability,792	   while	   its	  manifestation	   as	   militancy	   has	   led	   to	   increased	   violence	   and	   lawless	   in	   the	  country.793	  The	  hard-­‐lined	  religious	  political	  parties	  and	  militant	  organisations	  base	  their	  struggles	  on	  the	  assertion	  of	   Islamisation	  of	  the	  state	   law.	  They	  call	  for	  a	  complete	  dismantlement	  of	   the	  state	   in	   its	  current	   form,	  and	  abolition	  of	  all	   forms	  of	  democratic	  governance	  which	   is	   considered	   to	  be	  un-­‐Islamic.	  The	  cases	   of	   Red	   Mosque794	   and	   the	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  parallel	  legal	  system	  through	  Sharia	  Nizam-­‐e-­‐Adl	  Ordinance795	  are	  testament	  to	  this	  militant	  and	  violent	  assertion	  of	  the	  Islamic	  narrative.	  Despite	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	   this,	   however,	   its	   growth	   is	   both	  visible	   and	   troubling	   for	   the	  future	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
5.6. Concluding	  remarks	  
The	   preceding	   discussion	   traced	   the	   contours	   of	   Islamic	   narrative	   on	   law	   in	  Pakistan.	  It	  considered	  its	  manifestation	  as	  natural	  law	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792	  See,	  Chapter	  2,	  On	  Religion	  and	  State	  Law:	  A	  brief	  history	  of	  Islamisation	  of	  laws,	  1973-­‐1999	  on	  page	  73.	  793	  See,	  page	  138.	  794	  See,	  page	  87.	  795	  See,	  Islamic	  law,	  Judicature	  and	  parallel	  mechanisms	  of	  Justice	  on	  page	  107.	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its	  link	  to	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  of	  the	  country.	  In	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  the	  judiciary	  has	  increasingly	  embedded	  itself	  in	  the	  Islamic	  discourse	  and	   considers	   it	   as	   the	   ideological	   foundation	   of	   the	   overall	   legal	   system.	  However,	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  Islamic	  narrative	   is	  not	   limited	  to	  the	   judicial	  sphere,	  and	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	  wider	  political	   and	   social	   discourse	   as	  well.	   It	   has	   also	  been	  discussed	   in	  the	  chapter	  that	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  and	  its	  assertion	  on	  a	  particular	   ideology	  gives	  way	  to	  militancy,	  violence	  and	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  minorities	  in	  the	  country.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  one	  significant	  argument	  presented	  above	  is	  that	  this	  perspective	  ignores	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   colonial	   history	   of	   the	   region,	   and	   betrays	   the	   same	  colonial	  logic	  that	  is	  portrayed	  by	  the	  legal	  system	  of	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  dismissive	  of	  all	  other	  normative	  ideas	  that	  it	  perceives	  as	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  Islam.	  This	  argument	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  the	  discussion	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  other	  narrative	  that	  emerges	  from	  a	  critique	  of	  alienation	  presented	  against	  the	  dominant	  legal	  system.	  It	  takes	  the	  discussion	  towards	  pluralistic	  approach	  to	  law,	  and	  emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  the	  traditional	  normative	  systems	  in	  the	  country.	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Chapter	  6: Local	   Responses	   to	   an	   Alien	   Law:	   Legal	   Pluralism	  
and	  Popular	  Legality	  	  	  
6.1. Chapter	  Synopsis	  
The	  previous	   two	   chapters	  outlined	   the	   two	  prominent	  narratives	  of	   law	   that	  exist	  in	  Pakistan.	  Chapter	  4	  discussed	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  in	  Pakistan	  that	   focusses	   exclusively	   on	   state	   authored	   law	   as	   its	   subject	  matter,796	  while	  the	   preceding	   chapter	   highlighted	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   of	   law	   that	   emanates	  from	  a	  critique	  of	  alienation	  levelled	  against	  the	  dominant	  perspective.797	  It	  was	  argued	   that	   the	   critique	   of	   foreign	   or	   alien	   nature	   of	   dominant	   law	   leads	  towards	  assertions	  by	  local	  narratives	  that	  claim	  to	  represent	  the	  traditions	  and	  beliefs	  of	   the	  people	  of	   the	  country,	  with	  the	  Islamic	  narrative	  emerging	  as	   its	  primary	   consequence.798	   The	   current	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   second	   local	  narrative	   that	   emerges	   from	   the	   critique	   of	   alien	   law,	   which	   shifts	   the	   focus	  towards	   indigenous	   and	   local	   forms	   of	   legal	   and	   normative	   orderings.	   This	  
Narrative	   of	   Legal	   Pluralism	   is	   frequently	   challenged	   by	   state	   law	   through	  declaration	   of	   illegality,799	   and	   the	   human	   rights	   discourse	   further	   supports	  these	   declarations.	   However,	   despite	   denunciations	   by	   the	   dominant	   legal	  system,	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  pluralistic	  approach	  to	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   local	   mechanisms	   of	   justice	   are	   followed	   by	   a	   large	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796	  See,	  Tracing	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  Dominant	  Legal	  Narrative	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  144.	  797	  See,	  Local	  Responses	  to	  an	  ‘Alien	  Law’:	  The	  Islamic	  Narrative	  of	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  180.	  	  798	  See,	  ‘A	  burden	  on	  the	  soul	  is	  alien	  law’	  on	  page	  181.	  799	  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  on	  page	  115.	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section	   of	   the	   country’s	   populace.800	   Their	   appeal	   lies	   not	   just	   in	   their	  traditional	  and	  historical	   linkages	  with	   the	  region	  (as	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  3),	  but	  also	  in	  their	  role	  as	  alternative	  forums	  to	  state	  courts.801	  	  The	  current	  chapter	   first	  presents	  the	  narrative	  that	  exists	   in	  Pakistan	  around	  the	  local	  legal	  and	  normative	  systems,	  and	  then	  discusses	  some	  key	  theoretical	  perspectives	   linked	   with	   this	   approach.	   It	   conducts	   a	   dialogue	   between	   the	  socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan	   and	   some	   leading	   perspectives	   of	   legal	  pluralism.	  It	  will	  also	  introduce	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘coloniality’,	  which	  will	  be	  expanded	  on	   in	  Chapter	  8	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  nuanced	  narrative	  of	   law	  in	  Pakistan.	  The	   last	  section	  will	  conclude	  the	  chapter	  by	  giving	  a	  call	  for	  caution	  against	  an	  issue	  of	  romanticism	  and	  idealisation802	  that	  runs	  through	  both	  the	  academic	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  discourse	  on	  plurality.	  This	  notion	  assumes	  an	   inherent	  beneficial	  nature	  of	  pluralistic	  systems,	  mainly	  because	  of	  their	  historical	  and	  traditional	  linkages,803	   and	   because	   of	   their	   existence	   outside	   the	   state-­‐oriented	   legal	  frameworks.	   However,	   as	   the	   case	   of	   Pakistan	   suggests,	   the	   local	   normative	  orderings	  may	   be	   just	   as	   repressive	   and	   reactionary,804	   if	   not	  more,	   than	   any	  centralised	  system	  they	  stand	  in	  contrast	  to.	  Another	  argument	  that	  flows	  from	  this	  is	  that	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  societies	  such	  as	  Pakistan,	  centuries	  of	  colonial	  rule	  have	  significantly	  tainted,	  (re)constructed	  and	  co-­‐opted	  even	  those	  systems	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800	  Nasira	  Iqbal	  (2007)	  (n	  99)106.	  801	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  71,	  77.	  802	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  91.	  803	  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  on	  page	  115.	  804	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  91.	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lie	   outside	   the	   formal	   legal	   structures.805	   Statements	   of	   a	   true	   historical	   legal	  legacy,	   then,	   can	   serve	   rhetorical	   purposes,	   but	   these	   assertions	   do	   not	   hold	  true	  in	  substance.	  	  	  
6.2. ‘The	  Law	  of	  the	  People’	  
A	  critique	  of	  the	  foreign	  nature	  of	  mainstream	  legal	  system	  in	  Pakistan	  centres	  on	  two	  arguments.	  First,	  emphasising	  the	  colonial	  history	  of	  the	  dominant	  legal	  and	  juridical	  systems,	  this	  notion	  underscores	  the	  alien	  nature	  of	  State	  laws	  and	  the	  Constitution	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  traditions	  of	  the	  region.806	  Second,	  thus	  disputing	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   inherited	   and	   dominant	   legal	   system,	   this	  perspective	   shifts	   focus	   towards	   the	   identification	   and	   assertion	   of	  representative,	  native	  and	   ‘familiar’807	   legal	  ordering.	  The	   Islamic	  narrative	  of	  law	   employs	   this	   critique	   to	   take	   the	   discourse	   towards	   a	   conception	   of	   law	  based	   on	   Islamic	   injunctions	   which,	   it	   claims,	   represent	   the	   beliefs	   of	   the	  members	  of	  the	  society	  as	  well	  as	  the	  true	  ethos	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan.	  Emanating	   from	   the	   same	   critique	   of	   the	   dominant	   legal	   framework	   and	  narrative,	   the	   Narrative	   of	   Legal	   Pluralism	   adopts	   a	   different	   approach	   and	  brings	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  prevalence	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  multiple	  normative	  and	  legal	  orders	  that	  exist	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  51-­‐55.	  806	  See,	  on	  page	  181.	  807	  Hans	  Lindahl	  (2013)	  (n	  703)	  42.	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At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   pluralistic	   narrative	   of	   law	   lies	   the	   assertion	   that	   ‘law	   is	  much	  more	   than	   State	   law’.808	   In	   its	   application	   to	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	  Pakistan,	  it	  highlights	  that	  the	  traditional	  and	  alternative	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	  have	  existed	  in	  the	  region	  since	  before	  the	  current	  State	  came	  into	  existence,	  or	  even	   before	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   British	   colonial	   regime	   in	   the	   Indian	   sub-­‐continent.809	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   there	   are	   accounts	   of	   jirgas	   and	  
panchayats	  operating	   in	   the	  region	   from	  as	   far	  back	  as	   the	  early	  eighteenth810	  and	  nineteenth	  centuries.811	  While	  the	  British	  colonial	  regime	  largely	  replaced	  these	   traditional	   systems	  with	   its	   own	   local	   administrative	   setup,	   these	  were	  formally	  re-­‐instituted	  in	  those	  instances	  where	  they	  could	  fulfil	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  colonial	   government.812	   The	   case	   of	   Official	   Jirga	   formalised	   through	   the	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations	  (FCR)	  1901	  is	  a	  relevant	  example	  in	  this	  regard.813	  In	   the	   post-­‐independence	   era,	   the	   State	   of	   Pakistan	   continued	   this	   selective	  approach	   towards	   local	   tribunals.	   While	   jirgas	   under	   direction	   of	   the	  Commissioners	  of	  Tribal	  Areas	  are	  given	  official	  status	  in	  the	  regions	  governed	  through	  the	  FCR,814	  the	  formal	  legal	  system	  does	  not	  grant	  legal	  recognition	  to	  any	  other	  instance	  of	  local	  tribunals,	  and	  considers	  them	  as	  unconstitutional.815	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
808	  Baudouin	  Dupret,	  'Legal	  Pluralism,	  Plurality	  of	  Laws,	  and	  Legal	  Practices:	  Theories,	  Critiques,	  and	  Praxiological	  Re-­‐specification'	  European	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6852>	  last	  accessed	  18	  January	  2012,	  1.	  809	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  187.	  810	  Robert	  Nichols	  (2001)	  (n	  467)	  4.	  811	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  187.	  812	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  94.	  813	  The	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulation,	  1901.	  814	  Ibid.	  815	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  (n	  1).	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However,	   despite	   the	   proclamations	   of	   illegality,	   the	   proponents	   of	   these	  normative	  orderings	  as	  well	  as	  socio-­‐legal	  scholars	  highlight	   their	  significance	  and	  prevalence	   in	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain.	  Azam	  Chaudhary,	   through	  his	  anthropological	   study	  of	   law	   in	  Pakistan’s	   rural	   villages,	   goes	   as	   far	   as	   calling	  the	   traditional	   law	   and	   local	   tribunals	   the	   dominant	   system	   of	   law	   in	  Pakistan.816	  Building	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  alienation	  of	  people	  from	  the	  state-­‐oriented	  legal	   system,	   it	   is	   claimed	  by	   some	   sections	   of	   the	   society	   that	   the	   law	  of	   the	  state	   ‘is	  not	   the	   law	  of	   the	  people’.817	   Justice	  Nasira	   Iqbal,	   though	  arguing	  that	  these	  customary	  tribunals	  ‘are	  often	  illegal	  on	  the	  standard	  of	  Common	  law	  and	  Sharia	   Law	   principles’,818	   concedes	   the	   prevalence	   of	   local	   mechanisms	   of	  justice	   in	   rural	   areas.819	   A	   2004	   research	   study	   conducted	   by	   the	   Sustainable	  Development	   Policy	   Institute	   (SDPI)	   in	   twenty-­‐six	   villages	   in	   four	   districts	   of	  Punjab	  pointed	  out	  that	  	  
there	   was	   a	   very	   high	   level	   of	   satisfaction	   expressed	   with	   justice	  provided	   by	   the	   jirga	   or	   panchayat	   system	   and	   of	   one	   hundred	   and	  eighteen	   respondents,	   79	  %	   said	   they	  would	   continue	   to	   use	   the	   jirga	  system	  in	  the	  future.	  Fairness	  (31.5	  %),	  speediness	  (30.6%),	  and	  expense	  (26	   %)	   were	   the	   reasons	   cited	   for	   this	   confidence	   in	   the	   traditional	  system	  of	  justice.820	  	  	  Based	  on	  such	  assertions,	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  writes	  that	  as	   ‘“formal”	   laws	  are	  not	  the	  sole	  regulatory	  norms’	  in	  Pakistan,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	  towards	  other	  ‘parallel	   legal	   systems	   (which	   are	   often	   informal	   and	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   customary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (2009)	  (n	  420)	  101.	  817	  Adamson	  Hoebel	  (1965)	  (n	  421)	  45.	  818	  Nasira	  Iqbal	  (2007)	  (n	  99)	  106.	  819	  Ibid.	  	  820	  Samar	  Minallah	  (2006)	  (n	  423)	  2.	  For	  a	  detailed	  report	  of	  this	  study,	  see	  Foqia	  Sadiq	  Khan	  (2004)	  (n	  705)	  42.	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norms)	   working	   alongside	   the	   black	   letter	   law	   and	   regulations.’821	   This	  acknowledgement	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   traditional	   justice	   mechanisms	   is	  occasionally	   echoed	   in	   the	   mainstream	   media	   and	   legal	   fraternity	   as	   well.	   A	  former	  judge	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  stated	  in	  2012	  that	  the	  ‘efficient	  use	  of	  centuries	  old	  (sic.)	  Jirga	  and	  Panchayat	  system	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  society	  for	  resolution	  of	  all	  sort	  of	  disputes	  within	  the	  communities	  and	  tribes	   is	  a	  proof	  of	  the	  success	  of	  Mediation	  and	  Alternative	  Dispute	  Resolution	  (ADR)	  mechanisms.’822	  Similarly,	  at	   a	   conference	   organised	   by	   the	   SDPI,	   one	   of	   the	   foremost	   research	  organisations	   in	   the	   country,	   participants	   voiced	   that	   ‘jirgas	   and	   panchayats	  need	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  modern	  realities…	  to	  ensure	  transparency,	  accuracy	  and	   greater	   success	   in	   the	   system.’823	   Even	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   Pakistan	   is	  reported	  to	  have	  stated	  in	  2010	  that	  the	  country	  ‘still	  needs	  the	  local	  methods	  of	  dispute	   resolution	   such	   as	   jirga	   and	  panchayat	   for	   ensuring	   speedy	   justice	   in	  small	  offences,’	   though	  he	  acknowledged	   that	   these	  mechanisms	  have	  become	  problematic	   ‘as	  they	  could	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  time,	  the	  newly	  emerging	   human	   rights,	   norms	   of	   equity,	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.’824	  The	   new	  ADR	   projects	   emerging	   in	   the	   country	   in	   different	   areas	   of	   law	   also	  acknowledge	   the	   ‘familiarity’	   of	   the	   Pakistani	   society	   to	   traditional	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  170.	  822	  LJCP	  (2012)	  (n	  547)	  302.	  823	  The	  Express	  Tribune,	  'Dispute	  settlement:	  Experts	  underscore	  alternative	  modes'	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  12	  December	  2013)	  <http://pakistan.worldnewsviews.com/2013/12/12/dispute-­‐settlement-­‐experts-­‐underscore-­‐alternative-­‐modes/>	  last	  accessed	  13	  December	  2013.	  824	  The	  Nation,	  'CJP	  stresses	  jirga,	  panchayat's	  role'	  The	  Nation	  (Lahore,	  Pakistan	  30	  April	  2010)	  <http://www.nation.com.pk/politics/30-­‐Apr-­‐2010/CJP-­‐stresses-­‐jirga-­‐panchayats-­‐role>	  last	  accessed	  07	  January	  2013.	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alternate	  forms	  of	  dispute	  resolution,	  and	  aim	  towards	  ‘[benefitting]	  from	  that	  familiarity’	  in	  establishing	  different	  methods	  of	  dispute	  resolution.825	  	  However,	   even	   with	   the	   persistence	   and	   	   appeal	   of	   these	   traditional	  mechanisms	  of	   justice,	   the	   rising	   human	   rights	   concerns	  mean	   that	   there	   is	   a	  conflict	  between	  the	  pluralist	  narrative	  of	  law	  and	  the	  perspectives	  that	  assert	  the	  exclusivity	  of	  the	  state-­‐authored	  law.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  statements	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  superior	  judiciary	  cited	  above,	  the	  formal	  legal	  system,826	  rights	  activists	  and	  political	  commentators	  generally	  denounce	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  traditional	  normative	  orderings,	  both	  on	  account	  of	  their	  existence	  as	  a	  parallel	  judicial	  system	  as	  well	  as	  their	  perceived	  incompatibility	  with	  human	  rights.827	  They	   argue	   that	   the	   traditional	   and	   local	   normative	   orderings	   reflect	   the	  skewed	   structures	   of	   power,	   patriarchy,	   misogyny	   and	   religious	  totalitarianism.828	   There	   have	   been	   numerous	   instances	   in	   which	   the	   rulings	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  local	  courts	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  persecution	  of	  women	  and	   the	   marginalised	   communities.829	   Based	   on	   this,	   human	   rights	   activists	  argue	   that	   in	   Pakistan,	   ‘women	   have	   always	   become	   (sic.)	   victims	   of	   such	  parallel	  judicial	  systems	  and	  weak	  implementation	  of	  laws.’830	  They	  also	  argue	  that	   the	   ‘ruling	  class	   is	  responsible	   for	  the	  continuance	  of	  panchayat	  and	   jirga	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825	  Investment	  Climate	  Advisory	  Services	  in	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  	  (n	  632).	  	  826	  For	  instance,	  see	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  (n	  1).	  827	  Rabia	  Ali	  (2001)	  (n	  443	  25.	  828	  Saima	  Jasam	  (2009)	  (n	  452)	  2.	  829	  Some	  of	  the	  instances	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  in	  the	  section	  on	  Traditional	  law.	  See,	  page	  115.	  830	  The	  Express	  Tribune,	  'Rights’	  activists	  urge	  SC	  to	  ban	  jirga	  system'	  The	  Express	  Tribune	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  31	  May	  2012)	  <http://tribune.com.pk/story/386606/parallel-­‐courts-­‐rights-­‐activists-­‐urge-­‐sc-­‐to-­‐ban-­‐jirga-­‐system/>	  last	  accessed	  12	  September	  2013.	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justice	   system	  which	   is	   parallel	   to	   the	   prevailing	   judicial	   system,’831	   and	   that	  these	  systems	  are	   ‘hardly	  based	  on	  system	  of	   justice	  (sic.).’832	  It	   is	  due	  to	  such	  assertions	  and	  human	  rights	  violations,	   that	   the	  Sindh	  High	  Court	  declared	  all	  
jirgas	  and	  panchayats	  to	  be	  illegal.833	  	  To	   conceptualise	   the	  place	   of	   the	   local	   and	   traditional	   orderings	   in	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	   terrain,	   and	   to	   understand	   the	   wider	   conflict	   between	   these	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  state-­‐oriented	   legal	  system,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   turn	   to	   the	  academic	  discourse	  on	  legal	  pluralism	  that	  has	  been	  considering	  such	  issues	  for	  the	   past	   several	   decades.	   But	   prior	   to	   that,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   address	   some	  concerns	   that	   readily	   emerge	   from	   any	   discussion	   on	   legal	   pluralism.	   Any	  argument	   for	   a	   move	   away	   from	   the	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   state	   law	   to	   include	  other	   legal	   and	   normative	   orderings	   as	   units	   of	   analysis	   raises	   two	   vital	  questions:	   Why	   should	   the	   normative	   systems	   under	   consideration	   be	  examined	   through	   the	   language	   of	   law?834	   And,	   what	   are	   the	   benefits	   that	  emerge	   from	   a	   focus	   on	   non-­‐state	   systems	   of	   law?	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   first	  question,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   point	   out	   that	   any	   focus	   on	   non-­‐state	   legal	   or	  normative	  orderings,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan,	  is	  not	  merely	  born	  of	  academic	   or	   social	   scientific	   need	   to	   create	   novel	   categories.	   Rather,	   as	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  individuals	  living	  in	  Pakistan	  adhere	  to	  traditional	  normative	  orderings	  and	  follow	  them	  as	  valid	  legal	  mechanisms	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
831	  Ali	  Shan	  Shah	  and	  Shahnaz	  Tariq,	  'Implications	  of	  Parallel	  Judicial	  System	  (Panchayat	  and	  Jirga)	  on	  Society'	  (2013)	  2	  (2)	  Asian	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  &	  Humanities	  200,	  201.	  832	  Ibid.	  204.	  833	  Mst.	  Shazia	  v.	  SHO	  (n	  1)	  834	  Some	  critics	  of	  Legal	  Pluralism,	  such	  as	  Tamanaha	  argue	  that	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  pluralism	  lies	  outside	  the	  domain	  of	  law.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Brian	  Z.	  Tamanaha,	  'The	  Folly	  of	  the	  'Social	  Scientific'	  Concept	  of	  Legal	  Pluralism'	  (1993)	  20	  (2)	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  192.	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viable	  alternatives	  to	  the	  legal	  recourse	  provided	  by	  the	  State.835	  The	  presence	  of	   non-­‐state	   or	   informal	   systems	   of	   law	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   fact	   and	   therefore	   an	  approach	  to	  law	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  include	  and	  analyse	  them,	  rather	  than	  exclude	  them,	   becomes	   a	   necessary	   step	   towards	   a	   contextual	   understanding	   of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry.	  Moreover,	  amongst	  all	  the	  different	  narratives	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan	  identified	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  only	  the	  pluralistic	  perspective	  that	  enables	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  traditional	  justice	  systems	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	  	  In	  relation	  to	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  benefits	  of	   the	  pluralistic	  approach,	   it	  should	  be	  acknowledged	   that	   there	   may	   be	   no	   intrinsic	   or	   inherent	   advantages	   of	  focussing	   on	   non-­‐state	   normative	   or	   legal	   systems.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	   actually	   a	  need	  to	  be	  cautious	  against	  the	  romantic	  notions	  of	  some	  form	  of	  timeless	  and	  pure	   traditional	   orderings.	   Boaventura	   De	   Sousa	   Santos	   warns	   against	   the	  ‘romantic	   bias’	   of	   conceptions	   of	   pluralistic	   analysis	   of	   law	   and	   society,	   and	  points	   out	   that	   ‘there	   are	   instances	   of	   legal	   pluralism	   that	   are	   quite	  reactionary’.836	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  why	  this	  approach	  is	  significant.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  (perceived)	  aims	  of	  systems	  of	  law	  and	  justice,	   rather	   than	   an	   exclusive	   emphasis	   on	   the	   dominant	   institutions.	   This	  approach	   compels	   us	   to	   realise	   that,	   just	   as	   there	   is	   no	   intrinsic	   benefit	   of	  focussing	  on	  non-­‐state	  normative	  orderings,	   there	   is	  no	   inherent	  advantage	  of	  vesting	   in	   the	   state	   the	   exclusive	   authority	   to	   author	   valid	   law.837	   If	   the	  generally	   claimed	   purpose	   of	   the	   dominant	   legal	   and	   juridical	   systems	   is	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835	  See,	  Chapter	  3,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  on	  page	  115.	  836	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  91.	  837	  See,	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2007)	  (n	  28).	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provide	   justice	   to	   its	   subjects,	   any	   system	   that	   is	   deficient	   on	   this	   account	  should	  be	  reconsidered	  and	  re-­‐evaluated.	  Roger	  Cotterrell	  eloquently	  argues	  for	  this	   re-­‐emphasis	   on	   sociology	   and	  pluralistic	   versions	   of	   law,	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  
…there	  is	  now	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  examine	  how	  far	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  legal	  doctrine	   and	   its	   use	   can	   be	   linked	   more	   closely	   to	   the	   demands	   and	  requirements	   of	   individual	   citizens	   arising	   from	   their	   everyday	   social	  experience.	   We	   need	   to	   ask	   how	   far	   law,	   considered	   as	   deliberately	  constructed	  regulation,	  can	  be	  reclaimed	  from	  a	  kind	  of	  social	   isolation	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  abstract	  policies	  only	  indirectly	  reflecting	  individual	  moral	  experience	  of	  many	  citizens.	  We	  need	  to	  consider	  law	  not	  only	  in	  ‘top-­‐down’	   terms…[we	   ought]	   to	   think	   of	   it	   equally	   as	   something	   that	  might	   grow	   spontaneously	   out	   of	   everyday	   conditions	   of	   social	  interaction,	   and	   might	   provide	   a	   part	   of	   the	   cement	   that	   gives	   moral	  meaning	  to	  social	  existence.838	  	  This	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	   law	  in	  society,	  born	  mainly	  of	  disenchantment	  both	  with	  mainstream	   legal	   orders	   as	  well	   as	  mainstream	   legal	   narratives,	   provides	   the	  foundational	   concerns	  of	   the	  pluralistic	  approach	   to	   law.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  vein	   that	  the	  paradigm	  of	   legal	  pluralism	  has	  gained	  ascendancy.	   Since	   the	  1970s,	   legal	  pluralism	   ‘has	   become	   the	   key	   concept	   of	   post-­‐modern	   view	   of	   law’839	   and	  provides	  an	  alternative	  viewpoint	  to	  understand	  the	  law-­‐society-­‐state	  equation.	  Yilmaz	   considers	   legal	   pluralism	   a	   significant	   addition	   to	   legal	   analysis	   that	  accepts	   ‘a	   more	   complex	   relation	   between	   law	   and	   society’,	   as	   law	   is	  conceptualised	  ‘not	  located	  entirely	  in	  the	  state.’840	  Some	  theorists	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  ‘Law	  everywhere	  is	  fundamentally	  pluralist	  in	  character’	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
838	  Roger	  Cotterrell,	  Law’s	  Community:	  Legal	  Theory	  in	  Sociological	  Perspective	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford	  2005)	  307.	  839	  Brian	  Z.	  Tamanaha	  (2000)	  (n	  26)	  296.	  840	  Ihsan	  Yilmaz,	  Mulism	  Laws,	  Politics	  and	  Society	  in	  Modern	  Nation	  States:	  Dynamic	  Legal	  
Pluralisms	  in	  England,	  Turkey	  and	  Pakistan	  (Ashgate,	  Aldershot	  2005)	  2.	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that	  ‘[t]oday,	  this	  pluralism	  is	  so	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  it	  can	  be	  assumed’.841	  Despite	  this	  acknowledgement,	  however,	  legal	  pluralism	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	   a	   single	   theory;	   it	   is	   rather	   an	   umbrella	   term	   for	   a	   group	   of	   theories,	  standpoints,	   sociological	   approaches	   to	   law	   and	   critiques	   of	   legal	   analysis.	  These	   propositions	   present	   varied	   conceptions	   of	   the	   meaning(s)	   of	   law,	   its	  boundaries,	  the	  organisation	  of	  normative	  and	  legal	  structures	  in	  a	  society,	  and	  the	  means	   to	   analyse	   them.	  This	   essentially	   creates	   a	   situation	  where	  we	   can	  now	  observe	  a	   ‘plurality	  of	   legal	  pluralisms’842	  rather	  than	  one	  holistic	  theory,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  perspectives	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  	  
6.3. ‘Law	   is	   much	   more	   than	   State	   Law’:	   The	   Plurality	   of	   Legal	  
Pluralisms	  
Like	  other	  paradigms	  in	  the	  field	  of	  socio-­‐legal	  analysis,	  a	  precise	  definition	  of	  pluralism	  or	  popular	  law	  is	  difficult	  to	  arrive	  at	  because,	  as	  Abel	  points	  out,	  the	  ‘boundaries	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  are	  constantly	  shifting	  as	  new	  institutions	  are	  created	   or	   old	   ones	   recharacterised’.843	   Despite	   the	   variances	   between	   these	  trends,	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  these	  perspectives	  is	  the	  ‘very	  basic	  idea	  that	  law	  is	  much	   more	   than	   state	   law.’844	   They	   highlight	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   the	   state-­‐oriented	   positivistic	   notions	   of	   law	   in	   grasping	   the	   complex	   realities	   of	   social	  existence.	  Santos	  notes	  that,	  at	  its	  very	  basic,	  legal	  pluralism	  ‘concerns	  the	  idea	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841	  Brian	  Z.	  Tamanaha	  (2000)	  (n	  26)	  297.	  842	  Ibid.	  843	  Richard	  L.	  Abel,	  'Introduction:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Informal	  Justice'	  in	  Richard	  L.	  Abel	  (ed)	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Informal	  Justice	  (Academic	  Press,	  London	  1982)	  2.	  844	  Baudouin	  Dupret	  (2007)	  (n	  808)	  1.	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that	  more	  than	  one	  legal	  system	  operate	  in	  a	  polity’.845	  He	  posits	  pluralism	  as	  a	  counter	   to	   the	   legal	  positivistic	  approach,	  which	  has	   turned	   into	  a	   ‘hegemonic	  (i.e.	  commonsensical)	  thesis	  about	  law,	  state	  legal	  centralism	  or	  exclusivism’.846	  Sally	   Engle	  Merry,	  writing	   about	  mediation	   in	   non-­‐industrial	   societies,	   argues	  that	   ‘the	   formality	  of	   the	   courts,	   their	   adherence	   to	  an	  adversary	  model,	   their	  strict	   rules	   of	   procedure,	   and	   their	   reliance	   on	   adjudications	   render	   them	  inappropriate	   for	   handling	   many	   kinds	   of	   interpersonal	   quarrels	   arising	   in	  ongoing	  social	  relationships’.847	  Popular	  law	  and	  pluralism	  carries	  this	  critique	  of	   positivistic	   and	   centralist	   notions	   of	   law	   further	   as	   a	  way	   of	   distinguishing	  itself	   from	   the	   general	   characteristics	   of	   state-­‐led	   formal	   law,	   defining	   itself	  through	  its	  negation.	  For	  instance,	  Abel	  argues	  that	  this	  informal	  form	  of	  law	  ‘is	  less	  a	  positive	  ideal	  than	  a	  set	  of	  loosely	  associated	  aversions	  to	  characteristics	  of	  formal	  justice.’848	  He	  offers	  the	  parameters	  of	  informal	  and	  popular	  law	  in	  the	  same	  terms,	  in	  which	  popular	  law	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  being	  
unofficial	   (dissociated	   from	   state	   power),	   noncoercive	   (dependent	   on	  rhetoric	   rather	   than	   force),	   nonbureaucratic,	   decentralised,	   relatively	  undifferentiated,	   and	   non-­‐professional;	   its	   substantive	   and	   procedural	  rules	   are	   imprecise,	   unwritten,	   demotic,	   flexible,	   ad	   hoc,	   and	  particularistic.849	  	  Some	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	  informal	  justice	  identified	  by	  Abel	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  local	  tribunals	  in	  Pakistan	  as,	  despite	  the	  substantive	  and	  structural	  fluidity	  of	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  89.	  846	  Ibid.	  90.	  847	  Sally	  Engle	  Merry,	  'The	  Social	  Organisation	  of	  Mediation	  in	  Nonindustrial	  Societies:	  Implications	  for	  Informal	  Community	  Justice	  in	  America'	  in	  Richard	  L.	  Abel	  (ed)	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Informal	  Justice	  (Academic	  Press,	  London	  1982)	  17.	  848	  Richard	  L.	  Abel	  (1982)	  (n	  843)	  2.	  849	  Ibid.	  	  2	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different	   forms	   of	   traditional	   courts,850	   they	   are	   generally	   unofficial,	  decentralised	   and	   devoid	   of	   a	   fixed	   bureaucratic	   structure.	   However,	   while	  communal	  and	  rhetorical	  reprimands	  do	  form	  a	  mechanism	  of	  enforcement	  for	  these	  structures,	  coercion	  and	  severe	  punishments	  are	  also	  often	  relied	  upon.851	  This	  element	  of	  coercion	  and	  harsh	  punishments	   is	   the	  main	   issue	  that	  brings	  these	  traditional	  systems	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  mainstream	  legal	  structures	  and	  the	   rights-­‐based	  narrative	  within	   the	   society.852	  The	  need,	   therefore,	   is	   not	   to	  conceive	   of	   these	   systems	   as	   diametrical	   opposites	   to	   the	   state-­‐oriented	   legal	  systems,	  but	  approach	  them	  as	  different	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  	  In	  his	  1986	  paper,	  which	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  key	  and	  originary	  sources	  for	  the	   discussion	   of	   legal	   pluralism,	   Griffiths	   analyses	   some	   of	   the	   key	  characteristics	  of	  pluralism.	  He	  argues	  that	  legal	  pluralism	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  society	  and	  a	  category	  of	  societal	  analysis,	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  category	  of	  law.	  Griffiths	  advances	  the	  same	  notion,	  which	  Vanderlinden	  later	  supported,	  that	  in	  order	   for	  pluralism	  to	  exist,	   ‘more	   than	  one	   law	  must	  be	  present’.853	  He	  bases	  his	   conception	   of	   pluralism	   on	   Sally	   Falk	   Moore’s	   proposition	   (discussed	  below),	  though	  he	  rejects	  her	  differentiation	  between	  law	  and	  social	  fields	  as	  a	  ‘last-­‐minute	   lapse	   into	   legal	   centralism.’854	   To	   propose	   his	   own	   reading	   of	  pluralism,	  Griffiths	  writes:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
850	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420)	  85.	  851	  Ibid.	  852	  The	  Express	  Tribune	  (31	  May	  2012)	  (n	  830).	  	  853	  John	  Griffiths	  (1986)	  (n	  688)	  38.	  854	  Ibid.	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Legal	   pluralism	   is	   a	   concomitant	   of	   social	   pluralism:	   the	   legal	  
organization	   of	   society	   is	   congruent	   with	   its	   social	   organization.	   “Legal	  Pluralism”	  refers	  to	  the	  normative	  heterogeneity	  attendant	  upon	  the	  fact	  that	  social	  action	  always	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  context	  of	  multiple,	  overlapping	  “semi-­‐autonomous	  social	  fields”,	  which,	  it	  may	  be	  added,	  is	  in	  practise	  a	  dynamic	  condition.855	  	  He	  also	  considers	  pluralism	  to	  be	  an	   ‘omnipresent,	  normal	  situation	   in	  human	  society’.856	   In	   this	   ubiquitous	   pluralistic	   legal	   situation,	   ‘law	   and	   legal	  institutions	   are	   not	   all	   subsumable	   within	   one	   “system”	   but	   have	   their	   own	  sources	   in	   the	   self-­‐regulatory	   activities	   of	   all	   the	   multifarious	   social	   fields	  present…’.857	  Griffiths	  differentiates	  between	  definition	  of	  pluralism	  in	  the	  weak	  
sense,	  where	  multiple	  normative	  orders	  are	  considered	   to	  owe	   their	  existence	  and	   recognition	   to	   state	   law,	   and	   the	   strong	   sense,	   where	   no	   such	   need	   for	  recognition	   exists	   between	   multiple	   normative	   orderings.858	   This	   notion	   of	  pluralism	   through	   weak	   and	   strong	   definitions	   is	   also	   applicable	   to	   the	  conception	   put	   forward	   by	  Masaji	   Chiba.	   Chiba	   takes	   a	   different	   approach	   to	  understand	  this	  phenomenon	  and	  creates	  a	  differentiation	  between	  official	  and	  unofficial	  law,859	  where	  unofficial	  law	  is	  one	  that	  has	  not	  been	  authorised	  by	  the	  sovereign	  or	  state	  authorities,	  but	  is	  followed	  in	  practise.860	  Significant	  as	  these	  propositions	   are,	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   current	   study	   makes	   is	   that	   this	  distinction	  of	  categories	  such	  as	  official	  or	  unofficial	   laws,	  and	  weak	  or	  strong	  pluralism,	   reflects	   the	   same	   epistemic	   distinction	   that	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
855	  Ibid.	  856	  Ibid.	  39.	  857	  Ibid.	  39.	  858	  Ibid.	  8.	  859	  Werner	  Menski,	  Comparative	  Law	  in	  a	  Global	  Context:	  The	  Legal	  Systems	  of	  Asia	  and	  Africa	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  2006)	  124-­‐126;	  also,	  Werner	  Menski	  (2010)	  (n	  96)	  43.	  860	  Werner	  Menski	  (2006)	  (n	  859)	  124-­‐126.	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distinction	   between	   formal	   and	   informal	   systems	   of	   law.	   Through	   this	  categorisation,	  while	   the	   formal	  systems	  are	   included	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	   law,	  the	   informal	   systems	   are	   reduced	   to	   be	   something	   other	   than	   law.	   It	   is	   this	  ‘Weberian	  antinomy’	   that	  generates	  the	   ‘false	  antinomies	  of	  popular	   justice’861	  in	   the	   first	  place,	   therefore,	   is	  unable	   to	  provide	  us	   a	  way	   to	   comprehend	   the	  socio-­‐legal	   architecture	   of	   Pakistan,	   and	   the	   place	   of	   traditional	   or	   popular	  forms	  of	  justice	  within	  it.	  	  Santos	   takes	   us	   a	   step	   further	   in	   this	   regard.	   To	   study	   situations	   such	   as	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain,	   he	   employs	   the	   terminology	   of	  plurality	   of	   legal	  
orders	  rather	  than	  legal	  pluralism.862	  He	  asserts	  that	  although	  the	  time-­‐space	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  has	  become	  the	  most	  dominant	  category	  of	  the	  modern	  era,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  time-­‐space	  that	  law	  operates	  in.	  He	  presents	  a	  ‘conception	  of	  socio-­‐legal	   fields	   operating	   in	   multi-­‐layered	   time-­‐spaces’,863	   which	   affect	   the	  individual	   simultaneously.	   He	   terms	   this	   overlapping	   and	   interpenetrating	  system	  of	  legal	  orderings	  interlegality.864	  Santos	  asserts	  that	  we	  ‘live	  in	  a	  time	  of	  porous	   legality	   or	   of	   legal	   porosity,	   [with]	   multiple	   networks	   of	   legal	   orders	  forcing	   us	   to	   constant	   transitions	   and	   trespassing’.865	   The	   concept	   of	  
interlegality	   recognises	   the	   different	   strengths	   and	   symmetries	   of	   legal	   and	  normative	   orders,	   while	   also	   acknowledging	   their	   dynamic	   engagement	   with	  each	  other.	  But	  this	  engagement	  is	  not	  always	  conciliatory	  or	  hierarchical.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
861	  Alan	  Norrie,	  Law	  and	  the	  Beautiful	  Soul	  (The	  GlassHouse	  Press,	  London	  2005)	  36.	  862	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  89-­‐97.	  863	  Ibid.	  437.	  864	  Ibid.	  865	  Ibid.	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contact	  zones,	  where	  these	  normative	  orders	  encounter	  and	  conflict	  with	  each	  other,	   are	   spheres	   where	   ‘rival	   normative	   ideas,	   knowledges,	   power	   forms,	  symbolic	  universes	  and	  agencies	  meet	   in	  unequal	  conditions	  and	  resist,	  reject,	  assimilate,	   imitate,	   subvert	  each	  other,	  giving	  rise	   to	  hybrid	   legal	  and	  political	  constellations.’866	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  interlegality	  is	  one	  of	  the	  perspectives	  of	  legal	  pluralistic	  approach	  that	  gives	  us	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  engagement	  between	  multiple	  legal	  orderings	  in	  Pakistan.	   The	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan,	   considered	   from	   this	   angle,	  presents	  an	  interlegal	   ‘terrain	  of	  contestation’.867	  In	  this	  terrain,	  dominant	  law,	  Islamic	   law,	   traditional	   law	   and	   colonial	   law	   exist	   simultaneously	   in	   a	  multi-­‐layered	   time-­‐space,	   come	   into	   conflict,	   and	   struggle	   for	   domination	   and	  survival.868	   The	   Islamic	   laws	   within	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   and	   constitutional	  frameworks,869	  the	  oscillation	  between	  religious	  and	  secular	  notions	  of	  law,	  the	  institution	   of	   Official	   Jirgas	   coupled	  with	   the	   declarations	   of	   illegality	   against	  local	  tribunals	  in	  general,870	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  instances	  of	  the	  contact	  zones	  of	   this	   interlegal	   ordering.	  The	   significance	  of	   the	   insights	   offered	  by	   Santos’s	  conception	  of	  plurality	  granted,	  there	  are	  two	  questions	  that	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  an	   adequate	   explanation	   for.	   First,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   acknowledged	   that	  within	   this	  interlegal	   space	   the	   state	   law	   plays	   a	   dominant	   role	   because	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
866	  Ibid.	  472.	  867	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  (2005)	  (n	  5)	  183.	  868	  See,	  Pakistan’s	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  and	  the	  Narratives	  of	  Law	  on	  page	  142.	  869	  See,	  Islam	  and	  the	  Constitution	  on	  page	  103.	  870	  See,	  page	  1.	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‘hegemony’871	  of	  positivist	  conception	  of	  law,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  explain	  the	  perverse	  and	  colonial	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  in	  Pakistan.	  Second,	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  the	   Islamic	   narrative	   on	   law	   provides	   evidence	   for	   similar	   hegemonic	  characteristics	   that	   inhere	  within	  this	  discourse	  which,	  arguably,	  emerge	  from	  somewhere	   outside	   the	   time-­‐space	   of	   the	   state.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   these	  issues	  further,	  there	  are	  some	  other	  conceptions	  within	  pluralist	  paradigm	  that	  might	  enable	  us	  to	  build	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  interlegality.	  	  Sally	   Falk	   Moore’s	   conception	   of	   pluralism,	   which	   has	   been	   ‘unanimously	  applauded	  among	  legal	  pluralists	  for	  having	  provided	  the	  locus	  of	  law	  in	  socio-­‐legal	  research,’	  leads	  the	  discussion	  in	  a	  different	  direction.872	  Moore	  focuses	  on	  the	  sociology	  of	  society	  rather	  than	  law	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  legal	  pluralism.	  She	  argues	  against	  the	  narrow	  conception	  of	  law	  in	  which	  law	  is	  considered	  an	  instrument	  for	  social	  engineering.	  873	  In	  this	  narrow	  version,	  law	  is	  ‘abstracted	  from	  the	  social	  context	  in	  which	  it	  exists,	  and	  is	  spoken	  of	  as	  it	  were	  an	  entity	  capable	   of	   controlling	   that	   context.’874	   As	   the	   locus	   of	   law	   lies	   in	   the	   society,	  Moore	  contends	  that	   it	   is	  necessary	  that	  both	  are	  examined	  together.	  Through	  her	  analysis	  of	  different	  case	  studies,	  she	  makes	  an	  argument	  for	   focussing	  on	  
semi-­‐autonomous	   social	   fields,	   which	   are	   ubiquitous	   in	   both	   ‘tribal’	   as	  well	   as	  complex	   societies,	   as	   the	   main	   unit	   of	   anthropological	   and	   socio-­‐legal	  analysis.875	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  90.	  872	  Baudouin	  Dupret	  (2007)	  (n	  808)	  5.	  873	  Sally	  Falk	  Moore	  (1973)	  (n	  620)	  719.	  874	  Ibid.	  	  875	  Ibid.	  720.	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  Moore	  writes	   that	   in	  any	  society,	   there	  exist	  multiple	  semi-­‐autonomous	  social	  fields	   ‘to	  which	  the	   individual	  belongs’.876	  The	  nature	  and	  boundaries	  of	   these	  social	   fields	   are	   not	   defined	   by	   their	   structure,	   but	   through	   the	   ‘processual	  characteristics’	   of	   producing	   rules	   and	   ensuring	   compliance	   to	   them.877	   She	  argues	  that	  these	  social	  fields	  ‘have	  their	  own	  customs	  and	  rules	  and	  the	  means	  of	   coercing	  or	   inducing	  compliance’	  –	  a	   ‘legal	  order’	   in	   the	  Weberian	  sense.878	  The	  boundaries	  of	  these	  social	  fields	  may	  be	  aligned	  with	  corporates	  (groups	  of	  individuals),	  or	  a	  complex	  ‘unending’	  chain	  of	  corporates,	  which	  are	  connected,	  interdependent,	   as	   well	   as	   open	   to	   influences	   from	   the	   wider	   society.	   The	  interdependence	   of	   these	   social	   fields,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   openness	   to	   the	   larger	  societal	  setting,	  determines	  their	  relative	  possibilities	  and	  degrees	  of	  autonomy.	  Moore	  recognises	  the	  centrality	  of	  state	  in	  the	  modern	  legal	  order,	  and	  concedes	  that	   as	   ‘the	   law	   of	   the	   sovereign	   states	   is	   hierarchical	   in	   form,	   no	   social	   field	  within	   a	  modern	  polity	   could	  be	   absolutely	   autonomous	   from	  a	   legal	   point	   of	  view.’879	   However,	   she	   maintains	   that	   state	   law	   is	   just	   one	   among	   several	  factors	  that	  guide	  the	  behaviour	  of	  subjects	  –	  the	  totality	  of	  normative	  rules	  that	  govern	  individual	  and	  collective	  action	  include	  law,	  but	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  far	  greater	  than	  it.	  Against	  Hoebel’s	  position	  of	  force,	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  force,	  forming	  the	  distinction	  between	  law	  and	  norms,	  she	  asserts	  that	  ‘though	  the	  formal	  legal	  institutions	   may	   enjoy	   a	   near	   monopoly	   on	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   force,	   they	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  Ibid.	  721.	  877	  Ibid.	  722.	  878	  Ibid.	  721.	  879	  Ibid.	  742.	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cannot	  be	   said	   to	  have	  a	  monopoly	  of	   any	  kind	  on	   the	  other	  various	   forms	  of	  effective	  coercion	  or	  effective	  inducement.’880	  	  There	   are	   three	   main	   facets	   of	   Moore’s	   conception	   of	   pluralism	   that	   Dupret	  identifies:	   First,	   the	   identification	   of	   social	   fields	   as	   the	  main	   bodies	   of	   social	  control	   and	   normative	   ordering;	   second,	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   overlapping	   of	  these	   fields	   in	   that	   an	   individual	   may	   belong	   to	   several	   social	   fields	  simultaneously;	   and	   third,	   the	   ‘capacity	   of	   resistance’	   to	   maintain	   their	  normativity	   by	   resisting	   outside	   (even	   legal)	   influences.881	   This	   perhaps	  provides	  us	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  conceptualise	   the	  role	  of	   the	  traditional	  orderings	  within	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   Pakistan.	   Dupret	   points	   out	   that	   despite	   the	  identification	  of	  social	  fields	  as	  the	  main	  units	  of	  sociological	  analysis,	  Moore’s	  model	   maintains	   the	   distinction	   between	   law	   and	   other	   societal	   normative	  orderings.	  I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  this	  conception	  provides	  us	  within	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  comprehend	  the	  encounter	  between	  contested	  legalities.	  Moore’s	  idea	  of	  semi-­‐autonomous	   social	   fields	   includes	   the	   concession	   (theoretically)	   of	   a	  ‘complete	   domination’	   of	   these	   social	   fields	   by	   outside	   influences,	   the	   most	  significant	  of	  which	  are	  the	  proclamations	  emerging	  from	  the	  hierarchical	  form	  of	   modern	   state	   law.882	   The	   varied	   normative	   orderings,	   then,	   either	   remain	  
non-­‐legal,	  or	  the	  authority	  to	  accept	  them	  as	  legal	  normativities	  remains	  vested	  in	   the	   state	   law.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   in	   relation	   to	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry,	  where	  the	  dominant	  legal	  system	  either	  declares	  alternate	  justice	  mechanisms	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  Ibid.	  721.	  881	  Baudouin	  Dupret	  (2007)	  (n	  808)	  5.	  882	  Sally	  Falk	  Moore	  (1973)	  (n	  620)	  742.	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as	  illegal,	  or	  co-­‐opts	  them	  in	  limited	  geographical	  and	  normative	  spaces	  for	  its	  own	   benefit.	   The	   identification	   of	   these	   alternate	   and	   local	   tribunals	   as	   semi-­‐autonomous	  systems,	  then,	  is	  only	  beneficial	  until	  they	  enter	  into	  a	  conflict	  with	  the	   dominant	   legality	   that	   possesses	   the	   language	   and	   resources	   to	   proclaim	  their	  illegality.	  	  Expanding	   on	   this	   encounter	   between	   traditional	   or	   popular	   forms	   of	   justice	  and	  the	  dominant	  law,	  Vanderlinden	  argues	  that	  what	  necessarily	  differentiates	  law	   from	  other	   social	   fields	   is	   its	   ‘hegemonic	  ambition’	  –	   the	   tendency	  of	   law,	  particularly	   law	  based	  on	  positivistic	  and	  centralist	  conception	  –	  to	   impose	  its	  own	  normative	  structure	  on	  other	  social	  fields.883	  Sally	  Engle	  Merry	  has	  termed	  the	   same	   inclination	   of	   law	   as	   its	   inherent	   ‘coloniality’.884	   According	   to	  Vanderlinden,	   the	   legal	   system	   of	   the	   state,	  when	   confronted	  with	   ‘rival	   legal	  orders’,	  attempts	  to	  subsume	  them	  through	  the	  label	  of	  legal	  pluralism	  ‘in	  order	  to	  conceal	  the	  inevitable	  failure	  of	  its	  totalitarian	  ideal.’885	  This	  allows	  the	  state	  to	   maintain	   its	   ‘monopoly	   of	   regulatory	   order’	   in	   principle,	   as	   it	   allows	   the	  existence	   of	   other	   normative	   orders	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   own	   ‘toleration	   or	  recognition’.886	  He	  contends	  that	   legal	  pluralism,	   then,	  highlights	   the	   failure	  of	  the	  state	  system	  to	  fully	  realise	  ‘its	  totalitarian	  ambition’,	  and	  the	  dominant	  law	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  Jacques	  Vanderlinden,	  'Return	  to	  Legal	  Pluralism:	  Twenty	  Years	  Later'	  (1989)	  28	  Journal	  of	  
Legal	  Pluralism	  149,	  153.	  884	  Sally	  Engle	  Merry	  (1982)	  (n.	  885	  Jacques	  Vanderlinden	  (1989)	  (n	  883)	  153.	  886	  Ibid.	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endeavours	  to	  mask	  it	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  legal	  orderings,	  albeit	  in	  a	  ‘subordinate	  or	  inferior’	  position.887	  	  	  I	   argue	   that	   considering	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan	   from	   this	  perspective	   of	   ‘Coloniality’	   provides	   us	   a	   useful	   insight	   into	   the	   engagement	  between	  dominant	  and	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice.	  The	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  presents	  an	   interlegal	  terrain	  of	  contestation,	  with	  the	  dominant	  legal	  system	   necessarily	   differentiated	   by	   other	   normative	   and	   legal	   orderings	   by	  virtue	  of	   its	  nature	  of	  Coloniality	  and	  hegemony.	  Albeit	   approaching	   it	   from	  a	  different	  lens,	  these	  ideas	  of	  Coloniality	  and	  totality	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  these	  notions	  can	  provide	  us	  an	  alternative	  narrative	  to	  understand	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  particularities	  of	  Pakistan,	  by	  explaining	  the	   logic	   that	   grips	   both	   the	   state	   as	  well	   as	   competing	   notions	   of	   law	   in	   the	  country.	  	  	  
6.4. The	  Romanticism	  of	  Plurality	  and	  Concluding	  remarks	  
Apart	   from	   a	   consensus	   on	   assertions	   that	   law	   is	   more	   than	   the	   law	   of	   the	  state,888	   and	   that	   other	   normative	   structures	   should	   be	   included	   in	   legal	  analysis,	   or	   indeed	   be	   considered	   as	   instances	   of	   law,	   the	   theoretical	  propositions	  of	  legal	  pluralism	  offer	  divergent	  perspectives.	  This	  is	  why	  critics	  of	  pluralistic	   legal	  analysis,	  such	  as	  Brian	  Tamanaha	  or	  Baudoin	  Dupret,	  argue	  against	   this	   approach	   and	   assert	   that	   the	   definitional	   problems	   of	   pluralism,	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  Ibid.	  	  888	  Baudouin	  Dupret	  (2007)	  (n	  808)	  1.	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rather	   than	   helping	   legal	   analysis	   by	   clarifying	   the	   nature	   of	   law,	   actually	  confound	   it.889	   Despite	   the	   lack	   of	   consensus	   on	   concepts	   and	   definitional	  problems,	   legal	   pluralism	   nevertheless	   provides	   us	  with	   key	   insights	   into	   the	  legal	  architecture	  of	  situations	  such	  as	  Pakistan’s.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  this	  study	   has	   adopted	   a	   course	   of	   ‘methodological	   pluralism’890	   to	   approach	   the	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  The	   dominant	   legal	   narrative	   and	   positivistic	   (or	   centralist)	   understanding	   of	  law	   either	  willingly	   excludes,	   or	   is	   unable	   to	   recognise,	   the	  multiple	   forms	   of	  legal	   orderings	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   Pakistan.891	   Legal	  pluralism	   allows	   us	   to	   observe	   and	   analyse	   the	   notions	   of	   traditional,	   non-­‐formal,	  colonial,	  and	  religious	  structures	  of	  law	  on	  par	  with	  state-­‐oriented	  law,	  by	  adopting	  a	  sociological	  approach	  to	  law.	  It	  argues	  that	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  society	   in	  question,	  and	  without	  understanding	   it	   in	   its	  own	   terms,	  any	  grand	  narrative	  or	  understanding	  of	  law	  will	  remain	  lacking.892	  Tamanaha	  and	  Dupret,	  despite	   offering	   divergent	   critiques	   of	   pluralism	   for	   its	   elusive	   definitions	   of	  law,	  also	  agree	  on	  this	  approach.893	  They	  assert	  that	  law	  should	  be	  understood	  on	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   participants	   and	   subjects	   of	   legal	   orderings.	   This	   is	   the	  approach	  taken	  by	  this	  examination	  whereby	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  with	  all	  its	  multiple	  complexities	  of	   legal	   framework	  serves	  as	  the	   footing	  to	  comprehend	  law	  and	  legal	  analyses.	  Through	  this	  approach,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  unseat	  state	  law	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  See,	  generally	  Brian	  Z.	  Tamanaha	  (2000)	  (n	  26);	  Baudouin	  Dupret	  (2007)	  (n	  808).	  890	  Werner	  Menski	  (n	  709)	  74.	  891	  See,	  Chapter	  4,	  The	  Exclusivity	  and	  Singularity	  of	  Law	  and	  Justice	  on	  page	  151.	  892	  Roger	  Cotterrell	  (2005)	  (n	  838)	  307.	  893	  See,	  generally	  Brian	  Z.	  Tamanaha	  (2000)	  (n	  26);	  Baudouin	  Dupret	  (2007)	  (n	  808).	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from	   its	   dominant	   and	   complacent	   position,	   and	  move	   the	   focus	   towards	   the	  needs	  of	  the	  individual.	  This	  is	  why	  Santos	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  the	   ‘political	  claims’	  and	  the	  political	  project	  of	   legal	  pluralism,	  which	  gets	   left	  behind	   in	   definitional	   and	   analytical	   discussions.894	   A	   focus	   on	   legal	   orders	  other	   than	   state	   law	   is	   key	   to	   (re)discover	   and	   highlight	   the	   ‘emancipatory	  potential	   of	   law’.895	   As	   echoed	   in	   Cotterrell’s	   approach	   cited	   above,	   it	   is	  important	  to	  reclaim	  law	  from	  its	  top-­‐down	  and	  instrumental	  versions	  and	  align	  it	  to	  the	  social	  experiences	  of	  individuals.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   caution	   against	   the	   romantic	  notions	  of	  pluralism,	  as	  it	  carries	  a	  ‘normative	  connotation,	  in	  that	  whatever	  is	  designated	  by	  it	  must	  be	  good	  because	  it	  is	  pluralistic’	  and,	  tautologically,	  better	  than	  monistic	  or	  non-­‐pluralist	  conceptions	  of	   law.896	  The	  pluralist	  narrative	  of	  law,	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   state	   centralism,	   accepts	   or	   prefers	   any	   spontaneous	   or	  
rooted	  system	  of	   law	  that	  may	  exist	   in	  a	  society.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  this	  study,	   some	   of	   the	   traditional	   and	   non-­‐formal	   structures	   of	   law	   that	   exist	   in	  Pakistan	  are	  just	  as,	  if	  not	  more,	  patriarchal	  and	  repressive	  as	  the	  state	  law.	  The	  narrative	  of	  pluralism,	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  Pakistan,	  fails	  to	  conceive	  of	  ‘pluralism	  as	  a	  political	  project’897	  and,	  because	  of	  this,	  assumes	  a	  reactionary	  stance.	  It	  defines	  non-­‐state	   normative	   and	   legal	   systems	   in	   opposition	   to	   state-­‐law,	   not	  acknowleding	   that	   some	   of	   the	   pluralistic	   structures	   are	   deeply	   problematic,	  misogynistic,	   intolerant,	   and	   embedded	   within	   the	   feudal	   traditions	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
894	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692)	  90.	  895	  Ibid.	  85.	  896	  Ibid.	  89.	  897	  Ibid.	  90.	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pervade	   the	   society.898	  This	   is	   the	   reason	  why	   the	  primary	   challenges	   against	  non-­‐formal	   systems	   of	   law	   emerge	   from	   the	   discourses	   on	   human	   rights	   and	  social	   justice.	  And	  this	  romanticised	  notion	  of	  pluralistic	  orderings	  is	  the	  main	  weakness	  of	  legal	  pluralistic	  approach	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  This	  narrative	  is	  unable	  to	  translate	  the	  political	  and	  critical	  concepts	  of	   legal	  pluralism	  from	  academic	  discourse	  into	  legal	  discussions.	  And	  it	  is	  largely	  because	  of	  this	  that	  it	  proves	  unable	  to	  counter	  the	  arguments	  presented	  by	  human	  rights	  and	  state-­‐law	  narratives	  that	  criticise	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  inflicted	  by	  local	  tribunals.	  	  The	   notion	   of	   idealisation	   of	   pluralist	   approach	   to	   law	   is	   also	   linked	   with	  another	  significant	  issue	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  very	  critique	  of	  alienation	  from	  which	   the	  assertion	  of	  pluralism	  emanates	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  While	   it	  denounces	   the	   dominant	   legal	   system	   of	   being	   an	   alien	   imposition	   and	   a	  colonial	   inheritance,	   the	   local	   tribunals	   as	   they	   exist	   in	   Pakistan	   cannot	   be	  separated	   from	   their	  own	  colonial	  histories.	   In	   this	   sense,	  while	  a	   turn	   by	   the	  people	   to	   alternative	   and	   local	   justice	   mechanisms	   can	   be	   understood	   and	  appreciated,	   a	   return	   may	   not	   be	   possible,	   owing	   to	   the	   interceding	   two	  hundred	  years	  of	  colonial	  rule	  that	  altered	  their	  nature	  irrevocably.	  	  	  
	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
898	  See,	  generally,	  Rabia	  Ali	  (2001)	  (n	  443);	  Saima	  Jasam	  (2009)	  (n	  452).	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Chapter	  7: Approaching	   Law	   through	   Rights:	   Human	   Rights	  
Narrative	  in	  Pakistan	  	  
7.1. Chapter	  Synopsis	  
Building	  on	   the	  discussion	  of	  multiple	  narratives	  of	   law	  prevalent	   in	  Pakistan,	  this	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   Human	   Rights	   discourse	   on	   law	   as	   it	   exists	   in	   the	  country.	  Gaining	  prominence	  amongst	  civil	   society	  organisations	  and	  even	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  legal	  fraternity,	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	   most	   important	   lenses	   through	   which	   the	   functions,	   institutions	   and	  deficiencies	  of	  law	  are	  understood	  and	  approached	  within	  this	  context.	  Through	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  law,	  the	  argument	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative,	   in	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	  Pakistan,	   falls	   prey	   to	   some	   of	   the	   same	   contradictions	   that	   it	   attempts	   to	  denounce	  within	  other	  perspectives	  on	  law.	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  four	  key	  paradoxes	  and	  challenges	  that	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative	   faces	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   context.	   First,	   the	  human	   rights	  narrative	  vehemently	  challenges	  the	  traditional	  legal	  and	  normative	  orderings,	  and	  highlights	   their	  conflict	  with	  constitutional	   freedoms	  and	  modern	  notions	  of	  rights.	  However,	  by	  claiming	  the	  illegality	  of	  all	  legal	  structures	  that	  emanate	  from	  outside	  state	  authority,	   this	  approach	   to	   law	  reduces	   the	  already	   limited	  avenues	   available	   to	   those	   sections	   of	   the	   populace	   that	   are	   generally	   at	   the	  receiving	   end	   of	   human	   rights	   violations.	   Second,	   while	   it	   challenges	   the	  patriarchal	  and	  misogynistic	  tendencies	  within	  the	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	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and	  state	  law,	  the	  solutions	  proposed	  by	  this	  perspective	  remain	  centred	  on	  the	  state.	   In	   this	   manner,	   it	   strengthens	   the	   focus	   on	   state-­‐oriented	   law	   and	   is	  unable	  to	  transcend	  this	  dominant	  narrative.	  Third,	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  language	  are	  perceived	  as	  foreign,	  which	  generates	  both	  a	  sense	  of	  distrust	  and	  a	  communication	  gap	  between	  rights	  organisations	  and	  the	  people.	  Fourth,	  in	   an	   attempt	   to	   bridge	   this	   divide,	   the	   human	   rights	   approach	   comes	   into	  interplay	  with	   the	  pervasive	   religious	  narrative	  –	   an	  encounter	   in	  which	  both	  the	  paradigms	  denounce,	  but	  also	  attempt	  to	  co-­‐opt,	  each	  other.	  This	  paradox,	  while	  widening	   the	  approach	  of	   the	   rights	  discourse,	   simultaneously	   limits	   its	  appeal	  for	  some	  marginalised	  groups	  and	  communities.	  	  	  The	  discussion	  will	   return	   to	   these	   identified	  contradictions	  and	  paradoxes	   in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  current	  chapter,	  prior	  to	  which	  the	  following	  sections	  will	  demonstrate	   and	   elaborate	   on	   the	   presence	   and	   shape	   of	   the	   human	   rights	  narrative	  on	  law	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  
7.2. Pakistan	  in	  an	  ‘Age	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  
In	   the	   past	   sixty	   years,	   Human	   Rights	   discourse	   has	   emerged,	   both	   within	  Pakistan	  and	  around	  the	  globe,	  as	  the	   leading	  paradigm	  to	  challenge	  the	  state,	  its	   institutions,	   practises	   and	   laws,	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   bearing	   on	   the	   individual	  subject.	   It	  has	  become	  the	   ‘dominant	   language	   for	   justice	  claims	  of	  both	  social	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movements	  and	  states’;899	  it	  has	  come	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  main	  language	  of	  mediation	  between	  the	  states	  and	  its	  subjects;	  the	  ‘anchor	  of	  political	  ethics’,900	  the	  new	  social	   contract.	  Born	   in	  a	  post-­‐holocaust	  and	  post-­‐Second	  World	  War	  era,	   the	   human	   rights	   standards	   are	   now	   claimed	   by	   some	   to	   be	   ‘almost	  universally	   accepted,	   at	   least	   in	   word,	   or	   as	   ideal	   standards’.901	   Noting	   this	  continuing	   ascendancy,	   Baxi	   writes	   that	   ‘no	   preceding	   century	   has	   been	  privileged	   to	   witness	   a	   profusion	   of	   human	   rights	   enunciations	   on	   a	   global	  scale’.902	  Because	  of	  this,	  he	  terms	  the	  current	  period,	  starting	  from	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  as	  the	  ‘Age	  of	  Human	  Rights’.903	  	  	  In	  this	  Age	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  then,	  everyone	  is	  said	  to	  be	  ‘entitled’	  to	  ‘rights’	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	   ‘human’.904	  With	  the	  claim	  that	  this	  paradigm	  is	  based	  on	   ‘core	  [human]	   principles	   like	   dignity,	   equality	   and	   respect’,905	   these	   values	   are	  considered	   to	   be	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   treaties	   and	  frameworks	   that	   state-­‐signatories	   are	   expected	   to	   abide	   by.906	   The	   continued	  prominence	  of	  these	  treaties	  and	  norms	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  what	  Donnelly	  terms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
899	  Vasuki	  Nesiah,	  'The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Empire'	  28	  June	  2012	  <http://fpif.org/the_rise_and_fall_of_the_human_rights_empire/>	  last	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013.	  	  900	  Ibid.	  901	  Jack	  Donelly,	  Universal	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (Cornell	  University	  Press,	  Ithaca	  2003)	  1.	  902	  Upendra	  Baxi,	  'Voices	  of	  Suffering	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Human	  Rights'	  (1998)	  8	  Transnational	  
Law	  &	  Contemporary	  Problems	  125,	  125-­‐169.	  903	  Ibid.	  904	  Jack	  Donelly	  (2003)	  (n	  901)	  7-­‐8.	  905	  Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  'What	  are	  Human	  Rights?'	  (Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/human-­‐rights/what-­‐are-­‐human-­‐rights/>	  last	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013.	  906	  For	  instance,	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  states	  that	  the	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Covenant	  emerge	  from	  ‘the	  inherent	  dignity	  of	  the	  human	  person.’	  The	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  claims	  that	  ‘all	  human	  beings	  are	  born	  free	  and	  equal	  in	  dignity	  and	  rights’.	  Article	  1,	  UDHR,	  GA	  Res.	  217	  A	  (III),	  10	  December	  1948,	  A/810	  at	  71.	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the	   ‘international	   normative	   universality’	   of	   human	   rights.907	   He	   argues	   this	  case	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   ‘three	   quarters	   of	   the	   world’s	   states	   have	   undertaken	  international	  legal	  obligations	  to	  implement	  these	  rights	  by	  becoming	  parties	  to	  the	   International	  Human	  Rights	   Covenants,	   and	   almost	   all	   other	   nations	   have	  otherwise	   expressed	   approval	   and	   commitment	   to	   their	   content’.908	   One	  perspective	   that	   takes	   this	   approach	   even	   further	   argues	   for	   an	   integral	   link	  between	   human	   rights	   and	   jus	   cogens	   or	   peremptory	   norms	   of	   International	  Law,	   to	  which	  all	  states	  are	  expected	  to	  adhere	  to,	  regardless	  of	  whether	   they	  are	   signatories	   to	   a	   particular	   treaty	   or	   any	   other	   instrument.	   In	   this	   vein,	  Bianchi	  argues	   that	   ‘to	   think	  of	  both	  human	  rights	  and	   jus	   cogens	   at	   the	  same	  time	  is	  an	  almost	  natural	  intellectual	  reflex.’909	  	  Pakistan	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  country	  gripped	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse,	  though	  it	  has	  historically	  had	  an	  ambivalent	  relationship	  with	  human	  rights	  covenants	  and	  discourses.	  Despite	  the	  assertions	  of	  its	  poor	  human	  rights	  record	   of	   recent	   years	   based	   on	   the	   difficulties	   faced	   by	   women,	   ethnic	   and	  religious	  minorities,	  and	  marginalised	  communities,910	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  original	  48	  signatories	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR).	  Signed	  in	  1948,	  the	  UDHR	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  instruments	  within	  the	  regime	  of	  international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   its	   30	   Articles	   advocate	   equality	   for	   all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
907	  Jack	  Donelly	  (2003)	  (n	  901)	  2.	  908	  Ibid.	  1.	  909	  Andrea	  Bianchi,	  'Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Magic	  of	  Jus	  Cogens'	  (2008)	  19	  (3)	  The	  European	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  491,	  495.	  910	  See,	  for	  instance,	  HRCP’s	  2013	  State	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Report.	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  
Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  78).	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humans	   regardless	   of	   race,	   gender,	   colour,	   creed	   or	   religion.911	   Significantly,	  while	  Saudi	  Arabia	  had	  initially	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  UDHR	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  conception	  of	   rights	  enumerated	   in	   the	  document	   conflicted	  with	   Islamic	  Law	  principles,	   Pakistan	   not	   only	   adopted	   the	   opposite	   view,	   but	   also	   criticised	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	   interpretation	  of	   Islamic	  Law.912	   Since	   then,	   however,	   the	   legal	  and	  political	   situation	  has	  meant	   that	   the	  human	  rights	  of	   citizens	  have	  had	  a	  troubled	  relationship	  with	   the	  priorities	  of	   subsequent	  Pakistan	  governments.	  The	   human	   rights	   situation	   faced	   by	   the	   country,	   as	   briefly	   discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  chapters,	  is	  dire	  at	  the	  very	  least.	  	  	  Amnesty	   International	   and	   Human	   Rights	   Watch,	   among	   two	   of	   the	   most	  prominent	  international	  human	  rights	  advocacy	  organisations,	  have	  repeatedly	  condemned	  the	  persecution	  of	  minorities,	  enforced	  disappearances	  by	  security	  forces,	  violence	  faced	  by	  women,	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  force	  in	  Balochistan	  province	  and	  tribal	  areas,	  and	  the	  plight	  of	  civilians	  and	  displaced	  people	  in	  Pakistan.913	  The	  Ministry	   of	   Law,	   Justice	   and	   Human	   Rights,	   in	   a	   report	   submitted	   to	   the	  Parliament	   in	   September	   2013,	   noted	   8,648	   incidents	   of	   human	   rights	  violations	   reported	   between	   January	   2012	   and	   September	   2013.914	   The	  accounts	  by	  human	  rights	  organisations,	  however,	  present	  a	  situation	  far	  graver	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (adopted	  10	  December	  1948	  UNGA	  Res	  217	  A(III)	  (UDHR).	  912	  Daniel	  E.	  Price,	  Islamic	  Political	  Culture,	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  (Praeger	  Publishers,	  Westport,	  USA	  1999)	  163.	  913	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  'World	  Report	  2013:	  Events	  of	  2012'	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  New	  York	  2013)	  47-­‐52;	  Amnesty	  International,	  'The	  State	  of	  the	  World's	  Human	  Rights'	  (Amnesty	  International,	  London	  2013)	  201-­‐203.	  914	  APP,	  'Over	  8,500	  human	  rights	  violations	  reported	  in	  20	  months'	  Dawn	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  30	  September	  2013)	  <http://www.dawn.com/news/1046467/over-­‐8500-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐violations-­‐reported-­‐in-­‐20-­‐months>	  last	  accessed	  30	  September	  2013.	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than	   the	   ones	   contained	   in	   official	   accounts.	   The	   Asian	   Human	   Rights	  Commission,	   in	   its	   report	   issued	   in	   2013,	   claimed	   death	   of	   or	   injury	   to	   over	  15,500	   people	   through	   drone	   attacks	   and	   clashes	   between	   government	   and	  militant	  groups,	  and	  the	  death	  of	  6,982	  people	  in	  religious,	  sectarian	  or	  political	  violence.915	   The	   Human	   Rights	   Commission	   of	   Pakistan	   (HRCP),	   the	   most	  prominent	   human	   rights	   advocacy	   group	   in	   the	   country,	   in	   its	   2012	   Annual	  Report	   noted	   213	   incidents	   of	   sectarian	   violence	   in	   which	   583	   people	   were	  killed	   and	   853	   injured.916	   Pakistan	   Body	   Count,	   an	   independent	   group	  documenting	   the	   incidences	   of	   violence	   in	   the	   country,	   reported	   that	   21,559	  people	  have	  been	  killed	  or	  injured	  in	  suicide	  attacks	  in	  the	  country	  since	  1995,	  with	  over	  3,000	  killed	  between	  2006	  and	  2013.917	  Pakistan	   is	  also	  considered	  one	   of	   the	   most	   dangerous	   countries	   for	   journalists	   and	   human	   rights	  activists,918	  which	  contributes	  to	  the	  differing	  accounts	  and	  estimates	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  the	  country.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  backdrop	  of	  human	  rights	  atrocities	  that	  the	  narrative	  of	  human	  rights	  has	  gained	  prominence	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  	  The	  ascendancy	  of	   the	  human	  rights	  discourse	   in	  Pakistan	  has	  had	   two	  major	  and	  interlinked	  consequences	  for	  the	  country:	  First	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	   human	   rights	   oriented	   Non-­‐Governmental	   Organisations	   (NGOs)	   and	   civil	  society	  groups;	  second,	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  human	  rights	  narrative	  on	   law	  which	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915	  Asian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  'Pakistan:	  Country	  has	  Turned	  into	  a	  Killing	  Field'	  (Relief	  Web	  2013)	  <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AHRC-­‐SPR-­‐005-­‐2013-­‐HRRpt-­‐Pakistan.pdf>	  last	  accessed	  10	  January	  2014.	  916Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  78)	  6.	  917	  Pakistan	  Body	  Count,	  'Analytics'	  2011)	  <http://pakistanbodycount.org/analytics>	  last	  accessed	  26	  December	  2013.	  918	  Ali	  Dayan	  Hasan,	  'Commentary:	  Attacks	  on	  Journalists	  and	  Rights	  Defenders	  in	  Pakistan'	  The	  
Friday	  Times	  (Pakistan	  	  <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/08/commentary-­‐attacks-­‐journalists-­‐and-­‐rights-­‐defenders-­‐pakistan>	  last	  accessed	  11	  May	  2013.	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given	   impetus	   by,	   but	   is	   not	   limited	   to,	   the	   human	   rights	   and	   civil	   society	  organisations.	  Alongside	  the	  global	  rise	  of	   international	  human	  rights	  NGOs	  as	  ‘the	   critical	   link	   between	   a	   government’s	   violation	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   the	  activation	  of	   international	  pressure’,919	  Pakistan	  has	  seen	  a	  plethora	  of	  human	  rights	  organisations	  emerging	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  A	  study	  conducted	  at	  the	  turn	  of	   the	  millennium,	  by	   the	   Social	   Policy	  &	  Development	  Centre	   and	   Johns	  Hopkins	   University’s	   Centre	   for	   Civil	   Society,	   estimated	   that	   there	   were	  approximately	  more	  than	  45,000	  non-­‐profit	  organisations	  working	  in	  Pakistan	  at	   the	   time.920	  Out	  of	   these	  approximately	  17.5%	  operate	   in	   the	  areas	  of	  Civic	  Rights	  and	  Advocacy921	  –	  this	  constitutes	  a	  group	  of	  about	  8,000	  organisations.	  	  	  Alongside	  the	  proliferation	  of	  human	  rights	  NGOs,	  international	  donor	  funding	  for	   developmental	   causes	   has	   also	   poured	   in.	   In	   2009,	   the	   United	   States	  Congress	   authorised	  non-­‐military	   aid	   of	   up	   to	  US$1.5	   billion	   annually	   for	   five	  years,	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  in	  Pakistan.922	  US	  Economic	  Related	  Assistance	   (which	   includes	   human	   rights	   funding,	   food	   aid,	   and	   development	  assistance,	  among	  other	  foci)	  to	  Pakistan	  between	  2002	  and	  2012	  has	  totalled	  more	   than	   US$7.8	   billion.923	   Pakistan	   has	   also	   received	   development	   and	  economic	   aid	   from	   other	   countries	   and	   multilateral	   organisations.	   In	   2011	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
919	  James	  Meernik	  and	  others,	  'The	  Impact	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Organizations	  on	  Naming	  and	  Shaming	  Campaigns'	  (2012)	  56	  (2)	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution	  233,	  240.	  920	  Aisha	  Ghaus-­‐Pasha,	  Haroon	  Jamal	  and	  Muhammad	  Asif	  Iqbal,	  Dimensions	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  
sector	  in	  Pakistan	  (Social	  Policy	  and	  Development	  Centre,	  2002)	  12.	  921	  Ibid.	  922	  Susan	  B.	  Epstein	  and	  K.	  Alan	  Kronstadt,	  'Pakistan:	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Assistance'	  (2013)	  6.	  923	  Ibid.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  US$0.7	  million	  and	  US$2.7	  million	  given	  to	  Pakistan	  by	  the	  US	  in	  1947	  and	  1951	  respectively.	  Murad	  Ali,	  'US	  Aid	  to	  Pakistan	  and	  Democracy'	  (Institute	  of	  Policy	  Studies	  2009)	  <http://www.ips.org.pk/security-­‐and-­‐foreign-­‐policy/1080-­‐us-­‐aid-­‐to-­‐pakistan-­‐and-­‐democracy.html>	  last	  accessed	  4	  december	  2013.	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alone,	   the	   total	   Official	   Development	   Assistance	   received	   by	   the	   country	  amounted	   to	   US$4.15	   billion,	   with	   Wold	   Bank,	   United	   Kingdom,	   Japan,	   and	  institutions	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  being	  the	  major	  donors	  along	  with	  the	  US.924	  Due	   to	   unavailability	   of	   data,	   a	   breakdown	   of	   figures	   on	   how	   much	   of	   this	  funding	  has	  been	  spent	  on	  human	  rights	  projects	  and	  advocacy	  is	  not	  available.	  However,	   it	   is	   evident	   that	   the	   increase	   in	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   the	  country	   and	   the	   rise	   in	   human	   rights	   organisations	   and	   international	   funding	  mark	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  both	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  subject	  matter.	  	  
7.3. The	  Human	  Rights	  Narrative	  on	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  
The	   prominence	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative,	   particularly	   its	   approach	   to	  frame	  issues	  of	  law	  in	  rights	  terminologies,	  has	  grown	  alongside	  the	  number	  of	  civil	   society	   organisations	   in	   Pakistan.	   This	   narrative	   establishes	   the	   link	  between	  human	   rights	   and	   law,	   and	   asserts	   that	   the	   key	   responsibility	   of	   the	  state	   and	   its	   legal	   frameworks	   and	   institutions	   is	   to	   ensure	   the	  provision	  and	  protection	  of	   the	  human	  rights	  of	   its	   citizens.925	  This	  perspective	   conceives	  of	  law	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	   human	   rights,	   and	   frames	   its	   duties	   and	   deficiencies,	  responsibilities	   and	   limitations,	   from	   this	   lens.	   The	   prominence	   and	   the	  adoption	  of	  this	  narrative	  which	  reflects	  a	  global	  trend	  can	  be	  witnessed	  both	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924	  Centre	  for	  Global	  Development,	  'Aid	  to	  Pakistan	  by	  the	  Numbers'	  (Centre	  for	  Global	  Development	  <http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-­‐pakistan-­‐numbers>	  last	  accessed	  7	  December	  2013.	  	  925	  The	  News	  (10	  September	  2011)	  (n	  583).	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the	  level	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  and	  organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  within	  the	  legal	  fraternity	  of	  the	  country.	  	  The	   local	   and	   foreign	   NGOs	   repeatedly	   challenge	   the	   state	   on	   inadequate	  provision	  of	  amenities	  and	  lack	  of	  protection	  for	  minorities	  and	  civil	  rights.	  One	  local	  NGO,	  in	  its	  official	  statement	  on	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Day	  2013,	  asserted	  that	  the	  instances	  of	  human	  rights	  violation	  ‘are	  widespread	  due	  to	  the	  failures	  of…	  the	  country’s	  institutional	  framework,	  in	  particular,	  key	  institutions	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law:	   the	   police,	   prosecution	   and	   judiciary.’926	   The	   Asian	   Human	   Rights	  Commission’s	   2013	   report	   stated	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   ‘rule	   of	   law	   and	   the	  impotency	  of	  the	  courts	  has	  made	  Pakistan	  a	  killing	  field.’927	  HRCP	  mentioned	  in	  its	  2012	  Annual	  Report	  that	  the	  year	  brought	  ‘many	  challenges	  where	  Pakistan	  did	  not	  prove	  equal	  to	  the	  task.’928	  HRCP	  also	  condemned	  the	  ‘cycle	  of	  violence	  and	   the	   utter	   breakdown	   of	   law	   and	   order’	   in	   Karachi	   and	   other	   cities,	   and	  urged	   the	   government	   to	   ‘urgently	   find	   a	   way	   out.’929	   Other	   organisations	  operating	  in	  this	  sphere	  have	  also	  asserted	  the	  importance	  of	  legal	  mechanisms	  as	   a	   ‘major	   tool	   in	   promoting	   and	   protecting	   human	   rights,’930	   and	   that	   the	  State’s	   ‘lack	   of	   ability	   to	   deliver	   justice…	   violates	   human	   rights	   [and]	   basic	  human	   needs.’931	   These	   organisations	   urge	   the	   state	   to	   save	   the	   legal	   system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
926	  Ali	  Raza	  Khan	  Jatoi,	  'A	  Statement	  by	  the	  People	  Society	  For	  Justice	  Pakistan	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Day'	  (Pakistan	  2013).	  927	  Asian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  (2013)	  (n	  915).	  928	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  78)	  1-­‐3.	  929	  Ibid.	  334	  930	  Human	  Rights	  Monitor,	  'Collection	  and	  compilation	  of	  data	  on	  incidents	  of	  violence	  against	  civil	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Hazara	  Region'	  (HRM	  and	  Sungi	  Devlopment	  Foundation,	  Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  2011)	  3.	  931	  Sustainable	  Development	  Policy	  Institute,	  Governance	  (Sustainable	  Development	  Policy	  Institute,	  Pakistan).	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from	   becoming	   a	   ‘travesty	   of	   itself,’932	   and	   work	   towards	   the	   creation	   of	   ‘a	  rights-­‐respecting	   government	   that	   abides	   by	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   restores	   the	  public’s	  faith	  in	  democratic	  institutions.’933	  	  This	  narrative	  of	  human	  rights	  to	  approach	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  frameworks	  and	  implementation	  of	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  issues	  of	  women’s	  and	  minority	  rights	  and	   lawlessness,	   has	   also	   become	   embedded	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   legal	  fraternity.	  In	  2006,	  the	  incumbent	  President	  of	  the	  Pakistan	  Supreme	  Court	  Bar	  Association	  said	  in	  his	  speech	  during	  the	  International	  Judicial	  Conference	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  institutionalize	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Bar	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  human	  rights.’934	  He	  also	  argued	  that	  ‘given	  the	  volume	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  the	  vulnerability	   of	   the	   victims	   in	   Pakistan,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Bar	   and	   its	   members	  must	  go	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  role.’935	  A	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  stated	  in	  the	  same	  conference	  that	  the	  ‘courts	  in	  Pakistan	  in	  general	  and	  superior	  Courts	  in	   particular	   are	   the	   main	   operational	   source	   of	   protection	   of	   fundamental	  rights	  of	  people.’936	  The	  language	  and	  working	  of	  the	  superior	  courts	  in	  Pakistan	  depict	  the	  same	  rising	  prominence	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	   of	   Pakistan	   considers	   that	   human	   rights	   are	   already	   enshrined	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
932	  Human	  Rights	  Monitor	  (2011)	  (n	  930)	  3.	  933	  Ekklesia,	  'Pakistani	  government	  urged	  to	  protect	  religious	  minorities'	  Pakistan	  Christian	  Post	  (Pakistan	  12	  December	  2013)	  <http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4626>	  last	  accessed	  12	  December	  2013.	  	  934	  Malik	  Muhammad	  Qayyum,	  'The	  Role	  of	  the	  Bar	  in	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Pakistan'	  (International	  Judicial	  Conference)	  6.	  935	  Ibid.	  9.	  936	  Muhammad	  Nawaz	  Abbasi,	  'Domestic	  application	  of	  Human	  Rights	  norms'	  (International	  Judicial	  Conference)	  10.	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Constitution	   as	   Fundamental	   Rights,937	   and	   in	   2009	   there	   was	   a	   separate	  Human	  Rights	  Cell	  established	  within	  the	  Supreme	  Court.938	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  in	   the	   second	   and	   third	   years	   of	   its	   establishment	   (April	   2010	   to	   December	  2011),	   about	   90,000	   applications	  were	   received	   and	   registered	   by	   the	   Cell.939	  An	   International	   Commission	   of	   Jurists	   (ICJ)	   report	   states	   that	   the	   Human	  Rights	  Cell	  ‘instituted	  and	  disposed	  of	  over	  160,000	  applications’	  between	  2009	  and	   2012.940	   This	   includes	   incidences	   of	   kidnapping,	   honour	   crimes,	   acid	  attacks,	   land	   grabs,	   corruption	   and	   extortion,	   illegal	   appointments	   in	   the	  government	  and	  miscarriage	  of	  justice.941	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  exercise	  of	  Original	  Jurisdiction	  (Suo	  Motu)	  under	  Article	  184(3)	   though	   has	   been	   a	   major	   method	   through	   which	   the	   Court	   has	  attempted	   to	   enforce	   human	   rights	   and	   check	   the	   excesses	   of	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors.942	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   Pakistan	   in	   his	   judgement	   on	   a	   Suo	  Motu	  notice	  in	  2011	  said	  that	  the	  ‘basic	  human	  rights	  of	  life,	  liberty	  and	  enjoyment	  of	  one’s	  property	  have	  been	  recognized	  nationally	  as	  well	  as	  internationally.’943	  In	  2013,	  the	  Court	  received	  250	  petitions	  for	  Suo	  Motu	  notice	  daily,	  compared	  to	  450	   applications	   received	   in	   the	   whole	   of	   2004.944	   The	   ICJ,	   however,	   has	  criticised	  the	  inconsistent	  and	  discretionary	  approach	  of	  the	  SC	  in	  the	  exercise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937	  Human	  Rights	  Cell	  (2010/11)	  (n	  320)	  132.	  	  938	  Ibid.	  939	  Ibid.	  940	  Reema	  Omer,	  'Authority	  without	  Accountability:	  the	  search	  for	  justice	  in	  Pakistan'	  (Geneva,	  Switzerland	  2013)	  56.	  941	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan,	  'Annual	  Report:	  January	  2012	  to	  March	  2013'	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan,	  Islamabad	  2013)	  131.	  942	  Article	  184(3)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Pakistan,	  1973.	  943	  Suo	  Motu	  Case	  No.	  16	  of	  2011	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan).	  944	  Reema	  Omer	  (2013)	  (n	  940)	  14.	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of	   original	   jurisdiction,	   stating	   that	   the	   cases	   taken	   up	   by	   the	   Court	   often	  revolve	   around	   issues	   that	   gain	   prominence	   in	   the	   local	   media,	   but	   do	   not	  necessarily	  represent	   the	  gravest	   instances	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses.945	  Charles	  Kennedy	   argues	   that	   through	   steps	   such	   as	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Human	  Rights	   Cell,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   ‘has	   in	   effect	   assumed	   the	   role	   of	   a	   powerful	  federal	   ombudsman	   identifying	   and	   attempting	   to	   right	   the	   wrongs	   of	  individuals	   caught	   up	   in	   the	   injustices	   of	   the	   system.’946	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   of	  Pakistan	  endorsed	  this	  approach	  when	  he	  stated	  at	  the	  2012	  inaugural	  session	  of	   the	   South	   Asia	   Conference	   on	   Environmental	   Justice	   that	   ‘strengthening	  democratic	   institutions,	   socio-­‐economic	   development,	   safeguarding	   human	  rights	   and	   protection	   of	   environment	   are	   indeed	   the	   core	   values	   of	   every	  society’.947	  	  
7.4. Human	   Rights	   Narrative	   and	   the	   Socio-­‐Legal	   Tapestry	   of	  
Pakistan	  
The	  human	  rights	  discourse	  has	  served	  the	  significant	  purpose	  of	  highlighting	  the	   plight	   of	   the	   marginalised	   communities	   in	   Pakistan,	   and	   has	   become	   the	  dominant	   language	   through	   which	   the	   state’s	   (in)actions	   are	   challenged.	   Its	  narrative	  on	  law	  has	  emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  legal	   frameworks	   and	   institutions	   in	   ensuring	   and	   protecting	   the	   rights	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
945	  Ibid.	  15.	  946	  Charles	  H.	  Kennedy	  (2012)	  (n	  72)	  158.	  947	  Iftikhar	  Muhammad	  Chaudhry,	  'Special	  Address	  by	  Chief	  Justice'	  South	  Asia	  Conference	  on	  
Environmental	  Justice	  <http://ceej.pk/cms/docs/SAEJ/1%20Inaugural%20Session/5%20Special%20Address%20(HCJ%20Iftikhar%20Muhammad%20Ch).pdf>	  last	  accessed	  24	  March	  2012.	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citizens.	  However,	  when	  this	  perspective	  is	  examined	  in	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	   Pakistan,	   it	   brings	   to	   the	   fore	   several	   paradoxes	   and	  contradictions	   that	   not	   only	   affect	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   wider	   human	   rights	  discourse,	  but	  also	  reveal	   its	   limitations	   in	  understanding	   the	  dynamics	  of	   the	  wider	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain.	  	  The	  primary	  difficulty	   that	  emerges	   from	  the	   interplay	  between	  human	  rights	  narrative	  and	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  architecture	  is	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  former	  to	  understand	   the	   appeal	   and	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   local	   and	   traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  justice.948	  The	  human	  rights	  narrative	  on	  law	  stands	  opposed	  to	  the	   local	   legal	   and	   normative	   orderings	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   country.	   NGOs	   and	  activists	  working	  in	  this	  sphere	  have	  increasingly	  challenged	  traditional	  courts	  and	  customary	  laws	  for	  violation	  of	  basic	  human	  rights,949	  and	  provide	  impetus	  for	  questioning	  the	  legality	  of	  local	  courts.	  Notable	  organisations	  such	  as	  HRCP	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  the	  state’s	  obligation	  to	  its	  citizens	  to	  ‘save	  them	  from	  falling	  for	  a	  [normative]	  regime	  that	  may	  save	  them	  some	  time	  and	  a	  few	  pennies	  but	  all	  this	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   justice.’950	   At	   present,	   a	   petition	   from	   the	   National	  Commission	   on	   the	   Status	   of	  Women	   (NCSW)	   is	   pending	   before	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   of	   Pakistan	   requesting	   a	   judgement	   of	   illegality	   against	   the	   traditional	  courts	  and	  tribunals,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  far	  reaching	  consequences.951	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
948	  For	  a	  study	  of	  participants’	  perspectives	  with	  regards	  to	  their	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  the	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice,	  see	  Foqia	  Sadiq	  Khan	  (2004)	  (n	  705).	  949	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  of	  Pakistan	  (2013)	  (n	  78)	  170-­‐173.	  950	  Asma	  Jahangir	  (2009)	  (n	  397).	  951	  Tahira	  Noor,	  Pakistan:	  Supreme	  Court	  takes	  petition	  against	  Jirga	  system	  for	  regular	  hearing	  (National	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Women,	  Pakistan	  2012)	  <http://www.ncsw.gov.pk/enews/07newsletter.pdf>	  last	  accessed	  24	  September	  2013.	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Human	  Rights	   organisations	   further	   argue	   that	   the	   patriarchy,	  misogyny,	   and	  skewed	   religious	   conceptions	   that	   lie	   behind	   the	   traditional	   tribunals,	   and	  behind	   the	   Pakistani	   (particularly	   rural)	   society	   as	   a	   whole,	   render	   the	  traditional	   courts	   unable	   to	   deal	   with	   women	   judiciously.952	   Women	   are	  considered	   a	   ‘property’	   of	   the	   men	   in	   their	   tribes	   and	   families,	   and	   are	  exchanged,	  married	  or	   sold	   to	   settle	  disputes	  within	   community	  groupings.953	  Moreover,	   the	   issue	   of	   honour	   killings	   also	   emerges	   from	   these	   problematic	  power	  structures,	  as	  it	  is	  considered	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  men	  of	  a	  particular	  family	  or	  tribe	  to	  decide	  on	  what	  the	  honour	  of	  the	  family	  is	  tied	  to,	  and	  women	  are	  generally	  the	  ones	  who	  suffer	  for	  violating	  these	  notions.954	  The	  same	  issues	  are	   raised	   in	   relation	   to	   protection	   of	   marginalised	   groups	   and	   treatment	   of	  political	   dissidents	   and	   insurgents,	   when	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   traditional	   norms,	  religious	  customs	  and	  political	  aims	  determine	  what	  kind	  of	  treatment	  is	  meted	  out	   to	  particular	   individuals	  or	  groups.955	   In	   this	   light,	   activists	  urge	   the	   state	  not	  only	  to	  safeguard	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals,	  but	  also	  to	  ‘change	  the	  mind-­‐set	  (tribal,	  feudal	  and	  macho)	  of	  men’.956	  	  However,	   the	   insistence	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative	   on	   declaration	   of	  illegality	  against	  all	  normative	  and	  legal	  structures	  outside	  the	  state’s	   juridical	  system	   raises	   more	   problems	   than	   it	   solves.	   The	   shunning	   of	   absolutely	   all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
952	  Rabia	  Ali	  (2001)	  (n	  443)	  33-­‐34.	  953	  Ibid.	  20.	  954	  Justice	  Saleem	  Akhtar	  and	  others	  (2009)	  (n	  420)	  31-­‐32.	  955	  The	  legal	  frameworks	  laid	  down	  by	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulation	  and	  Actions	  in	  Aid	  of	  Civil	  Power	  Ordinance	  are	  relevant	  examples	  in	  this	  regard.	  956	  Peerzada	  Salman,	  'Seminar	  on	  honour	  killing:	  ‘Changing	  mindset	  govt’s	  responsibility’'	  Dawn	  (Pakistan	  09	  July	  2010)	  <http://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/media-­‐events/14761/>	  last	  accessed	  15	  March	  2013.	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forms	  of	  pluralistic	  structures	  creates	  room	  for	  further	  injustices	  faced	  by	  those	  who	   are	   already	   marginalised	   within	   the	   society.	   The	   assertion	   of	   illegality	  against	  all	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	  disregards	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  appeal	  of	  this	  system	  partially	   lies	   in	   the	   inefficacy	   of	   the	   state	   legal	   institutions	   to	   provide	  inexpensive	   and	   speedy	   justice	   to	   its	   citizens,	   especially	   those	  who	   are	   at	   the	  lowest	   economic,	   social	   and	   political	   strata.957	   Granted	   that	   the	   problems	   of	  patriarchy,	   misogyny	   and	   intolerance	   are	   embedded	   within	   some	   traditional	  tribunals,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  that	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  populace	  reverts	  to	  these	  structures	  due	  to	  a	  gulf	  between	  them	  and	  the	  formal	  legal	  system.958	  The	  formal	  legal	  system	  either	  fails	  to	  provide	  justice	  and	  respite	  to	  people	  on	  occasions,	  or	  fails	  to	  reduce	  their	  sense	  of	  alienation	  and	  remoteness.	  	  The	   case	   of	  Khwaindo	   Tolana	   is	   a	   relevant	   example	   in	   this	   regard.	   As	   briefly	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  this	  was	  the	  first	  women’s	  Jirga	  organised	  in	  Swat	  by	  a	  group	   of	   women	   activists	   to	   highlight	   the	   plight	   of	   two	   women	   who	   were	  allegedly	  murdered	  by	  their	  in-­‐laws.959	  The	  male	  dominated	  informal	  tribunals	  as	  well	  as	  the	  state	  courts	  and	  law	  enforcement	  organisations	  proved	  incapable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  help	  the	  victims	   in	  pursuing	  their	  cause.	  The	  Khwaindo	  Tolana	  served	  as	  an	  avenue	  to	  indict	  both	  the	  alleged	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  acts	  as	  well	  as	  the	   legal	   structures	   the	   women	   were	   subject	   to.960	   Its	   symbolic	   value	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
957	  See,	  Foqia	  Sadiq	  Khan	  (2004)	  (n	  705).	  958	  Muhammad	  Azam	  Chaudhary	  (1999)	  (n	  420)	  77.	  959	  Orla	  Guerin,	  'Pakistani	  women	  use	  jirga	  to	  fight	  for	  rights'	  (Pakistan	  25	  July	  2013)	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐asia-­‐23453243>	  last	  accessed	  12	  November	  2013;	  Syed	  Mohammad	  Ali	  (09	  August	  2013)	  (n	  478);	  A.	  Majeed,	  'Pakistan’s	  Women-­‐Only	  Jirga	  Fights	  for	  Equal	  Rights'	  Newsweek	  Pakistan	  (11	  July	  2013)	  <http://newsweekpakistan.com/pakistans-­‐women-­‐only-­‐jirga-­‐fights-­‐for-­‐equal-­‐rights/>	  last	  accessed	  12	  November	  2013.	  960	  A.	  Majeed	  (11	  July	  2013)	  (n	  959).	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therefore	  significant,	  more	  so	   than	  any	  material	  or	  official	   redress	   the	  women	  may	   now	   be	   able	   to	   acquire	   through	   the	   use	   of	   state	   legal	   frameworks.	   This	  view,	  however,	  was	  not	  shared	  by	  some	  human	  rights	  activists.	  Tahira	  Abdullah,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  rights	  activists	  in	  the	  country,	  said:	  ‘I	  don't	  see	  it	  as	  more	  than	  a	  gimmick….	  Who	  is	  going	  to	  listen	  to	  these	  women?	  The	  men	  with	  the	   Kalashnikovs?	   The	   Taliban	   who	   are	   anti-­‐women?	   The	   patriarchal	   culture	  that	  we	  have?’961	  She	  also	  asserted	   that	   the	   ‘Jirga	   system	   is	   totally	   illegal,	   and	  has	  been	  declared	  illegal	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Pakistan.	  It	  can	  never	  be	  just.	  There	   are	   several	   extremely	   notorious	   cases	   where	   we	   have	   noticed	   that	  women	  do	  not	   get	   justice	   from	   jirgas,	   neither	  do	  non-­‐Muslims.’962	  But	   I	   argue	  that	  for	  those	  who	  are	  not	  given	  justice	  by	  the	  state	  institutions	  and	  are	  barred	  from	   any	   other	   avenues	   to	   pursue	   redress,	   a	   closing	   down	   of	   even	   the	  possibility	  of	  searching	  for	  alternative	  forms	  of	  law	  presents	  a	  grave	  problem.	  	  The	   inability	   of	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative	   on	   law	   to	   recognise	   the	   appeal	   of	  local	   justice	   systems	   is	   not	   the	   only	   problem	   that	   this	   perspective	   presents.	  Following	   on	   from	   the	   previous	   point,	   while	   the	   human	   rights	   approach	  denounces	   the	   patriarchy	   prevalent	   in	   local	   tribunals	   and	   indigenous	   law	   as	  well	  as	  the	  state,	  its	  only	  proposed	  solution	  is	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  state.963	  By	   directing	   the	   demands	   for	   greater	   rights	   protection	   towards	   the	   state,	   it	  furthers	   the	   Hobbesian	   state	   narrative	   and	   remains	   within	   the	   dominant	  narrative	  on	  law	  in	  Pakistan.	  This	  presents	  the	  major	  paradox	  of	  the	  narrative	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
961	  Orla	  Guerin	  (25	  July	  2013)	  (n	  959).	  962	  Ibid.	  963	  Ali	  Raza	  Khan	  Jatoi	  (2013)	  (n	  926).	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while	   it	   recognises	   that	   it	   is	   the	   state	   along	  with	   its	   legal	   and	   juridical	   set-­‐up	  which	  violates	  the	  rights	  of	  some	  communities	  of	  its	  citizens,	  it	  also	  calls	  for	  the	  state	   to	   provide	   and	   protect	   its	   citizens’	   rights,	   and	   dissolve	   the	   normative	  orders	   that	  exist	  outside	   the	  established	   laws	  of	   the	  state.964	  This	   is	  primarily	  because	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse,	  on	  the	  whole,	  is	  unable	  to	  divest	  itself	  from	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  traditional	  notion	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  case	   of	   Pakistan	   as	  well.	   Zizek	  writes	   that	   in	   the	   current	   day	   and	   age,	   human	  rights	  movements	  ‘rely	  on	  state	  apparatuses,	  which	  are	  not	  only	  the	  addressee	  of	  their	  demands,	  but	  also	  provide	  the	  framework	  for	  their	  activity’.965	  Owing	  to	  their	   challenge	   to,	   but	   also	   dependence	   on,	   the	   conceptions	   linked	   to	   the	  state,966	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative	   serves	   to	   strengthen	   the	   state-­‐oriented	  approach	   to	   law	   and	   co-­‐opts	   the	   languages	   and	   means	   of	   resistance	   that	   lie	  outside	  it.	  	  Costas	  Douzinas’s	  critique	  of	  the	  wider	  discourse	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  apt	  here.	  He	  asserts	   that	   ‘human	   rights	   are	   an	   ideology	   with	   a	   moral	   inflection.	   They	   are	  supposed	  to	  be	  above	  politics,	  a	  neutral,	  rational,	  natural	  discourse	  and	  practise	  and	   a	   “moral	   trump	   card”’.967	   For	   Douzinas,	   it	   is	   the	   neutrality	   and	   apolitical	  nature	  of	  human	  rights	  that	  is	  the	  problem,	  by	  virtue	  of	  which	  this	  discourse	  is	  unwilling	   to	   challenge	   the	   political	   strength	   of	   the	   state.	   Tracing	   a	   history	   of	  human	   rights,	   he	   considers	   the	   Christianisation	   of	   Classical	   Natural	   Rights	  Theory,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  state-­‐led	  legal	  authority	  and	  Legal	  Positivism	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964	  The	  Express	  Tribune	  (31	  May	  2012)	  (n	  830).	  965	  Slavoj	  Zizek,	  In	  Defence	  of	  Lost	  Causes	  (Verso,	  London)	  371.	  966	  Ibid.	  967	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  The	  End	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  Oxford	  2000)	  11.	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the	  precursors	  of	  the	  contemporary	  paradigm.968	  Christianisation	  is	  said	  to	  have	  created	   the	   ‘individual’	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   natural	   rights,	  while	   legal	   positivism	  removed	  God	  from	  natural	  rights	  and	  installed	  the	  state	  in	  its	  stead.969	  Human	  Rights	   thus	  became	   the	   rights	  of	   an	   individual	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	   social	   contract	  with	  the	  state	  –	  a	  contract	  which	  the	  state	  could	  decide	  to	  revoke	  in	  its	  interest.	  He	   also	   traces	   the	   genealogy	   of	   the	   ‘Right	   to	   Protest’	   and	   struggle	   as	   the	  precursor	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  social	  contract	  theory.	  This	  Right	  to	  Protest,	  however,	  gradually	  declined	  between	  the	  French	  and	  American	  Revolutions	  and	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  while	  it	  was	  completely	  removed	  from	  the	  picture	  when	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  subsequent	  covenants	  were	  prepared	   and	   signed.970	   Douzinas	   writes	   that	   the	   ‘prime	   function’	   of	  contemporary	  human	  rights,	  therefore,	  is	  ‘to	  construct	  the	  individual	  person	  as	  a	  subject	  (of	  law)’,971	  where	  the	  subject’s	  entire	  existence	  as	  a	  subject	  depends	  on	  the	  state’s	  will,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  is	  disempowered	  by	  removal	  of	  any	  (non-­‐)legal	   avenues	   of	   struggle	   and	   protest.	   To	   address	   the	   state	   on	   the	  violation	  of	  his	  rights,	  he	  needs	  to	  communicate	  through	  the	  language	  of	  human	  rights.	   It	   recognises	   that	   the	   state	   has	   been	   unable	   to	   safeguard	   the	   rights	   of	  individuals,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   only	   presents	   the	   option	   of	   lobbying	   the	  state	   to	   do	   more.	   It	   looks	   towards	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   state’s	   mechanisms,	  procedures	  and	  structures,	  not	  recognising	  that	  advocacy	  alone	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  reform	  the	  state,	  as	  it	   is	   intricately	  embedded	  in	  the	  local	  and	  global	  power	  structures	  that	  benefit	  from	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968	  Ibid.	  11.	  969	  Ibid.	  970	  Ibid.	  971	  Ibid.	  7.	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  I	   argue	   that	  despite	   its	   strength	   in	  highlighting	   issues	  of	  human	  suffering	  and	  denial	  of	  rights,	  human	  rights	  discourse,	  especially	  in	  Pakistan’s	  case,	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  holistic	  critique	  of	  the	  structures	  of	  law	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  power.	  The	  organisations	  working	   in	   this	   arena	   challenge	   the	   state	   for	   failure	   to	   fulfil	   its	  obligations	  towards	  its	  subjects,	  but	  they	  look	  toward	  the	  state	  as	  the	  ultimate	  guardian	   of	   rights	   and	   freedom.	   The	   power	   structures,	   patriarchy,	   feudalism,	  religious	  conceptions	  and	  misogyny	  that	  are	  cited	  as	  criticisms	  of	  the	  traditional	  tribunals,	   formulate	   a	   problematic	   part	   of	   the	   state’s	   framework	   as	   well.972	  There	   have	   been	   numerous	   instances	   in	   which	   members	   of	   provincial	   and	  national	   legislatures	   have	   been	   found	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   instances	   of	   honour	  killings	  or	  exchange	  or	  trade	  of	  women	  to	  settle	  disputes.973	  Moreover,	  some	  of	  the	   grave	   instances	   of	   human	   rights	   abuses	   have	   the	   State	   as	   the	   main	  perpetrator	   behind	   them.	   The	   forced	   disappearances	   and	   the	   excesses	   of	  military	  personnel	  in	  Balochistan	  province	  and	  the	  tribal	  areas	  are	  carried	  out	  under	  state’s	  authority.974	  Furthermore,	  human	  rights	  organisations	  also	  argue	  for	  state	  to	  bring	  the	  people	  of	  the	  tribal	  regions	  (constitutional	  exteriority)	  into	  the	  net	  of	  citizenship	  and	  afford	  them	  more	  human	  rights.	  Considering	  that	  the	  rights	   of	  minorities,	  women	   and	  people	   involved	   in	   different	   struggles	  within	  Pakistan	  are	  not	  effectively	  safeguarded	  by	  the	  state,	  bringing	  the	  people	  of	  the	  tribal	  areas	  into	  the	  citizenship	  net	  will	  not	  necessarily	  resolve	  the	  problems	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
972	  Pratiksha	  Baxi,	  Shirin	  M.	  Rai	  and	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali,	   'Legacies	  of	  Common	  Law:	   'Crimes	  of	  Honour'	  in	  India	  and	  Pakistan'	  (2006)	  27	  (7)	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  1239,	  1249.	  973	  Dawn	  (31	  March	  2009)	  (n	  474).	  974	  See,	  generally,	  Adeel	  Khan	  (2003)	  (n	  74).	  The	  recent	  discovery	  of	  mass	  graves	  in	  Balochistan	  is	  a	  relevant	  example	  in	  this	  regard.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  graves	  holds	  bodies	  of	  ‘missing	  persons’	  from	  Balochistan,	  and	  the	  matter	  is	  currently	  sub	  judice.	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lawlessness	   and	   suffering.	   If	   the	   State	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   contributor	   to	   the	   human	  rights	  abuses,	  no	  mere	  assertion	  of	  human	  rights	  obligation	  would	  completely	  rectify	  the	  situation.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   two	   paradoxes	   discussed	   above,	   there	   are	   another	   two	  significant	   challenges	   that	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative	   faces	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   setup.	  First,	   the	  human	  rights	   language	  and	  discourse	   is	  perceived	   as	   alien	   to	   the	   people,	   a	   large	   section	   of	   whom	   believe	   it	   to	   be	   a	  narrative	   borrowed	   from	   western	   academic	   and	   legal	   discourse.975	   Human	  rights	   organisations	   challenging	   the	   state	   and	   traditional	   tribunals	   and	  normative	   customs	   prevailing	   in	   Pakistan	   are	   often	   branded	   as	   organisations	  that	  are	  foreign-­‐funded.976	  	  Human	  rights	  and	  development	  NGOs	  are	  accused	  of	  trying	   to	   fulfil	   a	   ‘western	   agenda’,977	   and	   there	   is	   recognition	   of	   the	   resultant	  ‘trust	  deficit’978	  even	  within	  the	  NGO	  community.	   It	   is	  argued	  that	  not	   just	   the	  wider	  public,	  but	  even	  the	  activists	  associated	  with	  the	  development	  and	  human	  rights	  sectors	  consider	   ‘human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  as	  a	  Western	  Agenda.’979	  In	   its	  2009	  report	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Reporting	   in	  Pakistani	  Media,	   the	  Pakistan	  Institute	  for	  Peace	  Studies	  claimed	  that	  this	  perspective	  was	  reflected	  by	  ‘many	  journalists’	  as	  well,	  who	  considered	   ‘human	  rights	  as	  anti-­‐Islam’	  and	  bearer	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
975	  Farida	  Shaheed	  (2010)	  (n	  288)	  862-­‐863.	  976	  Ibid.	  	  977	  Uzma	  Tahir,	  Space	  for	  NGOs	  in	  Pakistan	  (Actionaid,	  Pakistan	  2013).	  	  978	  Ibid.	  979	  Samson	  Salamat,	  'Civil	  Society	  of	  Pakistan:	  Contribution,	  Impact,	  Challenges	  and	  Way	  Forward'	  <http://www.chrepak.org/downloads/Civil%20Society%20in%20Pakistan%20Presentation.pdf>	  last	  accessed	  12	  January	  2014.	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foreign	  culture	  and	  values.980	  This	  is	  not	  too	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  wider	  critique	  of	  human	  rights	  discourse,	  which	  challenges	  the	  paradigm	  based	  on	  its	  historical	  and	   geographical	   particularity.	   Critics	   argue	   that	   the	   initial	   list	   of	   rights	   and	  values	   they	  were	  based	  on	  emerged	   from	  a	   specific	  moment	  of	  world	  history,	  and	   is	   inextricably	   tied	   to	   its	   geographical	   and	   cultural	   origins.	   Scholars	   also	  question	  the	  claimed	  universality	  of	  human	  rights.981	  They	  argue	  that	  while	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  not	  all	  members	  of	  humanity	  are	  afforded	  equal	  rights	  in	  practise,	  even	   the	   categories	  used	  at	   the	   theoretical	   level	   –	   terms	   like	   ‘human’,	   ‘rights’,	  ‘citizen’	  –	  are	  either	  unclear,	  or	  selectively	  defined	  and	  applied	  to	  suit	  the	  needs	  of	  power.982	  	  However,	   in	   relation	   to	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry,	   this	   critique	   takes	   a	  different	  turn.	  While	  it	  signifies	  a	  gulf	  between	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  the	   language	   of	   resistance	   adopted	   within	   the	   country,	   the	   critique	   of	   the	  particular	   origins	   of	   human	   rights	   discourse	   is	   appropriated	   in	   larger	  conspiracy	   theories.	   Promotion	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   women	   and	   minorities	   is	  considered	   a	   conspiracy	   against	   the	   cultural	   and	   religious	   values,	   and	   several	  rights	  activists	  have	  paid	  the	  price	  for	  this	  with	  their	  lives.983	  A	  sitting	  Member	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
980	  	  Safdar	  Sial,	  'Human	  Rights	  Reporting	  in	  Pakistani	  Media'	  (2009)	  2	  (1)	  Conflict	  and	  Peace	  
Studies	  1,	  8.	  981	  Sam	  Adelman,	  'Between	  the	  Scylla	  of	  Sovereignty	  and	  the	  Charybdis	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  pitfalls	  of	  Development	  in	  pursuit	  of	  Justice'	  (2008)	  2	  Human	  Rights	  and	  International	  Legal	  
Discourse	  17,	  29.	  982	  Ibid.	  30-­‐33.	  983	  Farida	  Afridi,	  Executive	  Director	  of	  Sawera	  (a	  women’s	  rights	  organisation	  based	  in	  North-­‐western	  region)	  and	  Zarteef	  Khan	  (a	  coordinator	  at	  HRCP)	  were	  murdered	  in	  2012	  and	  2011	  respectively,	  for	  promoting	  women’s	  rights	  in	  FATA	  regions.	  Myra	  Imran,	  'Safety	  of	  human	  rights	  defenders,particularly	  women	  demanded'	  The	  News	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan	  	  <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-­‐News-­‐6-­‐124577-­‐Safety-­‐of-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐defendersparticularly-­‐women-­‐demanded>	  last	  accessed	  05	  May	  2013.	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of	   the	   National	   Assembly	   of	   Punjab	   province	   had	   publicly	   claimed	   that	   the	  Mukhtar	  Mai	  case	  (discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2),	  highlighted	  by	  human	  rights	  groups,	  was	   ‘a	   conspiracy	   to	   defame	   Pakistan	   and	   Islam’,	   propagated	   to	   earn	   foreign	  aid.984	  This	  same	  sentiment	  was	  expressed	  by	  Pervez	  Musharraf,	  then	  President	  of	   Pakistan,	   when	   he	   called	   such	   incidents	   a	   ‘money-­‐making	   concern’	   and	  denounced	  the	  situation	  by	  saying	  that	  ‘A	  lot	  of	  people	  say	  that	  if	  you	  want	  to	  go	  abroad	  and	  get	  a	  visa	  for	  Canada	  or	  citizenship	  and	  be	  a	  millionaire,	  get	  yourself	  raped.’985	  	  Finally,	   emerging	   from	   the	   previous	   point,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   narrow	   the	   gulf	  between	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  the	  people	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  human	  rights	   discourse	   is	   often	   co-­‐opted	   by	   the	   Islamic	   narrative.	   Despite	   the	   two	  positions	   generally	   adopting	   oppositional	   stances,986	   this	   appropriation	   is	  apparent	  in	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative	  within	  the	  legal	  fraternity	  more	  than	  the	  narrative	   of	   the	   NGOs.	   Judges	   and	   lawyers	   have	   often	   associated	   the	  constitutional	   guarantees	   and	   human	   rights	   to	   the	   rights	   present	   within	   the	  Islamic	   religious	   discourse,	   some	   accounts	   of	   which	   have	   already	   been	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
984	  Usman	  Manzoor,	  'Dasti	  praises	  SC	  verdict	  in	  Mukhtaran	  Mai	  case'	  <http://www.pakistangendernews.org/dasti-­‐praises-­‐sc-­‐verdict-­‐in-­‐mukhtaran-­‐mai-­‐case/>	  last	  accessed	  15	  July	  2013.	  985	  BBC	  News,	  'Outrage	  at	  Musharraf's	  rape	  remarks'	  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4251536.stm>	  last	  accessed	  17	  May	  2013.	  	  986	  Farida	  Shaheed	  (2010)	  (n	  288)	  861-­‐863.	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7.5. Conclusion	  
The	  human	  rights	  discourse,	  and	  its	  associated	  narrative	  on	  law,	  have	  become	  increasingly	   prominent	   in	   Pakistan	   in	   the	   past	   few	   decades.	   The	   existence	   of	  this	   narrative	   is	   evident	   not	   only	   in	   NGO	   and	   activist	   accounts,	   but	   has	   also	  become	  visible	   in	   the	   language	  of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	  wider	   legal	   fraternity.	  However,	   one	   consequence	   that	   emerges	   from	   the	   human	   rights	   narrative	   on	  law	  is	  the	  insistence	  on	  disputing	  the	  legality	  of	  any	  alternative	  forms	  of	  justice	  that	   exist	   in	   the	   society	   outside	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   state.	   It	   has	   been	  emphasised	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   this	   approach	   inadvertently	   acts	   to	   further	  marginalise	   those	   sections	   of	   the	   society	   which	   do	   not	   have	   recourse	   to	  mainstream	   legal	   institutions.	   The	   chapter	   also	   sought	   to	   identify	   some	   other	  key	  issues	  that	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  when	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative	  is	  considered	  in	   the	  context	  of	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry.	  Building	  on	   the	   identification,	  analysis	   and	   critique	   of	   the	   four	   prominent	   narratives	   of	   law	   in	   Pakistan	   as	  offered	  in	  this	  and	  the	  preceding	  three	  chapters,	  the	  discussion	  will	  now	  move	  towards	  a	  different	  approach	  and	  discuss	  an	  alternate	  way	  through	  which	   the	  socio-­‐legal	  problems	  of	  Pakistan	  could	  be	  analysed	  and	  understood.	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Chapter	  8: Towards	   an	   Alternate	   Narrative:	   (Re)reading	   the	  
Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  	  This	   chapter	   builds	   on	   the	   foregoing	   discussion	   about	   the	   questions	   and	  contradictions	  that	  emerge	  from	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  multiple	  frameworks	  and	   narratives	   of	   law,	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   account	   for	   the	  particularities	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry.	  As	  the	  final	  substantive	  chapter	  of	   the	  dissertation,	   it	   returns	   to	   the	   issues	   raised	  heretofore,	   and	  presents	   an	  alternative	   view	   to	   frame	   them.	   By	   looking	   at	   the	   colonial	   foundation	   of	   the	  country’s	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain,	  this	  chapter	  develops	  the	  idea	  of	  Coloniality	  in	  Law,	  as	   distinct	   from	   the	   historical	   event	   of	   colonialism.	   It	   is	   argued	   here	   that	  through	   understanding	   the	   principles	   and	   logics	   of	   Coloniality,	   we	   can	   move	  towards	   a	   more	   nuanced	   narrative	   of	   the	   problems	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	  architecture,	   while	   also	   opening	   avenues	   for	   de-­‐colonial	   approaches	   and	  resistance.	  	  
8.1. Reconsidering	   Law	   in	   the	   Context	   of	   Pakistan:	   Foundational	  
questions	  
The	  current	  study	  has	  thus	  far	  developed	  two	  significant	  arguments	  in	  relation	  to	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   situation	   and	   analysis.	   One,	   it	   has	   outlined	   and	  discussed	   the	   various	   prominent	   facets	   of	   the	   country’s	   legal	   architecture	   to	  formulate	   and	   present,	   what	   the	   thesis	   terms	   as,	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	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tapestry.987	  It	  has	  considered	  the	  historical	  and	  conceptual	  trajectories	  of	  some	  of	  the	  multiple	  legal	  and	  normative	  structures	  that	  prevail	  in	  the	  country,	  their	  interplay	  and	  encounters,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  limitations	  and	  problems,	  as	  the	  key	  to	  comprehend	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  bifurcation	  between	  legal	  and	   political	   discourses,	   and	   between	   legalistic	   accounts	   and	   sociological	  examinations,	  has	  meant	  that	  most	  analyses	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  selected	  segments	  of	  the	  tapestry,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  considering	  their	  place	  within	   the	   wider	   terrain.988	   By	   examining	   the	   various	   notions	   and	  manifestations	  of	   law	  together,	   this	  study	  has	  presented	  the	  case	  for	  a	  holistic	  approach	   to	   law,	   which	   is	   the	   necessary	   prerequisite	   to	   understand	   the	  difficulties	   that	   the	   law,	   state	   and	   the	  wider	   society	   of	   the	   country	   are	   faced	  with.	  	  	  It	   has	  been	  argued	   that	   any	  wider	  examination	  of	   law	   in	  Pakistan	  has	   to	   take	  account	  of	   the	   struggle	   for	   constitutional	   and	   judicial	  dominance	  between	   the	  inherited	  colonial	   law,	  common	  law	  and	  Islamic	  law,	  which	  has	  dominated	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  history	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  which	  is	  very	  much	  evident	  today.989	  Moreover,	  this	  struggle	  has	  to	  be	  approached	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  traditional	  and	  community	  courts,	  the	  legal	  anomaly	  of	  tribal	  areas,	  and	  the	  ascendance	  of	  ‘lawlessness’	  –	  facets	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  anomalies	  in	  mainstream	   legal	   discourse	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   either	   left	   out	   of	   legal	  discourse	  or	  included	  primarily	  as	  obstacles	  that	  need	  to	  be	  overcome	  through	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
987	  Chapter	  3	  on	  page	  96.	  988	  Previously	  discussed	  on	  page	  42.	  989	  Page	  142.	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the	   (re)assertion	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   frames	   of	   analysis.990	   The	   strict	   legal	  expositions	   and	   isolationist	   standpoints	   that	   have	   largely	   dominated	   the	  country’s	  (socio)legal	  analyses	  tend	  to	  restrict	  their	  gaze	  on	  the	  structures	  that	  neatly	  fall	  within	  the	  seams	  of	  their	  pre-­‐defined	  categories.	  This	  study	  asserts,	  however,	  that	  unless	  the	  multiple	  tendencies,	  foci	  and	  structures	  of	  legality	  are	  approached	   together,	   this	   restricted	   ‘gaze’991	   can	   only	   offer	   partial	  understanding	  of	  issues,	  and	  will	  only	  lead	  to	  blind	  propositions.	  	  The	   other	   significant	   argument	   of	   the	   current	   study	   emerged	   from	   this	  expansion	   of	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   (socio)legal	   analysis.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	  throughout	   the	   course	   of	   the	   foregoing	   discussion	   that	   a	   shift	   in	   the	  understanding	  of	  what	  constitutes	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  logically	  leads	  towards	  a	  (re)consideration	  of	  the	  lenses	  and	  narratives	  generally	  employed	  to	  examine	  law.	  Abstractions	  and	  theoretical	  conceptions	  are	  crucial	  in	  enabling	  us	  to	   grasp	   the	   Pakistani	   legal	   system	   in	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   manner,	   and	  resolve	   or	   at	   least	   recognise	   its	   contradictions,	   though	   they	   may	   be	   trapped	  within	  their	  own	  contradictions.	  The	  discussions	  in	  the	  previous	  four	  chapters	  have	  underscored	  the	  various	  limitations	  that	  different	  prominent	  narratives	  to	  law,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   underlying	   theoretical	   conceptions,	   are	   faced	  with	  when	  they	   are	   applied	   to	   the	   legal	   realities	   of	   the	   context	   in	   consideration.	   The	  dominant	   legal	   narrative	   and	   the	   legal	   positivistic	   approach,	   through	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
990	  Page	  138.	  991	  Gaze	  and	  its	  role	  in	  not	   just	  witnessing	  or	  observing	  the	  subject,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	   subject	   itself	   is	   widely	   discussed	   in	   critical	   theory	   and	   psychoanalysis.	   As	   Lacan	   writes,	  ‘What	  determines	  me,	  at	  the	  most	  profound	  level,	   in	  the	  visible	  is	  the	  gaze	  that	  is	  outside.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  gaze	  that	  I	  enter	  light	  and	  it	  is	  from	  the	  gaze	  that	  that	  I	  receive	  its	  effects.’	  Quoted	  in	  Janne	  Seppänen,	  The	  Power	  of	   the	  Gaze:	  An	   Introduction	   to	  Visual	  Literacy	   (P.	  Lang,	  New	  York	  2006)	  76.	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exclusive	  focus	  on	  state	  law,	  are	  unable	  to	  recognise	  the	  multiple	  legal	  realities	  and	  normative	  orderings	   that	  exist	  both	  within	  and	  outside	   the	  state-­‐oriented	  legal	   frameworks.992	  Moreover,	   the	   insistence	   on	   the	   prevalent	   conception	   of	  law	   –	   a	   stronger	   state,	   greater	   ‘writ	   of	   the	   government’	   and	   undisputed	  assertion	  of	  Sovereignty	  –	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  contradictions	  that	  the	  society	  is	  faced	  with	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  the	  State.993	  But	  the	  narratives	  that	  aim	  to	  counter	  or	  amend	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  of	  law	  present	  their	  own	  difficulties.	   The	   Islamic	   law	   narrative	   denounces	   the	   alien	   nature	   of	   the	  inherited	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   traditions,	   and	   claims	   to	   represent	   the	  ideological	   foundation	   of	   Pakistan.	   However,	   it	   proves	   unable	   to	   divest	   itself	  from	  its	  own	  colonial	  heritage,	  or	  respond	  to	  the	  assertions	  that	  it	  is	  becoming	  more	   exclusionary	   and	   comes	   into	   conflict	   with	   the	   ideas	   of	   citizenship	   and	  democracy,	  no	  matter	  how	  weak	  they	  are	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.994	  	  	  The	  assertion	  on	  traditional	  normative	  orders	  and	  legal	  pluralism	  also	  emerges	  from	   the	   critique	  of	  dominant	   legal	   system	  as	  a	   foreign	   imposition.	  Positing	  a	  strong	   challenge	   to	   legal-­‐centralism,	   this	   narrative	   highlights	   the	   existence	   of	  alternative	  normative	  orderings	  that	  have	  historically	  existed	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  are	   still	   the	   fora	   of	   choice	   for	   a	   great	   section	   of	   the	   populace.995	   But	   this	  narrative	  comes	  under	  fierce	  criticism	  due	  to	  the	  repressive	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  these	  alternative	  justice	  mechanisms,	  and	  provides	  only	  limited	  insights	  on	  the	  conflicts	  between	  multiple	  legalities.	  The	  models	  of	  informal	  justice	  attempt	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
992	  See,	  Problematising	  the	  Dominant	  Narrative	  on	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  161.	  993	  Page	  161.	  994	  Page	  202.	  995	  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  on	  page	  115.	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create	  or	  recognise	  alternative	  methods	  of	  approaching	  and	  administering	  law,	  but	  they	  remain	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  dominant	  legality	  and	  primarily	  aim	  to	  address	   issues	  of	   immediacy	  and	  access.	  The	  human	  rights	  narrative	  of	   law	  has	  also	  gained	  prominence	  in	  the	  country	  and	  has	  become	  embedded	  in	  both	  the	   language	   of	   the	   courts	   as	  well	   as	   in	  wider	   legal	   and	  political	   discourse.	   It	  highlights	   the	   suffering	   of	   the	   people	   and	   challenges	   the	   patriarchal	   and	  misogynist	   tendencies	   present	   in	   both	   the	   dominant	   as	   well	   as	   alternative	  justice	   systems.	  However,	   its	  demands	  are	  generally	  aimed	   towards	  achieving	  greater	  safeguards	  from	  the	  state,	  and	  it	  has	  to	  ultimately	  rely	  for	  redress	  on	  the	  same	  system	  that	  it	  criticises	  as	  deficient.996	  	  The	   purpose	   behind	   the	   two	   above-­‐mentioned	   contributions	   to	   Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	   (and,	   in	   some	  ways,	  political)	  discourse	   is	  both	   to	  make	  a	   case	   for	  new	  avenues	  of	  context-­‐specific	  legal	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  create	  possibilities	  for	   it.	   The	   problems	   that	   the	   country	   faces	   and	   the	   suffering	   that	   its	   people	  experience	   create	   an	   urgent	   need	   to	   recognise	   the	   deficiencies,	   both	   in	   our	  conceptualisation	   of	   law	   in	   the	   country’s	   context,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   narratives,	  perspectives,	  theories	  and	  ideologies	  that	  we	  employ	  to	  approach	  it.	  This	  is	  the	  necessary	   first	  step	   if	  our	  goal	   is	   the	  (re)formation	  of	   the	   legal	  and	  normative	  orders	   to	   make	   them	   more	   accountable	   to	   the	   people,	   and	   more	   responsive	  towards	   their	   suffering.	   This	   critique	   and	   acceptance	   of	   limitations,	   albeit	  necessary,	   is	   not	   sufficient,	   for	   it	   displaces	   that	   which	  we	   have	   held	   dear	   till	  now;	   it	   creates	  a	  vacuum	   in	   the	  place	  of	   the	  perspectives	   it	   challenges.	  This,	   I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
996	  See,	  Human	  Rights	  Narrative	  and	  the	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  239.	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argue,	  is	  the	  most	  pressing	  task	  for	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  analyses	  of	  legal,	  social	  and	   political	   spheres	   of	   Pakistan.	   The	   identification	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry,	  the	  recognition	  of	  contradictions	  present	  in	  the	  prevalent	   narratives	   to	   law	   in	   the	   country,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   inadequacies	   of	  mainstream	  theoretical	  propositions	  on	  law	  to	  comprehend	  the	  legal	  realities	  of	  this	   region,	   create	   the	   need	   to	   search	   for	   alternative	   narratives	   and	   context-­‐specific	  theoretical	  conceptions.	  As	  the	  horizons	  of	  our	  understanding	  are	  found	  to	   be	   imperfect,	   we	   must	   search	   for	   new	   horizons	   and	   possibilities.997	   The	  sections	   below	  will	   begin	   this	   pursuit	   for	   alternative	  ways	   of	   comprehending	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  situation,	  by	  offering	  a	  more	  nuanced	  narrative	  of	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  However,	  any	  alternative	  narrative	  that	  might	  enable	  to	  us	  to	  comprehend	  the	  multiple	   facets	   of	   Pakistan’s	   legal	   architecture	   in	   a	   different	   light	   needs	   to	  address	  the	  questions	  raised	  by	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  the	  current	  examination.	  The	   foregoing	   discussion	   has	   identified	   the	   following	   key	   issues	   that	   the	  narratives	  discussed	  are	  unable	  to	  explain	  adequately:	  	  
• There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  uncover	  or	  discover	  the	  role	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  State	  and	  its	  authored	  law	  in	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  setup	  of	  the	  country.	  This	  poses	  the	  question	  of	  recognising	  the	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  Pakistan’s	  State	  and	  dominant	  legal	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
997	  This	   is	   the	  only	   logical	  goal	   to	  aim	  for,	   in	  response	  to	   ‘strong	  questions’	   that	  challenge	   ‘the	  societal	   and	   epistemological	   paradigm	   that	   has	   shaped	   the	   current	   horizon	   of	   possibilities.’	  
Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2009)	  (n	  692)	  3.	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can	  and	  should	  be	  explained	  in	  any	  terms	  other	  than	  the	  ‘weak	  state’	  terminology	  commonly	  employed	  in	  political	  discourses.	  	  
• The	  previous	  point	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  perceived	  and	  pervasive	  problem	  of	  lawlessness,	  which	  has	  significantly	  affected	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  State	  before	  its	  citizens.	  The	  discussed	  narratives	  to	  law	  (except	  perhaps	  for	  pluralism)	  primarily	  assert	  that	  the	  problems	  of	  violence	  and	  insecurity	  emerge	  from	  an	  absence	  of	  law	  and	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  State	  authorities,	  and	  that	  a	  stronger	  and	  wider	  reach	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  juridical	  instruments	  would	  resolve	  the	  problems.	  	  
• There	  is	  also	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  Islamic	  narrative	  of	  law	  that	  has	  gained	  such	  momentum	  in	  the	  recent	  decades	  that	  it	  has	  brought	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  State	  and	  the	  society.	  The	  Islamic	  perspective	  of	  law	  has	  been	  in	  constant	  struggle	  with	  the	  dominant	  legal	  system	  and	  its	  inherited	  secular/common	  law	  tradition,	  and	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  conflict	  within	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain.	  	  
• The	  issue	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  multiple	  legal	  and	  normative	  orderings	  that	  exist	  in	  different	  localities	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  are,	  by	  some	  accounts,	  the	  prevalent	  legality	  in	  the	  country,	  is	  one	  that	  eludes	  the	  dominant	  narrative.	  These	  orderings	  play	  both	  an	  emancipatory	  and	  a	  repressive	  role,	  but	  their	  existence,	  although	  downplayed	  by	  the	  State,	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  as	  these	  normative	  systems	  are	  followed	  by	  a	  large	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section	  of	  the	  country’s	  population.	  These	  mechanisms	  often	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  state-­‐authored	  legal	  order,	  which	  either	  subsumes	  them	  or	  declares	  them	  as	  illegal.	  How	  can	  any	  narrative	  on	  law	  recognise	  the	  plurality	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  various	  legal	  systems?	  	  
• The	  matter	  of	  the	  tribal	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  which	  are	  governed	  directly	  through	  executive	  authority,	  and	  to	  which	  the	  writ	  of	  the	  parliament	  and	  the	  judiciary	  does	  not	  extend,	  creates	  an	  unavoidable	  anomaly	  for	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  on	  law.	  These	  areas	  exist	  as	  a	  lacuna	  within	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  framework	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  to	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  these	  regions,	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  constitutional	  guarantees	  do	  not	  apply.	  If	  the	  problems	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  faced	  with	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  the	  extension	  and	  strengthening	  of	  legal	  instruments	  and	  institutions,	  why	  is	  the	  State	  adamant	  on	  maintaining	  the	  tribal	  regions	  as	  a	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  
exteriority?	  	  
• Finally,	  and	  most	  significantly,	  the	  task	  is	  to	  resolve	  these	  issues	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  people.	  There	  is	  an	  urgent	  and	  pressing	  need	  to	  bring	  recognition	  of	  suffering	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  legal-­‐theoretical	  discussions,	  so	  that	  possibilities	  for	  their	  alleviation	  may	  be	  opened.	  This	  may	  appear	  to	  some	  as	  an	  abstract	  ideal,	  but	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  has	  guided	  the	  current	  study.	  
	  In	  order	  to	  acquire	  greater	  clarity	  on	  these	  questions	  and	  move	  towards	  a	  more	  nuanced	   narrative	   on	   law	   in	   Pakistan,	   we	   have	   to	   begin	   from	   the	   common	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thread	  that	  seams	  across	  (most	  of)	  these	  questions,	  i.e.,	  the	  historical	  legacy	  of	  colonialism.	  	  
8.2. Colonialism	  and	  Pakistan’s	  Socio-­‐Legal	  terrain	  
To	  reiterate,	   the	  socio-­‐legal	   situation	  of	  Pakistan	  presents	  a	  complex	   tapestry,	  which	  emerges	  from	  the	  interplay,	  encounter	  and	  struggle	  between	  its	  various	  facets	  –	  common	  law,	  colonial	  law,	  Islamic	  law,	  traditional	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  laws	  applicable	  in	  the	  Tribal	  Regions.	  Disparate	  as	  these	  appear	  to	  be,	  a	  thread	  that	  runs	   through	   all	   of	   these	   manifestations	   of	   legality	   and	   normativity	   is	   their	  shared	  colonial	  history.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  evident	  rifts	  and	  tensions	  within	  the	  legal	   terrain	   today	   can	   be	   traced	   to	  what	   transpired	   in	   the	   region	   before	   the	  country	  itself	  was	  born.	  It	  was	  the	  colonial	  history	  that	  set	  events	  in	  motion	  and	  it	   is	   therefore	   the	  pertinent	  starting	  point	   for	  any	  wider	  analysis	  of	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  setup.	  	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   remnants	   of	   the	   colonial	   legal	   system	   still	   exist	   within	   the	  state-­‐law	  system	  has	  been	  widely	  acknowledged,	  and	  has	  also	  been	  examined	  previously	  in	  this	  dissertation.998	  The	  commercial	  and	  mercantile	  laws,	  codes	  of	  civil	  and	  criminal	  procedures	  and	  even	  the	  penal	  code	  in	  force	  today	  are	  largely	  a	  reformulation	  of	  the	  laws	  that	  the	  British	  Indian	  government	  implemented	  in	  the	  sub-­‐continent.999	  Though	  these	  have	  gone	  through	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  post-­‐independence	   period	   –	   the	   most	   prominent	   among	   them	   being	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
998	  Page	  128.	  999	  Martin	  Lau	  (1994)	  (n	  327)	  6.	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Islamisation	  of	  laws	  campaign	  during	  the	  Zia	  regime1000	  –	  the	  basic	  foundation	  of	   the	   laws	  and	   legal	   institutions	   laid	  during	  the	  colonial	  era	   is	  unmistakeably	  evident.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  even	  the	  controversial	  Blasphemy	  laws	  of	  the	  country	  reveal	  a	  religious	  (and	  majoritarian)	  modification	  of	  the	  provisions	  laid	  out	   in	   the	  penal	   code	   that	  Pakistan	   inherited	  at	   the	   time	  of	   independence.1001	  The	  case	  of	  the	  (legal)	  framework	  that	  governs	  the	  Tribal	  Areas	  is	  another	  case	  that	   has	   been	   extensively	   examined	   above.1002	   Born	   from	   the	   British	   colonial	  state’s	  need	  to	  safeguard	  its	  Indian	  Empire	  from	  the	  Pushtun	  tribes	  in	  the	  North	  West	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Russian	   Empire,	   these	   laws	   were	   mainly	   instituted	   to	  implement	  the	  ‘threefold	  Frontier’	  policy	  to	  keep	  the	  colonies	  protected	  and	  the	  tribes	   in	   control.1003	   The	   principle	   that	   was	   adopted	   at	   the	   time	   –	   that	   is,	   to	  
legally	   create	   a	   territory	   where	   the	   executive	   authority	   and	   the	   criminal	  sanctions	  of	  the	  State	  may	  reach,	  but	  not	  the	  rights	  and	  guarantees	  that	  may	  be	  afforded	   to	   its	   subjects	   –	   may	   have	   been	   a	   novel	   and	   successful	   experiment	  (from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	   the	  Empire)	  at	   the	   time.1004	  The	   fact	   that	   this	   legal	  framework1005	  has	  been	  continued	  by	  the	  post-­‐independence	  State	  till	  today1006	  demonstrates	   that	   it	   is	   not	   only	   the	   legal	   formulations	  of	   colonialism	   that	   the	  State	   inherited,	   but	   also	   the	   logics	   and	   principles	   that	   provided	   the	   very	  foundation	  for	  such	  rules.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  of	  colonial	  logic	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000	  See,	  generally,	  Charles	  H.	  Kennedy	   (1990)	  (n	  244);	  Martin	  Lau	   (2006)	  (n	  97);	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (1994)	  (n	  97).	  1001	  Raza	  Saeed	  (2013)	  (n	  246).	  1002	  See,	  Colonial	  Law	  and	  the	  Tribal	  Regions	  on	  page	  128.	  1003	  George	  Nathaniel	  Curzon	  	  (n	  504).	  1004	  Ibid.	  1005	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations,	  1901	  1006	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  47.	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The	   influence	  of	   colonialism,	  however,	   runs	  much	  deeper	   than	   the	  mentioned	  instances	  of	  prevalent	  laws.	  It	  not	  only	  provided	  the	  legal	  frameworks	  that	  are	  by	  and	  large	  in	  place	  today	  but,	  more	  significantly,	  laid	  the	  terrain	  in	  which	  the	  struggles	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  sphere	  are	  now	  panning	  out.	  This	  terrain,	  based	  on	  the	  categorisation	  of	  people,	  the	  classification	  of	  cultures,	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  norms,	  as	  applied	  by	  the	  colonial	  administrators,	  marked	  the	  course	  that	  the	  legal	   and	   normative	   orders	   have	   taken	   since	   then.	   It	  was	   this	  knowledge	   that	  ‘both	   enabled	   colonial	   conquest	   and	   was	   [in	   turn]	   produced	   by	   it.’1007	   In	   its	  desire	   to	   define	   and	   control	   the	   other	   it	   had	   encountered,	   the	   colonial	  enterprise	   established	   classifications	   of	   religion,	   culture	   and	   castes,	   which	  became	  reified	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  time.1008	  As	  Dirks	  argues,	  ‘representation	  in	  the	  colonial	   context	  was	  violent;	   classification	  a	   totalising	   form	  of	   control.’1009	  Randeria	   writes	   that	   despite	   the	   assertions	   of	   modernity,	   nationalism	   and	  homogenisation	  in	  the	  metropolis,	  the	  colonies	  were	  marked	  by	  differentiation	  and	   enumeration.1010	   The	   impact	   of	   this	   ‘production	   of	   difference’	   continued	  after	  independence,	  so	  that	  ‘religious	  communities	  [in	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent]	  as	  we	  know	  them	  today	  are	  very	  much	  a	  product	  of	  enumeration,	  classification	  and	   categorisation	   by	   the	   colonial	   state.’1011	   This	   writing	   and	   recording	   of	  differences	  ‘to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  cultural	  norms’	  led	  not	  only	  to	  the	   ‘fossilisation	   of	   [a	   particular	   form	   of]	   culture,’1012	   but	   led	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1007	   Nicholas	   B.	   Dirks,	   'Introduction:	   Colonialism	   and	   Culture'	   in	   Nicholas	   B.	   Dirks	   (ed)	  
Colonialism	  and	  Culture	  (University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  Ann	  Arbor,	  Michigan	  1992)	  3.	  1008	  Ibid.	  3-­‐5.	  1009	  Ibid.	  5	  1010	  Shalini	  Randeria	  (2006)	  (n	  25)	  226.	  1011	  Ibid.	  	  1012	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (2007)	  (n	  785)	  78.	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appropriation,	   classification	   and	   transformation	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   normative	  orders	  as	  well.	  	  	  Through	   the	   lens	   of	   their	   own	   rules	   and	   conceptions	   of	   law,	   the	   colonial	  administrators	  and	  gazetteers	   judged,	  appropriated	  or	  denounced	  the	  existent	  traditional,	   legal	  and	  normative	  orderings.1013	  The	  most	   substantial	  move	  was	  perhaps	   the	   shift	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   religious	   laws	   and	   customary	   norms	   from	  personal	  to	  territorial.	  The	  Imperial	  Gazetteer	  of	  India,	   first	  published	  in	  1881	  (with	  the	  new	  edition	  cited	  here	  published	  in	  1909),	  noted	  that	  the	  ‘indigenous	  law	  of	  India	  is	  personal’1014	  and	  then	  went	  on	  to	  classify	  this	  law	  between	  two	  major	  groups:	   the	  Hindu	  and	  Muhammadan.	  Based	  on	   this	  knowledge,	   it	   then	  moves	  further	  to	  state	  that	  at	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  British	  in	  India	  
[T]he	   natural	   consequence	   would	   have	   been	   their	   [colonial	  administrators’]	   submission	   to	   Native	   law.	   But	   there	   was,	   in	   the	   first	  place,	  no	  lex	  loci	  to	  govern	  the	  new	  comers,	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  territorial,	  as	  opposed	   to	   a	   personal	   law,	   is	   of	   European	   and	  modern	   origin,	   and	   the	  Shastras	   and	   Koran	   alike	   know	   no	   local	   limits,	   but	   bind	   individuals	  united	  only	  by	  a	  common	  faith.1015	  	  The	   initial	   tendency	   of	   the	   British	   colonial	   administration	  was	   to	   ‘make	   their	  law	  public	  and	  territorial,’1016	  which	  would	  apply	  equally	  to	  natives	  and	  colonial	  incomers.	   This	   approach	   was	   later	   renounced	   by	   the	   British	   Parliament’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1013	  Calling	  the	  Gazetteer	   ‘the	  new	  bible’	   for	   the	  colonial	  state,	  Shaheen	  Ali	  writes	   that	   ‘British	  [Officials]	   travelled	   the	   length	   and	   breadth	   of	   the	   country,	   from	   village	   to	   village,	   gathering	  people	   to	   question	   them	   on	  what	   their	   culture	  was,	   and	   compiling	   notes,	   later	   published	   (as	  Gazetteers).	  The	  crucial	  question	  to	  pose	  here	  is:	  who	  were	  the	  participants	  and	  informants	  in	  these	   culture-­‐gathering	  meetings?	   It	  was	   no	   doubt,	   the	  male	   elite,	   excluding	  working	   classes,	  minority	  groups	  and	  women.’	  Ibid.	  78.	  1014	  H.	  W.	  C.	  Carnduff	  (1909)	  (n	  483)	  126.	  1015	  Ibid.	  127.	  1016	  Ibid.	  127	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Declaratory	  Act	  of	  1780,	  which	  ruled	  that	  ‘as	  against	  a	  Hindu,	  the	  Hindu	  law	  and	  usage,	  and	  as	  against	  a	  Muhammadan	  the	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  Islam,	  should	  be	  applied.’1017	  However,	  notwithstanding	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  very	  decision	  and	  power	   to	   determine	   the	   applicability	   of	   laws	   in	   such	   a	   manner,	   the	   colonial	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  Hindus	  and	  Muhammadans	  was	  itself	   problematic.	   Scholars	   maintain	   that	   the	   assumption	   that	   Muslims	   and	  Hindus	   (a	   category	   which	   also	   included	   Sikhs	   and	   Jains)	   were	   ‘homogenous	  communities	   following	   uniform	   laws’	   created	   a	   ‘legal	   fiction’1018	   that,	   coupled	  with	   the	   strict	   rooting	  of	   these	   laws	   in	   scriptures,	   lead	   to	   ‘the	  Brahminisation	  and	  Islamisation	  of	  laws.’1019	  There	  are	  certainly	  those	  who	  praise	  the	  colonial	  law	   for	   removing	   ‘the	   angularities	   of	   the	   law	  of	   Islam’	   and	  bringing	   it	   ‘in	   line	  with	  the	  modern	  notions	  of	  social	   justice.’1020	  The	  British	  accounts	  of	   the	  time	  themselves	  mention	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  modernity,	  equity	  and	  justice	  created	  the	  ‘impossibility	  of	  allowing	  the	  crude	  penal	  law	  of	  the	  Muslaman	  system	  to	  be	  followed…	   and	   here	   also	   radical	   alterations	   were	   made.’1021	   The	   Imperial	  Gazetteer	  acknowledges	  that	  	  
Owing	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   Western	   jurisprudence,	   to	   the	   case-­‐law	  emanating	  from	  the	  courts	  established	  and	  moulded	  on	  English	  models,	  to	  the	  advance	  of	  enlightened	  ideas,	  and	  to	  the	  progress	  of	  education,	  the	  rules	   of	   the	   Shastras	   and	   the	   Koran	   have	   gradually	   been	   altered	   and	  relaxed.1022	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1017	  Ibid.	  127.	  1018	   An	   echo	   of	   the	   assertion	   of	   ‘legal	   fiction’	   asserted	   by	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   of	   law,	  discussed	  above.	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  (2004)	  (n	  490)	  566.	  1019	   Flavia	   Agnes,	   quoted	   in	   Shaheen	   Sardar	   Ali,	   'Conceptualising	   Islamic	   Law,	   CEDAW,	   and	  Women's	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Plural	  Legal	  Settings'	  (New	  Delhi	  2006)	  95.	  1020	  Asaf	  A.	  A.	  Fyzee,	   'Muhammadan	  Law	   in	   India'	   (1963)	  5	   (4)	  Comparative	  Studies	   in	  Society	  
and	  History	  401,	  413.	  1021	  H.	  W.	  C.	  Carnduff	  (1909)	  (n	  483)	  144.	  1022	  Ibid.	  128	  (emphasis	  added).	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  But	   such	   perspectives	   ignore	   or	   hide	   the	   very	   injustice,	   inequality	   and	  ‘epistemic	  violence’1023	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  classificatory	  enterprise.	  The	  codification,	  appropriation	  and	  ‘removal	  of	  angularities’1024	  in	  existing	  laws	  and	  customs	   was	   not	   an	   exercise	   in	   advancing	   justice,	   but	   served	   as	   an	   aid	   to	  conquest	   and	   domination.	   It	   led	   both	   to	   the	   fossilisation	   of	   religion,	   culture,	  customs	  and	  norms,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  their	   impoverishment.	  The	  understanding	  of	  Islamic	   principles	   applied	   by	   British	   Indian	   courts	   and	   administrators	  mainly	  stemmed	  from	  translations	  of	  selected	  texts,	  which	  disregarded	  the	  diversity	  of	  opinions,	   schools	   of	   thought	   and	   sects	  within	   Islam.	  Anderson	  writes	   that	   the	  textual	   foundation	   of	   Anglo-­‐Muhammadan	   law	   was	   primarily	   based	   on	   just	  three	  texts	  translated	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  centuries	  –	  the	  al-­‐
Hidaya	  (a	  compilation	  of	  texts	  from	  the	  Hanafi	  school	  of	  Islamic	  jurisprudence);	  
al-­‐Sirajiyya	   (which	   covered	   inheritance	   issues);	   and	   Baillie’s	   A	   Digest	   of	  
Moohammudan	   Law,	   which	   included	   abbreviations	   and	   portions	   of	   Shi’a	  jurisprudence	   and	   Fatwa	   Alamgiri	   (the	   seventeenth	   century	   anthology	   of	  Shariah	   law,	   mainly	   based	   on	   Hanafi	   jurisprudence,	   compiled	   during	  Aurangzeb’s	   Empire).1025	   Some	   errors	   in	   the	   translations	   were	   discovered	  during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   but	   were	   never	   incorporated	   in	   the	   English	  versions.1026	  The	  appropriation	  of	   Islamic	   law	  by	  the	  colonial	   legal	   framework	  divested	  it	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  its	  perspectives,	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  outlooks	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1023	  To	  borrow	  a	  term	  from	  Spivak.	  See,	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak,	  'Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?'	  in	   Cary	   Nelson	   and	   Lawrence	   Grossberg	   (eds),	   Marxism	   and	   the	   Interpretation	   of	   Culture	  (Macmillan	  Education,	  Basingstoke	  1988)	  82-­‐84.	  1024	  Asaf	  A.	  A.	  Fyzee	  (1963)	  (n	  1020)	  413.	  1025	  Michael	  Anderson	  (1993)	  (n	  481)	  214.	  1026	  Ibid.	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the	  differences	  of	  opinion.	  Based	  on	   this,	  Ali	   asserts	   that	   ‘by	   codifying	   Islamic	  law,	   the	  rich	  variation	  and	   flexibility	   in	   interpreting	  the	  religious	  text	   in	   Islam	  was	  lost	  and	  is	  a	  burden	  carried	  over	  to	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era.’1027	  	  	  The	   translation,	   codification	   and	   appropriation	   generated	   and	   embedded	   ‘an	  essentialist,	  static	  Islam	  incapable	  of	  change	  from	  within,’1028	  which	  marked	  the	  trajectory	   of	   the	   understanding	   and	   application	   of	   Islamic	   law	   in	   the	   region	  even	  post-­‐independence.	  Colonialism	  transformed	  a	  ‘living	  law’1029	  into	  ossified	  conceptions	   perpetually	   geared	   towards	   the	   past;	   it	   distorted	   the	   ‘law	   of	   the	  jurists’	  that	  was	  free	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  binding	  precedents	  and	  was	  predisposed	  to	   ‘respond	   to	   its	   immediate	   social	   context’1030	   to	   a	   stagnant	   and	   fossilised	  version	  of	   itself.	  But	   this	  appropriation	  and	  mutilation	  was	  not	   just	   limited	   to	  Islamic	  or	  Hindu	  or	  any	  other	  religious	  conception	  of	   law.	  A	  similar	  move	  was	  evident	  in	  relation	  to	  customary	  law	  and	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice.1031	  	  	  In	   the	   pre-­‐colonial	   India,	   ‘there	   were	   innumerable,	   overlapping	   local	  jurisdictions	  and	  many	  groups	  enjoyed	  one	  or	  another	  degree	  of	  autonomy	   in	  administering	   law	   to	   themselves.’1032	   These	   groupings	   did	   not	   relate	   to	   any	  single	  mode	  of	  classification,	  and	  religion,	  caste,	  culture,	  geography	  and	  locality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1027	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (2006)	  (n	  1019)	  267.	  1028	  Michael	  Anderson	  (1993)	  (n	  	  483)	  214.	  1029	   ‘Living	   law’	  as	   the	   ‘inner	  order	  of	  associations’;	  Eugen	  Ehrlich	  quoted	   in	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick,	  'Law	  and	  Societies'	  (1984)	  22	  (1)	  Osgoode	  Hall	  Law	  Journal	  115116;	  or	   ‘living	  law’	  as	  the	   ‘law	  that	   lives	   in	  citizens’	  experience’,	  as	  opposed	  to	   formal	  and	  state-­‐centred	   legal	  systems,	  Roger	  Cotterrell,	   'Ehrlich	   at	   the	   Edge	   of	   Empire:	   Centres	   and	   Peripheries	   in	   Legal	   Studies'	   in	   Marc	  Hertogh	  (ed)	  Living	  Law:	  Reconsidering	  Eugen	  Ehrlich	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  Oxford	  2009)	  77.	  1030	  Osama	  Siddique	  (2013)	  (n	  98)	  62.	  1031	  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  on	  page	  115.	  1032	  Marc	  Galanter,	  'The	  Displacement	  of	  Traditional	  Law	  in	  Modern	  India'	  (1968)	  24	  (4)	  Journal	  
of	  Social	  Issues	  65,	  66.	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all	  played	  different	  roles	  in	  constructing	  their	  own	  legal	  and	  normative	  spheres.	  Galanter	  states	  that	  	  
The	   relation	   of	   the	   “highest”	   and	  most	   authoritative	   parts	   of	   the	   legal	  system	   to	   the	   “lower”	   end	   of	   the	   system	   was	   not	   that	   of	   superior	   to	  subordinate	   in	   a	   bureaucratic	   hierarchy….	   Instead	   of	   systematic	  imposition,	   of	   “higher”	   law	   on	   lesser	   tribunals,	   there	   was	   a	   general	  diffusion	  by	  filtering	  down	  (and	  occasionally	  up)	  of	  ideas	  and	  techniques	  by	  conscious	  imitation	  and	  by	  movement	  of	  personnel.1033	  	  With	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   British,	   these	   local	   systems	   of	   justice,	   some	   of	   which	  were	   considered	   to	   be	   in	   a	   ‘remarkably	   high	   state	   of	   organisation’1034	   and	  equated	   to	   Athenian	   democracy,1035	   underwent	   radical	   transformation.	  Galanter,	   notwithstanding	   his	   praise	   for	   the	   unification	   and	  modernisation	   of	  Indian	   customary	   law	   by	   the	   colonial	   regime,	   highlights	   three	  major	   changes	  that	  the	  local	  and	  customary	  systems	  underwent.1036	  These	  entailed	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  indigenous	  law	  from	  informal	  to	  formal	  court,	  restrictions	  on	   the	   geographical	   and	   substantive	   remits	   of	   the	   informal	   courts,	   and	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	   local	   norms	   through	   their	   application	   by	   the	   state	  courts.1037	   Shah	   writes	   that	   through	   this	   appropriation,	   scripting	   and	  application	   based	   on	   common	   law	   method,	   the	   custom	   itself	   went	   through	  major	   changes	   as	   ‘the	   British	   imperialists	   narrativised,	   defined	   and	   codified	  custom	  and	  formalised	  the	  informal.’1038	  But	  this	  ossification	  of	  another	  aspect	  of	   the	   sub-­‐continental	   living	   law	   was	   not	   the	   only	   outcome	   of	   the	   colonial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1033	  Ibid.	  67	  1034	  Elphinstone,	  quote	  in	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (1999)	  (n	  99)	  187.	  1035	  Ibid.	  	  1036	  Marc	  Galanter	  (1968)	  (n	  1032)	  68.	  1037	  Ibid.	  69.	  1038	  Nafisa	  Shah	  (2007)	  (n	  115)	  138.	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encounter,	  as	  the	  local	  customary	  systems	  were	  co-­‐opted	  further	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  empire.	  While	  curtailed	  and	  even	  outlawed	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  colony,	  where	  they	  were	  actively	  replaced	  by	  state	  courts,	   the	  tribunals	  such	  as	   jirgas	  were	  effectively	  incorporated	  into	  some	  regions	  for	  the	  control	  and	  exclusion	  of	  the	   local	   communities.1039	   Laws,	   such	   as	   the	   Frontier	   Crimes	   Regulations,	  instituted	  the	  category	  of	  official	  jirgas	  that	  operated	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  state	  to	   apply	   (state	   authorised	   version	   of)	   customary	   law,	   and	   acted	   as	   the	   main	  judicial	   body	   within	   the	   tribal	   regions,	   as	   discussed	   in	   detail	   in	   the	   previous	  chapters.1040	  	  Colonialism,	   then,	   lays	   the	   very	   terrain	   on	   which	   the	   legal	   architecture	   of	  Pakistan	  stands;	  it	  pervades	  the	  very	  fabric	  on	  which	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  the	  country	  is	  formed.	  While	  the	  continuation	  of	  colonial	  laws	  is	  evident	  within	  the	   formal	   legal	   system	   and	   common	   law	   tradition,	   this	   historical	   legacy	   also	  lies	   at	   the	   foundation	   of	   customary	   or	   traditional	   orderings,	   the	   Islamic	  conception	  of	  law	  currently	  dominant	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  the	  laws	  applicable	  in	  the	  Tribal	  Areas.	  	  
8.3. From	  Colonialism	  to	  Coloniality	  
The	   recognition	   that	   the	  major	   contradictions	   and	   struggles	  within	   the	   socio-­‐legal	  sphere	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  born	  out	  of	  colonialism	  moves	  the	  analysis	  forward,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.	  Although	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  role	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  92.	  1040	  See,	  Traditional	  Law	  and	  Informal	  Courts	  on	  page	  115.	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the	   colonial	   legacy	   in	   the	   context	   of	   law,	   ‘Where	   do	  we	   go	   from	   here?’	   is	   the	  question	   that	   emerges	   from	   this	   and	   requires	   due	   attention.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  recognition	  and	  problematisation	  of	  the	  colonial	  legacy	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan,	  and	  indeed	  other	  post-­‐colonial	  countries,	  can	  mainly	  lead	  to	  three	  divergent	  options.	  One	  possibility	  is	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  existing	  state	  of	  affairs	  and	  the	  narratives	  employed	  to	  understand	  them,	  though	  acknowledging	  their	  troubled	  histories;	  reforming	  them	  to	  address	  the	  situation,	  tweaking	  and	  tuning	  them	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  generally	  perceived	  problems,	  if	  that	  lies	  within	  the	  larger	  interests	  of	  the	  state.	   This,	   however,	   is	   a	   false	   choice.1041	   Given	   the	   situation,	   the	   detrimental	  effects	  of	   the	  current	  structures	  and	  narratives	   for	   the	  people,	   the	   ‘ubiquitous	  suffering’1042	   that	  haunts	  day	  to	  day	   living	   in	   the	  country,1043	  opting	   for	  status	  quo	  is	  not	  really	  an	  option	  if	  the	  situation	  is	  considered	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  country’s	  larger	  populace.	  	  	  Another	  course	   that	  emerges	   from	   the	  above	  question	   is	   that	  an	  admission	  of	  the	  problematic	   legacy	   of	   colonialism	   should	   lead	   to	   its	   cancellation,	   and	   to	   a	  reversal	  of	  its	  laws,	  institutions	  and	  impact.	  Its	  call	  is	  to	  radically	  ‘transform	  and	  abrupt’	   the	   colonial	   legal	   legacy,	   ‘severing	   the	  past	   from	   the	  present.’1044	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1041	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2013)	  (n	  94)	  64.	  1042	  As	  Upendra	  Baxi	  argues,	  ‘Suffering	  is	  ubiquitous	  to	  the	  point	  of	  being	  natural’.	  Upendra	  Baxi	  (1998)	   (n,	   131.	   He	   even	   criticises	   the	   grammar	   of	   the	   current	   human	   rights	   discourse	   that	  ‘dissipate	  human	  and	  social	  suffering,	  at	  times	  to	  a	  point	  of	  social	  illegibility.’	  Upendra	  Baxi,	  The	  
Future	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  Delhi	  2006)	  xvi.	  For	  an	  exposition	  of	  the	  conceptual	  category	  of	  suffering	  and	  its	  engagement	  with	  the	  western	  philosophical	  discourse,	  see	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2013)	  (n	  94).	  1043	  See,	  The	  need	  to	  examine	  Pakistan’s	  Legal	  Tapestry	  on	  page	  6.	  1044	  Matthew	  C.	  R.	  Craven,	  The	  decolonization	  of	  international	  law:	  State	  Succession	  and	  the	  Law	  
of	  Treaties	  (Oxford	  monographs	  in	  international	  law,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  UK	  ;	  New	  York	  2007)	  19.	  Craven	  identifies	  these	  first	  two	  modes	  of	  decolonisation	  (evolution	  and	  radical	  transformation)	  in	  relation	  to	  International	  Law,	  and	  its	  post-­‐colonial	  manifestation.	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argument	  is	  for	  de-­‐colonisation	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  as	  a	  return	  to	  the	  local,	  traditional,	   and	   indigenous.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapters	   5	   and	   6,	   this	   position	   is	  adopted	   by	   the	   Islamic	   and	   plural-­‐legal	   narratives	   to	   law	   in	   Pakistan	   to	  denounce	  the	  alien	  law	  and	  assert	  the	  significance	  of	  their	  own	  legal	  modalities.	  However,	  appealing	  as	  it	  may	  or	  even	  does	  seem,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  problematic	  than	  it	   appears	   in	   the	   first	   instance.	   As	   considered	   previously	   in	   this	   chapter,	  colonialism	   implemented	  not	   just	   its	  own	  version	  of	   formal	   law	   in	   the	   region,	  but	   radically	   transformed	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   indigenous,	   cultural,	   religious	  and	  local	  normative	  orders.	   In	   the	  modern	  manifestation,	   the	   local,	   traditional	  and	  religious	   systems	   and	   narratives	   of	   law	   as	   they	   exist	   in	   Pakistan	   are	   colonial	  formations.1045	   And	   given	   that	   their	   modern	   origins	   are	   rooted	   in	   colonial	  history,	  no	   religious,	   local	   or	   cultural	   ordering	   can	   claim	   to	  be	  pure	  and	   truly	  indigenous.	   The	   idea,	   then,	   of	   a	   romanticised	  pre-­‐colonial	  mode	   of	   legality	   or	  normativity	   to	  which	  a	  return	  could	  be	  made	   is	  a	   ‘myth’1046	  and	  a	   fallacy.	  And	  this	   romanticised	   fallacy	   ignores,	   both	   the	   radical	   transformation	   that	   the	  region’s	  existing	  normative	  and	  legal	  systems	  underwent,	  but	  also	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  systems	  themselves	  were	  and	  are	  rooted	  in	  their	  own	  respective	  modes	  of	  exclusion,	   patriarchy,	   coercion	   and	   repression.	   The	   religious	   and	   local	  mechanisms	   of	   justice	   that	   we	   see	   today,	   therefore,	   cannot	   be	   considered	  manifestations	   of	   the	   pre-­‐colonial,	   or	   as	   viable	   reference	   points	   for	   de-­‐colonisation.	   Moreover,	   even	   if	   the	   de-­‐colonisation	   to	   the	   pre-­‐colonial	   is	  accepted	   in	   principle,	  where	   does	   the	   search	   for	   a	   truly	   pure	   and	   indigenous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1045	  Page	  259.	  1046	  Myth	  is	  used	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  proposes	  it,	  as	  ‘the	  world	  of	  limits	  which	   captures	   those	   within	   it.’	   Peter	   Fitzpatrick,	   The	   Mythology	   of	   Modern	   Law	   (Routledge,	  London	  1992)	  24.	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system	   in	   Pakistan	   end?	   Should	   it	  move	   beyond	   the	   British	   Crown’s	   reign	   to	  preceding	  centuries	  of	  Muslim	  Empires,	  as	  even	  these	  were	  external	  influences	  at	  one	  point	  in	  time,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  beyond	  that?	  Any	  romanticised	  notion	  of	  pre-­‐colonial	   religious	   and	   customary	   laws	   as	   untainted	   and	   unadulterated	  systems	   representing	   the	   true	   ethos	   of	   the	   society	   and	   beliefs	   of	   the	   people	  serves	   the	   purpose	   of	   rhetoric	   well,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   offer	   any	   concrete	  possibilities	  of	  de-­‐colonisation	  of	  law.	  Colonialism	  as	  a	  historical	  phenomenon,	  without	  doubt,	  has	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  of	  Pakistan;	  but	  while	  this	  history	  provides	  us	  a	  suitable	  starting	  point	  of	  analysis,	  it	  also	  restricts	  the	  options	  that	  can	  be	  undertaken	  to	  resolve	  this	  issue.	  	  	  Finally,	  and	  significantly,	   the	  most	  viable	  option	  then	   is	   to	   interpret	   the	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  colonialism	  and	  law	  differently;	  to	  think	  of	   new	   avenues	   to	   read,	   analyse	   and	   (re)form	   the	   legal	   realities	   of	   the	  country.1047	  If	  a	  return	  to	  the	  pre-­‐colonial	  is	  not	  possible,	  can	  we	  move	  towards	  some	  conception	  or	   formulation	  of	   law	   in	   this	  context	   that	   is	   ‘de-­‐colonial’?1048	  From	   this	  perspective,	   it	   is	   the	   identifiable	   facets	   of	   colonial	   law	  –	   judgement	  of/on	   the	  other;	   appropriation	  of	   knowledge	   and	  norms;1049	   unaccountability;	  systems	   based	   on	   alienation	   of	   those	   it	   purports	   to	   govern;	   aligning	   of	   state	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1047	   See,	   generally,	   Jayan	   Nayar	   (2007)	   (n	   28);	   Amita	   Dhanda	   and	   Archana	   Parashar,	  'Decolonisation	   of	   Legal	   Knowledge:	   Whose	   Responsibility?'	   in	   Amita	   Dhanda	   and	   Archana	  Parashar	  (eds),	  Decolonisation	  of	  Legal	  Knowledge	  (Routledge,	  Abingdon	  2009);	  Boaventura	  De	  
Sousa	  Santos	  (2002)	  (n	  692).	  1048	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo,	  'Geopolitics	  of	  sensing	  and	  knowing:	  On	  (de)coloniality,	  border	  thinking,	  and	  epistemic	  disobedience'	  (2013)	  1	  (1)	  Confero:	  Essays	  on	  Education,	  Philosophy	  and	  Politics	  129.	  1049	  Page	  259.	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with	  the	  interests	  of	  specific	  groups,	  classes	  and	  personalities	  –	  that	  need	  to	  be	  recognised	  and	  challenged.	  	  	  Divesting	  these	  notions	  of	  colonial	  law	  and	  Coloniality	  from	  the	  actual	  historical	  event	   of	   colonialism	   changes	   the	   mode	   of	   our	   analysis.	   I	   argue	   that	   in	   this	  approach	   it	   is	   not	   colonialism	   within	   the	   legal	   frameworks	   that	   is	   to	   be	  problematised	   and	   challenged,	   but	   Coloniality.1050	   Taking	   a	   lead	   from	  Walter	  Mignolo1051	  and	  Anibal	  Quijano,1052	  the	  assertion	  here	  is	  that	  Coloniality	  can	  be	  approached	   as	   an	   abstract	   idea,	   with	   colonialism(s)	   mainly	   appearing	   as	   its	  historical	   manifestation.	   Proposing	   this	   idea	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   knowledge,	  modernity/rationality	  and	  European/Western	  domination,	  Quijano	  argues	  that	  Coloniality	  ‘is	  still	  the	  most	  general	  form	  of	  domination	  in	  the	  world	  today,	  even	  after	   colonialism	   as	   an	   explicit	   political	   order	   was	   destroyed.’1053	   Linking	  Coloniality	   to	  modernity,	   he	  maintains	   that	   they	   are	  mutually	   constitutive1054	  and	   this	   duality,	   in	   the	   Eurocentric	   experience	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	  represented	  a	  ‘specific	  rationality	  or	  perspective	  of	  knowledge	  that	  was	  made	  globally	  hegemonic’	   that	  colonised	  and	  overwhelmed	  other	  conceptions,	  formulations,	  knowledges	  and	  people.1055	  Coloniality,	  and	  therefore	  colonialism	  that	  stemmed	  from	  it,	  was	  not	  only	  a	  political	  act	  of	  conquest	  or	  domination,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1050	   Quijano	   was	   the	   first	   theorist	   who	   coined	   the	   terminology	   of	   Coloniality	   of	   Power,	   and	  applied	  it	  to	  the	  Latin	  American	  situation.	  See,	  	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2000)	  (n	  12).	  1051	   See,	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   Coloniality	   and	   related	   issues,	   Walter	   D.	   Mignolo,	   'Epistemic	  Disobedience,	   Independent	   Though	   and	   Decolonial	   Freedom'	   (2009)	   26	   (7-­‐8)	  Theory	   Culture	  
Society	  159	  1052	  See,	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2007)	  (n	  12).	  1053	  Ibid.	  170.	  1054	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2000)	  (n	  12)	  548.	  1055	  Ibid.	  549.	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involved	  a	  ‘cognitive	  model’1056	  both	  for	  the	  colonisers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  colonised,	  that	   was	   based	   on	   racial,	   cultural,	   temporal,	   historical	   and	   systemic	  differentiation.1057	   This	   is	   similar	   to	   Boaventura	   Santos’s	   consideration	   of	  colonialism	   as	   an	   epistemologically	   hegemonic	   project	   that,	   he	   argues,	  generated	   an	   ‘abyssal	   divide’	   between	   the	   coloniser	   and	   the	   colonised.1058	  Santos	  contends	  that	  the	  abyssal	  thinking	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  modernity	  and	  colonialism	  continues	   in	   the	  post-­‐colonial	  era	  and	   that,	   in	  addition	   to	  dividing	  the	   colonial	   and	   the	   colonised,	   it	   renders	   the	   latter	   absent	   and	   invisible,	   ‘not	  existing	  in	  any	  relevant	  or	  comprehensible	  way	  of	  being.’1059	  Taking	  Coloniality	  both	   as	   the	   form	   and	   logic	   of	   domination,	   Quijano	   employs	   this	   category	   to	  describe,	   not	   just	   the	   occurrences	   during	   colonialism,	   but	   also	   the	   power	  disparity,	   hegemony	   and	   global	   inequality	   that	   prevails	   in	   the	   post-­‐colonial	  era.1060	  Based	  on	   this,	  Escobar	  writes	   that	  Coloniality	  as	  an	   idea	   ‘incorporates	  colonialism	  and	  imperialism	  but	  goes	  beyond	  them;	  this	   is	  why	  coloniality	  did	  not	  end	  with	  the	  end	  of	  colonialism…	  but	  was	  rearticulated….’1061	  	  	  The	  importance	  of	  considering	  the	  idea	  of	  Coloniality,	  its	  global	  materialisation	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  period	  and	  its	  manifestation	  in	  terms	  of	  Pakistan’s	  situation	  in	   the	   world	   affairs	   certainly	   requires	   much	   consideration	   and	   extensive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1056	  Ibid.	  552	  1057	   Anibal	   Quijano	   (2007)	   (n	   12)	   171-­‐173.	   This	   follows	   the	   same	   basic	   idea	   of	   colonial	  categorisation	  and	  appropriation	  of	  culture,	  knowledge,	  religion	  and	  laws,	  discussed	  previously	  in	  this	  chapter.	  1058	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos,	  'A	  Non-­‐Occidentalist	  West?	  Learned	  Ignorance	  and	  Ecology	  of	  Knowledge'	  (2009)	  26	  (7-­‐8)	  Theory	  Culture	  Society	  103,	  113-­‐114.	  1059	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos,	   'Beyond	  Abyssal	  Thinking:	  From	  Global	  Lines	  to	  Ecologies	  of	  Knowledges'	  (2007)	  XXX	  (1)	  Review	  Fernand	  Braudel	  Center	  45,	  45.	  1060	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2007)	  (n	  12)	  176-­‐178.	  1061	  Arturo	  Escobar,	   'Beyond	   the	  Third	  World:	   Imperial	  Globality,	  Global	  Coloniality	   and	  Anti-­‐Globalisation	  Social	  Movements'	  (2004)	  25	  (1)	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  207,	  219.	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examination.	  This,	  although	  a	  worthwhile	  endeavour,	   lies	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	   current	   study.	   However,	   I	   want	   to	   draw	   on	   and	   apply	   the	   notion	   of	  Coloniality	   as	   it	   manifests	   itself	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	  architecture.	   This	   requires	   us	   to	   approach	   Coloniality	   as	   a	   ‘totalitarian’1062	  conception	   that	   encounters	   other	   knowledges,	   rationalities	   and	   systems,	   and	  asserts	   itself	  as	   the	   truth.	  Mignolo	  argues	   that	   taken	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  a	   totality,	  Coloniality	   represents	   a	   conception	   ‘that	   negates,	   excludes,	   occludes	   the	  difference	  and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  other	  totalities.’1063	  This	  notion	  of	  Coloniality,	  which	  Mignolo	  considers	  as	  Ego-­‐logy1064	  (a	  rational,	  paradigmatic	  and	  historical	  solipsism),	   appears	   as	   ‘engulfing	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   defensive	   and	  exclusionary.’1065	   It	   is	   this	   idea	   of	   Coloniality	   as	   a	   totalitarian	   notion	   that	  provides	   us	   with	   a	   different	   insight	   to	   understand	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  in	  a	  more	  nuanced	  manner.	  In	  this	  argument,	  Coloniality	  emerges	  as	  a	  systemic	  tendency	  which	  can	  be	  present	  in	  systems	  other	  than	  those	  emerging	  from	  the	  European	  traditions	  of	  modernity/rationality,	   though	  the	   totalitarian	  characteristics	   remain	   present.	   Much	   has	   been	   said	   here	   as	   well	   as	   in	   other	  accounts	  about	  the	  use	  of	  law	  for	  colonisation,	  and	  the	  resultant	  modifications	  in	   the	  nature	  of	   legal	   and	  normative	  orders	  of	   the	   colonies	   in	   the	  process.1066	  However,	  divesting	  Coloniality	  from	  colonialism	  and	  approaching	  it	  as	  a	  totality	  that	   negates	   and	   excludes	   difference	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   other	   totalities1067	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1062	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105)	  451.	  1063	  Ibid.	  1064	  Ibid.	  459-­‐460.	  1065	  Ibid.	  451.	  1066	  See	  Colonialism	  and	  Pakistan’s	  Socio-­‐Legal	  terrain	  on	  page	  259.	  1067	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105)	  451.	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permits	  us	  to	   focus	  on	  Coloniality	   in	  Law1068	   that,	   I	  argue,	  grips	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  of	  Pakistan	  (and	  arguably	  other	  post-­‐colonial	  countries).	  	  Before	  moving	  further,	   it	  should	  be	  highlighted	  that	  the	  claim	  made	  here,	  may	  overlap,	  but	   is	  also	  significantly	  different	   from	  the	   ideas	  of	  post-­‐independence	  continuities	   that	   have	   been	   debated	   in	   post-­‐colonial	   literature,	   especially	   in	  relation	  to	  South	  Asian	  and	  African	  countries.1069	  The	  crucial	  difference	  is	  that	  a	  recognition	   of	   post-­‐colonial	   and	   historical	   continuities1070	   focusses	   more	   on	  material	   manifestations	   rather	   than	   the	   logics	   that	   govern	   these	   continuities,	  which	   the	   framework	   of	   Coloniality	   transcends.	   Moreover,	   the	   recognition	   of	  continuities	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  framework	  to	  move	  beyond	  this	  recognition,	  and	  is	  entrapped	  within	   the	   same	   conundrums	   discussed	   previously	   in	   this	   chapter.	  The	   notion	   of	   Coloniality	   has	   been	   adopted	   here	   to	   move	   beyond	   these	  weaknesses.	  	  
8.4. Coloniality	  in	  Law:	  Of	  Logic,	  Form	  and	  Rationalities	  
We	  have	  already	  seen	  how	  colonialism	  employed	  the	  instrumentality	  of	  law	  to	  impose	   its	  particular	   rationality	  and	  knowledge	  on	   the	   Indian	  sub-­‐continent	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1068	   I	  have	  used	   the	   term	  Coloniality	   in	   Law	  rather	   than	  Coloniality	  of	   Law,	  because	   the	   latter	  term	   implies	   a	   necessary	   and	   hegemonic	   link	   between	   law	   and	   coloniality,	   from	  which	   there	  may	   be	   no	   exit.	   Coloniality	   in	   Law	   is	   used	   primarily	   to	   argue	   that	   there	   may	   be	   a	   way	   to	  recognise	  and	  approach	  any	  emancipatory	  potential	  within	  law.	  1069	   See,	   for	   instance,	   Katharine	   Adeney,	   'Constitutional	   Centring:	   Nation	   Formation	   and	  Consociational	  Federalism	  in	  India	  and	  Pakistan'	  (2002)	  40	  (3)	  Commonwealth	  &	  Comparative	  
Politics	   8;	  Richard	  Higgott,	   'Structural	  dependence	  and	  decolonisation	   in	  a	  West	  African	   land-­‐locked	  state:	  Niger'	  (1980)	  7	  (17)	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy	  43.	  1070	   See,	   Introduction	   in	   John	   Dunn,	   West	   African	   States,	   Failure	   and	   Promise:	   A	   study	   in	  
comparative	  politics	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge	  1978).	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the	  cognitive	  element	  that	  was	  both	  a	  necessity	  and	  a	  corollary	  of	  conquest.1071	  In	   this	   process,	   the	   legal	   frameworks	   that	   existed	   in	   the	   region	   prior	   to	   the	  colonial	   arrival	   also	   underwent	   a	   radical	   shift.	   But	   the	   introduction	   of	  Coloniality	   in	   the	   region	   did	   not	   end	   with	   the	   so-­‐termed	   decolonisation	  movements	   of	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   The	   idea	   of	   Coloniality,	  once	  tied	  to	   the	   instrumentality	  of	   law	  and	  the	  state,	  carried	  over	  to	   the	  post-­‐independence	   period.	   Quijano,	  Mignolo	   and	   others	   primarily	   argue	   that	  what	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   this	  continued	  domination	  are	  global	  power	  structures	  and	  the	   Eurocentric	   paradigm.1072	   I	   argue,	   however,	   that	   this	   idea	   needs	   to	   be	  developed	   further	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   engagement	   with	   law.	   To	   function,	   and	  indeed	   to	   continue,	   Coloniality	   and	   colonialism	   required	   an	   alignment	   of	  internal	   systems,	   in	   addition	   to	   those	   external	   ones	   that	   the	   theorists	   of	  Coloniality	   have	   identified.	   But	   despite	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  Coloniality	   in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  decades,	  and	  the	  despite	  the	  centrality	  of	   law’s	  instrumentality	   in	   achieving	   this,	   theorists	   working	   within	   this	   particular	  sphere	   have	   not	   developed	   the	   link	   further.	   This	   study	   expands	   on	   this	  association	   between	   Coloniality	   and	   law,	   and	   argues	   that	   Coloniality	   and	  colonialism,	   through	   their	   link	   to	   the	   instrumentality	   of	   law	   and	   the	   state,	  introduced	   three	   major	   tendencies	   within	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   the	   sub-­‐continent,	  the	  identification	  of	  which	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	   predicaments	   and	   complexities	   of	   Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry.	   I	   argue	  that	   these	   relate	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   Colonial	   Logic,	   the	   Transformation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1071	  Nicholas	  B.	  Dirks	  (1992)	  (n	  1007)	  3.	  1072	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2000)	  (n	  12);	  Anibal	  Quijano	  (2007)	  (n	  12).	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Rationality	   and	   the	   Fetishisation	   of	   Legal	   Form,	   and	   I	   will	   discuss	   these	   in	  relation	  to	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  context.	  	  
8.4.1. The	  introduction	  of	  the	  Colonial	  Logic	  The	   first	   tendency	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   nexus	   between	  Coloniality	   and	   law	  was	  that	  the	  structure	  and	  frameworks	  of	   law	  (and	  the	  state)	  were	  embedded	  with	  the	  Colonial	  Logic.	  Scholars	  have	  used	  this	  terminology	  to	  depict	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  and	  occurrences	   linked	  with	   the	   colonial	   enterprise,	   including	   the	  ‘colonial	   logic	   of	   subordination	   and	   appropriation’,1073	   and	   the	   mutually	  constitutive	  colonial	   logic	  of	  distinction	  between	   the	   traditional/primitive	  and	  the	   modern,1074	   and	   the	   ‘logic	   of	   coloniality’	   that	   provides	   the	   ‘foundational	  structure’	   of	   Modernity	   and	   Western	   civilisation.1075	   Borrowing	   from	   such	  insights,	   I	   am	   employing	   this	   term	   in	   a	   specific	   manner	   to	   highlight	   the	  instrumentality	  of	  law.	  The	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  this	  colonial	  logic	  introduced	  two	  different	  facets	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  law	  in	  the	  sub-­‐continent.	  First,	  this	  logic	  embedded	   within	   the	   dominant	   legal	   and	   political	   instruments	   the	   notion	   of	  distinction	  between	  the	  governors	  and	  the	  governed;	  between	  the	  colonial	  and	  the	  natives;	  between	  the	  modern,	  civilised	  and	  legal	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  ‘savages	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1073	  Brenna	  Bhandar,	   'Plasticity	  and	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Recognition:	   ‘Owning,	  Knowing	  and	  Being’*'	  (2011)	  22	  (3)	  Law	  and	  Critique	  227,	  237.	  1074	   Walter	   D.	   Mignolo,	   'Enduring	   Enchantment:	   Secularism	   and	   the	   Epistemic	   Privileges	   of	  Modernity'	   in	   Purushottama	   Bilimoria	   and	   AndrewB	   Irvine	   (eds),	   Postcolonial	   Philosophy	   of	  
Religion	   (Springer	  Netherlands,	   2009),	   287;	   also,	   Fitzpatrick’s	   argument	   about	   the	  distinction	  between	   ‘lawless	   savages’	   and	  modern	   law,	  quoted	   in	  Sinkwan	  Cheng,	   'The	  Female	  Body	  as	   a	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Site	  of	  Political	  Protest:	  The	  Hunger	  Strikers	  versus	  the	  Labor	  Strikers	  in	  Forster's	  
A	   Passage	   to	   India'	   in	   Sinkwan	   Cheng	   (ed)	  Law,	   Justice,	   and	   Power:	   Between	   Reason	   and	  Will	  (Stanford	  University	  Press,	  Stanford,	  California	  2004)	  116	  &	  127.	  1075	  Walter	  Mignolo,	  The	  Darker	   side	   of	  Western	  Modernity:	   Global	   Futures,	   Decolonial	   Options	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  Durham	  2011)	  13-­‐16.	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in	   their	   state	   of	   lawless	   “anarchy”’1076	   on	   the	   other.	   Such	   distinctions	   clearly	  marked	  the	  place	  of	  law	  within	  the	  larger	  scheme	  –	  it	  emanated	  and	  served	  the	  colonial,	   and	   civilised	   and	   ordered	   the	   native.	   Through	   this,	   the	   legal	   system	  was	   geared	   towards	   serving	   the	   purpose	   of	   power	   rather	   than	   those	   it	  governed.1077	   Second,	   as	   a	   corollary,	   this	   logic	   instituted	   within	   the	   legal	  frameworks	   the	   idea	   of	   self-­‐preservation	   of	   this	   asymmetrical	   system	   at	   the	  expense	  of	  those	  that	  were	  subject	  to	  it.1078	  Indeed,	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  colonial	  enterprise	  depended	  on	  its	  efforts	  at	  self-­‐preservation.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  British	  colonial	   rule,	   the	   colonial	   state	   and	   the	   law	   served	   the	   purposes	   of	   conquest,	  domination	   and	   extraction;	   in	   the	   post-­‐independence	   period,	   they	   have	  continued	  to	  operate	  under	  the	  same	  colonial	  logic,1079	  and	  have	  been	  focussed	  on	   self-­‐preservation,	   dominance	   of	   particular	   institutions	   (such	   as	   the	  military),1080	  protection	  of	  personal	  interests	  and	  clientelism.	  	  I	   argue	   that	   this	   colonial	   logic	   –	   the	   remoteness	   of	   the	   legal	   system	   from	   the	  people,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  self-­‐preservation	  of	  the	  law	  and	  institutions	  of	  the	  State	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  people	  –	  underlies	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  situation	  of	  Pakistan.	  It	   is	   this	   colonial	   logic	   has	   resulted	   in	   the	   estrangement	   of	   people	   from	   the	  institutions	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state,	  which	  then	  invites	  a	  critique	  of	  alienation.1081	  One	  of	  the	  most	  relevant	  examples	  of	  the	  continuation	  of	  this	  colonial	  relation	  between	  the	  people	  and	  the	  state	  comes	  from	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  State	  defines	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1076	  Fitzpatrick	  uses	  this	  phrase	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  in	  the	  Americas.	  Peter	  
Fitzpatrick	  (1992)	  (n	  1046)	  80.	  1077	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  and	  Javaid	  Rehman	  (2001)	  (n	  115)	  12.	  1078	  See,	  Colonialism	  and	  Pakistan’s	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Terrain,	  on	  page	  259.	  1079	  With	  the	  Frontier	  Crimes	  Regulations	  an	  appropriate	  example	  in	  this	  regard.	  1080	  See,	  Hassan-­‐Askari	  Rizvi	  (1988)	  (n	  187).	  1081	  See,	  ‘A	  burden	  on	  the	  soul	  is	  alien	  law’	  on	  page	  181.	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itself	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  not	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  people,	  but	  as	  a	  revenue	  extraction	  body.	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  Constitution	  states:	  
The	  State	  means	  the	  Federal	  Government,	  Majlis-­‐e-­‐Shoora	  (Parliament),	  a	  Provincial	  Government,	  a	  Provincial	  Assembly,	  and	  such	  local	  or	  other	  authorities	   in	  Pakistan	  as	   are	  by	   law	  empowered	   to	   impose	   any	   tax	  or	  cess.1082	  	  It	   is	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   phrasing	   of	   this	   Article	   is	   such	   that	   a	   different	  reading	  that	  emerges	  from	  it	  would	  imply	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  State	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Federation	  and	  Legislature	  and	  the	  State	  at	  the	  level	  of	  local	  revenue	  collecting	  authorities.	  However,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  the	  State	  perceives	  itself,	  even	   if	  at	   the	   local	   level,	  as	  not	  a	  representative	  of	   the	  people,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  structure	   aimed	   towards	   revenue	   extraction.	   It	   is	   contended	   here	   that	   this	  notion	  of	  the	  state	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  rationale	  on	  which	  the	  British	  colonial	  administration	  was	   built.	   Moreover,	   once	   it	   assumes	   the	   role	   of	   an	   authority	  divested	   from	   representation	   of	   the	   people,	   it	   becomes	   caught	   in	   a	   self-­‐referential	   cycle	   of	   continuation	   and	   self-­‐preservation.	   If	   its	   existence	   and	  legitimacy	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   representing	   its	   subjects,	   then	   the	   state	   exists	  despite	  them;	  it	  constitutes	  itself,	  and	  ensures	  its	  own	  survival.	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	   this	   is	   the	   logic	   that	   has	   dictated	   the	   practise	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   legal	  formulations	  in	  the	  post-­‐independence	  history	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  	  This	   provides	   us	   different	   insights	   into	   some	   of	   the	   key	   issues	   in	   relation	   to	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   setup.	   The	   constant	   spate	   of	   Martial	   Law	   regimes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1082	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  1973	  Constitution.	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implemented	  to	  save	  the	  country	  from	  unruly	  political	  parties	  and	  democracy	  is	  one	   manifestation	   of	   the	   colonial	   logic.	   Importantly,	   the	   continuation	   of	   this	  logic	  also	  presents	  a	  different	  angle	  to	  understand	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  legal	  issues	  related	  to	  law	  in	  the	  Tribal	  regions	  of	  the	  country.1083	  The	  British	  colonial	  state’s	   need	   was	   to	   institute	   the	   Frontier	   as	   a	   barrier	   against	   the	   expanding	  Russian	   Empire,	   for	   which	   it	   created	   an	   ‘Imperial	   reasoning	   that	   included	  conceptions	   of	   subject,	   frontier,	   “their	   country”,	   and	   British	   dominion.’1084	  Similarly,	  the	  post-­‐independence	  Pakistani	  State	  had	  no	  impetus	  to	  include	  the	  people	  of	  this	  region	  into	  the	  ‘dominion’1085	  as	  ‘subjects’.	  Moreover,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	   the	   Tribal	   regions	   have	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   State’s	   overall	  strategy	   of	   countering	   its	   perceived	   enemies	   by	   proxy.	   The	   nexus	   between	  Islamic	   discourse	   and	   ‘exceptional’1086	   legal	   status	   of	   the	   Tribal	   regions	  provided	   ready	   tools	   for	   the	   State	   to	   assist	   the	   US-­‐led	   efforts	   to	   counter	   the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan.1087	  While	  this	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  this	  region	  as	  an	  ‘exteriority’,1088	  it	  has	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  Islamic	  narrative	  as	  well	  as	  the	  issues	  of	  lawlessness	  and	  militancy	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  is	  the	  primary	  reason	  why	  it	  has	  been	  asserted	  previously	  that	  the	  State	   as	   it	   is	   currently	   formulated	   in	   Pakistan,	   generates	   the	   societal	  contradictions	   that	   are	   evident	   today.	   Any	   narrative	   that	   calls	   for	   a	  strengthening	  of	   the	  State	  as	  a	   solution	   to	   these	   issues	   ignores	   the	  role	  of	   the	  State	  in	  perpetuating	  these	  problems	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  notions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1083	  See,	  Colonial	  Law	  and	  the	  Tribal	  Regions	  on	  page	  128.	  1084	  Robert	  Nichols	  (2001)	  (n	  467)	  174.	  1085	  State	  v.	  Dosso	  (n	  190)	  1086	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  (1998)	  (n	  491)	  18.	  1087	  Page	  73.	  1088	  See	  footnotes	  490-­‐494.	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of	  the	  weakening	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  State	  appear	  problematic,	  as	  the	  State	  is	  still	  holding	  true	  to	  its	  foundational	  logics.	  	  	  
8.4.2. The	  Transformation	  of	  Rationalities	  The	  second	  tendency	  that	  Coloniality	   introduced	  within	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  system	  of	   the	   region	   was	   the	   co-­‐optation	   or	   transformation	   of	   not	   just	   existent	   legal	  systems,1089	  but	  also	  the	  rationalities	   that	   lay	  at	  their	   foundation.1090	  It	  altered	  the	   inter-­‐personal	   laws	   to	   territorial	   ones;1091	   it	   reduced	   customary,	   religious	  and	  traditional	  legal	  norms,	  based	  on	  a	  diversity	  of	  opinions,	  into	  strict	  textual	  modes	  of	   law.1092	  While	   scholars	   argue	   that	   this	   change	   in	   the	   rationalities	   of	  law	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   ‘unfinished	   project	   of	   Modernity’,1093	   a	   detailed	  discussion	   on	   Modernity/Rationality	   link	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   study.	  However,	  it	  is	  contended	  here	  that	  territorial,	  static	  and	  fossilised1094	  nature	  of	  law	   that	   was	   introduced	   in	   the	   sub-­‐continent	   has	   now	   become	   so	   embedded	  within	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  of	  the	  country,	  that	  Quijano	  and	  Mignolo’s	  linking	  (or	   limitation)	   of	   Coloniality	   to	   Eurocentric	   rationalities	   requires	   a	  reconsideration.	  Grosfoguel,	  for	  instance,	  writes	  that	  ‘unlike	  other	  traditions	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  western	  is	  a	  point	  of	  view	  that	  does	  not	  assume	  itself	  as	  a	  point	  of	   view.’1095	  However,	   looking	   at	   the	   Islamic	  narrative	   in	  Pakistan,	   this	   seems	  like	   a	   romanticised	   notion	   of	   non-­‐Western	   traditions	   of	   knowledge.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1089	  Page	  274.	  1090	  Page	  262.	  1091	  Ibid.	  1092	  Ibid.	  1093	  Werner	  Menski	  (2010)	  (n	  96)	  46.	  1094	  Page	  262.	  1095	  Ramón	  Grosfoguel,	   'A	  Decolonial	  Approach	   to	  Political-­‐Economy:	  Transmodernity,	  Border	  Thinking	  and	  Global	  Coloniality'	  (2009)	  6	  KULT	  10,	  11.	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propagation	   by	   the	   Eurocentric	   civilisation	   of	   a	   particular	   Ego-­‐logical	  perspective,1096	  has	  although	  been	  dominant,	   it	   is	  not	   the	  only	   instance	  where	  Coloniality	   is	   visible	   today.	  Other	   claims	   to	  ultimate	   truth	  or	  universal	   beliefs	  stem	   from	   the	   same	  principle	   and	   carry	   the	   same	  motivation.	  They	   too	   adopt	  the	  mantle	  of	  eternal	  truths,	  and	  refuse	  to	  consider	  themselves	  as	  merely	  points	  of	  views.1097	  	  This	   clash	   of	   rival	   rationalities	   provides	   us	   a	   more	   nuanced	   insight	   into	   the	  conflict	  and	  contestation	  between	  competing	   legal	  and	  normative	  orderings	   in	  Pakistan.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  one	  of	   the	  major	   crises	   that	  has	  dominated	  the	   constitutional	   and	   legal	   developments	   in	   Pakistan	   is	   related	   to	   its	  identity.1098	  Claimed	  to	  represent	  a	  new	  homeland	  for	  the	  Muslims	  of	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent,	   the	   country’s	   legal	   and	   constitutional	   frameworks	   could	   never	  shape	  this	  idea	  into	  a	  viable	  working	  charter.	  While	  Islam	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  most	  potent	   symbol	   that	   could	   give	   a	   semblance	   of	   unity	   to	   this	   ‘inoperative	  community’,1099	  whether	   this	  was	  meant	   to	   translated	   into	   a	   democratic	   or	   a	  theocratic	  state	  is	  still	  an	  unresolved	  question.	  The	  ambiguity	  of	  this	  notion	  has	  had	  major	  impacts	  on	  the	  legal	  architecture,	  as	  it	  has	  created	  room	  for	  the	  rise	  of	   the	   Islamic	   legal	   and	   militant	   discourse.	   Religious	   political	   parties	   and	  militant	   groups	   assert	   that	   the	   country	  was	   founded	   in	   the	   name	   of	   Islam1100	  and	   through	   political	   manoeuvring,	   and	   outright	   violence	   in	   some	   instances,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1096	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105)	  459-­‐460.	  1097	  Ramón	  Grosfoguel	  (2009)	  (n	  1097)	  11.	  1098	  A	  History	  of	  Legal	  Uncertainty:	  Post-­‐Independence	  Turmoil	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  50.	  1099	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  (1991)	  (n	  142).	  1100	  See,	  Local	  Responses	  to	  an	  ‘Alien	  Law’:	  The	  Islamic	  Narrative	  of	  Law	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  on	  page	  180.	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these	   groups	   have	   proved	   successful	   in	   making	   the	   Islamic	   narrative	   as	   a	  competing	  and	  strong	  facet	  of	  Pakistan’s	  legal	  context.	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  argue	  that	  what	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  struggle	  between	  secular	   law	   and	   Islamic	   law,	   between	  mainstream	   legal	   frameworks	   and	   that	  which	   stands	   to	   challenge	   them,	   is	   the	   struggle	   of	   rival	   conceptions	   based	   on	  Coloniality	   and	   totalitarian	   notions	   of	   law.	   The	   engendering	   of	   colonial	  rationalities	   in	   the	   sub-­‐continent	   has	   meant	   that	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   system	   of	  Pakistan	  is	  caught	  within	  two	  rival	  totalitarian	  notions:	  One	  notion	  is	  that	  which	  emerges	   from	   the	   dominant	   legal	   system	   inherited	   from	   the	   colonial	   state;	  while	   the	   other	   is	   the	   Islamic	   notion	   of	   law	  which	  was	   adopted	   to	   provide	   a	  semblance	   of	   identity	   to	   the	   country.	   Both	   of	   these	   totalitarian	   conceptions	  struggle	   to	   gain	   greater	   control	   of	   the	   state,	   and	   deny	   the	   possibility	   of	  existence,	  not	  just	  to	  each	  other,	  but	  also	  to	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  marginalised	   sections	   of	   the	   society.	   A	   corollary	   of	   this	   is	   that	   the	   law	   of	  Pakistan	   presents	   not	   a	   harmonious	   pluralistic	   system	   of	  multiple	   normative	  orders,	   but	   an	   uncertain	   and	   violent	   amalgam	   of	   common	   law,	   secularism	   or	  even	  religious	  law.	  The	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  of	  Pakistan,	  therefore,	  presents	  more	  a	   case	   of	   contested	   legalities	   rather	   than	   interlegality.1101	   The	   Coloniality	   and	  totality	   embedded	   in	   the	   mainstream	   legal	   narrative	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Islamic	  discourse	  has	  dominated	  the	  legal	  history	  of	  Pakistan,	  and	  will	  continue	  on	  this	  path	   unless	   their	   foundational	   paradigms	   are	   challenged.	   In	   this	   vein,	   I	   argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  assertions	  of	  either	  of	  these	  two	  narratives	  that	  can	  resolve	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1101	  For	  discussion	  on	  Santos’s	  proposition	  of	  interlegality,	  see	  page	  218.	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difficulties	   faced	   by	   the	   people	   of	   the	   country,	   but	   rather	   a	   de-­‐colonial	  deconstruction	   of	   the	   two.1102	   With	   the	   acknowledgement	   that	   this	   requires	  considerable	  further	  analysis,	  this	  study	  provides	  a	  step	  in	  this	  direction.	  	  
8.4.3. The	  Fetishisation	  of	  the	  Legal	  Form	  Finally,	   one	   of	   the	   more	   significant	   tendencies	   that	   Coloniality	   introduced	  within	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   the	   sub-­‐continent	   was	   the	   co-­‐optation	   and	  transformation	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  normative	  forms	  that	  previously	  existed	  in	  the	  region.	   The	   Fetishisation	   of	   Legal	   Form,1103	   primarily	   aimed	   towards	   a	  reproduction	  of	  the	  European	  model	  of	  law	  and	  the	  state,	  meant	  that	  preference	  was	   given	   to	   a	   particular	   form	  of	   legal	   ordering,	   from	   the	   vantage	   of	   point	   of	  which,	   other	   systems	  were	   judged.1104	   It	  was	   the	   legal	   structures,	   procedures	  and	   categories	   of	   knowledge	   introduced	   by	   the	   colonial	   regime	   that	   took	  precedence	   over	   any	   substance	   that	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   dominant	   or	   any	  other	  normative	  system.1105	  This	  Fetishisation	  of	  the	  legal	  form	  meant	  that	  even	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  decolonisation,	  the	  state,	  its	  institutions	  and	  legal	  codes	  were	  adopted	  and	  continued	  without	  much	  modification.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  this	  precedence	  afforded	  to	  the	  form	  of	  law	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  struggle	  between	  traditional	  normative	  orderings	  and	  state-­‐oriented	  law.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1102	  Borrowing	  an	  insight	  from	  Mignolo.	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105).	  1103	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  Fetishism	  of	  Law	   in	  general,	   see	   John	  L.	  Comaroff	   and	   Jean	  Comaroff,	  'Reflections	   on	   the	   Anthropology	   of	   Law,	   Governance	   and	   Sovereignty'	   in	   Franz	   von	   Benda-­‐Beckman,	  Keebet	  von	  Benda-­‐Beckman	  and	  Julia	  Eckert	  (eds),	  Rules	  of	  Law	  and	  Laws	  of	  Ruling:	  
On	  the	  Governance	  of	  Law	  (Ashgate,	  Farnham	  2009)	  1104	  See,	  text	  to	  note	  1014.	  1105	  Ibid.	  
284	  	  
Foucault	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  this	  struggle	  manifests	  itself,	  not	  just	   in	   the	   sub-­‐continent,	   but	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Europe	   itself.	   In	   his	   discussion	  with	  Maoist	   rebels,	   transcribed	   in	  Power/Knowledge,	  Foucault	  argues	   that	   law	  and	   courts	   are	   not	   the	   embodiment	   of	   popular	   justice,	   rather	   their	   ‘historical	  function	  is	  to	  ensnare	  it,	  control	   it	  and	  to	  strangle	  it,	  by	  re-­‐inscribing	  it	  within	  institutions	  which	  are	  typical	  of	  a	  state	  apparatus’.1106	  Presenting	  a	  genealogical	  sketch	   of	   the	   history	   of	   courts	   in	   Europe	   in	   the	   Middle	   Ages,	   Foucault	  problematises	   the	   fiscalisation	   of	   the	   Judicial	   System	   which	   made	   the	  administration	   of	   justice	   into	   a	   ‘profitable’	   enterprise,1107	   and	   the	   coupling	   of	  the	   judicial	   system	  with	   institutions	  of	   power	   (feudals,	  monarchs)	   and	   armed	  force,	   through	   which	   the	   profitable	   enterprise	   was	   maintained.1108	   Based	   on	  these	  factors,	  Foucault	  argues,	  an	  ‘embryonic	  state	  judicial	  apparatus’	  emerged	  in	  France	  in	  the	  fourteenth	  century.	  He	  writes:	  
There	  thus	  sprang	  up	  a	  “judicial”	  order	  which	  had	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  expression	   of	   public	   power:	   an	   arbitrator	   both	   neutral	   and	   with	  authority,	  of	  whom	  the	  task	  was	  both	  to	  “justly”	  resolve	  disputes	  and	  to	  exercise	  “authority”	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  public	  order.	  It	  was	  on	  these	  foundations,	   of	   social	   struggles,	   the	   levying	   of	   taxes	   and	   the	  concentration	  of	  armed	  force,	  that	  the	  judicial	  apparatus	  was	  erected.1109	  	  Advancing	  this	  critique	  as	  the	  backdrop	  of	  popular	  law,	  Foucault	  considers	  law	  and	   the	   judicial	   system	   as	   a	   state	   apparatus	   and	   an	   instrument	   of	   class	  domination,	   and	   a	   practise	   ‘necessarily	   alien’	   to	   popular	   legality.1110	  Remarkably	   resonant	   with	   the	   critique	   of	   formal	   legal	   system	   that	   emerges	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1106	  Michel	  Foucault	  (1980)	  (n	  61)	  1.	  1107	  Ibid.	  4.	  1108	  Ibid.	  5.	  1109	  Ibid.	  6.	  1110	  Ibid.	  8-­‐9.	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from	  the	  country,	  this	  assertion	  or	  Fetishisation	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  law	  was	  embedded	   in	   the	   sub-­‐continent,	   through	   which	   the	   interpersonal	   laws	   were	  transformed	   into	   those	  of	   a	   territorial	  nature;1111	   the	  diverse	  was	   turned	   into	  monolithic;	   the	   oral	   traditions	   were	   turned	   into	   textual	   codes;1112	   and	  consequently,	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘living	  law’	  became	  ‘fossilised.’1113	  And	  this	  struggle	  between	  the	   ‘the	  world	  of	   legal	   texts	   in	  which	  the	  academic,	   the	  reformer,	   the	  politician,	   gather	   to	   promise	   equality,	   justice,	   prosperity,	   security,	   for	   all’1114	  and	   the	   ‘world	   of	   violence’1115	   on	   the	   other	   informs	   us	   of	   the	   present-­‐day	  conflict	  between	  dominant	  law	  and	  local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice.	  	  
8.5. Concluding	  Remarks:	  The	  search	  for	  De-­‐Coloniality	  
The	   foregoing	   discussion	   in	   this	   chapter	   has	   attempted	   to	   present	   a	   more	  nuanced	   narrative	   to	   approach	   and	   understand	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   tapestry	   of	  Pakistan.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   above	   the	   colonialism,	   and	   Coloniality	   form	   the	  very	   terrain	   on	   which	   the	   contestations	   of	   the	   multiple	   normative	   and	   legal	  order	   now	   occurs.	   Through	   this	   lens	   of	   Coloniality	   and	   its	   link	   with	   the	  instrumentality	   of	   law,	   the	   discussion	   highlighted	   three	   different	   tendencies	  that	  were	  introduced	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  of	  the	  sub-­‐continent,	  which	  were	  later	  inherited	  by	  Pakistan.	  These	  were	  the	  notions	  of	  Colonial	  Logic,	  Transformation	  of	  Rationalities	  and	  the	  Fetishisation	  of	  the	  Legal	  Form.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1111	  H.	  W.	  C.	  Carnduff	  (1909)	  (n	  483)	  126.	  1112	  See	  note	  1029.	  1113	  Shaheen	  Sardar	  Ali	  (2007)	  (n	  785)	  78.	  1114	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2007)	  (n	  28).	  1115	  Ibid.	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Based	  on	  this	  framework,	  the	  discussion	  then	  presented	  some	  alternate	  insights	  into	  the	  questions	  that	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  raises,	  as	  mentioned	  previously	  in	  this	  chapter.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  State	  in	  Pakistan	  are	  linked	  with	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  colonial	  logic,	   by	   virtue	   of	   which	   the	   State	   is	   predisposed	   to	   alienation	   and	   geared	  towards	  its	  self-­‐preservation.	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  conflict	  between	  Islamic	   law	  and	  mainstream	  legal	  system	  is	  a	  struggle	  for	  dominance	  between	  two	  rival	  colonialities.	  Furthermore,	  the	  issues	  linked	  with	  the	  legal	  exception	  of	  the	   Tribal	   areas,	   and	   the	   denunciations	   of	   illegality	   against	   traditional	  normative	   orderings,	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	   Coloniality	  portrayed	  by	  law	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  	  This	   leads	   us	   to	   the	   last	   point	   that	   has	   guided	   this	   enquiry	   –	   how	   to	   include	  people’s	  suffering	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  resistance	  within	  the	  narrative	  on	  law?	  This	  is	  where	  the	  Coloniality	  in	  law	  framework	  allows	  us	  to	  go	  further	  than	  the	  prevalent	   narratives	   to	   law.	   Mignolo	   asserts	   that	   approaching	   the	   idea	   of	  hegemony,	   of	   knowledge	   as	   well	   as	   its	   material	   manifestations,	   through	  Coloniality	   and	   its	   totalitarian	   nature	   opens	   up	   the	   door	   to	   its	   examination,	  critique	   and	   restructuring	   from	   the	   outside.1116	   This	   is	   a	   possibility	   that,	   he	  argues,	  post-­‐colonialism	  and	  post-­‐modernity	  do	  not	  offer,	  as	  they	  remain	  part	  of	  the	   internal	   critique	   of	   colonialism,	   modernity	   and	   Eurocentrism.1117	  Conceptualising	  the	  situation	  in	  these	  terms	  does	  not	  ‘lead	  necessarily	  to	  post-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1116	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105)	  451.	  1117	  Ibid.	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coloniality,	   but	   to	   de-­‐coloniality.’1118	   De-­‐coloniality	   requires	   the	   consideration	  of	   other	   knowledges,	   other	   rationalities,	   other	   forms,	   as	   it	   essentially	   ‘starts	  from	  other	  sources.’1119	  This	  idea	  of	  de-­‐coloniality,	  then,	  marks	  the	  most	  urgent	  and	   pressing	   task	   for	   socio-­‐legal	   scholars	   of	   Pakistan	   today.	   The	   need	   of	   the	  time,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  to	  understand	  law	  through	  alternative	  lenses	  –	  as	  part	  of	  ‘ecology	  of	  knowledges’,1120	  a	   ‘decolonisation	  of	   legal	   imagination’1121	  or	  a	   ‘de-­‐linking’	   from	   the	   dominant	   narratives	   and	   systems	   ‘as	   an	   epistemic	   de-­‐colonisation’.1122	  	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  and	  indeed	  of	  this	  entire	  dissertation,	  has	  not	  been	  to	   propose	   another	   totalising	   theory	   to	   replace	   the	   theories	   critiqued	  previously.	   The	   task	   was	   to	   move	   towards	   a	   more	   nuanced	   narrative	   to	  approach	   the	   legal	   realities	   of	   Pakistan;	   to	   construct	   an	   alternative	   lens	   that	  might	  enable	  us	   to	   read	   the	   situation	   in	  a	  different	  way,	   frame	   the	   issues	  and	  problems	   in	   an	   atypical	   manner,	   which	   might	   enable	   us	   to	   lead	   to	   different	  solutions	   than	   the	   ones	   generally	   propounded	  by	  mainstream	  narratives.	   The	  current	   study,	   having	   argued	   the	   necessity	   for	   such	   propositions	   and	   having	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  context-­‐specific	  theoretical	  formulations,	  acts	  only	  as	  a	  step	  towards	  this	  course.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1118	  Ibid.	  452	  1119	  Ibid.	  1120	  See,	  generally,	  Boaventura	  De	  Sousa	  Santos	  (2009)	  (n	  1058).	  1121	  Jayan	  Nayar	  (2007)	  (n	  28).	  1122	  Walter	  D.	  Mignolo	  (2007)	  (n	  105)	  453.	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One	  of	  the	  most	  potent	  directions	  that	  may	  be	  examined	  further	  to	  identify	  a	  de-­‐colonial	   approach	   to	   law	   is	   to	   look	   towards	   experiments	   to	   law	   conceived	   by	  people	  on	  the	  ground.	  The	  recent	  case	  of	  Khwaindo	  Tolana	  (Circle	  of	  Sisters)	  as	  Pakistan’s	   first	   women’s	   Jirga,	   which	   has	   been	   discussed	   previously,1123	   is	   a	  relevant	   example	   in	   this	   regard.	   It	   provides	   an	   example	   of	   how	   local	  mechanisms	  of	  justice	  may	  be	  used	  by	  marginalised	  groups	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  forms	   and	   procedures	   of	   dominant	   law,	   as	   well	   as	   beyond	   the	   patriarchal	  confines	  of	  local	  normative	  orderings.	  Its	  value,	  albeit	  symbolic,	  challenges	  our	  categories	   of	   law	   and	   our	   notions	   of	   justice.	   It	   is	   towards	   such	   steps	   that	   the	  focus	   of	   socio-­‐legal	   and	   legal-­‐theoretical	   discussions	   should	   lie,	   for	   it	   is	   these	  attempts	   towards	   de-­‐coloniality	   that	   can	   help	   us	   surpass	   our	   limitations,	  assumptions	   and	   preconceptions,	   and	   enable	   us	   to	   find	   ways	   to	   resolve	   the	  problems	  that	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  presents.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1123	  Page	  242.	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III. Conclusion	  and	  Possibilities	  	  
A. A	  Reiteration	  
The	  primary	  research	  question	  that	  has	  guided	  the	  rationale	  and	  the	  structure	  for	  the	  current	  study	  is	  that	  ‘how	  may	  we	  understand	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  situation	  of	  
Pakistan?’1124	   The	   complexity	   inherent	   in	   this	   question	   has	   guided	   the	   three	  main	   features	   of	   the	   foregoing	  discussion	   through	  which	   the	   examination	  has	  sought	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   study	   of	   Pakistan.	   These	   three	   facets	  relate	   to:	  Understanding	   the	  diversity	  and	  contestation	   that	  marks	   the	   terrain	  and	   the	   label	   of	   law	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Pakistan	   (Chapters	   2	   and	   3);	   the	  identification	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	   existing	   prominent	   narratives	   that	   are	  employed	   within	   the	   country	   to	   approach	   law,	   frame	   its	   issues,	   and	   propose	  solutions	   (Chapters	   4,	   5,	   6	   and	   7);	   and	   finally	   a	   reassertion	   of	   the	   need	   to	  examine	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  of	  Pakistan	  through	  more	  nuanced	  narratives,	  of	  which	  one	  such	  possibility,	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  Coloniality,	  was	   introduced	  and	  discussed	  (Chapter	  8).	  I	  will	  briefly	  reiterate	  the	  key	  points	  of	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  below.	  	  The	   subject	   matter	   for	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   related	   to	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	  complexity	  and	  contestation	  that	   is	   linked	  to	   the	   label	  of	   law	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Pakistan.	   Through	   a	   brief	   historical	   account	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	  uncertainty	   that	   has	   beset	   Pakistan	   since	   its	   independence,	   the	   discussion	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1124	  See,	  Main	  Research	  Question	  on	  page	  37	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Chapter	   2	   sought	   to	   highlight	   the	   precarious	   foundations	   on	   which	   the	  dominant	   legal	   and	   political	   frameworks,	   and	   indeed	   the	   wider	   socio-­‐legal	  architecture,	  of	   the	  country	  stand.1125	  Disputes	  about	   the	   rationale	  behind	   the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan,	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  link	  with	  Islam,	  and	  the	  problematic	  nexus	  between	  judicial	  validation	  and	  military	  rules	  have	   marred	   the	   political	   situation	   of	   the	   country	   from	   the	   outset.1126	   The	  incessant	   political	   upheavals,	   Martial	   Law	   regimes	   and	   the	   power	   struggle	  between	   political	   parties,	   armed	   forces	   and	   clerics	   brought	   to	   the	   fore	   the	  primary	  reason	  that	  stymies	  attempts	  to	  examine	  law	  and	  society	  in	  the	  country	  from	   a	   socio-­‐legal	   rather	   than	   a	   political	   lens.	   Furthermore,	   the	   chapter	   also	  emphasised	   how	   different	   regimes	   have	   tried	   to	   implement	   their	   varied	  ideological	   projects	   in	   Pakistan	   through	   transformation,	   appropriation	   and	  abrogation	  of	  the	  constitutional	  and	  legal	  frameworks.1127	  	  Chapter	  3	  linked	  this	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  legal	  uncertainty	  to	  a	  description	  and	   analysis	   of	  multiple	   normative	   and	   legal	   orderings	   that	   exist	   in	   Pakistan.	  Through	  a	  discussion	  on	  these	  diverse	  systems	  and	  tendencies	  of	  law	  that	  exist	  in	   the	   country	   –	   components	   that	   include	   common	   law,	   Islamic	   law,	   colonial	  law,	  traditional	  and	  local	  mechanisms	  of	   justice,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  notions	  of	   legal	  exteriority	  and	   lawlessness	  –	  a	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	   law	   in	   the	   context	  of	  Pakistan	  was	  presented.1128	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  within	  this	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  the	  country,	  these	  different	  systems	  interact,	  engage,	  encounter	  and	  attempt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1125	  See,	  A	  History	  of	  Legal	  Uncertainty:	  Post-­‐Independence	  Turmoil	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  50.	  1126	  See,	  A	  History	  of	  Legal	  and	  Constitutional	  Uncertainty	  on	  page	  51.	  1127	  See,	  pages	  66,	  73	  and	  82.	  1128	  See,	  The	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  96.	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to	   dominate	   each	   other.	   It	  was	   argued	   that	  while	   the	   legal	   and	   constitutional	  frameworks	  play	  a	  central	  role	  within	  this	   terrain,	   it	   is	  only	   through	  a	  holistic	  approach	  of	   the	   varied	   legal	   and	  normative	   components	   that	  we	   can	  begin	   to	  understand	  what	  the	  context	  of	  law	  actually	  means	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan.	  	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  socio-­‐legal	  study	  emphasised	  a	  need	  to	   examine	   the	   wider	   lenses	   through	   which	   law	   has	   traditionally	   been	  approached	  in	  Pakistan.	   In	  this	  regard,	   the	  study	  identified	  and	  problematised	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  narratives	  of	   law	  that	  exist	   in	  the	  country.	   It	  was	  argued	  that	  these	  narratives	  approach	  the	  legal	  phenomena	  through	  their	  own	  respective	   categories	   and	   in	   this	   sense,	   in	   addition	   to	   excluding	   those	  occurrences	  of	  law	  that	  exist	  outside	  their	  neat	  configurations,	  they	  face	  several	  challenges	   and	   paradoxes	   that	   may	   undermine	   their	   foundational	  assumptions.1129	  It	  was	  further	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  only	  through	  a	  problematisation	  of	  these	  narratives	  and	  their	  foundational	  theoretical	  assumptions	  that	  we	  can	  move	  the	  overall	  socio-­‐legal	  study	  of	  Pakistan	  forward.	  	  In	   this	   regard,	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   of	   law	   in	   Pakistan,	   which	   focusses	  exclusively	  on	  a	  state-­‐oriented	  legal	  system	  as	  its	  subject	  matter,	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.1130	   I	  argued	  that	   this	  narrative	  manifests	   itself	   in	   the	  country	  by	  linking	   the	   idea	   of	   justice	   to	   concepts	   such	   as	   exclusivity,	   administration	   of	  justice,	  and	  governance.	  It	  was	  further	  contended	  that	  the	  multiple	  assertions	  of	  this	  narrative	  can	  ultimately	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  legal	  positivistic	  understanding	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1129	  See,	  Four	  Narratives	  and	  Four	  Assertions	  on	  page	  42.	  1130	  See,	  Tracing	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  Dominant	  Legal	  Narrative	  in	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  144.	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law	   that	   governs	   the	   legal	   and	   political	   discourse	   in	   the	   country.1131	   It	   was	  discussed	  that	  this	  perspective	  is	  not	  only	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  plurality	  of	  legal	   orderings	   that	   exist	   in	   Pakistan,	   but	   also	   that	   since	   its	   reading	   of	   the	  context	   emerges	   from	   positivistic	   and	   Hobbesian	   lenses,	   the	   solutions	   it	  propounds	   carry	   these	   tones	   further.	   The	   problems	   of	   law	   in	   this	   sense	   are	  generally	   argued	   to	   be	   the	   results	   of	   a	   weaker	   state	   caught	   in	   the	   vortex	   of	  lawlessness	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  Rule	  of	  Law	  –	  the	  keys	  of	  which	  are	  said	  to	  lie	  in	  a	  Leviathan-­‐esque	  stronger	  state.	  However,	   it	  was	  argued	  that	  such	  assertions	  ignore	   the	   contradictions	   that	   the	   State	   itself	   generates	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Pakistan.	  By	  employing	  the	  idea	  of	   ‘perverse	  state	  formation’,1132	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  Pakistan’s	  post-­‐colonial	   State	   is	   such	   that	   the	   strengthening	  and	  widening	   of	   its	   writ	   will	   not	   resolve	   the	   problems	   that	   Pakistan	   is	   currently	  faced	  with.	  	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  presented	  the	  most	  evident	  critique	  of	   the	  mainstream	  legal	  structures	   as	   they	   exist	   in	   Pakistan.	   Through	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   foreign	   and	  colonial	   history	   of	   the	   dominant	   legal	   frameworks,	   these	   perspectives	   argue	  that	   the	   law	   and	   the	   constitution	   that	   govern	   the	   country	   are	   alien	   to	   the	  region.1133	  The	  Islamic	  law	  narrative	  employs	  this	  discourse	  to	  argue	  a	  need	  to	  turn	   towards	   the	   Islamic	   system	   of	   law,	   which	   it	   claims	   represents	   the	   true	  beliefs	   of	   the	   people	   of	   Pakistan	   as	   well	   as	   the	   motivation	   behind	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1131	  See,	  The	  Dominant	  Narrative	  and	  Legal	  Positivism	  on	  page	  165.	  1132	  See,	  Jenny	  Pearce	  (2010)	  (n	  627).	  1133	  See,	  ‘A	  burden	  on	  the	  soul	  is	  alien	  law’	  on	  page	  181.	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independence	   struggle.1134	   The	   legal	   pluralist	   perspective,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  takes	  this	  cue	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  local	  and	  indigenous	  mechanisms	  of	  justice.1135	   While	   elaborating	   on	   the	   contours	   and	   some	   of	   the	   theoretical	  propositions	   linked	   with	   these	   narratives,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   the	   most	  significant	   challenge	   for	   these	   two	   perspectives	   emerges	   from	   their	   own	  colonial	  history.1136	  Even	  though	  these	  perspectives	  denounce	  the	  colonial	  link	  of	  the	  mainstream	  legal	  system,	  these	  narratives	  and	  the	  systems	  they	  advocate	  are	   themselves	   tainted	  by	  colonialism.	  Moreover,	  while	   the	  pluralist	  narrative	  offers	  us	   significant	   insights	   to	  understand	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   system	  of	  Pakistan,	  the	   inability	   of	   the	   Islamic	   and	   pluralist	   narratives	   of	   law	   to	   address	   the	  concerns	  of	  women,	  religious	  minorities	  and	  marginalised	  communities	  further	  challenges	  their	  romanticised	  notions.1137	  	  Chapter	  7	  presented	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative	  on	  law	  in	  Pakistan,	  which	  has	  become	   increasingly	   prominent	   in	   the	   legal	   discourse	   in	   the	   past	   few	  decades.1138	  It	  was	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  the	  human	  rights	  narrative	  is	  not	   just	   visible	  with	   the	   spheres	  of	  NGOs	  and	  activists,	   but	  has	   also	  pervaded	  the	   language	   of	   the	   courts.	   Through	   a	   dialogue	   between	   this	   narrative	   and	  Pakistan’s	   socio-­‐legal	   context,	   it	  was	  argued	   that	   the	  most	   significant	  paradox	  for	  the	  human	  rights	  discourse	  is	   its	   insistence	  on	  the	  state	  as	  the	  panacea	  for	  all	   ills	   and,	   in	   this	   sense,	   it	   works	   to	   further	   strengthen	   the	   dominant	   state-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1134	  See,	  An	  Islamic	  Grundnorm	  on	  page	  195.	  1135	  See,	  Local	  Responses	  to	  an	  Alien	  Law:	  Legal	  Pluralism	  and	  Popular	  Legality	  on	  page	  204.	  1136	  See,	  ‘A	  burden	  on	  the	  soul	  is	  alien	  law’	  on	  page	  181.	  1137	  See,	  Pakistan’s	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  and	  the	  challenges	  for	  Islamic	  Narrative	  on	  page	  199.	  1138	  See,	  Pakistan	  in	  an	  ‘Age	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  on	  page	  229.	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oriented	  narrative	  on	  law.1139	  Moreover,	  while	  the	  challenge	  that	  human	  rights	  narrative	  mounts	  against	  the	  local	  and	  traditional	  justice	  systems	  on	  account	  of	  their	   human	   rights	   violations	   is	   important,	   an	   unquestioning	   assertion	   of	   this	  further	  reduces	   the	  options	   for	  recourse	  available	   to	   the	  already	  marginalised	  sections	  of	  the	  society.1140	  	  Based	   on	   the	   foregoing	   analysis	   of	   the	   prominent	   narratives	   of	   law	   in	   the	  country,	   the	   subject	  matter	   for	   Chapter	   8	   entailed	   the	   need	   to	  move	   towards	  more	   nuanced	   and	   context-­‐specific	   approaches	   to	   law	   to	   understand	   the	  particular	  predicament	  of	  Pakistan.1141	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  role	  of	  colonialism	  in	  shaping	  the	  multiple	  legal	  systems	  and	  in	  laying	  down	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  terrain	  in	  which	  the	  current	  events	  are	  panning	  out	  was	  discussed.	  I	  argued	  that	  divesting	  the	   colonial	   instrumentality	   of	   law	   from	   the	   particular	   historical	   event	   of	  colonisation,	   leads	   us	   to	   a	   framework	   of	   Coloniality.1142	   Examining	   the	   link	  between	  Coloniality	   and	   law,	   the	   chapter	   identified	   three	  different	   tendencies	  that	   were	   introduced	   in	   the	   region:	   Colonial	   logic,	   the	   transformation	   of	  Rationalities	   and	   the	   Fetishisation	   of	   legal	   form.1143	   It	   was	   argued	   that	   an	  analysis	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  of	  Pakistan	  from	  this	  lens,	  while	  providing	  us	  with	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  contestation	  between	  different	  legal	  orderings,	  also	  allows	  us	   to	  conceptualise	  an	  emancipatory	  potential	  of	   law.	   It	  was	   asserted	   in	   the	   study	   that	   a	   critique	   of	   existing	   lenses,	   and	   a	   search	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1139	  See,	  Human	  Rights	  Narrative	  and	  the	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  239.	  1140	  Ibid.	  1141	  See,	  Towards	  an	  Alternate	  Narrative:	  (Re)reading	  the	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Tapestry	  of	  Pakistan	  on	  page	  251.	  1142	  See,	  From	  Colonialism	  to	  Coloniality	  on	  page	  267.	  1143	  See,	  Coloniality	  in	  Law:	  Of	  Logic,	  Form	  and	  Rationalities	  on	  page	  274.	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alternative	   context-­‐specific	   approaches,	   might	   enable	   us	   to	   move	   towards	   a	  resolution	  of	  some	  of	  the	  grave	  problems	  that	  the	  people	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  faced	  with.	  	  	  
B. Limitations	  and	  Future	  Directions	  of	  study	  
Despite	   presenting	   a	   holistic	   study	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	   Pakistan,	   it	  should	   be	   acknowledged	   that	   no	   research	   can	   be	   completely	   incontestable.	  There	   are	   a	   few	   limitations	   that	   the	   foregoing	   examination	   has	   faced,	   both	  because	  of	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  matter,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  constraints	  of	  time,	  resources	  and	  nature	  of	  doctoral	  research	  in	  general.	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  limitations	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  constraints	  precluded	   an	   even	  more	   extensive	   discussion	   on	   the	  multiple	   constituents	   of	  the	   socio-­‐legal	   terrain	   of	   Pakistan,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   multitude	   of	   narratives	  employed	   to	  approach	   them.	  Each	  of	   the	  preceding	   substantive	   chapters	  have	  the	   potentiality	   to	   be	   expanded	   and	   developed	   into	   standalone	   theses	   and	  studies.	   Indeed,	  not	   just	   the	   legal-­‐theoretical	  discussions,	  but	  also	  some	  of	   the	  studies	   conducted	   on	   areas,	   such	   as	   the	   constitutional	   history	   of	   Pakistan1144	  and	   the	   Islamisation	   of	   laws,1145	   that	   I	   have	   attempted	   to	   examine	   in	   single	  chapters,	  are	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  possibilities	  of	  study	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  further.	  However,	   bringing	   all	   these	   varied	   contextual,	   historical,	   theoretical	   and	  analytical	   nuances	   together	   was	   one	   of	   the	   express	   aims	   of	   the	   study,	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1144	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Zulfikar	  Khalid	  Maluka	  (1995)	  (n	  153);	  Paula	  Newberg	  (1995)	  (n	  20).	  1145	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Rubya	  Mehdi	  (1994)	  (n	  97);	  Martin	  Lau	  (2006)	  (n	  97).	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hope	   that	   this	   holistic	   account	   could	   prove	   as	   a	   platform	   to	   guide	   further	  research.	  	  Furthermore,	   a	   key	   rationale	   of	   the	   foregoing	   examination	  was	   to	   expand	   the	  context	   of	   law	   as	   it	   is	   understood	   in	   Pakistan,	   and	   argue	   a	   case	   for	   context-­‐specific	   narratives	   and	   approaches	   to	   understand	   and	   analyse	   law	   in	   this	  regard.	  With	   this	  argument,	   it	   is	   reiterated	  here	   that,	   given	   the	  multitude	  and	  severity	  of	  problems	  that	  the	  people	  of	  Pakistan	  are	  faced	  with,	  a	  pressing	  task	  for	   scholars	   and	   students	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	   the	   country	   is	   to	  move	  towards	   imaginative	  ways	   of	   thinking	   to	   approach	   the	   subject.	   In	   this	   regard,	  there	  may	  be	  other	  ways	  of	   thinking	  about	   the	  situation,	  and	  narratives	  other	  than	   the	   one	   presented	   here	   may	   give	   us	   different	   insights	   into	   the	   present	  difficulties.	  One	  such	  alternate	  route	   is	  offered	  by	   the	  Constituent/Constituted	  Power	   debate	   within	   critical	   and	   political	   theories.	   With	   Antonio	   Negri’s	  argument	  that	  	  ‘to	  speak	  of	  constituent	  power	  is	  to	  speak	  of	  democracy,’1146	  and	  the	   assertion	   that	   this	   debate	   touches	   upon	   what	   lies	   at	   the	   ‘heart	   of	   our	  understanding	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   political	   constitution	   of	   the	  modern	   state’,1147	  this	   paradigm	   offers	   a	   different	   starting	   point	   to	   discuss	   the	   interplay	   of	   the	  society,	   law,	  state	  and	  popular	  will.1148	  Touching	  upon	  what	   lies	  at	   the	  core	  of	  our	   conceptions	   of	   nation,	   constitution,	   and	   law	   among	   others,	   this	   debate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1146	  Antonio	  Negri,	  Insurgencies:	  Constituent	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  State	  (University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  Minneapolis	  1999)	  1.	  1147	  Illan	  Rua	  Wall,	  'A	  different	  Constituent	  Power:	  Agamben	  and	  Tunisia'	  in	  Matthew	  Stone,	  Illan	  Rua	  Wall	  and	  Costas	  Douzinas	  (eds),	  New	  Critical	  Legal	  Thinking:	  Law	  and	  the	  Political	  (Routledge,	  Oxford	  2012)	  46.	  1148	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  this	  debate,	  see	  Martin	  Loughlin,	  The	  Idea	  of	  Public	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	  2004);	  Illan	  Rua	  Wall,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Constituent	  Power:	  Without	  
Model	  or	  Warranty	  (Routledge,	  Abingdon	  2011).	  
297	  	  
creates	   a	   possibility	   to	   judge	   their	   manifestations	   in	   the	   present	   world.	   This	  could	   then	   offer	   a	   possible	   route	   to	   analyse	   the	   nature	   of	   Pakistan’s	   pre-­‐independence	  struggle,	  its	  subsequent	  translation	  into	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  state,	  and	  its	  relation	  with	  the	  internal	  struggles	  since	  then.	  	  Linked	  to	  this,	  it	  should	  be	  said	  that	  despite	  the	  importance	  of	  legal-­‐theoretical	  insights	  as	  a	  means	  to	  understanding	  the	  material	  realities	  of	  law	  (in	  the	  broad	  sense)	  around	  us,	  the	  legal	  and	  social-­‐scientific	  education	  in	  Pakistan	  does	  not	  equip	   us	   to	   adequately	   engage	  with	   these	   paradigms.1149	   There	   is	   a	   need	   for	  students	   of	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	   Pakistan	   to	   move	   towards	   theoretical	  analysis	  of	  our	  assumptions.	  That	  said,	  legal-­‐theoretical	  discussions	  can	  provide	  us	  useful	  expositions,	  but	  cannot	  be	  a	  substitute	  for	  examining	  material	  realities	  and	   the	   creativity	   that	   exists	   among	   communities.	   In	   this	   regard,	   some	  of	   the	  arguments	   introduced	   in	   the	   preceding	   discussion	   can	   be	   strengthened,	   or	  challenged,	   through	   on-­‐ground	   empirical	   study	   and	   qualitative	   research.	   As	  stated	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  this	  thesis,	   I	  acknowledge	  that	  understanding	  the	  socio-­‐legal	   context	   of	   Pakistan,	   its	   multiple	   constituents	   and	   divergent	  narratives	  could	  be	  a	  lifelong	  project.	  The	  current	  study	  is	  presented	  here	  as	  a	  first	  step	  in	  this	  direction.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1149	  As	  Akbar	  Zaidi,	  a	  prominent	  scholar	  of	  sociology	  and	  political	  economy	  of	  Pakistan,	  argues	  while	  criticising	  the	  ‘decrepit	  state’	  of	  social	  scientific	  scholarship	  in	  Pakistan:	  ‘Has	  any	  Pakistani	  social	  scientist,	  in	  any	  of	  their	  fields	  in	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  developed,	  reconstructed,	  reformulated,	  expanded	  upon,	  disputed	  or	  rejected,	  any	  theory	  or	  theoretical	  formulation,	  qua	  theory,	  or	  even	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  Pakistan?	  The	  answer	  would	  probably	  be	  a	  simple	  “no”.’	  S.	  Akbar	  Zaidi,	  'Dismal	  State	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  in	  Pakistan'	  (2002)	  37	  (35)	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  3644,	  3660.	  Despite	  being	  a	  rather	  exaggerated	  account,	  it	  brings	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  scarcity	  of	  sociological	  investigations	  of	  diverse	  fields	  which	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  study	  of	  law	  in	  Pakistan.	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